Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

The plaintiff alleged that he was sexually abused by a priest while attending a summer camp in the mid-1970s, which was managed by the defendants. At the time of the alleged abuse, New Hampshire law required minors to bring personal actions within two years after reaching the age of majority. The plaintiff, born in 1966, did not file his complaint before the limitations period expired in 1986. Decades later, the legislature amended the relevant statute, RSA 508:4-g, first to extend and then, in 2020, to remove the statute of limitations for personal actions based on sexual assault. The plaintiff filed his complaint in 2023, seeking to take advantage of the amended law.The Superior Court (Leonard, J.) dismissed the complaint, holding that the claim was time-barred because the statute of limitations had expired in 1986. The court further ruled that applying the 2020 amendment to revive the plaintiff’s claim would violate Part I, Article 23 of the New Hampshire Constitution, which prohibits retrospective laws. The plaintiff’s motion to reconsider was denied, and he appealed.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case de novo. It assumed, without deciding, that the legislature intended the 2020 amendment to apply retroactively, but held that doing so would be unconstitutional. The court reaffirmed longstanding precedent that a defendant acquires a vested right to a statute of limitations defense once the limitations period has expired, and that this right cannot be abrogated by subsequent legislation. The court declined to overrule this precedent or to adopt a balancing test weighing the plaintiff’s right to recover against the defendants’ vested right. The Supreme Court of New Hampshire affirmed the dismissal, holding that the constitutional prohibition against retrospective laws precludes application of the amended statute to revive the plaintiff’s time-barred claim. View "Ball v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Manchester" on Justia Law

Daniel Cook, an independent contractor, was injured when he fell from an exposed, unguarded ledge while installing cabinetry in a second-story bathroom at a residential construction site owned by SMG Construction Services. Cook had previously observed the absence of a guardrail on the ledge and acknowledged this hazard in his deposition. At the time of the accident, he was moving backward toward the ledge while working. Cook sued SMG, alleging that the company failed to maintain a safe premises, which led to his injuries.The Superior Court granted summary judgment to SMG, finding that Cook had actual knowledge of the hazard and failed to exercise ordinary care for his own safety. The court concluded that Cook’s knowledge of the exposed ledge was equal to SMG’s, and therefore, SMG owed him no duty to warn or protect against the risk. On appeal, the Court of Appeals of Georgia reversed, holding that although Cook knew of the ledge, there was evidence that conditions at the site affected his ability to perceive the exact location and risk posed by the ledge. The appellate court found a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Cook’s knowledge of the hazard was equal to or greater than SMG’s.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case and determined that the Court of Appeals had conflated actual and constructive knowledge, erroneously applying standards relevant to constructive knowledge. The Supreme Court held that Cook’s own testimony established his actual knowledge of the specific hazard—the unguarded ledge—that caused his injury. The Court vacated the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case for further proceedings to address the remaining elements of SMG’s affirmative defenses in light of Cook’s actual knowledge of the hazard. View "SMG CONSTRUCTION SERVICES, LLC v. COOK" on Justia Law

The plaintiff in this case alleged that she developed uterine fibroids as a result of using chemical hair relaxer products manufactured by two companies over a period spanning from 1995 to 2014. She purchased and used different products from each manufacturer at various times, applying them every six to eight weeks, with a brief pause between 2001 and 2002. She was diagnosed with uterine fibroids in 2018 and filed suit in 2022, claiming that the products contained harmful chemicals that caused her injury.The Superior Court denied the manufacturers’ motions to dismiss her strict products liability claims, which were based on Georgia’s ten-year statute of repose for such actions. The manufacturers argued that the statute of repose began running from the date the plaintiff first purchased any product from each manufacturer, which would bar her claims. On interlocutory appeal, the Court of Appeals of Georgia reversed, holding that the statute of repose for all units sold by each manufacturer to the plaintiff began with the earliest sale to her, and thus her claims were time-barred.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case to determine how the statute of repose under OCGA § 51-1-11(b)(2) applies when a plaintiff alleges injury from multiple consumable products sold over time. The Court held that the statute of repose applies on a per-unit basis, meaning the ten-year period begins with the sale of each individual unit as new to the end user. Therefore, claims are not barred for units sold within ten years of the lawsuit, even if earlier units were sold outside that period. The Court reversed the Court of Appeals’ decision in part and remanded the case, allowing the strict liability claims to proceed for units sold within the statutory period. View "BURROUGHS v. STRENGTH OF NATURE GLOBAL, LLC" on Justia Law

A woman died after being treated at a hospital and left behind two minor children. Her mother took custody of the children following a juvenile court order that granted her authority over their care. The mother, acting as custodian, sent pre-suit notice to the health care providers she believed responsible for her daughter’s death, identifying herself as the “claimant authorizing the notice” but not mentioning the minor children. She later filed a wrongful death lawsuit, initially on her own behalf and on behalf of the children, but ultimately pursued the claim solely for the children.The Circuit Court for Anderson County first granted, then vacated, the defendants’ motions to dismiss, finding that the mother had substantially complied with the pre-suit notice requirements and that the omission of the children’s names did not prejudice the defendants. The court also found that while the children held the right to the claim, the mother was the claimant on their behalf. The Court of Appeals, however, reversed this decision, holding that the pre-suit notice was deficient because it failed to identify the children as claimants, and that this failure prejudiced the defendants. The appellate court did agree that the mother had standing to bring the suit on behalf of her grandchildren.The Supreme Court of Tennessee reviewed the case and reversed the Court of Appeals. The Court held that under Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-121(a)(2)(B), the “claimant authorizing the notice” is the person who asserts the right and formally approves giving pre-suit notice. Since the minor children could not act for themselves, their legal custodian was the proper person to authorize notice and file suit on their behalf. The Court concluded that the mother complied with the statutory pre-suit notice requirements and remanded the case to the circuit court. View "Denson ex rel. Denson v. Methodist Medical Center of Oak Ridge" on Justia Law

A husband and wife brought a lawsuit after the wife suffered a pelvic fracture during a forceps-assisted delivery performed by a doctor at a women’s health group. They alleged that the doctor failed to obtain the wife’s informed consent by not disclosing the risks associated with the procedure. The plaintiffs claimed that this omission violated Massachusetts law and sought damages for the resulting injury.The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts handled the case initially. During pretrial proceedings, the defendants moved to strike the plaintiffs’ expert witnesses, arguing that the plaintiffs had not made their experts available for deposition as required by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The plaintiffs did not respond to this motion, and the District Court granted it, excluding the expert testimony. The plaintiffs later failed to appear at a pretrial conference, citing email issues, and only addressed the missed conference, not the exclusion of their experts. The District Court declined to vacate its order striking the experts, finding the plaintiffs’ delay and lack of explanation unjustified. Subsequently, the District Court granted summary judgment to the defendants, concluding that expert testimony was necessary to support the informed consent claim under Massachusetts law.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the District Court’s decisions. The appellate court held that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to reconsider the order striking the expert witnesses, given the plaintiffs’ prolonged inaction and failure to address the underlying issues. The First Circuit also held that, under Massachusetts law, expert testimony was required to establish that the risk of pelvic fracture from a forceps-assisted delivery was more than negligible, and thus, summary judgment for the defendants was appropriate. The judgment of the District Court was affirmed. View "Meka v. Haddad" on Justia Law

An attorney who represented a client in a high-profile employment discrimination case against Louisiana State University (LSU) officials later brought suit against two attorneys and their law firm who had served as outside counsel to LSU. The plaintiff alleged that these attorneys engaged in misconduct during a Title IX investigation and, during subsequent state court litigation, made defamatory statements about him, including accusations of fabricating evidence. The state court had previously imposed significant monetary sanctions against the plaintiff and his client, citing, among other things, the plaintiff’s alleged fabrication of evidence and abusive litigation tactics.After the state court proceedings, the plaintiff filed a new lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana, asserting claims for defamation, negligent infliction of emotional distress, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and civil conspiracy under Louisiana law. The district court dismissed all claims with prejudice. It found the defamation claim barred by the Rooker–Feldman doctrine, which limits federal review of state court judgments, and determined that the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim was inadequately pleaded. The court also dismissed the conspiracy claim for lack of an underlying tort and denied leave to amend the complaint.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The Fifth Circuit held that the Rooker–Feldman doctrine did not bar the defamation claim because the plaintiff’s alleged injury arose from the defendants’ conduct, not from the state court judgment itself. The court vacated the dismissal of the defamation and conspiracy claims and remanded for further proceedings. However, it affirmed the dismissal of the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim, finding the alleged conduct did not meet the required legal standard. The court also vacated the denial of leave to amend the complaint. View "English v. Crochet" on Justia Law

Curtis Diblin and Monee Gagliardo were housemates when Diblin attacked Gagliardo with a rubber mallet, causing significant injuries. Diblin was criminally prosecuted and pled guilty to assault with intent to commit a sexual crime. Gagliardo then filed a civil suit against Diblin, alleging several intentional torts and negligence, all based on the attack. The operative complaint at trial did not allege any facts suggesting accidental conduct or negligence unrelated to the assault. Diblin’s homeowners insurance policy with State Farm covered injuries arising from an “occurrence,” defined as an “accident,” and excluded coverage for intentional or willful acts.In the San Diego County Superior Court, a jury found Diblin liable for gender violence (an intentional tort) and negligence, awarding Gagliardo over $2.5 million in compensatory damages. The jury also found Diblin acted with malice and oppression, supporting punitive damages, though Gagliardo later waived her right to punitive damages. State Farm, having defended Diblin under a reservation of rights, filed a declaratory relief action seeking a determination that it owed no duty to indemnify Diblin for the judgment.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the trial court’s judgment in favor of State Farm. The appellate court held that the jury’s findings in the underlying action established Diblin’s conduct was intentional, not accidental, and therefore not a covered “occurrence” under the policy. The court rejected arguments that the negligence finding mandated coverage or that the concurrent independent causes doctrine applied, finding the injury-producing conduct was not independent of the intentional act. The court also found no need for a new jury to determine intent for exclusion purposes. The judgment in favor of State Farm was affirmed. View "State Farm Fire and Casualty Co. v. Diblin" on Justia Law

A nursing home resident’s legal representative, acting under a durable power of attorney, sued a nursing home for alleged medical negligence during the resident’s stay. Upon admission, the representative signed several documents, including an agreement to arbitrate any disputes arising from the resident’s care. The representative later claimed not to recall signing the documents but did not dispute her signature. The nursing home moved to compel arbitration based on the signed agreement, which expressly stated it was governed by the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA).The District Court of McCurtain County, Oklahoma, held a hearing on the motion to compel arbitration. The court found that a valid arbitration agreement existed, signed by both an authorized agent of the nursing home and the legal representative. The court determined that the FAA applied due to the involvement of interstate commerce and that the Oklahoma Nursing Home Care Act’s (NHCA) prohibition of arbitration agreements was preempted by federal law. The court granted the nursing home’s motion to compel arbitration and stayed the judicial proceedings.The Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma reviewed the case de novo. It affirmed the district court’s decision, holding that the FAA preempts the NHCA’s categorical prohibition of arbitration agreements in the nursing home context when interstate commerce is involved and the agreement expressly invokes the FAA. The court found the arbitration agreement was validly executed and not unconscionable, distinguishing this case from prior Oklahoma precedent and aligning with the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Marmet Health Care Center, Inc. v. Brown. The Supreme Court of Oklahoma affirmed the district court’s order compelling arbitration. View "Thompsonl v. Heartway Corp." on Justia Law

A man who operated an outfitting and hunting guide business was married to the defendant from 2019 to 2021. After their divorce, he learned that his hunting and guiding privileges had been suspended in both Idaho and Wyoming due to a misdemeanor hunting violation. In 2022, he alleged that his ex-wife made false and damaging statements about him to members of their small community, including claims that he was a convicted felon, a homosexual, a poacher, and attracted to underage girls. He attributed several negative consequences in his personal and professional life to these alleged statements and filed a lawsuit against his ex-wife for defamation per se.The District Court of Park County reviewed the case after the defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing there was no genuine dispute of material fact because she denied making the statements and the plaintiff had no evidence to the contrary. The district court agreed and granted summary judgment in her favor, dismissing the defamation per se claim. The plaintiff appealed, contending that there was admissible evidence—specifically, an affidavit from a third party who swore the defendant made the statements—to create a genuine issue of material fact.The Supreme Court of Wyoming reviewed the district court’s decision de novo. The court held that the affidavit from the third party was competent, admissible evidence and not hearsay, and that it directly contradicted the defendant’s denial. The court clarified that imputing a criminal offense is a separate and sufficient basis for defamation per se under Wyoming law. Because a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether the defendant made the alleged statements, the Supreme Court of Wyoming reversed the district court’s summary judgment and remanded the case for trial. View "Lewis v. Francis" on Justia Law

A man with severe chronic pain had long been prescribed oxycodone. When he visited his doctor for an unrelated issue, he was also prescribed clonazepam, a benzodiazepine. The combination of these two drugs carries a significant risk of respiratory depression and death, a fact underscored by an FDA-mandated black box warning. The man and his wife expressed concern about the new prescription, but his doctor reassured them. When the prescription for clonazepam was filled at a pharmacy, the pharmacist’s computer system flagged a warning about the dangerous interaction with oxycodone. The pharmacist overrode the warning and dispensed the medication. The man died the next day from toxicity due to both drugs.The man’s family and estate sued the pharmacy, alleging negligence, including a failure to warn about the drug interaction. The Third District Court, Salt Lake County, denied the pharmacy’s motion for summary judgment, which was based on the “learned intermediary rule.” This rule generally exempts pharmacists from warning patients about the general risks of FDA-approved drugs, on the assumption that the prescribing physician is best positioned to provide such warnings. The district court found that there were material factual disputes about whether the pharmacist knew of a patient-specific risk and whether the learned intermediary rule applied.The Supreme Court of the State of Utah reviewed the case on interlocutory appeal. It held that the learned intermediary rule does not shield a pharmacist from liability when the pharmacist is aware of a patient-specific risk, as opposed to general risks associated with a drug. The court affirmed the district court’s denial of summary judgment, clarifying that pharmacists retain a duty to act as a reasonably prudent pharmacist would when aware of such risks. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Walgreen v. Jensen" on Justia Law