Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

A woman died after being treated at a hospital and left behind two minor children. Her mother took custody of the children following a juvenile court order that granted her authority over their care. The mother, acting as custodian, sent pre-suit notice to the health care providers she believed responsible for her daughter’s death, identifying herself as the “claimant authorizing the notice” but not mentioning the minor children. She later filed a wrongful death lawsuit, initially on her own behalf and on behalf of the children, but ultimately pursued the claim solely for the children.The Circuit Court for Anderson County first granted, then vacated, the defendants’ motions to dismiss, finding that the mother had substantially complied with the pre-suit notice requirements and that the omission of the children’s names did not prejudice the defendants. The court also found that while the children held the right to the claim, the mother was the claimant on their behalf. The Court of Appeals, however, reversed this decision, holding that the pre-suit notice was deficient because it failed to identify the children as claimants, and that this failure prejudiced the defendants. The appellate court did agree that the mother had standing to bring the suit on behalf of her grandchildren.The Supreme Court of Tennessee reviewed the case and reversed the Court of Appeals. The Court held that under Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-121(a)(2)(B), the “claimant authorizing the notice” is the person who asserts the right and formally approves giving pre-suit notice. Since the minor children could not act for themselves, their legal custodian was the proper person to authorize notice and file suit on their behalf. The Court concluded that the mother complied with the statutory pre-suit notice requirements and remanded the case to the circuit court. View "Denson ex rel. Denson v. Methodist Medical Center of Oak Ridge" on Justia Law

A husband and wife brought a lawsuit after the wife suffered a pelvic fracture during a forceps-assisted delivery performed by a doctor at a women’s health group. They alleged that the doctor failed to obtain the wife’s informed consent by not disclosing the risks associated with the procedure. The plaintiffs claimed that this omission violated Massachusetts law and sought damages for the resulting injury.The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts handled the case initially. During pretrial proceedings, the defendants moved to strike the plaintiffs’ expert witnesses, arguing that the plaintiffs had not made their experts available for deposition as required by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The plaintiffs did not respond to this motion, and the District Court granted it, excluding the expert testimony. The plaintiffs later failed to appear at a pretrial conference, citing email issues, and only addressed the missed conference, not the exclusion of their experts. The District Court declined to vacate its order striking the experts, finding the plaintiffs’ delay and lack of explanation unjustified. Subsequently, the District Court granted summary judgment to the defendants, concluding that expert testimony was necessary to support the informed consent claim under Massachusetts law.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the District Court’s decisions. The appellate court held that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to reconsider the order striking the expert witnesses, given the plaintiffs’ prolonged inaction and failure to address the underlying issues. The First Circuit also held that, under Massachusetts law, expert testimony was required to establish that the risk of pelvic fracture from a forceps-assisted delivery was more than negligible, and thus, summary judgment for the defendants was appropriate. The judgment of the District Court was affirmed. View "Meka v. Haddad" on Justia Law

An attorney who represented a client in a high-profile employment discrimination case against Louisiana State University (LSU) officials later brought suit against two attorneys and their law firm who had served as outside counsel to LSU. The plaintiff alleged that these attorneys engaged in misconduct during a Title IX investigation and, during subsequent state court litigation, made defamatory statements about him, including accusations of fabricating evidence. The state court had previously imposed significant monetary sanctions against the plaintiff and his client, citing, among other things, the plaintiff’s alleged fabrication of evidence and abusive litigation tactics.After the state court proceedings, the plaintiff filed a new lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana, asserting claims for defamation, negligent infliction of emotional distress, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and civil conspiracy under Louisiana law. The district court dismissed all claims with prejudice. It found the defamation claim barred by the Rooker–Feldman doctrine, which limits federal review of state court judgments, and determined that the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim was inadequately pleaded. The court also dismissed the conspiracy claim for lack of an underlying tort and denied leave to amend the complaint.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The Fifth Circuit held that the Rooker–Feldman doctrine did not bar the defamation claim because the plaintiff’s alleged injury arose from the defendants’ conduct, not from the state court judgment itself. The court vacated the dismissal of the defamation and conspiracy claims and remanded for further proceedings. However, it affirmed the dismissal of the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim, finding the alleged conduct did not meet the required legal standard. The court also vacated the denial of leave to amend the complaint. View "English v. Crochet" on Justia Law

Curtis Diblin and Monee Gagliardo were housemates when Diblin attacked Gagliardo with a rubber mallet, causing significant injuries. Diblin was criminally prosecuted and pled guilty to assault with intent to commit a sexual crime. Gagliardo then filed a civil suit against Diblin, alleging several intentional torts and negligence, all based on the attack. The operative complaint at trial did not allege any facts suggesting accidental conduct or negligence unrelated to the assault. Diblin’s homeowners insurance policy with State Farm covered injuries arising from an “occurrence,” defined as an “accident,” and excluded coverage for intentional or willful acts.In the San Diego County Superior Court, a jury found Diblin liable for gender violence (an intentional tort) and negligence, awarding Gagliardo over $2.5 million in compensatory damages. The jury also found Diblin acted with malice and oppression, supporting punitive damages, though Gagliardo later waived her right to punitive damages. State Farm, having defended Diblin under a reservation of rights, filed a declaratory relief action seeking a determination that it owed no duty to indemnify Diblin for the judgment.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the trial court’s judgment in favor of State Farm. The appellate court held that the jury’s findings in the underlying action established Diblin’s conduct was intentional, not accidental, and therefore not a covered “occurrence” under the policy. The court rejected arguments that the negligence finding mandated coverage or that the concurrent independent causes doctrine applied, finding the injury-producing conduct was not independent of the intentional act. The court also found no need for a new jury to determine intent for exclusion purposes. The judgment in favor of State Farm was affirmed. View "State Farm Fire and Casualty Co. v. Diblin" on Justia Law

A nursing home resident’s legal representative, acting under a durable power of attorney, sued a nursing home for alleged medical negligence during the resident’s stay. Upon admission, the representative signed several documents, including an agreement to arbitrate any disputes arising from the resident’s care. The representative later claimed not to recall signing the documents but did not dispute her signature. The nursing home moved to compel arbitration based on the signed agreement, which expressly stated it was governed by the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA).The District Court of McCurtain County, Oklahoma, held a hearing on the motion to compel arbitration. The court found that a valid arbitration agreement existed, signed by both an authorized agent of the nursing home and the legal representative. The court determined that the FAA applied due to the involvement of interstate commerce and that the Oklahoma Nursing Home Care Act’s (NHCA) prohibition of arbitration agreements was preempted by federal law. The court granted the nursing home’s motion to compel arbitration and stayed the judicial proceedings.The Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma reviewed the case de novo. It affirmed the district court’s decision, holding that the FAA preempts the NHCA’s categorical prohibition of arbitration agreements in the nursing home context when interstate commerce is involved and the agreement expressly invokes the FAA. The court found the arbitration agreement was validly executed and not unconscionable, distinguishing this case from prior Oklahoma precedent and aligning with the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Marmet Health Care Center, Inc. v. Brown. The Supreme Court of Oklahoma affirmed the district court’s order compelling arbitration. View "Thompsonl v. Heartway Corp." on Justia Law

A man who operated an outfitting and hunting guide business was married to the defendant from 2019 to 2021. After their divorce, he learned that his hunting and guiding privileges had been suspended in both Idaho and Wyoming due to a misdemeanor hunting violation. In 2022, he alleged that his ex-wife made false and damaging statements about him to members of their small community, including claims that he was a convicted felon, a homosexual, a poacher, and attracted to underage girls. He attributed several negative consequences in his personal and professional life to these alleged statements and filed a lawsuit against his ex-wife for defamation per se.The District Court of Park County reviewed the case after the defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing there was no genuine dispute of material fact because she denied making the statements and the plaintiff had no evidence to the contrary. The district court agreed and granted summary judgment in her favor, dismissing the defamation per se claim. The plaintiff appealed, contending that there was admissible evidence—specifically, an affidavit from a third party who swore the defendant made the statements—to create a genuine issue of material fact.The Supreme Court of Wyoming reviewed the district court’s decision de novo. The court held that the affidavit from the third party was competent, admissible evidence and not hearsay, and that it directly contradicted the defendant’s denial. The court clarified that imputing a criminal offense is a separate and sufficient basis for defamation per se under Wyoming law. Because a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether the defendant made the alleged statements, the Supreme Court of Wyoming reversed the district court’s summary judgment and remanded the case for trial. View "Lewis v. Francis" on Justia Law

A man with severe chronic pain had long been prescribed oxycodone. When he visited his doctor for an unrelated issue, he was also prescribed clonazepam, a benzodiazepine. The combination of these two drugs carries a significant risk of respiratory depression and death, a fact underscored by an FDA-mandated black box warning. The man and his wife expressed concern about the new prescription, but his doctor reassured them. When the prescription for clonazepam was filled at a pharmacy, the pharmacist’s computer system flagged a warning about the dangerous interaction with oxycodone. The pharmacist overrode the warning and dispensed the medication. The man died the next day from toxicity due to both drugs.The man’s family and estate sued the pharmacy, alleging negligence, including a failure to warn about the drug interaction. The Third District Court, Salt Lake County, denied the pharmacy’s motion for summary judgment, which was based on the “learned intermediary rule.” This rule generally exempts pharmacists from warning patients about the general risks of FDA-approved drugs, on the assumption that the prescribing physician is best positioned to provide such warnings. The district court found that there were material factual disputes about whether the pharmacist knew of a patient-specific risk and whether the learned intermediary rule applied.The Supreme Court of the State of Utah reviewed the case on interlocutory appeal. It held that the learned intermediary rule does not shield a pharmacist from liability when the pharmacist is aware of a patient-specific risk, as opposed to general risks associated with a drug. The court affirmed the district court’s denial of summary judgment, clarifying that pharmacists retain a duty to act as a reasonably prudent pharmacist would when aware of such risks. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Walgreen v. Jensen" on Justia Law

A fatal traffic accident occurred when a tractor trailer, driven by Andre Hill, ran a stop sign and collided with a vehicle driven by Olivia Mendoza, resulting in her death. Prior to the accident, Hill had picked up produce from Irigoyen Farms for delivery to a Walmart distribution center. The transportation of the produce involved several intermediaries: Irigoyen Farms contracted with a freight broker, who in turn contracted with other logistics companies, ultimately resulting in Hill being hired as an independent contractor by the motor carrier. Law enforcement determined that Hill’s extreme fatigue contributed to the crash.The decedent’s mother, Christina Casarez, filed suit in the Superior Court of Fresno County against Irigoyen Farms and Walmart, alleging motor vehicle negligence, general negligence, and wrongful death. She claimed that both defendants were directly negligent in their roles: Walmart for imposing contractual requirements that allegedly incentivized unsafe conduct, and Irigoyen Farms for loading the truck and sending Hill on his way despite knowledge of his fatigue. Both defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994 (FAAAA) preempted Casarez’s claims. The superior court agreed, granting summary judgment in favor of both defendants.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, reviewed the superior court’s decision de novo. The appellate court held that the FAAAA expressly preempts state law negligence claims against parties whose actions relate to the price, route, or service of a motor carrier with respect to the transportation of property, regardless of whether the party is a motor carrier, broker, or shipper. The court further held that the FAAAA’s safety exception did not apply because the claims did not directly concern the safety of the motor vehicle itself. The appellate court affirmed the superior court’s judgments in favor of Irigoyen Farms and Walmart. View "Casarez v. Irigoyen Farms" on Justia Law

Tristin Fahrnow was injured when a hot-oil truck operated by an employee of E-5 Oilfield Services struck him on an icy Montana highway. Fahrnow had been inspecting his own vehicle after a prior collision at the intersection, and was standing in the roadway when the E-5 truck lost control and hit him. Fahrnow sued E-5 for negligence under a theory of vicarious liability, alleging that the E-5 driver failed to operate the truck safely given the hazardous conditions. E-5 asserted that Fahrnow’s own actions, including parking in the traffic lane and failing to display warning devices, constituted comparative negligence.The Seventh Judicial District Court of Montana granted summary judgment in favor of E-5, finding that Fahrnow was solely responsible for his injuries as a matter of law. The District Court also denied Fahrnow’s motions for sanctions against E-5 for alleged spoliation of evidence (loss of truck data and employment records) and denied his motion to compel E-5 to answer an interrogatory comparing the parties’ medical experts’ qualifications, granting E-5’s cross-motion for a protective order.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case de novo. It held that the record presented a genuine issue of material fact regarding the comparative negligence of both drivers, making summary judgment inappropriate. The Court reversed the District Court’s grant of summary judgment to E-5 and remanded for trial. However, the Supreme Court affirmed the District Court’s denial of Fahrnow’s motions for default judgment as a sanction for spoliation and its denial of the motion to compel further expert discovery, finding no abuse of discretion in those rulings. View "Fahrnow v. E-5 Oil Services" on Justia Law

Patrick Jones Jr. was hired as a probationary deputy sheriff by the Lake County Sheriff’s Office and sent to a police training academy. During his training, Jones obtained a document from his girlfriend, believing it to be a study guide, and offered to share it with classmates. The document was actually a cheat sheet for a prior version of the Illinois state law enforcement exam. After an investigation by the training institute, which concluded Jones likely did not understand the document’s true nature, the Sheriff’s Office nonetheless terminated his employment. The termination letter, authored by Undersheriff Lawrence Oliver, cited Jones’s conduct as violating the office’s code of conduct and was distributed internally and to the office’s Merit Commission. Jones later struggled to find new law enforcement employment, attributing this difficulty to the termination letter.Jones filed suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, alleging that the termination letter was defamatory and that it deprived him of occupational liberty in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court granted summary judgment for the Sheriff’s Office and Undersheriff Oliver, finding that Jones failed to show it was virtually impossible for him to find new employment and that the statements in the letter were either true or opinion, and that Oliver was entitled to absolute immunity under Illinois law.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed. The court held that the Sheriff’s Office was not a proper defendant under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because Jones did not allege a policy or custom as required for municipal liability. The court further held that Jones’s occupational liberty claim failed because there was no evidence that Undersheriff Oliver publicly disclosed the termination letter. Finally, the court held that Undersheriff Oliver was entitled to absolute immunity under Illinois law for statements made within the scope of his official duties. View "Jones v. Lake County Sheriff's Office" on Justia Law