Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

This appeal arises from a dispute about CoolSculpting, a medical device intended to minimize the appearance of fat. When Plaintiff tried CoolSculpting, he developed a rare condition called Paradoxical Adipose Hyperplasia (“PAH”), which enlarges the targeted fat tissue. Needless to say, Plaintiff was unhappy that CoolSculpting maximized the fat he wanted to minimize. So Plaintiff sued Zeltiq Aesthetics, Inc., the manufacturer of the CoolSculpting system, for failure to warn and design defects under Florida law. The district court granted Zeltiq summary judgment. On failure to warn, the district court concluded that Zeltiq’s warnings about PAH were adequate as a matter of law. On design defect, the court determined that Plaintiff failed to provide expert testimony that the risk of CoolSculpting outweighed its utility. Plaintiff challenged both of the district court’s rulings on appeal.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Zeltiq warned medical providers in its user manual and training sessions about the exact condition Plaintiff experienced: PAH is an increase of adipose tissue in the treatment area that may require surgery to correct. Accordingly, the district court properly concluded Zeltiq’s warnings were adequate as a matter of law. Further, the court held that it is convinced that Plaintiff’s defect claim fails under either test. View "Terrance Nelson Cates v. Zeltiq Aesthetics, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court dismissing the underlying wrongful death lawsuit, holding that the allegations of the petition established that Crystal May was entitled to official immunity, as a matter of law, and therefore, the petition failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.Plaintiff brought a wrongful death suit against May, alleging that May, a children's division caseworker, owed M.S., a toddler who died from a fentanyl overdose, a ministerial duty to make a SAFE CARE provider referral and that the failure to make such a referral under after M.S. died resulted in M.S.'s death. The circuit court dismissed the petition, finding that May was entitled to official immunity and that the complaint failed to allege sufficient facts establishing that May caused M.S.'s death. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the allegations of Plaintiff's petition established that May was entitled to official immunity as a matter of law. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the allegations in the petition established that May was entitled to official immunity as a matter of law. View "Forester v. May" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the order of the district court granting summary judgment in favor of the United States in this civil action brought by Gabiel Lozada-Manzano and his parents against the government under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. 1346(b)(1), alleging, among other claims, malicious prosecution, holding that there was no error.In 2013, a federal grand jury indicted Lozada-Manzano on charges of carjacking and use of a firearm during a crime of violence arising from a home invasion. When evidence later surfaced suggesting that Lozada-Manzano had been in policy custody at the time of the incident the prosecution successfully moved to dismiss the charges. Plaintiffs subsequently brought this action. The district court granted summary judgment for the government. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) Lozada-Manzano failed to raise a triable issue as to malice under Puerto Rico law on his malicious prosecution claim; and (2) Lozada-Manzano was not entitled to relief on his remaining allegations of error. View "Lozada-Manzano v. United States" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals reversing the judgment of the trial court granting Defendant's motion to dismiss Plaintiff's vicarious liability claims under the common-law rule, holding that Tennessee's Health Care Liability Act necessarily implied an intent to abrogate the common-law rule under the circumstances of this case. Plaintiff brought this action against Defendant-hospital alleging that Defendant, either directly or vicariously through its employees and agents, negligently caused the death of Sheila Warren. The trial court granted Defendant's motion to dismiss, concluding that the vicarious liability claims fell within the operation-of-law exception and thus were subject to dismissal. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the Act and the common law conflicted, and therefore, the provisions of the Act prevailed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the operation-of-law exception did not bar Plaintiff's claims. View "Ultsch v. HTI Memorial Hospital Corp." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals reversing the order of the trial court granting Defendant's motion for summary judgment under the common-law rule governing vicarious liability claims, holding that Tennessee's Health Care Liability Act necessarily implied an intent to abrogate the common-law rule under the circumstances of this case.Plaintiff-patient sued Defendant-hospital alleging that Defendant, acting through its employees or agents, negligently provided medical treatment to her. Defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing that the claims were barred under common law. The trial court granted the motion, concluding that the vicarious liability claims fell within the operation-of-law exception and were therefore subject to dismissal. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the claims were timely under the Act and that, given the conflict between the Act and the common law, the provisions of the Act prevailed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court of appeals correctly reversed the trial court's summary judgment in this case. View "Gardner v. Saint Thomas Midtown Hospital" on Justia Law

Raul Camacho was installing glass panels when he fell out of a scissor lift manufactured by JLG Industries Inc. (JLG). Camacho failed to latch a chain that was designed to guard the lift’s entrance. Camacho sued JLG for strict products liability, failure to warn, and related claims. At a jury trial, Camacho alleged the scissor lift as designed with the chain invited human error, and the foreseeable risk of harm could have been avoided if JLG had marketed only its alternative design with a self-closing gate. Camacho also alleged there was a defective warning label on the lift. At the close of evidence, JLG moved for a directed verdict. The trial court granted the motion. The court ruled in order to show causation Camacho needed to prove if the chain been latched, “the accident would have happened anyway.” To this, the Court of Appeal disagreed: "Camacho only needed to make a prima facie showing that the alternative design with the self-closing gate would have prevented his fall. Under a risk-benefit test, it was then JLG’s burden to prove the benefits of the chain outweighed its risks." The Court found Camacho made a prima facie showing of causation, and the jury could have reasonably inferred that had a self-closing gate been in place, Camacho’s fall would have been prevented. The Court also found the jurors could have reasonably inferred JLG’s allegedly defective warning label was also a substantial factor in causing Camacho’s injuries. Thus, the Court reversed the judgment and directed the trial court to vacate its order granting JLG’s motion for a directed verdict. View "Camacho v. JLG Industries" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs in two consolidated lawsuits against San Diego Guns, LLC (San Diego Guns) seeking a peremptory writ of mandate to direct the trial court to vacate its ruling that granted summary judgment to San Diego Guns on plaintiffs’ causes of action seeking to recover against San Diego Guns based on the doctrine of negligence per se. Plaintiffs’ theory of negligence per se was that San Diego Guns violated California law in selling the 19-year-old involved with the shooting at the Chabad of Poway synagogue, a rifle. According to plaintiffs, the shooter did not qualify for the then-existing exception that allowed a person under the age of 21 to be sold a rifle if that person possessed a “valid, unexpired hunting license.” The trial court granted summary judgment based on its conclusion that the shooter’s hunting license was valid and unexpired in April 2019 even though, on its face, the license stated that it was “Valid 07/01/2019 to 06/30/2020,” i.e., for a period beginning more than two months after San Diego Guns sold him the rifle. The trial court distinguished between the time period “when the license is ‘valid’ or effective for purposes of hunting,” which began on July 1, 2019, and the time period when “the license is valid for purposes of sale of the weapon,” which, according to the trial court, began when the license was issued in April 2019. The Court of Appeal found that the California Legislature's subsequent enactment of Penal Code section 16685, which clarified that “a valid and unexpired ‘hunting license’ means a hunting license . . . for which the time period authorized for the taking of birds or mammals has commenced but not expired,” the trial court erred in concluding that the shooter’s hunting license was valid for the purpose of purchasing a firearm. The Court accordingly granted plaintiffs' petition for a writ of mandate. View "Goldstein v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Several cities in Minnesota alleged that a chemical in refined coal tar that was used in pavement sealants contaminated their stormwater ponds. They filed an action seeking damages from refiners and manufacturers of the tar. The “refiner” defendants take raw coal tar and refine it into a product used by the “manufacturer” defendants to create pavement sealants. The district court dismissed all of the claims against the refiners and dismissed all but three of the claims against the manufacturers. The Cities moved under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) for entry of final judgment against the refiners. The district court, however, denied the motion because the Cities had not “demonstrated a danger of hardship or injustice through delay which would be alleviated by immediate appeal.” The Cities then entered into an agreement with the manufacturers, which provided that the Cities would conditionally dismiss their claims against the manufacturers. The Cities then appealed the district court’s decision dismissing claims against the refiners, and some of the refiners cross-appealed.   The Eighth Circuit dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The court concluded that this conditional dismissal of the Cities’ claims against the manufacturers does not create a final decision under 28 U.S.C. Section 1291. The whole purpose of pairing the voluntary dismissal with the tolling agreement was to provide for reinstatement of the claims in the event of reversal—that is, to make the dismissal conditional. The court wrote that its only power to prevent the manipulation of appellate jurisdiction is a rigorous application of the final judgment requirement. View "City of Burnsville v. Koppers, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court granting a summary judgment motion filed by Petitioners and two insurers, Farmers Insurance Exchange and Truck Insurance Exchange (collectively, Insurers), and denying Respondent's cross-motion for summary judgment, holding that the district court did not err by finding that Insurers had no duty to defend Respondent under the terms of the relevant insurance policies.After a complaint in the underlying lawsuit alleging slander, malicious prosecution, and bodily injury was amended to add Respondent as a defendant Respondent tendered the complaint to Farmers seeking defense and indemnity under a series of homeowners insurance policies and commercial general liability policies. Later, the Insurers filed a declaratory judgment action seeking a judicial determination that they were not obligated to defend and indemnity Respondent. The district court found that Insurers had no duty to defend Respondent under any of the policies. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Respondent failed to meet his burden of demonstrating that the claims fell within the scope of coverage of any of the policies at issue. View "Farmers Insurance Exchange v. Minemyer" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the district court granting a new trial and vacating the underlying judgment on a $168,500 jury verdict in favor of Plaintiff in an admitted-liability automobile accident case, holding that the district court abused its discretion when it concluded that Plaintiff did not receive a fair trial under Mont. Code Ann. 25-11-102(1).Plaintiff sued Defendant seeking damages for the injuries she received when Defendant rear-ended her. The jury rendered a verdict that Plaintiff was not contributorily negligent, she was injured in the collision, and the general damages sustained totaled $168,500. Thereafter, the district court granted Plaintiff's motion for a mistrial, ordered a new trial, and vacated the judgment, concluding that two statements by Plaintiff's counsel constituted an irregularity preventing a fair trial under Mont. Code Ann. 25-11-102(1). The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court misapplied Mont. R. Evid. 411 and abused its discretion when it ordered a new trial because the disputed statements were not sufficiently prejudicial to warrant a new trial. View "Voegel v. Salsbery" on Justia Law