Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

L.W.’s appendix ruptured during her incarceration, and she subsequently died from sepsis. Plaintiff, as special administrator of L.W.’s estate, filed suit against the county in which L.W. was incarcerated, as well as against the individuals involved in her incarceration and medical care, alleging civil rights claims under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 and tort claims under state law. The medical malpractice claim against the jail physician, Defendant, went to trial. Defendant moved for judgment as a matter of law at the close of Plaintiff’s evidence. The district court granted the motion. The jury returned a verdict for Plaintiff and awarded $1.3 million in damages. The district court granted Defendant a credit against the verdict for the value of the settlement, amending the judgment to $800,000. Defendant appealed the denial of judgment as a matter of law on the medical malpractice claim. Plaintiff appealed the grant of judgment as a matter of law on the punitive damages claim, as well as the grant of credit against the verdict.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that it does not believe that the court’s decision to preclude the use of legal terms like “reckless” would have had any bearing on its decision to grant judgment as a matter of law on punitive damages. The court explained that it does not matter that separate wrongdoings caused L.W.’s injuries. UCATA does not focus on the cause of the injury or the policy reason for imposing liability. It focuses on the injury, which Plaintiff has alleged is the same for the Section 1983 claims as it is for the medical malpractice claim View "Christine Turner v. Garry Stewart, M.D." on Justia Law

Plaintiff was severely injured at work when a tank filled with compressed air exploded. Plaintiff brought common-law claims for strict liability and negligence against Tyco Fire Products, LP (“Tyco”), which sold the tank to Plaintiff’s employer. Tyco moved for summary judgment, arguing that Plaintiff’s claims are preempted under the Hazardous Materials Transportation Act of 1975 (“HMTA”), 49 U.S.C. Section 5125(b)(1). The district court held that the claims are preempted and granted Tyco summary judgment.   The Second Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the HMTA expressly preempts nonfederal laws “about” certain subjects related to the transportation of hazardous materials in commerce. The court explained that as relevant here, the HMTA preempts state laws that are (1) “about . . . the . . . marking” of a “container . . . that is represented, marked, certified, or sold as qualified for use in transporting hazardous material in commerce,” and (2) “not substantively the same as a provision” of the HMTA or a regulation promulgated thereunder. Both requirements are satisfied here. First, the court explained that the tank was “marked . . . as qualified for use in transporting hazardous material,” and Plaintiff’s common-law claims are “about” the “marking” of Tyco’s tank. Second, the court wrote that Plaintiff’s common-law claims cannot be deemed “substantively the same” because they would impose duties beyond the HMTA and associated regulations. The HMTA thus expressly preempts Plaintiff’s common-law claims. View "Buono v. Tyco Fire Prods., LP" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed this nationwide class action on behalf of herself and others similarly situated after her personally identifying information (“PII”), including her name and Social Security number, which had been entrusted to Defendants, were exposed to an unauthorized third party as a result of a targeted data hack. At issue is the proper framework for evaluating whether an individual whose PII is exposed to unauthorized actors, but has not (yet) been used for injurious purposes such as identity theft, has suffered an injury in fact for purposes of Article III standing to sue for damages.   The Second Circuit reversed and remanded. The court concluded that with respect to the question of whether an injury arising from risk of future harm is sufficiently “concrete” to constitute an injury, in fact, TransUnion controls; with respect to the question whether the asserted injury is “actual or imminent,” the McMorris framework continues to apply in data breach cases like this. Thus, the court concluded that Plaintiff’s allegation that an unauthorized third party accessed her name and Social Security number through a targeted data breach gives her Article III standing to bring this action against Defendants to whom she had entrusted her PII. View "Bohnak v. Marsh & McLennan Companies, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and her deceased husband, brought claims under the Federal Tort Claims Act against the United States alleging that a U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs hospital negligently failed to diagnose her husband with lung cancer. Prior to trial, the government conceded that the hospital’s ten-month failure to diagnose her husband was a departure from the standard of care. Following a two-day bench trial, the district court entered judgment and awarded $975,233.75 in damages to Plaintiff, including $850,000 for pain and suffering and $50,000 for loss of consortium.   On appeal, Plaintiff argued: (1) the district court erred in failing to adequately explain its factual findings and methodology for arriving at its awards as required under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a); and (2) the district court’s awards for pain and suffering and loss of consortium were based on legal errors.   The Second Circuit affirmed the judgment. The court first clarified that the appropriate standard of review for assessing a district court’s FTCA damages award governed by New York law is whether the award “deviates materially from what would be reasonable compensation,” as articulated under New York Civil Practice Law and Rules Section 5501(c). The court nonetheless found Plaintiff’s challenges to the district court’s damages awards to be unpersuasive. The district court’s explanation for the awards in its factual findings and conclusions of law, as well as in its denial of the motion to amend or alter the judgment as to these awards, satisfied the requirements of Rule 52. View "Gonzalez v. United States" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals reversing the opinion of the Workers' Compensation Board affirming the administrative law judge's (ALJ) conclusion that medical providers did not have to submit their medical billing statements until after a determination of liability, holding that the statute is unambiguous.At issue was whether P&P Construction, Inc. and, by extension, the company's insurer, Kentucky Employers Mutual Insurance (KEMI), was responsible for payment of medical billings statements submitted outside of the forty-five-day period set forth in Ky. Rev. Stat. 342.020(4). The ALJ and Board determined that medical providers do not have to submit their billings until after a determination of liability. The court of appeals reversed, holding that medical providers are required to submit their billings within forty-five days of service, regardless of whether a determination of liability has been made, and therefore, employers and their insurance carriers are not responsible for payment of billings submitted after the forty-five day period. The Supreme Court, holding that under the unambiguous language of the statute, medical service providers must submit their billings within forty-five days of treatment, and such requirement applies both pre- and post-award. View "Farley v. P&P Construction, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court granting Defendant's motion to dismiss the underlying complaint filed by Port of Louisville for defamation and professional malfeasance, holding that Port of Louisville had no legally recognized relationship with R. Wayne Stratton, CPA and Jones, Nale & Mattingly PLC (collectively, Stratton), and therefore, Stratton did not owe the Port of Louisville any duty.Louisville and Jefferson County Riverport Authority filed a lawsuit seeking to terminate Port of Louisville's lease based on allegations that Port of Louisville breached the parties' lease The action was stayed while the claims were referred to an arbitrator, who found that Port of Louisville had not breached the lease. Based on what occurred during the arbitration the Port of Louisville brought a complaint against Stratton for defamation and professional malfeasance. The trial court granted Stratton's motion to dismiss, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Port of Louisville had no legally recognized relationship with Stratton that would cause Stratton to owe it a duty. View "New Albany Main Street Properties, LLC v. R. Wayne Stratton, CPA" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court denying the State's motion to dismiss the second count of the complaint filed by Celine Escobar-Santana (Celine) and her son Emmett Escobar-Santana (Emmett), holding that the phrase "medical malpractice claims" in Conn. Gen. Stat. 4-160(f) was broad enough to encompass Celine's claim for emotional distress damages under the circumstances of this case.Celine brought this action alleging that she suffered emotional distress damages from physical injuries to Emmett that were proximately caused by the negligence of health care professionals (collectively, Defendants) during the birthing process. The State moved to dismiss count two of the complaint on the ground that the count did not fall within the statutory waiver of the State's sovereign immunity in section 4-160(f) because the count stated a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress or bystander liability rather than medical malpractice. The trial court denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Celine's allegation that she suffered a traumatic delivery followed by severe psychological distress was inextricably connected to her allegations of medical malpractice and therefore qualified as a medical malpractice claim for purposes of section 4-160(f). View "Escobar-Santana v. State" on Justia Law

For decades, a facility has allegedly emitted dangerous levels of a chemical called Ethylene Oxide (“EtO”). The dangerous properties of the chemical were not widely known outside the scientific community, so it was not until a local law firm began advertising potential lawsuits. Fourteen plaintiffs eventually sued. The case was severed, and the instant case is the first to reach the court. The district court granted Shell’s and Evonik’s motions to dismiss. The court concluded that all claims predicated on Plaintiff’s wife’s death were time-barred and that Plaintiff had not properly pleaded damages for the claims based on his own fear of cancer. Plaintiff appealed.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed the finding of improper joinder. The court reversed and remanded Plaintiff’s claims predicated on his wife’s death. The court vacated the denial of leave to amend the claims predicated on Jack’s emotional injuries, as pleaded against Evonik. The court explained that Plaintiff, who had no connections to the plant, had lived in the same small town all his life, was computer illiterate, and had no medical training, could not be expected to hunt down answers to a problem when there was absolutely no suggestion, at the time of the diagnosis, that any out-of-the-ordinary problem existed. Thus the court reversed and remanded this claim to the district court for further factual development as to when Plaintiff reasonably could have discovered the allegedly tortious cause of his wife’s diagnosis and death. View "Jack v. Evonik Corporation" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court awarding Plaintiff $1,000 in actual damages and $2,000 in punitive damages in the underlying trial relating to Defendant's potentially racial motivations for two incidents leading to Plaintiff's assault and battery and negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims, holding that a new trial was required.On appeal, Plaintiff argued that the district court erred in granting Defendant's motion in limine to exclude Plaintiff's race-based evidence because of its prejudicial nature from the punitive damages phase of trial. The Supreme Court agreed and reversed, holding that the district court erred in excluding this evidence during the punitive damage phase of trial and that a new trial was required limited to the amount of punitive damages for which Defendant was liable to Plaintiff in accordance with this opinion. View "Two Leggins v. Gatrell" on Justia Law

Midvale created an “instant quote” feature on their websites. Anyone who supplied basic identifying information could receive a quote for auto insurance. Each site would auto-fill some information, including the number of the applicant’s driver’s license. Anyone could enter a stranger’s name and home address, which caused the form to disclose the number of the stranger’s driver’s license. Midvale discontinued the autofill feature after observing unusual activity suggesting misuse, and notified people whose information had been disclosed improperly. Three people who received Midvale’s notice filed a purported class action under the Driver’s Privacy Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. 2721–25.The district court held that the plaintiffs lacked standing, having failed to show a concrete injury traceable to the disclosure. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that whether the Act applies at all is questionable. Its principal rule is directed to state officials rather than private actors. A driver’s-license number is not potentially embarrassing or an intrusion on seclusion. It is a neutral fact derived from public records, a fact legitimately known to many private actors and freely revealed to banks, insurers, hotels, and others. Plaintiffs have not plausibly alleged that Midvale’s disclosure of their numbers caused them any injury, and the disclosure of a number in common use by both public and private actors does not correspond to any tort. View "Baysal v. Midvale Indemnity Co." on Justia Law