Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

Todd Olson filed suit against Robert Farrar, alleging he was liable for property damage to Olson's trailer home and vehicle. Farrar's insurer, Mt. Morris Mutual Insurance Company, sought a declaration that it had neither a duty to defend nor a duty to indemnify Farrar under the terms of its insurance policy. The circuit court granted a declaratory and summary judgment in favor of Mt. Morris. The court of appeals reversed. Mt. Morris appealed, arguing that it had no duty to defend or indemnify because of certain coverage exclusions. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the policy provisions at issue were ambiguous; therefore, the Court construed them in favor of coverage. Remanded.

This case arose out of an accident that occurred when a truck collided with the Casper family's minivan. The Caspers brought suit against several defendants, including the truck driver, his two employers, an employer CEO, and an employer's excess insurer. The Supreme Court granted review, affirming in part and reversing in part the decision of the court of appeals. The Court (1) affirmed the decision of the appellate court in finding the circuit court did not erroneously exercise its discretion in (a) finding excusable neglect and granting the insurer's motion to enlarge time by seven days to answer the amended complaint, and (b) denying the Caspers' motion for default judgment; (2) reversed the decision of the appellate court affirming the lower court's ruling that a liability insurance policy needs to be delivered or issued for delivery in Wisconsin in order to subject the insurer to a direct action under Wis. Stat. 632.24 and 803.04(2); and (3) affirmed that a corporate officer may be liable for non-intentional torts committed in the scope of his employment but reversed the decision of the appellate court because in this instance, the CEO's actions were too remote to provide a basis for personal liability.

Charles Swenson sustained a work-related injury while working as a driver for deBoer Transportion. Upon returning to work, Swenson completed the company's orientation requirements with the exception a check-ride, which required him to be away from his terminally ill father. DeBoer then discharged Swenson. Swenson sought benefits under Wis. Stat. 102.35(3), alleging that deBoer unreasonably refused to rehire him. Following a hearing, the ALJ for the Department of Workforce Development concluded deBoer unreasonably refused to rehire Swenson and was, therefore, liable to Swenson for a year of lost wages. DeBoer appealed to the Labor and Industry Review Commission (LIRC), which concurred with the order of the ALJ and concluded that deBoer failed to show reasonable cause for its refusal to rehire Swenson. On review, the circuit court affirmed, and the court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals, holding that (1) in reaching its conclusion that deBoer failed to show reasonable cause, LIRC applied an unreasonable interpretation of Wis. Stat. 102.35(3), and (2) LIRC's conclusion that deBoer failed to show reasonable cause based on LIRC's finding that the check-ride policy was pretext was not supported by credible and substantial evidence. Remanded.

Plaintiffs filed a personal injury slip-and-fall action against defendants and defendants moved to disqualify plaintiffs' attorney. At issue was whether defendants had standing to bring a motion to disqualify plaintiffs' attorney where plaintiffs' attorney's law firm had previously represented defendants' exclusive property manager. Also at issue was whether the circuit court erred as a matter of law in applying an "appearance of impropriety" standard in deciding the motion for disqualification. The court held that defendants had standing to move to disqualify opposing counsel where defendants have shown that plaintiffs' attorney's prior representation was so connected with the current litigation that the prior representation was likely to affect the just and lawful determination of defendants' position. The court also held that the circuit court incorrectly applied the standard of law and should have determined the motion for disqualification based on an attorney's duty to a former client in SCR 20:1.9. Accordingly, the court reversed the order of the circuit court and remanded for further proceedings.

Plaintiffs, injured in an automobile accident, sought $10,000 from defendant, the driver, the amount received by plaintiffs from plaintiffs' insurer. At issue was whether the circuit court erred in denying plaintiffs a judgment of $10,000 against defendant when defendant did not pay plaintiffs' insurer $10,000, a sum that represented the insurer's subrogation claim. The court concluded that the collateral source rule did not, under the facts of the case, entitle plaintiffs to recover $10,000 when the case was indistinguishable from Paulson v. Allstate. Ins. where the Paulson court determined that the injured party's recovery from the tortfeasor was not affected by the subrogated insurer's settlement of its subrogation claim with the tortfeasor.

The driver of a vehicle, owned by the driver's girlfriend's father, in which plaintiff was a passenger, lost control of the vehicle and drove into a ditch wherein the driver and one other passenger were killed and plaintiff sustained severe injuries. The vehicle was insured by Wisconsin American Mutual Insurance Company ("Wisconsin American") through an automobile insurance policy issued to the driver's girlfriend's father. The girlfriend permitted the driver to use the vehicle as long as he went to a local grocery store. The driver, instead, picked up passengers including plaintiff, and was driving to a party when the accident occurred. At issue was whether the alleged negligent entrustment of the vehicle constituted an independent concurrent cause of plaintiff's injuries sufficient to trigger coverage under Wisconsin American's insurance policy. The court held that the alleged negligent entrustment of the vehicle did not constitute an independent concurrent cause of plaintiff's injuries sufficient to trigger coverage when no coverage existed for the alleged negligent operation of the vehicle. Therefore, there was no coverage for plaintiff's negligent entrustment claim and Wisconsin American was entitled to summary judgment. The court also held that its holding was dispositive of the case and did not need to reach the issue of whether plaintiff's negligent entrustment claim was barred by claim or issue preclusion.

Plaintiff appealed a grant of summary judgment in favor of Allstate Indemnity Company ("Allstate") where plaintiff's claims for coverage stemmed from the death of plaintiff's eight-year-old daughter at her ex-husband's home. At issue was whether plaintiff's claim for wrongful death was covered under the terms of a homeowner's insurance policy Allstate issued to plaintiff's ex-husband. The court held that summary judgment in favor of Allstate was improper where Allstate failed to meet its burden of demonstrating that the family exclusion unambiguously precluded coverage.