Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

In this case, the Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma addressed a claim brought by a mother seeking recovery for the loss of her minor child who had drowned in a neighbor's swimming pool. The mother alleged negligence against the property owner, claiming that the swimming pool was an "attractive nuisance." Initially, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the property owner, arguing that the owner did not owe a duty to the child. The mother appealed the decision, leading the Court of Civil Appeals to reverse the district court's judgment, positing that whether the swimming pool was an attractive nuisance was a fact for the jury to decide.Upon review, the Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma held that the swimming pool was not an attractive nuisance as a matter of law. The court observed that the pool did not contain any hidden or unusual element of danger. However, the court also determined that a question of fact remained regarding whether the owner could be held liable under ordinary premises liability law. This conclusion barred summary judgment in favor of the property owner.Thus, while the Court affirmed the district court's judgment concerning the attractive nuisance claim, it reversed the decision on the issue of ordinary premises liability. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the Supreme Court's opinion. It was noted that these circumstances would allow a jury to evaluate all surrounding facts in determining liability under ordinary premises liability law. View "Brown v. Dempster" on Justia Law

This case involves Jade P. Schiewe and Zachary Pfaff, who filed a lawsuit against the Cessna Aircraft Company, alleging negligence after a plane crash in September 2010. The plaintiffs were flying a Cessna 172RG when a fire erupted in the cockpit, leading to a crash landing. They claimed that Cessna was negligent in not updating its service manual to include a new part and its installation instructions. Cessna, however, filed a motion for summary judgment, contending that the plaintiffs' claims were barred by the General Aviation Revitalization Act of 1994 (GARA), an act that limits liability for aircraft manufacturers 18 years after the delivery of the aircraft to its first purchaser.The Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma affirmed the lower court's decision to grant summary judgment in favor of Cessna. The court held that the service manual was created by Cessna in its capacity as a manufacturer, and thus, was included within the limitation period provided in GARA. The court further found that Cessna had not added or omitted anything to the service manual that was a proximate cause of the accident, and thus, the GARA statute of repose did not restart. Therefore, the plaintiffs' claims were barred by GARA as the statute of repose had expired. View "SCHIEWE v. CESSNA AIRCRAFT CO" on Justia Law

In a medical malpractice case before the Supreme Court of the State of Nevada, the plaintiff, Kimberly D. Taylor, sued Dr. Keith Brill and Women’s Health Associates of Southern Nevada-Martin PLLC for professional negligence. Taylor alleged that Dr. Brill breached the standard of care by perforating her uterus and bowel during a surgical procedure and failed to inform her of these complications. The jury ruled in favor of Dr. Brill and denied all of Taylor’s claims.The Supreme Court of Nevada held that in a professional negligence action, evidence of informed consent and assumption of the risk are irrelevant and inadmissible when the plaintiff does not challenge consent. The court stated that even if a plaintiff gave informed consent, it would not vitiate the medical provider’s duty to provide treatment according to the ordinary standard of care. Furthermore, evidence of a procedure’s risks must still fall within Nevada's professional negligence statute, and a case-by-case analysis is required to determine whether the evidence should be excluded due to its potential to confuse the jury.The court also held that expert or physician testimony is not required to demonstrate the reasonableness of the billing amount of special damages. The court found that the district court had abused its discretion by prohibiting non-expert evidence demonstrating the reasonableness of the charges for medical treatment received by Taylor.Finally, the court ruled that evidence of insurance write-downs is not admissible under NRS 42.021(1), as it only contemplates evidence of actual benefits paid to the plaintiff by collateral sources.Based on these errors, the Supreme Court of Nevada reversed the judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings, including a new trial. View "Taylor v. Brill" on Justia Law

Dorothy Hampton was released from the Medical Center of Southeast Texas after an abdominal hernia surgery. Later that night, she fell at home, becoming confused and disoriented, and was readmitted to the hospital. She filed a health care liability claim against Dr. Leonard Thome, alleging that she was released prematurely from the hospital which led to her fall and subsequent mental and physical injuries. Hampton's lawyer sent a pre-suit notice to Dr. Thome along with a medical authorization form as required under Texas law before filing a suit. The form listed only two providers and omitted future health care providers.Hampton filed her suit outside the usual two-year statute of limitations but within the 75-day tolling period provided by the law. Dr. Thome argued that the lawsuit was filed outside the limitations period as the medical authorization form served by Hampton was deficient, and hence the 75-day tolling period was not applicable. The trial court rejected this argument, but the court of appeals reversed the decision.The Supreme Court of Texas held that an imperfect medical authorization form is still a medical authorization form, which is sufficient to toll the statute of limitations for 75 days. The court emphasized that the limitations period should be established with clarity at the outset. Any defects or omissions in the medical authorization form that came to light during the litigation could have been adequately addressed by the statutory remedy of abatement, additional discovery, or even sanctions. The judgment of the court of appeals was reversed, and the case was remanded for further proceedings. View "HAMPTON v. THOME" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of Nevada ruled on a motion for disqualification of a supreme court justice in a medical malpractice action appeal. The appellant argued that Nevada Code of Judicial Conduct 2.11(A)(6)(d) required disqualification of Justice Douglas Herndon, who had been assigned the case when he was a district judge, but had not heard or decided any matters in the case before it was reassigned. The appellant argued that the rule required disqualification whenever a judge previously presided over a matter, regardless of the level of involvement.Justice Herndon and the respondents countered that he had seen no documents and performed no work on the case at the district court level, and therefore his impartiality could not be questioned. They argued that the Code of Judicial Conduct does not require disqualification in such circumstances, and that a judge has a general duty to hear and decide cases where disqualification is not required.After considering the language and context of the Code of Judicial Conduct, along with similar cases from other jurisdictions, the Supreme Court of Nevada held that to "preside" over a matter within the meaning of the disqualification rule, a judge must have exercised some control or authority over the matter in the lower court. Given that Justice Herndon had simply been administratively assigned the case and took no action during his assignment, he did not "preside" over the case in a way that mandated disqualification. The court therefore denied the motion for disqualification. View "Taylor v. Brill" on Justia Law

This case revolves around a lawsuit filed by Tiffiny Grace, legal guardian of E.G., against Sunrise Hospital and Nurse Cord Olsen for professional negligence. E.G. was born prematurely at Sunrise Hospital and suffered permanent developmental damage following a cardiac arrest in the Neonatal Intensive Care Unit. The hospital's Patient Safety Committee investigated the incident, which Grace sought to examine during discovery. However, Sunrise Hospital objected, asserting that the information was privileged under the Patient Safety and Quality Improvement Act of 2005 (PSQIA) and Nevada law. The district court compelled the testimony, ruling that Sunrise Hospital had waived any privilege by allowing testimony on certain privileged topics.The Supreme Court of the State of Nevada, however, disagreed with the lower court's interpretation. It ruled that the PSQIA provides an absolute privilege for patient safety work products that is not subject to waiver. The court explained that this privilege aims to encourage healthcare providers to identify and learn from errors without fear of legal repercussions. The court concluded that the district court erred by interpreting the PSQIA to allow for waiver of privilege and by failing to determine whether the testimony sought constituted identifiable or non-identifiable patient safety work product. Therefore, the court granted a writ of prohibition, vacated the district court's order, and directed the lower court to reconsider Grace's motion to compel in light of its interpretation of the PSQIA. View "Sunrise Hospital v. Eighth Judicial District Court" on Justia Law

In a case before the Supreme Court of the State of Oregon, the plaintiffs, Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s London, sued TNA NA Manufacturing, Inc. and Food Design, Inc., claiming negligence and product liability for a listeria outbreak that resulted from using the defendants' food processing equipment. The outbreak cost the plaintiffs around $20 million. The trial court and Court of Appeals upheld that the plaintiffs had waived any action in tort through their purchase contract with the defendants, as the contract contained a waiver of tort liability. The Supreme Court of Oregon, however, disagreed.The court ruled that, under Oregon law, a contract will not be construed to provide immunity from consequences of a party’s own negligence unless that intention is clearly and unequivocally expressed. The court found that the language in the contract between the plaintiffs and defendants did not meet this standard. The court held that to waive tort liability, contract language must be clear and explicit, stating that the waiver will not be deduced from inference or implication. The text of the contract must unambiguously show that the parties intended to disclaim actions outside of contract, i.e., actions in tort.Consequently, the court reversed the judgment of the circuit court and remanded the case back to the circuit court for further proceedings. The court confirmed that, while no magic words are required for a waiver of tort liability to be effective, the use of terms such as "negligence" or "tort" may be helpful in demonstrating an explicit intent to waive such liability. View "Certain Underwriters v. TNA NA Manufacturing" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of Florida was tasked with reviewing a case involving the interpretation of the state's comparative fault statute and its application to tort actions involving the "dram-shop exception." The case originated from a tragic accident in which an intoxicated 18-year-old, Jacquelyn Faircloth, was hit by a speeding truck driven by an intoxicated 20-year-old, Devon Dwyer. Faircloth's guardianship sued two bars, asserting that they had "willfully and unlawfully" served alcohol to Dwyer and Faircloth, leading to their intoxication and the subsequent accident.The central legal question in this case was whether the action permitted under the dram-shop exception, section 768.125, which allows liability when alcohol is "willfully and unlawfully" provided to an underage patron causing intoxication and injury, is a "negligence action" for the purposes of the comparative fault statute, section 768.81.The court agreed with the district court’s finding that the action permitted by the underage drinker exception in section 768.125 is indeed a negligence action for purposes of the comparative fault statute, section 768.81. The court reasoned that while the dram-shop exception requires a finding of willful misconduct, this does not alter the basic relationship between the defendant’s conduct and the plaintiff’s injury inherent in a negligence claim. The court clarified that willfulness in this context pertains to the defendant’s knowledge of the purchaser's underage status, not an intentional infliction of harm.The court did not, however, rule on the district court's conclusions about how fault should be allocated among the bars and underage patrons involved in the case, considering those issues outside the scope of the certified question. View "Faircloth v. Main Street Entertainment, Inc., etc." on Justia Law

The case involved David Papenhausen, who sustained an injury when his foot fell through a hole concealed by a layer of ice and snow on an oil well site operated by ConocoPhillips Company and Burlington Resources Oil & Gas Company LP. Papenhausen sued the companies under North Dakota law, alleging negligence and premises liability due to the existence of an unreasonably dangerous hole concealed by ice and snow due to the defendants' negligent maintenance of the well site.The Supreme Court of North Dakota answered two certified questions from the United States District Court for the District of North Dakota concerning the state's natural accumulation rule, which generally precludes liability for injuries caused by natural accumulations of snow and ice. The questions asked whether the rule applies to an oil well site in a rural area and if it still applies if it conceals a condition substantially more dangerous than one typically associated with ice and snow.The court answered the first question in the affirmative, ruling that the natural accumulation rule does apply to a rural oil well site. The court reasoned that it is unreasonable to expect property owners to continually monitor and clear snow or ice from remote areas. For the second question, the court answered in the negative, stating that the concealment of a dangerous condition by snow or ice is outside the scope of the natural accumulation rule. The court held that when snow or ice conceals a separate danger, the question of the owner's duty is considered differently - focusing on the obviousness of that danger and whether the owner knew or should have known about it. View "Papenhausen v. ConocoPhillips Co." on Justia Law

In 2021, a warehouse developed by TriStar Companies, LLC but possessed by Amazon collapsed during a tornado, causing injuries and deaths. Several personal injury and wrongful death lawsuits were filed against TriStar, claiming negligence in the warehouse's construction. TriStar, insured by AXIS Surplus Insurance Company, sought coverage under their policy, but AXIS denied coverage and filed a complaint for a declaratory judgment that it had no duty to defend or indemnify TriStar for the resulting lawsuits. The district court granted AXIS's motion for summary judgment, ruling that the insurance policy did not cover the warehouse due to certain exclusions and limitations.Upon appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision. The Court of Appeals applied Missouri law, giving the insurance policy terms "the meaning which would be attached by an ordinary person of average understanding if purchasing insurance." The court found that the policy's language was clear and unambiguous. It limited coverage to premises owned, rented, or occupied by TriStar per a schedule of locations on file with AXIS. As the warehouse's location was not listed in the schedule, and TriStar did not own, rent, or occupy the warehouse when the incident occurred, the court concluded that the policy did not cover the incident.The court rejected TriStar's interpretation of the schedule of locations, which would have resulted in coverage extending to an entire city, as untenable and against common sense. Therefore, AXIS had no duty to defend or indemnify TriStar for the lawsuits arising from the warehouse collapse. View "Axis Surplus Insurance Company v. TriStar Companies, LLC" on Justia Law