Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

In this case, the Supreme Court of North Carolina dealt with the issue of whether a statute of limitations barred a defendant's counterclaim for negligence because it was filed one day after the three-year limitations period had expired. The court ruled that the counterclaim should be considered as having been filed on the same date that the plaintiff commenced his lawsuit, thus making it timely.The case originated from a two-automobile accident that occurred on 19 December 2015. The plaintiff filed a lawsuit against the defendant over injuries he allegedly sustained in the accident on 19 December 2018. The defendant filed a counterclaim against the plaintiff for his own injuries on 20 December 2018, arguing that the plaintiff's own negligence caused the accident. The plaintiff moved for summary judgment, asserting that the counterclaim should be dismissed under N.C.G.S. § 1-52(16) because it was filed outside the statute’s three-year limit for personal injury claims.The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff. The defendant appealed, arguing that his counterclaim filed on 20 December 2018 should be deemed to relate back to the filing of the original complaint by the plaintiff on 19 December 2018, and thus should be considered timely filed within the three-year statute of limitations. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s summary judgment order dismissing the defendant’s counterclaim.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals, reasoning that for purposes of the statute of limitations in N.C.G.S. § 1-52(16), the filing of a compulsory counterclaim relates back to the filing of the complaint. Therefore, the court held that N.C.G.S. § 1-52(16) did not bar the defendant’s compulsory counterclaim against the plaintiff. The case was remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Upchurch v. Harp Builders, Inc" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs, Jennifer Zeno-Ethridge and Dennis Ethridge, appealed from the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendants, Comcast Corporation, Eustis Cable, and Green Mountain Flagging. The suit arose from an incident in which Jennifer witnessed a fatal accident involving a utility truck and a flagger while she was driving. Following the incident, she was diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and depression.Jennifer sued the defendants for negligent infliction of emotional distress (NIED) and negligence, while Dennis filed a loss-of-consortium claim. The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendants, determining that Jennifer's contact with the flagger’s blood and brain matter did not constitute a "physical impact from external force" necessary for a NIED claim. It also concluded that Jennifer's PTSD diagnosis did not satisfy the "actual injury" requirement for a negligence claim.On appeal, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision, holding that the act of Jennifer stepping in the flagger's blood and brain matter was not a physical impact from an external force. Furthermore, the court clarified that a PTSD diagnosis alone is insufficient to satisfy the “actual injury” requirement of a negligence claim, as it is a mental or emotional harm, rather than a physical one. Consequently, Jennifer's NIED and negligence claims failed as a matter of law. Therefore, the defendants were entitled to summary judgment on Dennis's loss-of-consortium claim, which was dependent upon the success of Jennifer's claims. View "Zeno-Ethridge v. Comcast Corporation" on Justia Law

In the Supreme Court of Mississippi, two interlocutory appeals were consolidated, both arising from the same wrongful-death lawsuit. Beverly Butts, on behalf of the wrongful-death beneficiaries of John Albert Hemphill, Sr., alleged that four years prior to Hemphill's death, Dr. Reese Lindsey failed to remove part of a bladder catheter, leading to recurring infections and ultimately Hemphill's death. Additionally, she claimed that the staff at Greenwood Leflore Hospital, where Lindsey treated Hemphill, provided substandard care.Regarding Lindsey, the court found that he had not been lawfully served with process. Despite multiple summons, Butts failed to comply with the Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 4, which outlines the requirements for serving process. As a result, the trial court lacked jurisdiction over Lindsey, leading the Supreme Court to reverse the trial court's decision and render judgment dismissing Lindsey from the lawsuit.Concerning the Hospital, the court found that Butts had failed to provide the necessary medical expert testimony to support her medical negligence claim against the Hospital. Despite her argument that the Hospital's summary judgment motion was preemptive as no scheduling order had been set, the court noted that a defendant can file for summary judgment at any time. Given Butts's failure to present necessary expert testimony, the Supreme Court reversed the denial of summary judgment and rendered judgment in favor of the Hospital. View "Lindsey v. Butts" on Justia Law

In this case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed a verdict from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas. The plaintiffs, C. Sidney Johnston and Danette Johnston, had sued Ferrellgas, Incorporated after Mr. Johnston was injured using a propane tank manufactured by Ferrellgas. A jury had found Ferrellgas liable for a manufacturing defect and negligence and awarded the Johnstons $7 million, which the district court reduced to $1.7 million. On appeal, Ferrellgas contended that the district court erred in denying its motion for judgment as a matter of law because there was insufficient evidence to support the verdict.The Court of Appeals agreed with Ferrellgas. The Court found that there was no substantial evidence to support the jury's finding that the tank was defective when it left Ferrellgas's possession, a crucial element of a manufacturing defect claim. The Court also found that the negligence claim must fail, as it was dependent on the tank having a manufacturing defect.The Court therefore reversed the district court's denial of Ferrellgas's motion for judgment as a matter of law on both the manufacturing defect and negligence claims, and rendered judgment for Ferrellgas. View "Johnston v. Ferrellgas" on Justia Law

This case revolves around the fatal shooting of Daniel Hernandez by Officer Toni McBride of the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD). Hernandez's estate and family members filed a lawsuit against McBride, the LAPD, and the City of Los Angeles, alleging violations of Hernandez's Fourth Amendment rights, the family members' Fourteenth Amendment rights, and several state law claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit concluded that a reasonable jury could find that the force McBride used in her final two shots was excessive, but she was entitled to qualified immunity because she did not violate clearly established law. The court explained that while the Fourth Amendment excessive force claim could proceed to trial, McBride was protected by qualified immunity because no prior case law established that her conduct was unlawful.The court also dismissed the Fourteenth Amendment claim, stating that plaintiffs failed to show that McBride acted with a purpose to harm without regard to legitimate law enforcement objectives. The court further ruled that the Monell claim against the City of Los Angeles and the LAPD failed because even if there was an underlying constitutional violation, plaintiffs failed to provide any basis for holding the City and LAPD liable for McBride’s actions.However, the court reversed the dismissal of plaintiffs' state law claims for assault, wrongful death, and violation of the Bane Act, determining that the reasonableness of McBride's final shots presented a question for a trier of fact. The court thus sent these claims back to the district court for further proceedings. View "In re Estate of Hernandez v. City of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

In a lawsuit between two competitors in the shipping logistics industry, Project44, Inc. and FourKites, Inc., Project44 alleged that FourKites agents sent defamatory emails to Project44's chief revenue officer and two members of its board of directors. FourKites argued that there was no publication to a third party because the emails were sent to members of the corporation who were, in effect, the corporation itself. The Cook County circuit court agreed with FourKites and dismissed Project44's complaint for failure to state a claim. On appeal, the appellate court reversed the decision, and the case was remanded for further proceedings.The Supreme Court of the State of Illinois affirmed the decision of the appellate court, holding that there is publication to a third party when an allegedly defamatory statement is communicated to a member of a corporation’s executive leadership team. It was determined that a corporation has a distinct reputation from that of its management-level employees and an interest in protecting that reputation among its employees and the public at large. Therefore, defamatory statements made to corporate employees, even those with the power to act on behalf of the corporation, can harm the corporation’s business reputation among those employees. Communication of a defamatory statement regarding the corporation to these employees establishes the publication element for a defamation action brought by the corporation against the party that publishes the statement. View "Project44, Inc. v. FourKites, Inc." on Justia Law

The Michigan Supreme Court, in a per curiam opinion, addressed the applicability of the Recreational Land Use Act (RUA) and the owner-liability provision of the Michigan Vehicle Code to a case involving a fatal off-road vehicle (ORV) accident. The accident occurred on private land owned by the defendants, also the grandparents and vehicle owners, and involved their 12-year-old granddaughter. The plaintiff, mother of the deceased, sought to hold the defendants liable.The court held that the RUA, which limits a landowner's liability for injuries occurring during recreational activity on their property to instances of gross negligence or willful and wanton misconduct, applies in this case. It found that the RUA applies to the plaintiff's proposed owner-liability claim, which is premised on the defendants' ownership of the vehicle involved in the accident. The court reasoned that the longstanding nature of owner liability when the RUA was enacted, the RUA's detailed provisions and lack of an exception for owner liability, and the optimal effect given to both statutes under this interpretation, indicate that the legislature intended the RUA to limit owner liability under the Michigan Vehicle Code.Since the plaintiff did not challenge the lower court's finding that there was no factual support for gross negligence on the part of the defendants, the court affirmed the trial court's decision granting the defendants' motion for summary disposition and denying the plaintiff's motion to amend her complaint. View "Estate Of Riley Robinson v. Robinson" on Justia Law

In West Virginia, a woman sued the City of Logan after she tripped over a loop of cable wire on a sidewalk, which she alleged the city negligently maintained. The cable wire and post were owned by the First Baptist Church of Logan, West Virginia, and the wire had been around the pole for at least ten years. The woman had walked the same route on her lunch break daily for over a year prior to the accident. She testified that she had never noticed the wire before the day of her injury.The city, in its defense, pointed out that it did not own the wire, had never received any reports about the wire causing a hazard, and did not have any notice or knowledge that the wire was on the sidewalk before the woman's fall. Street Commissioner for the City of Logan, Kevin Marcum, testified that under city ordinances, property owners are in charge of sidewalks.Following discovery, the circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of the city, finding that the woman failed to support a negligence claim under West Virginia law. The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia affirmed this decision, agreeing that the woman failed to establish that the city knew or should have known that the wire was on the sidewalk causing a potential hazard. The court held that foreseeability or reasonable anticipation of the consequences of an act is determinative of a defendant’s negligence. Because there was no evidence demonstrating that the city knew or should have known that the wire was on the sidewalk causing a potential hazard, the court concluded that the city was entitled to summary judgment. View "Orso v. The City of Logan" on Justia Law

The case involves Michael Goguen, an engineer and businessman, who was the subject of two civil suits alleging sexual and criminal misconduct. The New York Post published an article detailing these lawsuits, which Goguen claimed was defamatory. Goguen filed a defamation lawsuit against New York Post's parent company, NYP Holdings, and others. In response, NYP Holdings argued that their article was protected by New York’s fair report privilege, a law that protects media from defamation suits if they are reporting on official proceedings.However, the District Court in Montana, where Goguen resides, applied Montana law and denied NYP Holdings' motion to dismiss, finding that whether the article was privileged was a question of fact for the jury. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Montana determined that under Montana's choice of law rules, New York law should be applied to determine the fair report privilege. The Court found that all the contested statements in the article fairly and accurately reported the lawsuits against Goguen and were thus protected by New York's fair report privilege. Therefore, the Court held that NYP Holdings was entitled to dismissal of Goguen’s complaint.The Court also upheld the District Court's decision to dismiss Goguen's defamation claim against former police chief Bill Dial, ruling that Dial's statements in the article were protected opinions and not actionable. View "Goguen v. NYP Holdings" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of the State of Montana affirmed a lower court decision that granted Dr. Gregory S. Tierney's motion to dismiss a medical malpractice lawsuit filed by Janice M. Dodds for insufficient service of process. Dodds initially filed the suit against Dr. Tierney and Benefis Health System in 2013, alleging medical malpractice related to a knee replacement surgery. She failed to serve the defendants in time. Dr. Tierney later filed for bankruptcy, which invoked an automatic stay, halting the lawsuit. After his bankruptcy discharge, Dodds attempted to serve Dr. Tierney but failed to do so within the required 30-day timeframe following the discharge.Dodds further sought to join Dr. Tierney's malpractice insurance company as the real party in interest, but the court denied the motion. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that Dodds had not proven Dr. Tierney's liability, thus the insurer had no duty to indemnify him. The court also rejected Dodds' argument that Dr. Tierney lacked standing after his Chapter 7 discharge. The court held that Dr. Tierney maintained a personal stake in demonstrating he was not liable for medical malpractice and that his insurer would only have a duty to indemnify him once Dodds proved her malpractice claims. View "Dodds v. Tierney" on Justia Law