Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

In this case, Arlene James filed a premises liability lawsuit against Brixmor New Chastain Corners SC, LLC, after she tripped on a parking bumper in a parking lot owned by Brixmor and sustained injuries. The parking bumper was not in its usual location but was instead laid out to separate the parking space from a motorcycle parking area. After the incident, Brixmor painted the parking bumper yellow. The trial court denied Brixmor's motion for summary judgment due to disputed facts about whether the structure James tripped on was a hazard and whether she had previously encountered it. The trial court also granted James's motion for sanctions for spoliation of evidence, barring Brixmor from arguing that the parking bumper was not a potential hazard. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of summary judgment but vacated the order imposing spoliation sanctions, remanding the matter to the trial court to apply the correct legal standard.The Supreme Court of Georgia granted Brixmor's petition for a writ of certiorari but chose to address a different issue: the Court of Appeals' determination that Brixmor failed to demonstrate an abuse of discretion by the trial court in considering the subsequent remedial measures rule in its analysis of the spoliation issue. The Supreme Court of Georgia held that once the Court of Appeals concluded that the trial court applied the incorrect standard on spoliation, consideration of the remedial measure rule was unnecessary and thus dicta. The Supreme Court of Georgia vacated Division 3 of the opinion to the extent that it purports to make a legal determination on the subsequent remedial measures rule and remanded the case to the Court of Appeals for proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "BRIXMOR NEW CHASTAIN CORNERS SC, LLC v. JAMES" on Justia Law

In this case, Crista Miller tripped on a vertical misalignment of less than one inch between a metal plate covering an underground utility vault, owned by the Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E), and the surrounding sidewalk adjacent to a property owned by Hip Sen Benevolent Association (Hip Sen), resulting in an injury to her ankle. Miller filed a lawsuit against both PG&E and Hip Sen, alleging general negligence and premises liability. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, ruling that the lawsuit was barred by the trivial defect doctrine.Miller appealed, but the Court of Appeal of the State of California, First Appellate District, Division Three, affirmed the trial court's ruling. The appellate court concluded that the vertical misalignment was a trivial defect as a matter of law. The court stated that to recover damages for negligence or premises liability, Miller had to prove that the defendants breached a legal duty to either repair or warn about the existence of the misalignment. However, it is well-established law that landowners are not liable for damages caused by minor, trivial, or insignificant defects in property. Even considering the steepness of the sidewalk, the weather conditions, the time of the incident, and the crowded nature of the street, the court found that these factors did not render the misalignment a dangerous condition. The court also found that the city's guidelines and repair notices did not impose a legal duty to repair such minor defects.Miller also argued that the city's repair notices to PG&E and Hip Sen for their violations of the city's Guidelines rendered them liable under a theory of negligence per se. However, the appellate court found this argument to be forfeited as Miller did not raise this issue in the trial court and only presented it for the first time in her appellate reply brief.Therefore, the appellate court concluded that no reasonable trier of fact could find the trivial sidewalk defect posed a substantial risk of injury to a foreseeable pedestrian exercising due care and affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendants. View "Miller v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co." on Justia Law

A minor, Freedom Morris, sought emergency treatment for appendicitis at Vidant Medical Center and was operated on by Dr. David Rodeberg. Despite complaining of severe pain after the surgery, Morris was discharged. He returned to the hospital a day later with a fever and sharp abdominal pain. A second surgery performed by a different doctor revealed that not all of the appendix had been removed during the first operation. This had caused a ruptured appendix and infection in Morris' body. Morris underwent a third surgery to drain a pelvic abscess.More than five years after the first surgery, Morris filed a lawsuit against Dr. Rodeberg and Vidant Medical Center alleging medical malpractice and medical negligence. The defendants responded with motions to dismiss the complaint, arguing that the lawsuit was filed outside the statute of limitations for medical malpractice claims of persons who are over ten years old but under eighteen years old when their claims accrue. The trial court denied the defendants' motions, but the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's order.The Supreme Court of North Carolina held that the three-year statute of limitations barred Morris' medical malpractice claims. The Court reasoned that while the North Carolina General Assembly has recognized that individuals under certain disabilities, including being a minor, are unable to appreciate the nature of potential legal claims and take appropriate action, subsection 1-17(c) of the North Carolina General Statutes eliminates the tolling of the medical malpractice claims of minors, except in certain situations. None of those exceptions applied to Morris' case, so his claim was subject to the standard three-year statute of limitations and was therefore time-barred. The Court did not address Morris' argument that the application of the three-year statute of limitations violated his constitutional right to equal protection of the laws because it did not have jurisdiction to review that issue. View "Morris v. Rodeberg" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of Alabama has reversed an order by the Dale Circuit Court, which held Omni Healthcare Financial, LLC in contempt for failing to comply with a subpoena. This case arose from claims asserted by Amy Lee Walker against Eric Irvin Reese and SCP Distributors, LLC, following an automobile collision. Omni, a North Carolina-based factoring company, had purchased certain accounts receivable from a medical provider who had treated Walker. The accounts receivable are secured by an interest in any recovery that Walker obtains from her lawsuit against the defendants. The defendants had served a nonparty subpoena on Omni's registered agent in Alabama, seeking certain documents. Omni later responded with some documents but also asserted objections to the subpoena. The defendants then filed a motion asking the circuit court to hold Omni in contempt of court for failing to comply with the subpoena. The circuit court granted this motion, leading to Omni's appeal. The Supreme Court of Alabama found that the trial court erred by holding Omni in contempt, as the subpoena was invalid. It was determined that the subpoena seeking documents located in North Carolina needed to be issued by a North Carolina court and served in accordance with North Carolina law. As the defendants had not asked a North Carolina court to direct Omni to produce the documents, they had not complied with the requirements to hold Omni in contempt. The case was reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "In re Omni Healthcare Financial, LLC" on Justia Law

In 2017, plaintiff Marcelina Barron sued the Santa Clara County Valley Transportation Authority and bus driver Bruce Arnold Gaillard for general negligence after she was injured in a bus accident. After several delays, the defendants moved to dismiss the case, arguing that it had not been brought to trial within the five-year deadline defined by the Code of Civil Procedure section 583.310. Barron countered that the deadline had been extended by six months due to Emergency rule 10(a), enacted during the COVID-19 pandemic by the Judicial Council of California. The trial court granted the dismissal, interpreting the Ables v. A. Ghazale Brothers, Inc. decision to mean that the emergency rule did not extend the five-year period because it was not a statute. Barron appealed.The Court of Appeal of the State of California Sixth Appellate District reversed the trial court's decision. The appellate court held that the Judicial Council had the authority to enact Emergency rule 10(a), and therefore the time to bring the case to trial was legally extended by six months. The court held that the trial court erred in dismissing Barron's complaint prematurely based on an incorrect interpretation of the five-year statute of limitations in section 583.310 and Emergency rule 10(a). The case was reinstated and remanded for further proceedings. View "Barron v. Santa Clara Valley Transportation Authority" on Justia Law

An incarcerated individual developed a mass under his armpit and was referred to a surgeon who had a contract with the Department of Corrections and Community Supervision (DOCCS). The surgeon performed a biopsy, which was then sent to the pathology department at the Cortland Regional Medical Center (CRMC) for examination. Dr. Jun Wang, the Medical Director of CRMC's pathology department and a member of Cortland Pathology, examined the specimen and determined that the mass was benign. A year later, the patient was diagnosed with Hodgkin's lymphoma.The patient initiated a medical malpractice lawsuit against CRMC and others, alleging that they misdiagnosed his condition and failed to promptly diagnose or refer him for treatment. Dr. Wang sought defense and indemnification from the State, claiming that he was entitled to coverage under Public Officers Law § 17 and Correction Law § 24-a because his actions arose from treating an incarcerated individual at the request of DOCCS. The Attorney General rejected Dr. Wang's request, stating that he treated the patient through his employment arrangement with CRMC, not directly at the request of the State, and thus the State had no obligation to provide defense or indemnification.The New York Court of Appeals held that the State is not obligated to indemnify or defend Dr. Wang in a medical malpractice lawsuit. The court ruled that under the Correction Law § 24-a, the State's obligation to defend and indemnify only applies when there has been an explicit request by DOCCS for the services of a specific provider—an arrangement or understanding made in advance between DOCCS and the healthcare professional. In this case, no such express request or direct agreement existed between DOCCS and Dr. Wang, therefore, the State had no obligation to defend or indemnify him. The court also stated that the Attorney General's interpretation of the statute was not arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. Hence, the court affirmed the order of the Appellate Division. View "In re Wang v James" on Justia Law

In the case of Clark Alave v. The City of Chicago, the plaintiff, Clark Alave, filed a complaint against the City of Chicago after he was injured when his bicycle struck a pothole. The Illinois Supreme Court ruled that the city did not owe the plaintiff a duty of care under section 3-102(a) of the Tort Immunity Act. The court based this decision on the lack of any affirmative physical manifestations, such as signs or pavement markings, that the city intended for the roadway to be used for bicycling. The court also considered the Divvy bicycle rental station located nearby, but found that this station only indicated that the city permitted, not intended, bicycling on the roadway. The court therefore concluded that the plaintiff was not both a permitted and intended user of the roadway, and thus the city owed him no duty of care. The court reversed the judgment of the appellate court and affirmed the dismissal of the plaintiff's complaint. View "Alave v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

In a defamation lawsuit brought by E. Jean Carroll against former President Donald Trump, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit ruled that presidential immunity can be waived and that Trump had waived his presidential immunity by failing to raise it as an affirmative defense in his original response to Carroll's complaint. Carroll sued Trump for defamation after he publicly denied her accusation of sexual assault in the mid-1990s. The court affirmed the lower court's decision to deny Trump's motion for summary judgment and his request to amend his answer to include presidential immunity as a defense. The court also upheld the lower court's decision to strike Trump's presidential immunity defense from his answer to Carroll's amended complaint. The case was remanded back to the lower court for further proceedings. View "Carroll v. Trump" on Justia Law

The case concerns a firefighter, Matthew Vann, who was injured when a bus driver, Louis Yu, drove through an active emergency scene and over a fire hose, causing it to break off from a fire engine and strike Vann. Vann sued the City and County of San Francisco and Yu for negligence. The trial court dismissed the case, sustaining the defendants' demurrer without leave to amend. The court ruled that the action was barred by the exclusivity provisions of the Workers’ Compensation Act, as Vann was receiving workers' compensation benefits for the injuries he sustained in the incident.On appeal, the Court of Appeal of the State of California, First Appellate District, Division Two affirmed the trial court's decision. The appellate court rejected Vann's argument that the San Francisco Fire Department (SFFD) and the San Francisco Municipal Transportation Agency (SFMTA), which employed Vann and Yu respectively, were separate legal entities akin to separate businesses within a multi-unit corporate enterprise. The court reasoned that the SFFD and the SFMTA were not independent entities but were merely parts of the same entity, the City and County of San Francisco. Consequently, the City was the employer of both Vann and Yu. Therefore, under the Workers’ Compensation Act, workers' compensation was Vann's exclusive remedy against the City as his employer and against Yu as his coemployee. View "Vann v. City and County of S.F." on Justia Law

In a car accident resulting in the death of a motorcyclist, the driver, Yvonne Patrice Kessel, was convicted of one count of aggravated vehicular homicide. The State of Wyoming Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, holding that Kessel’s proposed jury instruction, which suggested that the jury could consider the victim’s actions when determining proximate cause, was not a proper theory of defense. The Court found that Kessel was essentially arguing that the State failed to prove the proximate cause element of the charged offense, which it deemed a "claim of innocence" or "failure of proof" defense not warranting a special theory of defense instruction. The Court also ruled that the jury had been adequately instructed on the concept of proximate cause and that the instructions allowed both parties to argue their respective theories of the case. Thus, the Court concluded that the lower court did not abuse its discretion by denying Kessel’s proposed instruction. View "Kessel v. The State of Wyoming" on Justia Law