Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff contracted hepatitis C after participating in drug trials and screenings at Pharma Medica Research, Inc. (Pharma Medica) and other companies. He sued Pharma Medica for negligence, and a jury found in favor of Pharma Medica. Challenging the jury instructions and the district court’s evidentiary rulings, Plaintiff filed a motion for a new trial, which the district court denied. Plaintiff appealed.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. Plaintiff argued that the district court should have struck the expert testimony of Dr. Aronsohn and Glasgow-Roberts because Pharma Medica failed to timely disclose that it had sent the two witnesses certain documents, like the deposition transcript of Plaintiff’s expert witness and Plaintiff’s hepatitis C testing records, for review before they testified at trial. The court explained that even assuming Pharma Medica violated Rule 26(e), Plaintiff failed to articulate how Pharma Medica’s nondisclosures were prejudicial. Dr. Aronsohn’s opinion did not change after he reviewed the non-disclosed documents. And his trial testimony was consistent with his deposition testimony, which was given before he received the non-disclosed documents. There was no “unfair surprise” to Plaintiff, then, when Dr. Aronsohn’s opinion remained unchanged. View "Ian Wallace v. Pharma Medica Research, Inc." on Justia Law

Hoping to minimize her risk of suffering serious complications from future blood clots, Johnson underwent surgery to implant a retrievable intravascular filter–a medical device that is placed in the inferior vena cava to prevent blood clots that develop in the lower body from flowing into the heart and lungs. Johnson’s doctor selected the Meridian filter, which was supposed to be temporary and easily removable. Johnson’s filter migrated and fractured, leaving shards embedded in the wall of her heart and elsewhere. Her surgeon was unable to remove the device safely and fully. As a result, Johnson faces an ongoing risk of infection, pain, and other complications.Johnson sued the manufacturers of the Meridian filter (Bard), claiming that they defectively designed the Meridian filter and failed to warn medical providers about the device’s risks, in violation of Wisconsin law. A jury rejected most of Johnson’s theories but returned a $3.3 million verdict in her favor on her strict liability failure-to-warn count. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, stating that its decision “should not be misinterpreted as our endorsement of some of Johnson’s counsel’s trial tactics.” There was no reversible error in instructing the jury or in permitting certain testimony, in alleged violation of expert witness disclosure requirements. View "Johnson v. C. R. Bard, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff sustained a spinal injury during a rollover car accident in Mexico. Plaintiff, along with his wife (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) filed a claim for damages against General Motors, LLC (“GM”) on theories of strict liability, negligence, and loss of consortium. The district court applied the law of Coahuila, Mexico, under Missouri’s choice of law principles and granted GM’s motion for summary judgment. Plaintiffs appealed the district court’s choice of law decision.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that its conclusion in Azarax that the district court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to allow a party to rely on foreign law does not lead to the conclusion the district court abused its discretion here when it decided the opposite under different facts. Further, the court wrote that after considering the Section 6 factors and the parties’ arguments, it concluded Missouri’s relationship to this case does not overcome the presumption that the place of the injury—Coahuila, Mexico—is the place with the most significant relationship to the parties and occurrence. View "Nicolas Valadez Rey v. General Motors, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court dismissed this interlocutory appeal from a district court order granting a motion to stay arbitration proceedings between the codefendants in the underlying negligence action, holding that the order staying arbitration was not immediately appealable.Walgreens Boot Alliance, Inc. contracted with Ferrandino & Son, Inc. to provide services at various locations through the United States. Ferrandino contracted with Patera Landscaping, LLC to perform snow removal services at three Walgreens locations in Omaha. Yvonne McPherson was injured when she slipped and fell on an icy sidewalk outside an Omaha Walgreens and filed a negligence action against Patera, Ferrandino, and Walgreens. Ferrandino filed a demand for arbitration seeking a determination that under the terms of the subcontract, Patera had a contractual duty to defend and indemnify both Ferrandino and Walgreens against McPherson's claims. Petera moved to stay the arbitration based on Neb. Rev. Stat. 25-2603. The district court granted the motion to stay arbitration, and Ferrandino appealed. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the order staying arbitration was not immediately appealable. View "McPherson v. Walgreens Boot Alliance, Inc." on Justia Law

Coloplast Corporation and Coloplast Manufacturing US, LLC (collectively, Coloplast) manufacture and market Restorelle L, a surgical mesh device. Plaintiff sued Coloplast for injuries allegedly caused by the implantation of Restorelle L mesh. After excluding portions of Plaintiff’s expert opinions and testimony, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of Coloplast. On appeal, Plaintiff argued that the district court erred in excluding her expert’s opinion on specific causation and in granting summary judgment on her negligent design claim.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court concluded that the expert’s supplemental declaration was untimely because it was submitted after the deadlines for disclosure of expert reports and completion of all discovery. The court reasoned that Rule 26(e)(2) requires that an expert’s supplement “be disclosed by the time the party’s pretrial disclosures under Rule 26(a)(3) are due.” Rule 26(a)(3)(B), in turn, states that “Unless the court orders otherwise, these disclosures must be made at least 30 days before trial.” Plaintiff maintains that she, therefore, had until thirty days before trial to disclose the expert’s supplemental declaration. However, the court explained that she ignored the caveat that Rule 26’s default timing provision applies only if the court does not order otherwise. Here, the court set deadlines in its scheduling order, those deadlines superseded the default rules, and Plaintiff failed to meet those deadlines. Further, the court wrote that the district court also did not abuse its discretion when it decided to exclude the expert’s report and declaration without considering lesser sanctions. View "Angela Cantrell v. Coloplast Corp." on Justia Law

Appellants, American victims of terror attacks in Israel, appealed from the district court’s judgment dismissing their complaint for lack of in personam jurisdiction over Appellee Bank Saderat PLC, a bank associated with the Islamic Republic of Iran. Appellants challenged the district court’s conclusion that the Appellee’s default, which occurred just after the venue was transferred from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia to the Eastern District of New York, did not forfeit its objection to personal jurisdiction in New York.   The Second Circuit concluded that the district court’s judgment relied on the erroneous factual finding that the Appellee had successfully challenged personal jurisdiction in the District of Columbia before the case was transferred to New York. The court explained that the district court premised its legal conclusion – that this case was distinguishable from Mickalis Pawn Shop – on the incorrect factual finding that BSPLC’s pre-transfer, pre-default personal jurisdiction challenge in the District of Columbia was successful. The record demonstrates that BSPLC achieved no such victory. It was, therefore clear error for the district court to find otherwise and to rely on that fact for the purpose of distinguishing BSPLC’s conduct from that of the defendants in Mickalis Pawn Shop. View "Kaplan v. Bank Saderat PLC" on Justia Law

In summer 2010, plaintiff Carol Conforti obtained a restraining order against her husband. On September 8, he was arrested for violating the restraining order by returning to the marital home to see his son. Conforti was taken to the OCJ, where he was evaluated by a staff member of Correctional Health Services (CHS). A CHS staff member wrote on the “Intake Receiving and Screening” form that Conforti reported: (1) drinking half a gallon of vodka each day; (2) major surgery that left him with rods and screws in his back; (3) feeling “hopeless or helpless”; and (4) the “[r]ecent significant loss” of his marriage. A physician prescribed him one extra mattress and medicine for back pain and alcohol dependence, and instructed that he not be assigned work or a top bunk. After 27 days, Conforti was released. Just over a week later, Conforti was arrested for again returning to the marital home to see his son. He arrived at OCJ on October 13, 2010. A document from Conforti’s file acknowledged his previous incarceration and history of binge drinking but stated he had “[n]o current mental health issues/concerns” and was cleared for OCJ’s general population. On October 16, he requested medical attention for back pain. On October 20, Conforti wrote a suicide note to his parents, closed the door to his cell, covered the cell door window with a sheet, and hung himself. During discover, plaintiff submitted an expert report who opined that defendants the County of Ocean and the Ocean County Jail acted negligently by failing to adequately train and supervise OCJ staff to prevent inmate suicide. The County defendants moved for summary judgment on immunity grounds under the New Jersey Tort Claims Act (TCA). A jury found defendant negligent and apportioned liability 60% against the County and 40% against Correctional Health Services (CHS). Defendants moved for JNOV, reasserting their medical-facility-immunity argument. The New Jersey Supreme Court found no reversible error in the trial court’s refusal to dismiss plaintiff’s negligence count at the summary judgment stage, and no error in refusing to overturn the jury’s verdict after trial. View "Conforti v. County of Ocean, et al." on Justia Law

In January 2021, many customers of the online financial services company Robinhood were aggressively buying specific stocks known as “meme stocks” in a frenzy that generated widespread attention. Robinhood suddenly restricted its customers’ ability to buy these meme stocks (but not their ability to sell them). Some Robinhood customers who could not buy the restricted stocks brought this putative class action, seeking to represent both Robinhood customers and all other holders of the restricted meme stocks nationwide who sold the stocks during a certain period. As Robinhood customers, they allege that they lost money because Robinhood stopped them from acquiring an asset that would have continued to increase in value.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the claims. The court explained that Plaintiffs failed to state a claim. The court explained that its contract with Robinhood gives the company the specific right to restrict its customers’ ability to trade securities and to refuse to accept any of their transactions. Thus, the court wrote that because Robinhood had the right to do exactly what it did, Plaintiffs’ claims in agency and contract cannot stand. And under basic principles of tort law, Robinhood had no tort duty to avoid causing purely economic loss. View "Andrea Juncadella, et al v. Robinhood Financial LLC, et al" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Larissa Troy appealed a superior court order granting summary judgment in favor of defendants Bishop Guertin High School (BGHS) and Brothers of the Sacred Heart of New England, Inc. (BSHNE), based upon the court’s finding that the plaintiff’s claims were barred by the statute of limitations. In 1998, Shawn McEnany was convicted in Main of unlawful sexual conduct with a fifteen-year-old female student while McEnany was teaching at another school BSHNE owned and operated. Despite knowledge of this conviction, in 1990, BSHNE hired McEnany to each at BGHS. Plaintiff attended BGHS from 1992 to 1996. In 1995, when plaintiff was seventeen years old and a high school senior, plaintiff alleged McEnany sexually assaulted her on two occasions on the BGHS campus. Despite reporting the second incident to the BGHS Dean of Students, no action was taken on plaintiff’s report. In 1997, McEnany was charged in New Hampshire with “teaching as a convicted sex offender and failing to register as a sex offender.” The headmaster of the school notified parents of McEnany’s conviction, but plaintiff alleged she first became aware of McEnany’s conviction in 2017. That year, McEnany passed away. In May 2018, plaintiff brought two common-law claims alleging defendants were: (1) negligent in hiring, retaining and supervising McEnany; and (2) negligent in failing to protect her when she was a student at BGHS. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff, the New Hampshire Supreme Court concluded there was a material factual dispute as to when plaintiff knew, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence, should have known, that her injury was proximately caused by defendants’ conduct. Accordingly, the Court reversed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment and remanded for further proceedings. View "Troy v. Bishop Guertin High School, et al." on Justia Law

Petitioners Infinity Select Insurance Company and Infinity Property and Casualty Corporation (collectively, Infinity) are named Defendants in a pending action (the instant lawsuit). The instant lawsuit stems from an earlier 2013 case (the prior action) in which plaintiffs sued Infinity’s insured for negligence and wrongful death in connection with a three-vehicle collision (the collision). In August 2022, the court issued its ruling. The primary effect of the ruling was to reform the Infinity policy to provide greater bodily injury policy limits of $750,000. Per its terms, the ruling “establishes the policy limits for the jury’s consideration in the upcoming jury trial on the remaining causes of action” including plaintiffs’ cause of action against Infinity for bad faith breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing due to Infinity’s rejection of plaintiffs’ Code of Civil Procedure section 998 demand of $750,000. Infinity filed a petition for a writ of mandate challenging the subject ruling.   The Fifth Appellate District concluded that the trial court erred in reforming the Infinity policy. The court held that the motor carrier of property—not the insurer—bears ultimate responsibility for meeting the requirements necessary to obtain a motor carrier permit. Moreover, even where an insurer intends to issue and certify a policy under section 34631.5, it is not obligated to issue the policy in the full amount of $750,000. Additionally, the court wrote evidence of insurance is not the only means of complying with the MCPPA financial responsibility requirements and infinity was under no duty to determine whether the insured had otherwise complied with MCPPA requirements. View "Infinity Select Ins. Co. v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law