Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

The Second Circuit vacated and remanded the district court’s ruling granting summary judgment for Defendants, a former Immigration and Customs Enforcement officer. Plaintiff, Jane Doe, alleged she was sexually and psychologically abused by Defendant, a former Immigration and Customs Enforcement officer. Four years after the abuse ended, Doe initiated this action against Rodriguez and various government defendants. Defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing Doe’s claims were untimely. Doe asked the district court to equitably toll the applicable statutes of limitations. The court granted summary judgment to Defendants.   The Second Circuit vacated and remanded. The court explained that in this case, the district court denied equitable tolling as a matter of law, purporting to draw every inference in favor of Doe. The court vacated its judgment because the record allows for a finding that Doe faced extraordinary circumstances and acted with reasonable diligence. On remand, the district court should act in a fact-finding capacity and determine whether Doe has demonstrated extraordinary circumstances and reasonable diligence. The court explained that if the court determines that she has established these prerequisites for equitable tolling, then it should engage in the discretionary determination of whether to grant her request for equitable tolling. View "Doe v. United States" on Justia Law

Petitioner sued directors and staff of a structured sober living facility, including a real party in interest Peter Schuster, for dependent adult abuse. The trial court found Petitioner failed to comply with Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.210 because his statement of compliance in response to Schuster’s document requests failed to identify which documents would relate to which specific requests. The court imposed sanctions against Petitioner and his attorney in the amount of $910 for misusing the discovery process. Petitioner filed the instant petition for a writ of mandate directing the court to reverse the sanctions order. He argued that a statement of compliance in response to a production demand need not identify which document pertains to which request; such identification need only occur when the documents are produced.   The Second Appellate District granted Petitioner’s petition. The court explained that based on the plain language of section 2031.210, a statement of compliance need not identify the specific request to which each document will pertain. Because Petitioner substantially complied with his discovery responsibilities in this regard, the court’s imposition of sanctions was an abuse of discretion. View "Pollock v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Agnes Cramer petitioned for workers’ compensation benefits for the alleged physical and mental injuries she sustained after suffering an electrical shock and falling from a ladder while working for Transitional Health Services of Wayne, which was insured by American Zurich Insurance Company. Plaintiff claimed that as a result of the shock and fall, she injured her right shoulder and suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and non-epileptic seizures. The magistrate denied benefits for plaintiff’s PTSD/non-epileptic seizure claim, finding that there was insufficient evidence that the disability was work-related. Applying the four-factor test set forth in Martin v. Pontiac Sch Dist, 2001 ACO 118, the magistrate concluded that plaintiff failed to meet her burden of proof that her employment contributed to or accelerated her mental injuries. The magistrate also denied wage-loss benefits on the basis that, although plaintiff was physically disabled from the injury to her shoulder, there was no evidence that plaintiff had made a good-faith effort to secure other employment. The Michigan Compensation Appellate Commission affirmed in part magistrate’s denial of benefits, reversing the denial of wage-loss benefits for plaintiff’s shoulder injury. Both parties appealed; the Court of Appeals denied defendants’ application for lack of merit in the grounds presented. The appeals court remanded the matter to the Board of Magistrates for a determination of whether plaintiff was entitled to a discretionary award of attorney fees on unpaid medical benefits. Plaintiff appealed to the Michigan Supreme Court, which granted review, limited to two issues: (1) whether the four-factor test in Martin was at odds with the principle that a preexisting condition is not a bar to eligibility for workers’ compensation benefits and conflicts with the plain meaning of MCL 418.301(2); and (2) assuming that Martin provides the appropriate test, whether the Court of Appeals erred by affirming the commission’s conclusion that the magistrate properly applied Martin. Ultimately the Court determined the magistrate erred in its application of Martin to their decision. The magistrate’s findings were vacated. The Court of Appeals judgment was reversed, and the case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Cramer v. Transitional Health Services" on Justia Law

Two cases consolidated for the Michigan Supreme Court's review involved premises liability, specifically slip-and-fall instances where plaintiffs both argued while the hazards were open and obvious, they were unavoidable. In Case No. 162907, Ahlam Kandil-Elsayed filed a negligence action based on premises liability after she slipped and fell at a gas station defendant F & E Oil, Inc. operated. Plaintiff argued snow and ice on the premises constituted a dangerous condition. In Case No. 163430, Renee Pinsky tripped over a cable that had been strung from a checkout counter to a display basket at a local Kroger supermarket. In both cases, defendants moved for summary judgment arguing that because the hazards were open and obvious and no special aspects were present, they owed no duty of care to plaintiffs. The trial court granted defendant's motion in the former case, but denied defendant's motion in the latter case. The respective losing parties appealed to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court reversed summary judgment in both cases: although defendants in both cases owed a duty to the respective injured plaintiffs, there remained genuine issues of fact that were relevant to whether the defendants breached that duty and if so, whether plaintiffs were comparatively at fault and should have their damages reduced. The judgments of the Court of Appeals were reversed, and both cases were remanded for further proceedings. View "Kandil-Elsayed v. F & E Oil, Inc." on Justia Law

During their employment with Dialysis Clinic, Inc. (DCI), the Doctors maintained staff privileges and worked at Washington Hospital. In 2013, Alyssa McLaughlin was admitted to the Hospital and received treatment from, among other medical staff, the Doctors, Kathryn Simons, M.D., Anne F. Josiah, M.D., Thomas Pirosko, D.O., and Ashely Berkley, D.O. At some point during or after that treatment, McLaughlin sustained severe and permanent neurological injuries. Attributing those injuries to negligence in her treatment, McLaughlin and her husband, William McLaughlin (collectively, the McLaughlins), initiated an action against the Doctors, the Hospital, and the other physicians noted above who were responsible for her care. The issue this case presented for the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's review centered on whether, as a matter of law, the Hospital could seek contribution and/or indemnity from DCI for negligence committed by DCI’s employees (the Doctors). The trial and superior courts both concluded that, although traditional principles of contribution and indemnity did not apply cleanly these particular circumstances, equitable principles of law permitted the Hospital to seek both contribution and indemnity from DCI. As a result, the trial court denied DCI’s motion for summary relief, and the superior court affirmed. The Supreme Court was unanimous in finding that, if the Hospital and DCI were determined to be vicariously liable for the negligence of the Doctors, the law permitted the Hospital to seek contribution from DCI. The Court was evenly divided on the question of whether the Hospital could also seek indemnification from DCI. Given the decision on contribution and inability to reach a decision on indemnity, the superior court was affirmed on those questions. View "McLaughlin v. Nahata, et al." on Justia Law

In this insurance dispute, the Supreme Court held that Ariz. Rev. Stat. 20-259.01 mandates that a single policy insuring multiple vehicles provides different underinsured motorist (UIM) coverages for each vehicle rather than a single UIM coverage that applies to multiple vehicles.Plaintiff's mother died in a car crash caused by a neglectful driver. Plaintiff submitted a UIM to CSAA General Insurance Company, her mother's insurer. At the time of the accident, Plaintiff's mother's CSAA policy covered the mother's two vehicles and provided UIM coverage of $50,000 per person. When CSAA paid only $50,000 Plaintiff sought an additional $50,000 under an "intra-policy stacking" theory. After CSAA rejected the claim, Plaintiff sued for declaratory judgment, alleging breach of contract, bad faith, and a class action. CSAA moved to certify two questions. The Supreme Court answered (1) insurers seeking to prevent insureds from stacking UIM coverages under a single, multi-vehicle policy must employ section 20-259.01(H)'s sole prescribed method for limiting stacking; and (2) section 20-259.01(B) does not bar an insured from receiving UIM coverage from the policy in an amount greater than the bodily injury or death liability limits of the policy. View "Franklin v. CSAA General Insurance" on Justia Law

A man was arrested for being part of a scheme to take a picture of Senator Thad Cochran’s late wife in the privacy of her nursing room home. One month later, the man was found dead in his home, seemingly from suicide. His widow, sons, and estate filed a complaint alleging 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 claims, as well as various tort claims against state and private actors involved in his arrest and prosecution. The complaint alleges that the man was subject to a politically motivated prosecution that deprived him of his constitutional rights, shut down his law practice, and humiliated him and his family, causing severe emotional distress—all of which directly led to his suicide. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss all claims. The district court granted summary judgment for the City of Madison and Mayor Hawkins-Butler. Plaintiffs appealed the dismissal of their claims, the summary judgment on their Lozman claim, and several orders regarding expert testimony and discovery.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that here, Plaintiffs’ best evidence merely establishes that the City of Madison was aggressively pursuing those who committed a potential invasion of the privacy of an incapacitated adult. The evidence doesn’t show that the City carried out the investigation, arrest, search, or prosecution because of the man’s political views. The same is true of the Mayor. Accordingly, the district court properly granted summary judgment for the City of Madison and its Mayor. View "Mayfield v. Butler Snow" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court against Plaintiffs on their action brought against BMW of North America, LLC claiming that a fire that occurred in their garage was the result of a manufacturing or design defect in their 2016 BMW X5 hybrid vehicle, holding that the district court properly concluded that Plaintiffs could not satisfy their burden of proof at trial.Plaintiffs had parked their hybrid BMW vehicle in their garage and were charging it using an extension cord when a fire occurred. Plaintiffs brought this lawsuit claiming that the fire was the result of a manufacturing or design defect in their BMW. Plaintiffs, however, failed to present an expert to support their theory. The district court granted judgment for Defendants. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that, absent expert support for the theory that Plaintiffs presented below, there was no basis for inferring that the accident was caused by a defective product. View "Molinary-Fernandez v. BMW of North America, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeal finding evidence of Plaintiff's subsequent molestation was admissible into evidence in a trial claiming emotional distress damages from the conduct of a teacher at the Mountain View School District, holding that remand was required for the trial court to undertake proper proceedings under Cal. Evid. Code 1106 and 783.Plaintiff sued the District seeking to recover for sexual abuse committed when she was eight years old by her fourth-grade teacher. The District sought to introduce evidence that Plaintiff was subsequently molested a few years later by another person and that this subsequent molestation caused at least some of Plaintiff's emotional distress injuries and related damages. The appellate court found the evidence regarding the subsequent molestation admissible. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case, holding (1) section 1106 subdivision (e) may permit admission of evidence that would otherwise be excluded under subdivision (a), but such admissibility is subject to the procedures set out in section 783 and scrutiny under section 352; and (2) section 352, as applied under the circumstances, required special informed review and scrutiny defined to protect Plaintiff's privacy rights, which appear not to have been applied in this case. View "Doe v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Plaintiff The Highland Consulting Group, Inc. (“Highland”), a consulting firm, sued Defendant for misappropriating its trade secrets under the Defend Trade Secrets Act (“DTSA”). At trial, the jury returned a verdict of $1.2 million in favor of plaintiff Highland. The district court carefully used a special verdict form on which the jury answered questions and made specific findings on each element of plaintiff Highland’s claims. On appeal, Defendant does not challenge the jury’s findings that the documents he took contained trade secrets and that he misappropriated those trade secrets. Instead, Defendant contends that (1) Plaintiff failed to prove it was an “owner” of those trade secrets, as required by the DTSA, and (2) the district court erred in denying his motions for judgment as a matter of law, or alternatively for a new trial on this ground.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court explained that drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of plaintiff Highland, the court concluded that the record contains sufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding that Plaintiff owned “any”—in other words, at least one—of the trade secrets involved here. The court wrote that the evidence, in the light most favorable to Plaintiff Highland, demonstrated the plaintiff owned multiple trade secrets misappropriated by Defendant. View "The Highland Consulting Group, Inc. v. Jesus Felix Minjares Soule" on Justia Law