Justia Zoning, Planning & Land Use Opinion Summaries

Applicants sought an Act 250 permit to construct a farm store on Route 5 in Hartland, Vermont. The proposed project includes a 9000 square-foot, two-story building with a deli, bakery, eating area, and parking lot. The store will sell products primarily from the applicants' nearby farm, Sunnymede Farm. The project site is a vacant lot near the Interstate 91 interchange, with significant traffic and no existing sidewalks.The District 3 Environmental Commission approved the project and issued the permit. The Hartland Planning Commission (HPC) appealed to the Environmental Division, arguing the project did not meet Act 250 Criteria 9(L) and 10. The Environmental Division granted summary judgment to the applicants, finding the project satisfied both criteria. The HPC then appealed to the Vermont Supreme Court.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case de novo. The court concluded that the project made efficient use of land, energy, roads, utilities, and other supporting infrastructure, as required by Criterion 9(L). Although the project met the definition of strip development, the court found it would not contribute to a pattern of strip development due to its agricultural nature and specific conditions limiting its use. The court also determined that the project conformed with the local town plan under Criterion 10, despite the HPC's argument to the contrary. The court affirmed the Environmental Division's grant of summary judgment to the applicants. View "In re SM Farms Shop, LLC Permit Appeal" on Justia Law

The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Church) submitted a site plan and an application for a conditional use permit (CUP) to the City of Cody Planning, Zoning, and Adjustment Board (Board) for the construction of a temple. The Board approved the site plan and CUP application at a meeting on June 15, 2023. Preserve Our Cody Neighborhoods (POCN), an association of local landowners, opposed the construction and filed petitions for review in the district court challenging the Board's approvals.The district court determined that it lacked jurisdiction over POCN’s petitions because they were untimely. The court found that the Board had approved the site plan and CUP at the June 15, 2023 meeting, and any subsequent actions by the Board to reconsider or modify those approvals were unauthorized. POCN's petitions for review were filed more than 30 days after the June 15, 2023 meeting, making them untimely.The Wyoming Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The Court held that the Board's approval of the site plan and CUP at the June 15, 2023 meeting constituted final agency action, as it concluded the proceedings regarding the Church’s site plan and CUP application. The Court found that the Board did not have the authority to reconsider or modify its approvals at subsequent meetings. Therefore, POCN's petitions for review, filed in August 2023, were untimely, and the district court correctly determined it lacked jurisdiction to consider them. View "Preserve Our Cody Neighborhoods v. The Church of Jesus Christ of the Latter-Day Saints" on Justia Law

Lauren and John Paul Szymkowicz, who live near Georgetown University, experienced secondhand smoke infiltrating their home from a neighboring property occupied by a Georgetown undergraduate student. The smoke caused health issues and discomfort for the couple. Despite their efforts to address the issue directly with the student and through various university channels, the problem persisted until the student was eventually relocated by the university.The Szymkowiczes filed a lawsuit against Georgetown University in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia, asserting claims of negligence, negligent infliction of emotional distress, public and private nuisance, and breach of contract. They argued that the university had a duty to mitigate the impacts of student behavior on the surrounding neighborhood, as outlined in Georgetown’s campus plan and the Zoning Commission’s order approving that plan. The trial court dismissed the case, ruling that Georgetown owed no duty to the Szymkowiczes and that no contract existed between the university and the couple.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case de novo. The court affirmed the trial court’s decision, holding that Georgetown University did not owe a duty of care to the Szymkowiczes under common law or based on the campus plan and Zoning Commission’s order. The court also found that the university was not in control of the student’s conduct and thus could not be held liable for nuisance. Additionally, the court determined that no enforceable contract existed between Georgetown and the District of Columbia that would allow the Szymkowiczes to sue for breach of contract. Consequently, the court upheld the dismissal of all claims. View "Szymkowicz v. President and Directors of the College of Georgetown University" on Justia Law

Newfield Sand, a Maine corporation engaged in mineral extraction, owns a nearly three-hundred-acre parcel in the Town of Newfield. In 1994, the Planning Board granted a permit to the previous owner for a five-acre gravel-extraction operation with specific conditions on hours of operation and truck trips. Newfield Sand acquired the property in 1998 and sought to expand its operations. In May 2022, Newfield Sand applied for a conditional use permit to operate on thirty acres of open pit at a time and extract minerals from about eighty-five acres. The Planning Board approved the application in November 2023, subject to conditions, including provisions allowing the Board to reevaluate the hours of operation and truck trip limits.The Business and Consumer Docket affirmed the Planning Board’s decision. Newfield Sand appealed, arguing that the Planning Board lacked the authority to retain jurisdiction and modify permit conditions post-approval. The Town contended that the Board’s authority to impose such conditions was implied.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case and concluded that the ordinance did not explicitly or implicitly authorize the Planning Board to modify or revoke a permit after issuance or retain jurisdiction over it. The Court found that the conditions allowing reevaluation of hours of operation and truck trips were outside the Board’s authority and did not clearly define compliance requirements. Consequently, the Court vacated the lower court’s judgment and remanded the matter to the Planning Board for further consideration of Newfield Sand’s application for a conditional use permit. View "Newfield Sand v. Town of Newfield" on Justia Law

Old Golden Oaks LLC applied for an encroachment permit and a grading permit from Amador County for a housing development project. The county deemed the applications incomplete and requested additional information. Old Golden Oaks filed a petition for writ of mandate, arguing that the county violated the Permit Streamlining Act by requesting information not specified in the submittal checklists for the permits.The Superior Court of Amador County sustained the county’s demurrer without leave to amend, finding that the encroachment permit checklist allowed the county to request additional information and that the county had statutory authority to seek information necessary for compliance with the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA).The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court agreed with Old Golden Oaks that the catch-all provision in the county’s encroachment permit submittal checklist violated the Permit Streamlining Act because it did not specify in detail the required information. However, the court found that the county could condition the completeness of the grading permit application on additional environmental information because the grading permit checklist informed Old Golden Oaks that the project must comply with CEQA. The court reversed the trial court’s judgment regarding the encroachment permit but affirmed the judgment regarding the grading permit. Each party was ordered to bear its own costs on appeal. View "Old Golden Oaks v. County of Amador" on Justia Law

Landowners Stephen and Sharon Wille Padnos appealed two Environmental Division decisions that granted summary judgment to landowner Jason Struthers. The court ruled that the City of Essex Junction could not regulate Struthers' duck-raising and cannabis-cultivation operations. The court found that the duck-raising operation was exempt from municipal regulation under 24 V.S.A. § 4413(d)(1)(A) as it constituted a commercial farming operation subject to the Required Agricultural Practices (RAPs) Rule. Additionally, the court concluded that the City could not enforce its zoning regulations on Struthers' cannabis-cultivation operations under 7 V.S.A. § 869(f)(2).The City’s zoning regulations do not permit agricultural, farming, or cannabis-cultivation establishments in the Residential-1 Zoning District. The City’s zoning officer initially declined to enforce these regulations against Struthers. The City’s Development Review Board (DRB) reversed the zoning officer’s decision regarding the duck-raising operation but upheld it for the cannabis-cultivation operation. The Environmental Division later granted summary judgment in favor of Struthers in both cases, concluding that the City could not regulate the duck-raising and cannabis-cultivation operations.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that neither 24 V.S.A. § 4413(d)(1)(A) nor 7 V.S.A. § 869(f)(2) exempts Struthers' operations from all municipal regulation. The court clarified that § 4413(d)(1)(A) prohibits municipal regulation of the specific agricultural practices required by the RAPs Rule, not all farming activities subject to the RAPs Rule. Similarly, § 869(f)(2) prevents municipal regulation of licensed outdoor cannabis cultivators only concerning the water-quality standards established by the RAPs Rule, not all aspects of cannabis cultivation. Consequently, the Vermont Supreme Court reversed the Environmental Division’s decisions and remanded the cases for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "In re 8 Taft Street DRB & NOV Appeals" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute between a railroad company and La Plata County over land use changes made by the railroad at its Rockwood Station. The railroad made several modifications to accommodate increased passenger traffic, including enlarging a parking lot and adding portable toilets and tents. The County claimed these changes violated its land use code and demanded compliance or corrective action.The railroad initially sought a declaratory judgment and an injunction in La Plata County District Court, arguing that the County lacked jurisdiction over its operations. While this case was pending, the County petitioned the Colorado Public Utilities Commission (PUC) for a declaratory ruling that the changes required compliance with the County's land use code. The PUC accepted the petition, and an administrative law judge (ALJ) concluded that the changes constituted "extensions, betterments, or additions" under the relevant statute, thus requiring compliance with the County's code. The PUC upheld the ALJ's decision, and the district court affirmed the PUC's ruling.The Colorado Supreme Court reviewed the case and addressed several issues raised by the railroad. The court concluded that the PUC had jurisdiction to interpret the relevant land use statute, the County had standing to petition the PUC, and the PUC did not violate the railroad's due process rights. The court also found that the PUC's determination that the changes constituted "extensions, betterments, or additions" was just and reasonable and supported by the evidence. Consequently, the Colorado Supreme Court affirmed the district court's judgment upholding the PUC's decision. View "Am. Heritage Ry.s v. Colo. Pub. Utils. Comm'n" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, a residential substance abuse treatment program operator, sought a special permit from the defendant, the Planning and Zoning Commission of the Town of Kent, to construct a greenhouse on its farm parcel. The plaintiff had been using the farm parcel for agricultural therapy as part of its treatment program, a use that became nonconforming after the town amended its zoning regulations in 2020 to prohibit privately operated clinics in rural residential districts. The commission denied the application, citing concerns that the greenhouse would impermissibly expand the nonconforming use by extending it from a seasonal to a year-round operation.The trial court upheld the commission's decision, dismissing the plaintiff's administrative appeal. The court found that the proposed greenhouse would indeed expand the nonconforming use, which was limited to the terms of the 2018 special permit and site plan approval. The court also noted that the commission's decision was consistent with the zoning regulations' intent to limit nonconforming uses.The Appellate Court reversed the trial court's judgment, concluding that the greenhouse was a permissible intensification of the nonconforming use. The court reasoned that the greenhouse would be located on land already used for agricultural therapy and would not change the nature, character, or kind of use involved. The court also found insufficient evidence to support the commission's concerns about adverse effects on the neighborhood.The Supreme Court of Connecticut reversed the Appellate Court's judgment, holding that the installation of the greenhouse would impermissibly expand the plaintiff's nonconforming use from seasonal to year-round. The court emphasized that extending a seasonal use into a year-round operation changes the character of the use, which is not permissible under zoning regulations. The case was remanded to the Appellate Court with direction to affirm the trial court's dismissal of the plaintiff's administrative appeal. View "High Watch Recovery Center, Inc. v. Planning & Zoning Commission" on Justia Law

A group of neighbors appealed the Environmental Division’s decision affirming the District 4 Environmental Commission’s granting of an Act 250 permit amendment to JAM Golf, LLC for the construction of a housing development on a lot that was formerly part of the Wheeler Nature Park in South Burlington, Vermont. The neighbors argued that the landowner was required to show changed circumstances to amend the permit and that the development did not comply with Act 250 Criteria 8 and 10.The Environmental Division held six days of trial and conducted a site visit. In August 2024, the court affirmed the Act 250 permit amendment with conditions related to noise and safety during the construction period, concluding that the project complied with all relevant Act 250 criteria. The court also determined that the application should not be denied on the grounds of inequitable conduct because the neighbors failed to support assertions that the landowner made material misrepresentations in its application and on appeal.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case and concluded that the permit-amendment argument was not preserved for appeal because it was not included in the statement of questions presented to the Environmental Division. The court also found that the Environmental Division did not err in allowing the landowner to elect to be assessed against the updated 2024 City Plan rather than the 2016 City Plan. The court determined that the evidence supported the Environmental Division’s findings that the project complied with Act 250 Criteria 8 and 10, including visual aesthetics, noise, and compliance with the local or regional plan. The court affirmed the Environmental Division’s decision. View "In re Wheeler Parcel Act 250 Determination" on Justia Law

The case involves the City of Lava Hot Springs, which regulates short-term rentals based on whether they are occupied by an owner or manager. Non-owner-occupied short-term rentals are prohibited in residential zones and only allowed in commercial zones. John and Michelle Taylor applied for a business license to operate a non-owner-occupied short-term rental in a residential zone, but the City denied their application. The Taylors, along with the Idaho Association of Realtors, sued the City, claiming that its regulations violated the Short-term Rental and Vacation Rental Act, which limits municipal regulations on short-term rentals.The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the City, finding that the City's regulations did not have the express or practical effect of prohibiting short-term rentals and were permissible under the health, safety, and welfare exception in the Act. The court concluded that because at least one type of short-term rental (owner-occupied) was allowed in residential zones, the City had not violated the Act. The Taylors and the Realtors appealed this decision.The Supreme Court of Idaho reviewed the case and reversed the district court's decision. The Court held that the City's ordinance, which prohibited non-owner-occupied short-term rentals in residential zones, violated the Short-term Rental and Vacation Rental Act. The Act prohibits any city ordinance that has the express or practical effect of prohibiting short-term rentals. The Court found that the City's ordinance amounted to a prohibition rather than a regulation and thus invalidated the ordinance. The Court awarded costs on appeal to the Petitioners but did not grant attorney fees to either party. View "Idaho Association of Realtors, Inc. v. City of Lava Hot Springs" on Justia Law