Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court dismissing the appeal brought by the Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities in this housing discrimination case, holding that this Court was compelled to affirm.For several years, Richard Cantillon harassed his neighbor, Kelly Howard, by making obscene gestures, calling her racial epithets, and physically menacing Howard. Howard eventually filed a neighbor versus neighbor claim with the Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities, alleging that Cantillon had violated her civil rights on account of her race. Cantillon defaulted, and the referee awarded Plaintiff $15,000 in damages. The Commission appealed the award as insufficient, but neither Howard nor Cantillon participated in the appeal. The trial court dismissed the appeal, concluding that there was no legal basis for it to second-guess the amount of the award. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the appellate court appropriately resolved the Commission's claims under the circumstances of this case. View "Comm'n on Human Rights & Opportunities v. Cantillon" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that absolute immunity attaches to statements made in judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings and that while Jane Doe was not entitled to absolute immunity, a qualified privilege is appropriate for alleged victims of sexual assault presented in the context of this case.In disciplinary proceedings conducted at Yale University by the University-Wide Committee on Sexual Misconduct (UWC) Doe accused Plaintiff of sexual assault, resulting in Plaintiff's expulsion from Yale and criminal charges being brought against him. Plaintiff was acquitted. At issue in this appeal was whether Doe, who enjoyed absolute immunity in a subsequent civil action challenging her testimony given during Plaintiff's criminal proceeding, should likewise be afforded absolute immunity from suit for her statements made during the UWC proceeding. The Supreme Court held (1) absolute immunity attaches to statements in judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings; (2) the USC's proceeding did not meet the conditions necessary to be considered quasi-judicial, and therefore, Doe was not entitled to absolute immunity; but (3) due to the public interest in encouraging the proper reporting of sexual assaults a qualified privilege is appropriate for alleged victims of sexual assault at institutions of higher education. View "Khan v. Yale University" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court denying Plaintiff's challenge to the constitutional validity of Mo. Rev. Stat. 303.390, which prohibited Plaintiff from collecting noneconomic damages in her personal injury lawsuit filed against Defendant, with whom she had been in a motor vehicle accident, holding that Plaintiff was not entitled to relief.At the time of the underlying accident, Plaintiff was an uninsured motorist prohibited from recovering noneconomic damages under section 303.390. The circuit court awarded Plaintiff economic damages for her medical bills but denied her renewed motion to strike Defendant's affirmative defense regarding section 303.390. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Plaintiff failed properly to preserve her constitutional argument for appellate review. View "Bridegan v. Turntine" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court dismissing Petitioner's petition seeking relief from fraudulent transfers Respondent made to hinder collection of her judgments against him, holding that Petitioner adequately alleged facts that, if true, entitled her to relief under the Uniform Fraudulent Transfers Act (UFTA), Mo. Rev. Stat. 428.005 to 428.059.On appeal, Petitioner argued that she alleged facts that, if taken as true, demonstrated that she was Respondent's creditor and that he made two transfers with the actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud her and, regarding one of the transfers, without receiving an equivalent value in exchange and either was insolvent or became insolvent as a result of the transfer. The Supreme Court agreed and remanded the case, holding that Petitioner adequately pleaded a claim for relief under both Mo. Rev. Stat. 428.024.1(1) and Mo. Rev. Stat. 928.029.1. View "Konopasek v. Konopasek" on Justia Law

In April 2019, plaintiff Zach Bellard petitioned for damages for personal injuries he allegedly sustained when a defective attic/ceiling joist broke and caused him to fall while working as a plumber on a construction project (the “Project”) involving renovations to a building located on the campus of The University of Louisiana at Lafayette (“ULL”). Plaintiff named as defendants: ATK Construction, LLC (“ATK”), Bernard, the Board of Supervisors for the University of Louisiana System, Garden City Construction Co., Inc., United Fire & Indemnity Company, and American Empire Surplus Lines Insurance Company. Plaintiff alleged his injuries were due to the fault and negligence of the Defendants and that, as a result of their fault and/or obligation to insure, Defendants were individually and jointly liable. Plaintiff did not allege any contractual privity with the Defendants, including Bernard, or any other source of liability beyond negligence. Over one year after Plaintiff filed his petition, Bernard filed a third party demand against Doug Ashy, alleging it entered into a contract with ULL in 2017 to furnish all labor, materials, equipment, transportation, supervision, permits, etc., necessary to complete “Phase I” renovations to the Project. Doug Ashy filed an Exception of Prematurity and an Exception of Prescription, asserting: (1) the tort indemnity claim was premature because Bernard had not suffered a compensable loss; and (2) the claims for redhibition and products liability were prescribed because Bernard failed to file its third party demand within 90 days of Plaintiff’s demand pursuant to La. C.C.P. art. 1041. Doug Ashy also filed an Exception of No Right and/or No Cause of Action. The district court granted the Exception of Prematurity and Exception of Prescription and found the Exception of No Right and/or No Cause of Action to be moot as a result of its ruling. While both Doug Ashy and Bernard focused their arguments to the Louisiana Supreme Court on prematurity and prescription of Bernard’s third party claims, the Court observed it was questionable whether the facts alleged in the petition could ever support a third party claim for tort indemnity. The Court remanded the case to the district court for reconsideration of Plaintiff's exceptions: "a suit alleging liability of a defendant arising solely as a result of its own fault cannot support a defendant’s claim for tort indemnity." View "Bellard v. ATK Construction, LLC et al." on Justia Law

In the summer of 2010, SD and DJ attended the Rock Solid Camp, a Shreveport day camp providing sports and other activities to children of varying ages. SD was an eight-year-old special education student with a mild case of Cornelia de Lange Syndrome (“CdLS”). At that time, fourteen-year-old DJ was on probation for aggravated sexual assault of a child under the age of fourteen in Texas and had been accused of a sexual assault in March 2010 at Northwest Regional Mental Health Center, where he had been receiving counseling. As a juvenile on probation, DJ was eligible for State-provided services. DJ’s case coordinator at the Shreveport region Office of Behavioral Health (“OBH”), an arm of the State of Louisiana, Department of Health and Hospitals (“DHH”), approved the funding for DJ to attend Rock Solid Camp, and the State of Louisiana paid his camp tuition. Jared Green, a camp counselor, gave SD permission to use the men’s restroom. When SD took longer than expected to return, Mr. Green went into the restroom and discovered SD and DJ in a shower stall pulling up their pants. Camp officials reported the incident to the Shreveport Police Department, which conducted an investigation. SD was examined by a hospital sexual assault nurse examiner, but no physical injuries were noted. SD gave a taped video statement indicating that DJ anally raped him. DJ was arrested for aggravated rape and adjudicated delinquent. CD, individually and as tutor of his son SD, filed a petition for damages, naming as defendants, SC (mother of DJ); Rock Solid Camps, LLC; and the State of Louisiana, through DHH. The Louisiana Supreme Court granted certiorari in this matter to consider whether the court of appeal erred by reducing the general damages awarded to SD, the minor victim of a sexual assault. After reviewing the record, the Supreme Court found the jury did not abuse its discretion in assessing the amount of general damages, and the court of appeal erred in holding otherwise. The trial court’s award of general damages was reinstated in accord with jury’s verdict. In all other respects, the court of appeal’s judgment was affirmed. View "C.D. v. S.C., et al." on Justia Law

Defendants, the Congregation of Holy Cross Southern Province, Inc. and Holy Cross College, Inc. (collectively “Holy Cross”), challenged the constitutionality of 2021 La. Acts 322, §2 (“Act 322”), an enactment of the Louisiana legislature that amended La. R.S. 9:2800.9 and revived prescribed child sex abuse claims for a limited three-year period (sometimes referred to as “revival provision”). Plaintiff T.S. directly appealed the trial court’s judgment sustaining Holy Cross’s exception of prescription. In sustaining the exception, the trial court found the matter could not be resolved on non-constitutional grounds and declared Act 322, §2 unconstitutional, reasoning that the legislature lacked authority to revive a prescribed claim. After reviewing the record, along with the pertinent legislation, the Louisiana Supreme Court concluded the trial court erred in finding Act 322 unconstitutional when this matter could be resolved on non-constitutional, statutory grounds. Nevertheless, the Court found the trial court was correct in granting the exception of prescription. View "T.S. v. Congregation of Holy Cross Southern Province, et al." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court quashed the decision of the superior court granting Defendant's motion to compel production of a complete, unreacted copy of a settlement agreement between Plaintiffs and the former codefendants who settled Plaintiffs' claims, holding that the trial justice abused her discretion in granting Defendant's motion.In granting Defendant's motion to compel production, the trial justice concluded that the amount paid in accordance with the settlement agreement was not discoverable "pursuant to Rhode Island and federal law." When Plaintiffs failed to comply with the order the superior court granted Defendant's motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court quashed the decision below and remanded the case, holding that the trial justice abused her discretion in granting Defendant's motion to compel production of a complete, unreacted copy of the settlement agreement. View "Noonan v. Sambandam" on Justia Law

Medytox’s patent is directed to the use of an animal-protein-free botulinum toxin composition that exhibits a longer-lasting effect compared to an animal protein-containing botulinum toxin composition and purportedly can be used to treat both cosmetic and non-cosmetic conditions. Galderma requested post-grant review of claims 1–10, which the Patent Trial and Appeal Board granted. Medytox filed a non-contingent motion to amend seeking to cancel claims 1–10 and substitute claims 11–18 and requested that the Board issue a Preliminary Guidance. Galderma argued that the claims added new matter because the claims covered compounds with a 16-week responder rate between 50-100% but the specification only disclosed responder rates of up to 62%.Reversing its Preliminary Guidance, the Board found that the substitute claims impermissibly introduced new matter with the inclusion of the responder rate limitation and failed to meet the requirements for revised motions to amend; that the proposed substitute claims were unpatentable for a lack of written description; and that the full scope of the claims was not enabled.The Federal Circuit affirmed, upholding the Board’s claim construction of the responder rate limitation as a range. The Board provided adequate explanation for its enablement finding. The Board’s revision of its claim construction of the responder rate limitation made between its Preliminary Guidance and final decision was not arbitrary and capricious, depriving Medytox of a full and fair opportunity to litigate. View "Medytox, Inc. v. Galderma S.A." on Justia Law

Plaintiff alleged that a Transportation Security Officer (“TSO”) sexually assaulted her during an airport security screening. At issue is whether Plaintiff may bring claims for battery and intentional infliction of emotional distress against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”).   The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s summary judgment in favor of the United States. The panel held that TSOs fall under the FTCA’s “law enforcement proviso,” which waives sovereign immunity for torts such as assault and battery committed by “investigative or law enforcement officers of the United States Government.” 28 U.S.C. Section 2680(h). The panel joined the Third, Fourth, and Eighth Circuits in holding that the FTCA’s limited waiver of sovereign immunity applies to certain intentional torts committed by TSOs. The district court, therefore, had subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s FTCA claims.   The panel considered whether, as officers of the United States, TSOs are “empowered by law to execute searches, to seize evidence, or to make arrests for violations of Federal law.” 28 U.S.C. Section 2680(h). The government argued that TSOs do not “execute searches” by conducting screenings. The panel held that the screenings fit the ordinary, contemporary, and common meanings of searches. View "MICHELE LEUTHAUSER V. USA, ET AL" on Justia Law