Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Wisconsin Supreme Court
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Vicki Blasing was the named insured in an automobile liability insurance policy issued by American Family Insurance Company. Blasing was injured when lumber fell on her foot that was being loaded into her pickup truck by an employee of Mernard, Inc. Blasing filed a personal injury lawsuit against Menard and Menard’s insurer. Menard, in turn, claimed its employee was an insured under the American Family policy as a permissive user of Blasing’s pickup truck. At issue in this case was whether American Family had a duty to defend and indemnify Menard when Menard’s employee was a permissive user of the injured insured’s vehicle. The court of appeals concluded that permissive user coverage was required in this case under the omnibus statute. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the American Family policy explicitly provided coverage in the present case. View "Blasing v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co." on Justia Law

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Defendant hired an independent contractor to spray herbicide on his property. The spraying caused extensive, permanent damage to seventy-nine trees on the property of his neighbors, Plaintiffs. At issue in this case was whether Defendant could be liable for the negligence of the independent contractor he hired to spray herbicides under the “inherently dangerous” exception to the independent contractor rule. The Supreme Court held here that Defendant could be liable for the acts of the independent contractor on the grounds that the spraying was an inherently dangerous activity because it posed a risk of naturally expected harm, and it was possible to reduce the risk. Remanded for determinations to be made as to whether Defendant exercised ordinary care to prevent damage to Plaintiffs’ property. View "Brandenburg v. Luethi" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff sought recovery for her husband’s death, which occurred at a snowmobile event in Michigan. Plaintiff moved for a declaratory order determining that Michigan’s Wrongful Death Act applied to the damage issues in her lawsuit because Wisconsin’s wrongful death statute does not apply to deaths caused outside Wisconsin. The circuit court determined that Wisconsin law would apply to the damage issues in this case. The court of appeals disagreed and concluded that the Michigan law on wrongful death would apply. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Michigan law applied in this case. View "Waranka v. Wadena Ins. Co." on Justia Law

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Musson Brothers, Inc. was conducting sewer removal and installation as a contractor for the Wisconsin Department of Transportation (DOT) when Mark Showers' property was flooded. Showers filed a complaint against Musson and the City alleging that the two entities were jointly and severally liable for the negligent acts or omissions that caused Showers' building to flood. The circuit court granted summary judgment for the City and Musson, finding that the entities were entitled to governmental immunity. The court of appeals affirmed the summary judgment for Musson, finding that Musson was entitled to governmental contractor immunity as a statutory "agent" under Wis. Stat. 893.80(4). The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Musson failed to show it was acting as a governmental entity's agent for purposes of the alleged injury-causing conduct because it was not acting pursuant to "reasonably precise specifications" as required under section 893.80(4); and (2) in asserting the defense of immunity Musson failed to assert that the acts for which it claimed immunity were "acts done in the exercise of legislative, quasi-legislative, judicial or quasi-judicial functions" as required under section 893.80(4). Remanded. View "Showers Appraisals, LLC v. Musson Bros., Inc. " on Justia Law

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Bostco LLC and Parisian, Inc. (hereinafter, Bostco) filed a complaint against Milwaukee Metropolitan Sewerage District (MMSD), claiming that MMSD's negligent operation and maintenance of a sewerage tunnel beneath Bostco's property resulted in excessive groundwater seepage into the tunnel, causing significant damage to Bostco's buildings. The court of appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part the decision of the circuit court. The Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals on all but one of the issues, holding (1) MMSD was not entitled to immunity for its construction and maintenance of the tunnel; (2) the court of appeals erred in denying the equitable relief of abatement, as MMSD's duty to abate the private nuisance that MMSD caused by its negligent maintenance of the deep tunnel was not statutorily abrogated; (3) the damage cap capping the damages recoverable in an action against governmental entities at $50,000 does not violate equal protection; and (4) MMSD had sufficient notice of Bostco's claim. Remanded. View "Bostco LLC v. Milwaukee Metro. Sewerage Dist." on Justia Law

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Plaintiff purchased certain batches of concrete from Defendant that were allegedly defective. Plaintiff used the concrete to pour outdoor installations at various properties. When problems arose with the installations, several property owners transferred their putative right to sue Defendant over to Plaintiff. Plaintiff then sued Defendant in both its own name and in that of the assignees, alleging tort and contract claims, among others. The circuit court granted summary judgment for Defendant, concluding, inter alia, (1) Plaintiff's claims through the property owners and its tort claims were barred by the economic loss doctrine, and (2) damages were insufficiently established to support the remaining claims. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed but on different grounds, holding (1) the court of appeals erred in determining that the claims Plaintiff asserted through the assignments were valid when, with two exceptions, the economic loss doctrine barred the homeowners from suing Defendant and thus barred Plaintiff from suing in their name; but (2) the court of appeals correctly reversed the circuit court for finding all of the asserted damages speculative. Remanded with directions to dismiss the claims asserted through the assignments and to allow the remaining claims to proceed to trial. View "United Concrete & Constr., Inc. v. Red-D-Mix Concrete, Inc." on Justia Law

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Defendant hosted an underage drinking party in which one of the guests known to become belligerent when intoxicated assaulted and seriously injured another guest. The victim sued Defendant and his insurer (Insurer) for damages for his injuries. Insurer disputed coverage, arguing that it had no duty to defend and indemnify Defendant because there was no "accident" or "occurrence" under Defendant's family's homeowner's insurance policy where Defendant's actions were intentional. The circuit court granted summary judgment to Insurer. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that there was an occurrence because the assault was an accident when viewed from the standpoint of the injured person or Defendant, the insured. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) viewed from the standpoint of a reasonable insured, Defendant's intentional actions in setting up a drinking party and procuring alcohol for underage guests, including one known to become belligerent when intoxicated, created a direct risk of harm resulting in bodily injury; and (2) thus, the victim's bodily injury was not caused by an "occurrence" within the meaning of the policy, and Insurer was not obligated to provide insurance coverage for Defendant. View "Schinner v. Gundrum" on Justia Law

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Petitioners commenced this action against Defendants - a voluntary firefighter (Firefighter), the fire department of which Firefighter was a member, and their insurers - alleging that Firefighter negligently caused their injuries when he drove his vehicle through a red stop signal and collided in the intersection with a vehicle carrying Petitioners. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants, concluding that Firefighter was subject to public officer immunity and that his acts did not fall within the ministerial duty exception to that immunity. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) because Firefighter was within the scope of his employment when the collision occurred, he was within the class of individuals that may be shielded by public officer immunity; but (2) Firefighter was not entitled to that immunity because his acts in proceeding through the red stop signal without an audible signal violated a ministerial duty. Remanded. View "Brown v. Acuity, A Mut. Ins. Co." on Justia Law

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Petitioners sought underinsured motorist coverage (UIM) under a policy issued by Auto-Owners Insurance Company (Owners) as a result of an automobile accident caused by an allegedly negligent driver of a rental vehicle owned by Avis Rent-a-Car (Avis). Avis, as a car rental company, was statutorily required to pay $50,000 as a result of the accident. Owners denied Petitioners' UIM claim, asserting that because Avis was a self-insurer, the rental vehicle was not an underinsured automobile under the terms of the policy. The circuit court ruled in favor of Owners, determining that Avis was unambiguously a self-insurer, and therefore, the Avis vehicle did not fall within the policy definition of underinsured automobile. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) as applied, the policy term "self-insurer" is ambiguous, and therefore, the policy is interpreted in favor of Petitioners to afford coverage; and (2) even if the term "self-insurer" appears to be unambiguous, interpreting it to exclude self-insured rental vehicles from coverage leads to an absurd result here. Remanded. View "Bethke v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co." on Justia Law

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This case arose out of an automobile accident involving a vehicle owned by the State and driven by Respondent. Petitioners were the estate of Danny Hopgood and individuals who suffered injuries arising from the accident. Petitioners filed complaints, alleging that Respondent was negligent and that his negligence caused the injuries. Because Respondent was an agent of the State Petitioners served notices of claims upon the attorney general. The circuit court granted summary judgment for Respondent, concluding that the notices were not properly "sworn to" pursuant to Wis. Stat. 893.82.(5). The court of appeals summarily affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) to the extent that Newkirk v. Dep't of Transp. expanded the requirements set forth under Kellner v. Christian for a notice of claim to be properly sworn to, it misapplied Kellner, and that language was heretofore withdrawn; and (2) the notices in this case met the two requirements set forth in Kellner for a notice of claim to be properly "sworn to" under section 893.82(5). View "Estate of Hopgood v. Boyd" on Justia Law