Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

A retired teacher who continued to work as a substitute until 2014 filed a workers’ compensation claim in 2015, alleging he developed mesothelioma from asbestos exposure during his employment with a county school board. Initially, he identified his last exposure as occurring during his full-time employment, which ended in 2003, and named Kentucky Employers’ Mutual Insurance (KEMI) as the insurer. Later, the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) determined that the last injurious exposure actually occurred in 2014, when the teacher stopped substitute teaching, which would make Encova Mutual Insurance Group the responsible carrier for the claim.After the ALJ’s finding, KEMI sought to have Encova certified as the responsible insurer, but the ALJ denied the motion as untimely and questioned his authority to resolve the issue. The Workers’ Compensation Board (WCB) affirmed the denial, but on the ground that neither KEMI nor Encova had standing, as neither had been formally joined as parties. The Kentucky Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the ALJ and WCB had the authority and obligation under the Workers’ Compensation Act to determine and certify the proper insurance carrier, even after a change in the last date of exposure.The Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed the Court of Appeals. It held that the ALJ and WCB have statutory authority to determine which insurer is responsible for payment of benefits when the last date of injurious exposure changes, and that insurers have standing to participate in such proceedings. The Court further held that the Act binds the insurer on the risk at the time of last exposure, regardless of notice or formal joinder, and that equitable defenses such as laches or estoppel do not bar certification in these circumstances. The case was remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "ENCOVA MUTUAL INSURANCE GROUP V. HALL" on Justia Law

A Kentucky resident purchased a firearm from a local pawn shop and, shortly after, suffered severe injuries when the gun allegedly discharged unexpectedly while the safety was engaged. The gun had been manufactured by a Utah-based company, which sold it to a Texas distributor. The distributor then sold the firearm to a Kentucky merchant, and it eventually reached the plaintiff through a Kentucky pawn shop. The injured party filed a products liability lawsuit in Fayette Circuit Court against both the manufacturer and the pawn shop, alleging the manufacturer’s product caused his injuries.The Fayette Circuit Court initially held the manufacturer’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction in abeyance to allow for limited discovery. However, the manufacturer failed to timely respond to discovery requests, only providing responses after being compelled by court order and after significant delay. Despite this, the trial court granted the manufacturer’s motion to dismiss, finding that the manufacturer had not purposefully availed itself of doing business in Kentucky and that exercising personal jurisdiction would not comport with due process. The Kentucky Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal, agreeing that due process would be offended, though it found the manufacturer fell within the state’s long-arm statute due to deriving substantial revenue from Kentucky sales.The Supreme Court of Kentucky reviewed the case and held that the evidence was sufficient to show the manufacturer derived substantial revenue from sales in Kentucky and that the plaintiff’s claims arose from those sales, thus satisfying the long-arm statute. However, the Court determined that the manufacturer’s failure to comply with discovery obligations deprived the plaintiff of an adequate opportunity to conduct jurisdictional discovery. The Court reversed the dismissal in part and remanded the case to the Fayette Circuit Court, instructing it to allow the plaintiff ample opportunity to complete jurisdictional discovery before ruling on personal jurisdiction. View "BRAUN V. BEARMAN INDUSTRIES, LLC" on Justia Law

An employee of a roofing subcontractor was severely injured after falling through an uncovered hole while working on a library roof replacement project. The general contractor had contracted with the property owner to perform the roof work and then subcontracted the roofing portion to the injured worker’s employer. The injured worker received workers’ compensation benefits from his direct employer and subsequently filed a negligence lawsuit against the general contractor, seeking damages for his injuries.In the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas, the general contractor asserted statutory employer immunity under Pennsylvania’s Workers’ Compensation Act, arguing it was immune from tort liability as a statutory employer. The trial court struck the general contractor’s answer and new matter as untimely and granted the injured worker’s motion to preclude the statutory employer defense at trial. The case proceeded to a jury, which found the general contractor negligent and awarded $5 million to the plaintiff. The trial court denied the general contractor’s post-trial motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.On appeal, the Pennsylvania Superior Court vacated the trial court’s judgment and remanded for entry of judgment in favor of the general contractor. The Superior Court held that the general contractor was the injured worker’s statutory employer and thus immune from tort liability, finding all elements of the statutory employer test satisfied and that the defense was not waivable.The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reviewed whether to overrule prior precedent (Fonner and LeFlar) regarding statutory employer immunity and waiver, and whether the Superior Court properly applied the statutory employer test. The Supreme Court reaffirmed its prior holdings that a general contractor’s statutory employer immunity does not depend on actual payment of workers’ compensation benefits and that the defense is jurisdictional and not waivable. However, it found the Superior Court erred by exceeding its scope of review and remanded the case to the trial court to determine, after appropriate proceedings, whether the general contractor satisfied the disputed elements of the statutory employer test. View "Yoder v. McCarthy Const." on Justia Law

A patient was involuntarily admitted to a hospital for mental health treatment due to dementia-related aggression. During his stay, he developed and experienced worsening pressure ulcers. After being transferred to another facility, he died ten days later. The estate of the patient filed a wrongful death and survival action against the hospital, alleging negligence and corporate negligence in the care and treatment of the patient’s pressure ulcers, claiming these injuries contributed to his decline and death.The Lehigh County Court of Common Pleas granted the hospital’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, finding that the hospital’s care for the pressure ulcers was incidental to the patient’s mental health treatment. The court concluded that, under Section 114 of the Pennsylvania Mental Health Procedures Act (MHPA), the hospital was immune from liability for ordinary negligence because the care provided was coincident to mental health treatment, and the complaint did not allege willful misconduct or gross negligence. The Superior Court of Pennsylvania affirmed this decision, holding that the immunity provision of the MHPA applied to the hospital’s conduct.The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reviewed whether the MHPA’s immunity provision applied to the hospital’s treatment of the patient’s physical ailments during his mental health admission. The Court held that the MHPA’s immunity provision covers not only treatment directly related to mental illness but also medical care coincident to mental health treatment, including foreseeable physical complications like pressure ulcers. Because the estate’s complaint alleged only ordinary negligence and not gross negligence or willful misconduct, the Court affirmed the Superior Court’s order granting judgment on the pleadings in favor of the hospital. View "Wunderly v. Saint Luke's Hosp." on Justia Law

A patient alleged that she suffered a neck fracture after falling from her hospital bed while medicated and unattended at a hospital. She filed a complaint against the hospital within the one-year statute of limitations for medical claims, also naming ten John Doe defendants described as unknown medical providers involved in her care. The hospital was served and answered the complaint, but the plaintiff did not obtain summonses or attempt service on the John Doe defendants. Several months later, with the hospital’s consent, she amended her complaint to replace the John Doe defendants with specific individuals and entities, including two doctors and a medical group.The newly named defendants moved to dismiss, arguing that the claims against them were time-barred because they were not named before the statute of limitations expired and the plaintiff had not complied with Ohio Civil Rule 15(D), which governs the naming and service of unknown defendants. The Richland County Court of Common Pleas granted the motion, holding that the statutory 180-day extension for joining additional defendants in medical-claim actions did not apply to defendants who were “obvious” at the outset and that the plaintiff was required to comply with Civil Rule 15(D). The Fifth District Court of Appeals reversed, finding that the statutory extension applied to any additional defendants not named in the original complaint, regardless of whether their existence was contemplated at filing.The Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed the appellate court’s decision. It held that a plaintiff is not required to comply with Civil Rule 15(D) to name additional defendants in an amended complaint under R.C. 2323.451(D)(1), and that the 180-day extension under R.C. 2323.451(D)(2) is not limited to newly discovered defendants. Because the plaintiff properly amended her complaint to join the additional defendants, the extension applied and her action was timely commenced. View "Lewis v. MedCentral Health Sys." on Justia Law

A patient with a history of aortic valve replacement visited an urgent care facility with symptoms including fever, headache, and chills. The urgent care doctor suspected bacterial endocarditis, a potentially fatal infection, and referred the patient to the emergency department at a hospital, providing a note and calling ahead. At the emergency department, the attending physician reviewed the note but dismissed the suspicion of endocarditis, diagnosing the patient with a viral syndrome and discharging him. The patient later saw his primary care provider, who also suspected endocarditis, but he died two days later. An autopsy confirmed death from complications of sepsis due to acute bacterial endocarditis. The patient’s family filed a wrongful death lawsuit, alleging that the hospital and emergency physician’s failure to diagnose and treat endocarditis caused his death.The Superior Court in Maricopa County granted summary judgment for the defendants, finding that the plaintiff’s expert testimony did not meet the clear and convincing evidence standard required by Arizona Revised Statutes § 12-572 for emergency department malpractice claims. The court reasoned that the experts did not state causation to a high degree of medical probability. The Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the expert opinions were insufficient to meet the heightened standard and that summary judgment was appropriate.The Supreme Court of the State of Arizona reversed and remanded. It held that the clear and convincing evidence standard in § 12-572 is a standard of proof, not a prima facie element of the claim. The Court clarified that a plaintiff’s expert testimony that negligence “likely” caused the injury is sufficient to establish causation for purposes of surviving summary judgment. The factfinder must consider all relevant, admissible evidence—not just expert testimony—when determining whether causation has been proven by clear and convincing evidence. The Court vacated the court of appeals’ decision and remanded for further proceedings. View "HENKE v. HOSPITAL" on Justia Law

After her pregnancy extended past her due date, a woman was admitted to a hospital and came under the care of a physician who, along with hospital staff, induced labor. When a vacuum extraction delivery attempt failed, the physician performed an emergency cesarean section, delivering a baby who was born alive but in critical condition. The infant died eight days later after being treated in neonatal intensive care and ultimately removed from life support.The woman brought suit against the physician, the hospital, and a nurse-midwife, asserting several claims, including medical malpractice and lack of informed consent, both on behalf of her deceased son’s estate and on her own behalf. As relevant here, she sought damages for her own emotional distress based on an alleged lack of informed consent for the vacuum extraction procedure. The Supreme Court, Bronx County, granted summary judgment dismissing her direct medical malpractice claim but denied summary judgment on her lack of informed consent claim, finding factual disputes. The Appellate Division, First Department, affirmed, holding that precedent barring recovery for purely emotional damages in prenatal torts did not apply to lack of informed consent claims, and alternatively invited the Court of Appeals to revisit its precedent.The New York Court of Appeals reviewed whether its prior decision in Sheppard-Mobley v King, which bars recovery for purely emotional damages by a birthing parent when medical malpractice causes in utero injury to a fetus born alive, also applies to lack of informed consent claims. The Court held that it does, reasoning that lack of informed consent is a form of medical malpractice and that no legal or logical basis exists to treat such claims differently for purposes of emotional damages. The Court declined to overrule its precedent, reversed the Appellate Division’s order, dismissed the lack of informed consent claim for emotional damages, and answered the certified question in the negative. View "SanMiguel v. Grimaldi" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, S.C., filed a civil action in September 2022 against Doe 1, alleging that she was sexually assaulted by her foster father while in foster care under Doe 1’s custody, care, and control, “in approximately 1981.” S.C. complied with the statutory requirement to file certificates of merit, which were approved by the Tulare County Superior Court. Later, upon receiving her juvenile case records, S.C. discovered she was not placed in foster care by Doe 1 until March 1984, and thus sought to amend her complaint to reflect that the alleged abuse occurred between 1984 and 1986.The Tulare County Superior Court denied S.C.’s motion for leave to amend her complaint, reasoning that the certificate of merit requirement under former section 340.1 of the Code of Civil Procedure did not allow for amendments to the complaint or certificates of merit after filing. The court subsequently granted Doe 1’s motion for summary judgment, finding that S.C. was not in Doe 1’s custody in 1981, as alleged in the original complaint, and therefore Doe 1 could not have owed or breached any duty to S.C. at that time.The California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, reviewed the case and reversed both the summary judgment and the orders denying S.C.’s motion for leave to amend. The court held that former section 340.1 does not prohibit amendments to the complaint under section 473, subdivision (a)(1), and that the certificates of merit may be amended in accordance with the relation-back doctrine. The appellate court directed the superior court to allow S.C. to amend her complaint to allege the abuse occurred between 1984 and 1986 and to permit the filing of amended certificates of merit. Costs on appeal were awarded to S.C. View "S.C. v. Doe 1" on Justia Law

During the early months of the COVID-19 pandemic, a patient received medical care that included a hysterectomy performed by a physician at a local medical center. Following the procedure, the patient experienced significant complications, including infection, sepsis, and additional surgeries, which led to prolonged recovery and ongoing health issues. The patient and her husband filed a lawsuit against the physician, the medical practice, and the hospital, alleging negligence and gross negligence in the performance of the surgery and subsequent care.The defendants moved to dismiss the lawsuit, arguing that they were immune from civil liability under North Carolina’s Emergency or Disaster Treatment Protection Act, which was enacted in response to the pandemic. They asserted that the Act provided them with immunity because the care was rendered during the pandemic and was impacted by it, and that the complaint did not allege bad faith. The Superior Court in Pitt County denied the motions to dismiss. The defendants appealed, and the North Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s order, holding that the requirements for statutory immunity under the Emergency Act were not met on the face of the complaint and that the denial of the motions to dismiss was not immediately appealable as a matter of right.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed the case and held that the trial court’s denial of the motions to dismiss was an interlocutory order and not immediately appealable. The Court concluded that the Emergency Act provides immunity from liability, not from suit, and therefore does not create a substantial right warranting immediate appeal. The Court also found that the denial of the motions did not implicate personal jurisdiction under the relevant statute. As a result, the Supreme Court vacated the Court of Appeals’ judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Land v. Whitley" on Justia Law

Melvin Joseph Long was fatally injured while working on an industrial chiller at North Carolina State University. The chiller, which had been improperly winterized by university maintenance employees, developed internal pressure after water left in its tubes froze and caused the tubes to burst, allowing refrigerant to enter and pressurize the system. When Long, an OSHA-certified pipefitter, attempted to remove a flange from the chiller, the pressurized component caused the flange to detach explosively, striking him and resulting in his death.After the incident, Long’s estate filed a wrongful death action in the Superior Court of Person County against the university employees involved. The trial court granted summary judgment for the defendants, finding no genuine issue of material fact and concluding that the defendants were entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The estate appealed, arguing that issues of foreseeability and contributory negligence should have precluded summary judgment. The North Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision, holding that the accident was not a foreseeable result of the defendants’ actions and, alternatively, that contributory negligence barred recovery.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed the case de novo. It held that the uncontradicted evidence demonstrated the accident resulted from an unforeseeable sequence of events, and that foreseeability is a necessary element of proximate cause for actionable negligence. The Court found that neither the defendants’ training nor the equipment manuals provided any basis to reasonably foresee the type of injury that occurred. Accordingly, the Supreme Court of North Carolina affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals, upholding summary judgment for the defendants. View "Long v. Fowler" on Justia Law