Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries
Castillo v. Rex
The case involves a healthcare liability action filed by the plaintiff, Payton Castillo, against CHI Memorial Hospital and other entities and physicians, alleging negligence in the care provided to her husband, who died shortly after being discharged from the hospital's emergency room. The defendants sought a protective order based on the quality improvement committee (QIC) privilege under Tennessee Code Annotated section 68-11-272 to prevent inquiry into a meeting held by the hospital and the decedent's family. The trial court denied the defendants' motion.The Hamilton County Circuit Court initially reviewed the case and denied the defendants' motion for a protective order, finding that statements made during the meeting were not protected by the QIC privilege. The defendants appealed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision, concluding that the statements made in the meeting were not protected by the QIC privilege.The Supreme Court of Tennessee reviewed the case and held that the QIC privilege applied to statements made during the meeting that were based on information obtained during the QIC process. However, the court found that Memorial waived the privilege when hospital management voluntarily disclosed the privileged information during the meeting with Mrs. Castillo. The court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals on separate grounds and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Castillo v. Rex" on Justia Law
Czech v. Allen
In this case, the appellant, Keith L. Allen, shot and killed Brett Allen Torres in May 2020. Allen was subsequently prosecuted and convicted of first-degree murder and use of a firearm to commit a felony. Separately, Victoria A. Czech, as the personal representative of Torres' estate, sued Allen for wrongful death and conscious suffering. Czech also sought and obtained an order of prejudgment attachment on Allen’s assets, fearing he might conceal or remove them.The district court for Lincoln County, Nebraska, overruled Allen’s pretrial motions, including a motion for change of venue and a motion in limine to exclude evidence of his convictions. The court also granted Czech’s motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of liability, finding no material issue of fact regarding Allen’s responsibility for Torres’ death. Allen’s subsequent objection and motion to vacate the order of prejudgment attachment were also overruled.Allen appealed these decisions during the trial (case No. S-23-1037) and after a jury awarded Czech $130,000 in damages (case No. S-24-047). The Nebraska Supreme Court dismissed the first appeal for lack of jurisdiction, as the orders challenged were not final. In the second appeal, the court affirmed the district court’s decisions, finding no abuse of discretion or error in the rulings.The Nebraska Supreme Court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Allen’s motion for change of venue, as Allen failed to provide evidence of pervasive pretrial publicity. The court also found that Allen did not preserve his claim regarding the motion in limine because he did not object to the evidence at the summary judgment hearing. The court affirmed the partial summary judgment, noting the record was insufficient to review the decision. The court also found Allen’s claims regarding the prejudgment attachment moot due to the final judgment. Finally, the court held that the district court retained jurisdiction despite Allen’s appeal, as the appeal was not from a final order. View "Czech v. Allen" on Justia Law
Flickinger v. King
Daniel Flickinger, a full-time litigator at Wainwright, Pope & McMeekin, P.C. (WPM), posted conservative political commentary on his personal social media. In June 2020, he posted a controversial message about George Floyd's death. Lawrence Tracy King, a partner at King Simmons Ford & Spree, P.C. (the King law firm), sent this post to Flickinger's supervising attorney, Lonnie Wainwright, expressing concern. Wainwright and other WPM partners, who were not familiar with social media, reviewed Flickinger's posts and asked him to resign, which he did.Flickinger sued King and the King law firm for defamation, invasion of privacy, and tortious interference with a business relationship. The Jefferson Circuit Court dismissed his claims, but the Supreme Court of Alabama reversed the dismissal of the tortious interference claim and remanded the case. The King defendants then moved for summary judgment, arguing there was no substantial evidence that their actions caused Flickinger's damages. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of the King defendants, concluding that the WPM partners' decision to terminate Flickinger was based on their independent review of his social media posts.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case and affirmed the summary judgment for the King law firm, finding that King's actions were not within the scope of his employment and did not benefit the firm. However, the court reversed the summary judgment for King, holding that there were genuine issues of material fact regarding whether King's actions were a substantial factor in Flickinger's termination and whether King was justified in sending the post. The case was remanded for further proceedings. The court also upheld the denial of Flickinger's motion to compel King's cellular-telephone records and his motion to continue the summary-judgment hearing. View "Flickinger v. King" on Justia Law
TLM Investments, LLC v. Yates
Shanda Yates was bitten by a pit bull named Yurk while visiting her friend Neah Friar, who rented a property from TLM Investments, LLC. Friar's lease had a no-pet provision, which she disregarded by keeping Yurk and concealing his presence from TLM. Yates filed a personal injury claim against both Friar and TLM, alleging negligence on TLM's part for allowing Yurk on the property and claiming protections under the lease.The Prentiss County Circuit Court denied TLM's motion for summary judgment, leading to an interlocutory appeal. TLM argued that it had no knowledge of Yurk's presence or his dangerous propensities, as Friar had intentionally concealed the dog. TLM also contended that Yates failed to establish herself as an intended third-party beneficiary under the lease.The Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed the case de novo and found that Yates did not provide evidence that TLM had actual or constructive knowledge of Yurk or his dangerous propensities. The court noted that the no-pet provision in the lease was not an admission that all dogs are dangerous but was intended to prevent property damage. Additionally, the court found that Yates did not have standing to claim protections under the lease as she was not a party to it and was not an intended third-party beneficiary.The Supreme Court of Mississippi reversed the trial court's denial of summary judgment, rendered summary judgment in favor of TLM, and remanded the case to the Prentiss County Circuit Court for any necessary further proceedings. The case against TLM was dismissed with prejudice. View "TLM Investments, LLC v. Yates" on Justia Law
Johnson v. Exide Technologies, Inc.
Trenton Johnson, an employee of Concorp, Inc., was injured while performing maintenance work at Exide Technologies, Inc.'s plant in Kansas City, Missouri. Johnson fell into a vat of molten lead while replacing a belt on a conveyor, resulting in severe burns. He subsequently sued Exide for negligence in Missouri state court.The case was removed to the United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri, where the parties engaged in discovery and briefed the issue of whether Johnson's exclusive remedy was under Missouri's workers' compensation system. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Exide, concluding that Johnson's claim was indeed limited to workers' compensation benefits.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the district court's decision de novo. The appellate court examined whether an employer-employee relationship existed between Exide and Johnson under Missouri's workers' compensation statute. The court applied the means/control test and the statutory-employee status test. It found that Concorp, not Exide, had the means/control relationship with Johnson. However, the court determined that Johnson was a statutory employee of Exide because his work was performed under a contract and in the usual course of Exide's business.The Eighth Circuit held that Johnson's exclusive remedy for his injuries was through Missouri's workers' compensation system, and Exide was immune from the negligence claim. The court affirmed the district court's summary judgment in favor of Exide. View "Johnson v. Exide Technologies, Inc." on Justia Law
M.R. v. State
M.R., a high school student and basketball player, was sexually abused by Cody Butler, a women's basketball coach at Yakima Valley Community College (YVCC), starting when she was 17 years old. The abuse continued into her adulthood, including inappropriate touching, sexual comments, and physical advances. Butler's actions had a significant negative impact on M.R.'s life, leading to substance abuse, abusive relationships, and other personal issues. In 2018, M.R. connected her experiences of abuse to her injuries while in therapy.In 2019, M.R. sued the State of Washington, YVCC, and Butler for various claims, including negligence and assault. The trial court denied the State's motion for summary judgment, which argued that M.R.'s claims were time-barred by the three-year statute of limitations in RCW 4.16.080(2). The court found that the abuse was a continuous series of events that could not be segregated. The Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that RCW 4.16.340 only applies to claims based on acts of childhood sexual abuse occurring before the plaintiff turns 18 years old.The Supreme Court of the State of Washington reviewed the case and reversed the Court of Appeals. The court held that RCW 4.16.340 does not preclude complainants from bringing claims of sexual abuse that originate from childhood sexual abuse and extend into the victim’s adulthood. The court found that the statute's plain language and legislative intent support the inclusion of claims for continuing sexual abuse that are based on intentional acts of childhood sexual abuse. The court also noted that the statute accounts for the continuing tort doctrine, allowing for claims involving a common scheme of abuse by the same perpetrator. View "M.R. v. State" on Justia Law
Newport News School Board v. Z.M.
Z.M., a non-verbal autistic child, attends the Center for Autism at Kiln Creek Elementary School. Through his father, he filed a lawsuit alleging that while being transported on a school bus, Newport News Public Schools employees struck him with a wet sock, verbally abused him, and allowed him to leave the bus partially unclothed. The complaint also mentioned previous verbal insults by school employees. Z.M. sought $15 million in compensatory and punitive damages, alleging negligence and gross negligence by the School Board and its employees.The Newport News School Board filed a plea in bar, claiming sovereign immunity. The Circuit Court of Newport News denied the plea regarding claims of simple and gross negligence but granted it concerning punitive damages, citing sovereign immunity. The School Board then filed an interlocutory appeal under Code §§ 8.01-626 and 8.01-670.2, which allow appeals from decisions on sovereign immunity pleas.The Supreme Court of Virginia reviewed the case de novo. The court concluded that Code § 22.1-194, which waives sovereign immunity when a vehicle is "involved in an accident," did not apply because the bus was not involved in an accident. The court held that the alleged acts did not relate to the operation of the bus as a vehicle. Consequently, the court reversed the circuit court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. The court also noted that while the School Board is protected by sovereign immunity, the employees accused of gross negligence are not, allowing the lawsuit to proceed against them. View "Newport News School Board v. Z.M." on Justia Law
Doe 3, Family Services Organization v. Superior Court
In 2009, John Roe DZ 20, John Roe DZ 21, and John Roe DZ 22 (Plaintiffs) sued an employee of Doe 3, Family Services Organization (Family Services) for alleged childhood sexual assault. The trial court dismissed the claims against the employee with prejudice due to the statute of limitations. In 2022, Plaintiffs filed a new complaint against Family Services based on the same allegations, relying on the revival provision of Code of Civil Procedure section 340.1.The trial court overruled Family Services' demurrer, which argued that Plaintiffs' claims could not be revived under section 340.1, subdivision (q), because they were derivative of the claims litigated to finality in the 2009 action. Family Services then petitioned for a writ of mandate to direct the trial court to vacate its order and sustain the demurrer without leave to amend.The California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court held that a claim for derivative liability against a principal (Family Services) was "litigated to finality" under section 340.1, subdivision (q), where a previous suit against an agent (Dowell) for the same damages based on the same operative facts was dismissed with prejudice. The court directed the trial court to vacate its order overruling the demurrer and to sustain the demurrer with leave to amend, allowing Plaintiffs the opportunity to amend their complaint to allege facts supporting liability based on conduct other than that of Dowell. View "Doe 3, Family Services Organization v. Superior Court" on Justia Law
Mitchell v. City of Benton Harbor
Several hundred children in Benton Harbor, Michigan, suffered from elevated lead levels in their blood after drinking lead-contaminated water from the city’s public water system for three years. Plaintiffs, represented by their guardians, filed a lawsuit against various state and city officials, as well as two engineering firms, alleging that these parties failed to mitigate the lead-water crisis and misled the public about the dangers of the drinking water. The claims included substantive-due-process and state-created-danger claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as well as state-law negligence claims.The U.S. District Court for the Western District of Michigan dismissed the complaint in full. The court found that the plaintiffs did not plausibly allege a violation of their constitutional rights and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims. Plaintiffs appealed the dismissal of their federal claims against the city and state officials and the state-law claims against one of the engineering firms.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the dismissal of the claims against the state officials, finding that the plaintiffs did not plausibly allege that these officials acted with deliberate indifference. However, the court reversed the dismissal of the claims against the city officials and the City of Benton Harbor, finding that the plaintiffs plausibly alleged that these officials misled the public about the safety of the water, thereby causing the plaintiffs to drink contaminated water. The court also reversed the district court’s declination of supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims against the engineering firm and remanded the case for further proceedings. The court affirmed the district court’s denial of leave to amend the complaint. View "Mitchell v. City of Benton Harbor" on Justia Law
Tillinghast v. L.A. Unified School District
Maxwell Tillinghast, a 13-year-old student, collapsed from sudden cardiac arrest while jogging during a physical education class at Palms Middle School. Although the school had a defibrillator in the main office, the teachers were unaware of its presence. Despite being trained to use a defibrillator, the teachers could not utilize it, leading to Tillinghast's death. His father sued the Los Angeles Unified School District (LAUSD) and several employees, alleging negligence for failing to inform the teachers about the defibrillator.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County heard the case, where the jury focused on whether Tillinghast's latent heart defect would have been fatal even if the teachers had known about the defibrillator. The jury found the school district negligent and awarded Tillinghast's father $15 million in damages. The jury exonerated the school principal, Dr. Derek Moriuchi, from negligence.The LAUSD appealed to the Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, arguing that the trial court erred in giving a specific jury instruction (CACI No. 423) related to public entity liability for failure to perform a mandatory duty. The appellate court found that the school district had forfeited its objections to this instruction by not raising the issue during the trial. Additionally, the court noted that the school district had conceded mistakes were made regarding the defibrillator's availability and training.The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment, holding that the evidence supported the jury's verdict and that the school district's failure to inform the teachers about the defibrillator constituted negligence. The court awarded costs to the respondent, Tillinghast's father. View "Tillinghast v. L.A. Unified School District" on Justia Law