Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court in this case alleging malicious prosecution, civil conspiracy, and abuse of process claims against certain officials involved in Petitioner's prosecution for domestic battery and domestic assault, of which he was acquitted at trial, holding that there was no error.Petitioner Norm Launi II brought claims of malicious prosecution and civil conspiracy against West Virginia State Police Corporal Scott Nazelrod, special prosecuting attorney John Ours, and prosecuting attorney in Hampshire County Dan James and also asserted a claim for abuse of process against Nazelrod. The circuit court dismissed the claims against James and Ours on the basis of absolute prosecutorial immunity and found that Petitioner failed to state valid claims as to Nazelrod. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court (1) properly dismissed the claims against James and Ours based on prosecutorial functions; and (2) did not err in concluding that Petitioner's claims against Nazelrod for malicious prosecution, civil conspiracy, and abuse of process failed on their merits. View "Launi v. Hampshire County Prosecuting Attorney's Office" on Justia Law

In April 2015, federal agent Quinn shot and killed Kellom while trying to arrest him. Kellom’s estate sued Quinn under the Federal Tort Claims Act with a “Bivens” excessive-force claim. The government replaced Quinn as the defendant in the tort claims. The estate then filed an unsuccessful claim with Quinn’s employer, DHS. The FTCA requires plaintiffs to seek relief “first” from the federal agency within two years: the government notified the estate that it needed to bring a new lawsuit for its FTCA claims. Instead, in May 2018, the estate amended its complaint, asserting the same claims. The district court treated the FTCA exhaustion requirement as jurisdictional and dismissed the FTCA claims. The Bivens claim proceeded. A jury ruled in Quinn’s favor. Meanwhile, Kellom’s family members brought FTCA claims by joining the estate’s amended complaint, which was filed in May 2018. The family had not sought relief from DHS, so the district court dismissed those claims. In October 2018, the family filed a claim with DHS. DHS denied the claim. Rather than rejoin the estate’s lawsuit, the family filed a new one. The district court dismissed the family’s claims as untimely.The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The government did not waive or forfeit its exhaustion defense in the estate’s case by failing to oppose a motion to amend. The estate did not cure its failure to exhaust by filing an amended complaint. The family’s claims were untimely. View "Kellom v. Quinn" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs were injured in an auto accident and brought product liability claims against the vehicle’s manufacturer. In the course of litigation, the manufacturer moved to exclude Plaintiffs’ two liability experts, moved for a new trial and a judgment as a matter of law, and objected to the denial of a jury instruction regarding the presumption of nonliability (“the presumption”). Ultimately, the manufacturer was found liable and ordered to pay nearly $5 million in damages.On appeal, the manufacturer argued the district court erred in denying the motions and rejecting the requested instruction. The Fifth Circuit affirmed, finding that Plaintiffs’ experts based their opinions on reliable methodologies and provided relevant, helpful testimony. View "Kim v. American Honda Motor" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the determination of the district court granting Hill County, Montana, and Blaine County, Montana summary judgment on the standalone claims brought by the Estate of A.J. Longsoldier, Jr. for negligence and denying its cross-motion for partial summary judgment on liability, holding that remand was required for further proceedings.Longsoldier died in 2009 while in Hill County's custody. In the first appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the determination that neither Blaine County, where Longsoldier was arrested, nor Hill County discriminated against Longsoldier on the basis of race or disability. In the second appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the ruling that Hill County could be held vicariously liable for the negligence of the hospital where Longsoldier was treated during his detention. In this third appeal, the Supreme Court reversed in part and remanded the case, holding that the district court (1) erred in determining that the Estate's negligence claim against Hill County was barred by principles of issue preclusion; (2) erred in ruling that the Estate may not pursue a negligence claim against Blaine County; and (3) did not err in denying the Estate's motion for partial summary judgment on liability. View "Stricker v. Blaine County" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed in part and vacated in part the district court's grant of summary judgment to the United States on Petitioner's claims brought under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) and to the Suffolk County Sheriff's Department (SCSD) on Petitioner's claims brought under the Rehabilitation Act (RHA), 29 U.S.C. 794, and Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12132, holding that the district court erred in granting summary judgment as to Petitioner's FTCA claims.Petitioner filed this action setting forth FTCA claims against the United States based on the treatment to which he was allegedly subjected while he was in immigration custody, as well as claims brought under the RHA and the ADA based on the alleged discrimination against him owing to his disability during his detention. The district court granted summary judgment for Defendants. The First Circuit vacated the judgment in part, holding that the district court (1) erred in granting summary judgment to the United States as it pertained to Petitioner's FTCA claims; but (2) did not err in awarding summary judgment to SCSD on Petitioner's RHA and ADA claims. View "Thiersaint v. Dep't of Homeland Security" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court declined to answer the first portion of a certified question and answered the second portion of the certified question that a settlement payment made by an uninsured motorist insurer to settle a first-party bad faith claim is not a collateral source under Fla. Stat. 768.76(2)(a)2.Plaintiff, who was injured in a car crash, sued Defendant for vicarious liability based on Defendant's co-ownership of the other car involved in the crash. Plaintiff further sued his uninsured motorist insurance carrier, seeking to recover policy benefits and statutory bad faith damages. Plaintiff and his insurer settled for $4 million. After a trial against Defendant, the jury returned a $30 million verdict for Plaintiff. Defendant sought to set off the $4 million insurance settlement against the damages award, but the motion was denied. The court of appeal affirmed the denial of the setoff request. The Supreme Court held (1) Defendant did not ask the trial court for a setoff under section 768.041(2); and (2) a settlement payment made by an uninsured motorist insurer to settle a first-party bad faith claim is not a collateral source within the meaning of Fla. Stat. 768.76(2)(a)2. View "Ellison v. Willoughby" on Justia Law

Douglas Byrne appealed the grant of summary judgment in favor of Vera Fisk regarding Byrne's premises-liability negligence claim against Fisk. On December 8, 2018, Byrne was a mail carrier working for the United States Postal Service. That evening, Byrne was responsible for a delivery route different from his usual route. Byrne attempted to deliver mail to Fisk's residence. Although Fisk's home was not on his usual delivery route, Byrne had likely delivered mail there before, including within the preceding year. It was dark outside, and it was raining. Fisk's porch lights were not turned on, but Byrne was wearing a headlamp, which was on at the time. Byrne was also wearing slip-resistant boots, as required by his employer. Byrne crossed the five tiled steps leading to Fisk's tiled front porch, where her mailbox was located, "holding the handrail and being careful." However, Byrne slipped and fell backward down the steps. Byrne suffered three fractures in his right femur and a fracture in his hip socket. He was hospitalized for nine days, underwent multiple weeks of rehabilitation, and returned to work in May 2019. In December 2020, Byrne filed suit against Fisk and fictitiously named parties, alleging there were defects in Fisk's premises about which Fisk knew or should have known and that Fisk should have remedied the defects or should have warned him about or guarded him from the defects. Byrne's complaint asserted a negligence claim and a "wantonness/recklessness" claim. Fisk answered Byrne's complaint, moved for and received a summary judgment. The Alabama Supreme Court reversed, finding genuine issues of material fact exist regarding whether a defect or unreasonably dangerous condition existed on Fisk's premises; whether Fisk had knowledge of the alleged defect; whether the alleged defect proximately caused Byrne's injuries; and whether the darkness of Fisk's premises or the rainfall present there constituted open and obvious hazards. View "Byrne v. Fisk" on Justia Law

Alicia Sampson ("Alicia"), as administratrix of the estate of her deceased husband, Joshua Sampson ("Josh"), appealed the grant of summary judgment in favor of HeartWise Health Systems Corporation; HeartWise Clinic, LLC (collectively referred to as "HeartWise"); Isaac Health & Prevention Partners, LLC ("Isaac Health"); William Nixon, M.D.; and Jeffrey Saylor, M.D., in a wrongful-death action. At its HeartWise clinic, Isaac Health administered a battery of up to 31 physical tests that were intended "to assist in the detection of early evidence of vascular and cardiac abnormalities." In 2015, 29-year-old Josh visited the Isaac Health clinic. Months earlier, Josh's father died at age of 56 from "right ventricular dysplasia," which was a "congenital heart defect." Lowell's death led the Sampson family to seek heart evaluations to determine whether they had inherited the heart defect. Josh underwent the full battery of testing provided at the Isaac Health clinic; Josh's data from the left ventricular echocardiogram was within the "normal" range. Josh's mother, who also received the testing, stated that the nurse practitioner did not tell Josh in any way that he "needed to have any further diagnostic work-up or testing relative to his heart." On October 5, 2015, Josh collapsed at home while working on a construction project. He was taken to the Emergency Room, but died that day. The Sampson family procured a private autopsy; the report concluded that Josh died due to an arrhythmia secondary to hypertrophic cardiomyopathy, a congenital heart condition. Alicia thereafter filed suit against the clinic, HearWise and the doctors, alleging fraud and negligence. The Alabama Supreme Court reversed summary judgment entered in favor of Isaac Health and Drs. Nixon and Saylor with respect to Alicia's negligence allegations against them because those allegations were never properly presented to the circuit court for adjudication. The Court also reversed summary judgment in favor of HeartWise with respect to Alicia's fraud allegations against HeartWise because Alicia presented substantial evidence of Josh's reasonable reliance upon HeartWise's representations about its program. The Court affirmed summary judgment in favor of Isaac Health with respect to Alicia's fraud allegations against Isaac Health because Alicia failed to present substantial evidence that Josh's course of conduct would have changed if he had not seen HeartWise materials in the Isaac Health clinic's waiting room. The Court also affirmed summary judgment in favor of HeartWise with respect to Alicia's negligence allegations against HeartWise for multiple reasons. View "Sampson v. HeartWise Health Systems Corporation, et al." on Justia Law

Selanmin Gross appealed the grant of a new trial in a case filed by Christopher Dailey against Gross stemming from a motor-vehicle accident. Dailey alleged Gross' negligence and/or wantonness in operating his motor vehicle on August 5, 2019, had resulted in a collision with Dailey's motor vehicle and that Dailey had suffered physical, mental, and emotional injuries as a result of the accident. Dailey's action was consolidated with an action commenced by Ken Houston against Gross that stemmed from the same accident. The trial court dismissed Houston's action following the filing of a joint stipulation of dismissal. Trial proceeded on Dailey's claims. The trial court entered the jury-verdict forms into the record, which showed that the foreperson had signed both verdict forms. The first form simply stated: "We the jury find for the defendant" and had the date filled in by hand above a blank line labeled "Date" and the signature of the foreperson on a second blank line labeled "Foreman." The second verdict form stated: "We the jury find for the plaintiff, Christopher D. Dailey, and assess damages of $0 dollars." That form likewise had the date filled in by hand above a blank line labeled "Date" and the signature of the foreperson on a second blank line labeled "Foreman." Dailey moved for a new trial "Due to Inconsistent Verdict." Gross opposed it, noting that the trial judge announced a verdict for defendant in open court and had polled each juror and that each juror had confirmed the verdict for defendant. He argued that "the verdict was in no way inconsistent: the verdict form for the Plaintiff awarded zero (0) dollars in damages which is perfectly consistent with a verdict for the Defendant." The trial judge granted Dailey's motion. The Alabama Supreme Court concluded the trial court erred in concluding the second verdict form awarding zero dollars in damages to Dailey meant that the jury reached an inconsistent verdict. "The cases relied upon by the trial court do not support that conclusion, and the evidence concerning the verdict overwhelmingly supports the conclusion that the jury reached a verdict in favor of the defendant, Gross." Accordingly, the trial court's order granting a new trial is reversed, and the trial court was instructed to reinstate the verdict in favor of Gross and to enter a judgment on that verdict. View "Gross v. Dailey" on Justia Law

Luxottica of America, Inc., Jeremiah Andrews, Jr., and Anthony Pfleger appealed a circuit court judgment entered in favor of plaintiff Jackie Lee Bruce on Bruce's claims alleging that Andrews and Pfleger, Luxottica employees, defamed him and publicly placed him in a false light by accusing him of shoplifting. Andrews was the manager of the "Sunglass Hut" store at a shopping center in Montgomery. Luxottica owned the store. Andrews was working when Bruce entered the store. Another man, who was known by Andrews to have recently shoplifted from the store, entered the store immediately behind Bruce. Andrews suspected Bruce was acting as the shoplifter's accomplice on this particular occasion. Surveillance video showed Bruce walking back and forth five or six times before walking away from the store. Bruce explained his pacing as simple indecision about whether to visit another store or to instead leave the shopping center. Shortly after Bruce walked away, the shoplifter left the store with sunglasses without paying for them, which Andrews witnessed. Bruce testified that a friend named Orlando had driven Bruce to and from the shopping center and he denied knowing the shoplifter or seeing him steal sunglasses. Andrews reported the incident to Montgomery police and to defendant Pfleger, who was a former police officer and the asset-protection manager for Luxottica responsible for investigating shoplifting. After attempting without success to obtain the assistance of police, Pfleger contacted Central Alabama Crimestoppers, giving the organization photographs of the shoplifter, Bruce, and the shoplifter's other alleged accomplices so that Crimestoppers could make the information public in an attempt to identify the suspects. In addition to photographs, Pfleger provided Crimestoppers with a written synopsis of multiple incidents at the store. After review of the trial court record, the Alabama Supreme Court concluded Andrews could not be held liable because, under the McDaniel/Burney rule, he did not publicize any statements about Bruce. And, because Pfleger enjoyed a qualified-privilege defense, he too could not be held liable. The Court surmised the only basis for Luxottica's possible liability was vicarious liability for Andrews's and Pfleger's actions. Because those parties were not liable, neither was Luxottica. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court's judgment and remanded the matter. View "Luxottica of America, Inc., et al. v. Bruce" on Justia Law