Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

In this defamation suit involving a music producer and the singer and songwriter known as "Kesha" the Court of Appeals reversed the order of the appellate division reversing Supreme Court's decision granting Defendant's motion for a ruling that 2020 amendments to the anti-SLAPP statute applied to this action and then granting Defendant leave to file a counterclaim, holding that the appellate division's orders were not properly made.Plaintiff, the producer, brought this action alleging that statements made by Defendant with respect to an alleged sexual assault were defamatory. The parties cross-moved for summary judgment, Defendant arguing that Plaintiff was a public figure and that some of her alleged defamatory statements were privileged. Supreme Court granted partial summary judgment for Plaintiff. While Defendant's appeal was pending, the Legislature amended the anti-SLAPP statute. Defendant then moved in Supreme Court for a ruling that the amendments applied to this action and for leave to assert counterclaims as permitted by the amended statute. The court concluded that the amendments applied retroactively. The appellate division reversed. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) Plaintiff was a limited-purpose public figure, requiring proof that the allegedly defamatory statements were made with actual malice; and (2) the strong presumption against retroactive legislation was not overcome with respect to the amendments to the anti-SLAPP statute. View "Gottwald v. Sebert" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs are the legal representatives and family members of two individuals killed using guns that had been listed on armslist.com, an online firearms marketplace. Plaintiffs each sued Armslist LLC and its member manager, Jonathan Gibbon, in separate diversity actions, alleging negligence and other Wisconsin state law claims. Plaintiffs asserted that Defendants designed the website to encourage and assist individuals in circumventing federal and state law regulating firearms. Defendants argued that Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted because publishing third-party offers to sell firearms does not establish tort or other liability under Wisconsin law. The district court dismissed the negligence claim in both cases, concluding that Plaintiffs failed to plausibly allege the website’s design caused the deaths. The remaining claims were also dismissed, and Gibbon was dismissed from the lawsuit for lack of personal jurisdiction.   The Seventh Circuit reversed the decision in Webber that personal jurisdiction exists over Gibbon. Further, the court wrote that because Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, it affirmed the dismissal in each case. The court explained that Plaintiffs have not alleged an act or omission occurring within the state or solicitation or service activities outside of the state by Gibbon that would bring him within the grasp of Wisconsin’s long-arm statute. Moreover, the court wrote that Plaintiffs have failed to plausibly plead that the deaths would not have occurred but for Armslist LLC’s failure to permit users to flag illegal conduct. View "Richard Webber v. Armslist, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff worked for Defendant Huntington Ingalls (formerly “Avondale”) as a shipyard electrician from February 1969 to June 1977. In March 2020, Plaintiff was diagnosed with mesothelioma. Following his diagnosis, he filed a state-law tort suit in the Civil District Court for the Parish of Orleans, alleging that Avondale, among other defendants, caused Plaintiff to contract mesothelioma by exposing him to asbestos in a negligent manner. Because Plaintiff primarily worked on United States Navy ships when he was exposed, Avondale removed the case to the federal district court under the federal officer removal statute. Plaintiff never claimed benefits under the LHWCA, which provides a no-fault compensation remedy to injured workers. Avondale moved for summary judgment. The district court held that the claims are preempted.   The Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded. The court held express preemption does not apply. Despite the clear proclamation of exclusivity in the LHWCA’s text that prohibits any liability “at law or in admiralty” for injuries covered by the Act, there is no express preemption here. The court wrote that its conclusion that conflict preemption does not apply is supported by the existence of concurrent jurisdiction and the acceptable incongruity inherent therein, the Supreme Court’s consistent rejection of arguments resisting that regime, the LHWCA’s role of supplementing rather than supplanting state law, the limited category of claims at issue here, and the similarity between these claims and those the Supreme Court has already permitted in Hahn. View "Barrosse v. Huntington Ingalls" on Justia Law

Dr. Robert P. Rothenberg (Rob) tragically suffered a fatal heart attack prior to paying the initial premium on his term life insurance policy issued by Principal National Life Insurance Company (Principal). Principal filed this action in the district court, seeking a declaratory judgment that Appellant— the policy’s intended beneficiary—was not owed death benefits in light of the nonpayment. Appellant filed a counterclaim, asserting claims against Principal for breach of contract, vexatious denial of proceeds, and negligence, as well as claims against Appellee, the couple’s insurance broker and financial planner, for negligence. After the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of Principal and Appellee, finding, in part, that the policy was not in effect at the time of Rob’s death. Appellant appealed, arguing that the district court erred in concluding (1) that the Policy was not in effect at the time of Rob’s death and (2) that, assuming the Policy was not in effect, neither Principal nor Appellee were negligent because neither owed a duty to Appellant.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Appellant did not pay the initial premium until after Rob’s death, at which time he was not in a similar state of health as when he applied for the policy. Moreover, any “privileges and rights” Rob (or Appellant) had to retroactively effectuate the Policy were terminated at Rob’s death pursuant to the Policy’s termination provision. Second, Rob’s signature on the EFT Form alone did not render the Policy effective on April 26, 2019, or earlier. View "Principal National Life Insurance Company v. Donna Rothenberg" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the order of the circuit court denying motions to dismiss this tort action brought against correction officers Bryon Whetzel and Isaiah Blancarte and West Virginia Division of Corrections and Rehabilitation (DOC), holding that the circuit court erred in denying DOC's motion to dismiss Plaintiff's negligent training and supervision claim.Plaintiff asserted three claims against the officers, including failure to protect and deliberate indifference, and two claims against the DOC - failure to train and adequately supervise and vicarious liability for the violation of his clearly established rights under the Eighth Amendment. In denying Defendants' motions to dismiss, the Supreme Court concluded that Plaintiff alleged sufficient particularized facts to satisfy the heightened pleading requirement. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that the circuit court (1) did not err in denying the officers' motions to dismiss; (2) did not err in denying DOC's motion to dismiss the vicarious liability count; but (3) erred in denying DOC's motion to dismiss the negligent training and supervision count because the allegations in the complaint were insufficient to deprive DOC of the immunity from suit that otherwise attaches to its discretionary functions of training and supervising employees. View "W. Va. Division of Corrections & Rehabilitation v. Robbins" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the decision of the district court granting summary judgment to Vitamin Shoppe and ruling that the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) preempted Plaintiffs' state law tort claims, holding that Plaintiffs' state law claims were expressly preempted by the FDCA.Plaintiffs purchased three dietary supplements containing glutamine as a main ingredient. Plaintiffs brought this action against the products' manufacturers claiming that the labels on the supplements contained statements that were false and misleading under state law. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Vitamin Shoppe, holding that the FDCA preempted Plaintiffs' state law claims. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) the statements on Vitamin Shoppe's labels were structure/function claims under 343(r)(6), and Vitamin Shoppe complied with the FDCA's requirements to make such claims; and (2) therefore, Plaintiffs' state law claims challenging the statements about glutamine were expressly preempted by the FDCA. View "Ferrari v. Vitamin Shoppe Industries LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs sued the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), alleging that the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe failed to warn motorists of unsafe road conditions. The district court held that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that as a sovereign, the United States is immune from suit. It has waived immunity in some FTCA cases but expressly retains immunity in cases involving “a discretionary function or duty.” If the discretionary function exception applies, “it is a jurisdictional bar to suit.” The court wrote that Plaintiffs “have failed to rebut the presumption that the Tribe’scdecision not to post warning signs was grounded in policy.” Accordingly, the court concluded it lacks subject matter jurisdiction under the FTCA’s discretionary function exception. View "Jade Mound v. The United States of America" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued defendants alleging childhood sexual abuse, and defendants moved to dismiss on the ground that the statute, which eliminated the prior limitations period, was unconstitutional. The civil division denied the motion to dismiss, concluding that the limitations period was a procedural bar and defendants had no vested right in the expiration of the prior statute of limitations. Defendants brought an interlocutory appeal to determine whether 12 V.S.A. § 522 violated Chapter I, Article 4 of the Vermont Constitution by reviving an otherwise time-barred claim of childhood sexual abuse. The Vermont Supreme Court concluded there was no constitutional violation and affirmed. View "A.B. v. S.U. et al." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the order of the district court denying Polk County's motion to dismiss this tort action under Iowa Code 670.4A, a new provision of the Iowa Municipal Tort Claims Act, and Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.421, holding that only two of the four counts met the applicable pleading standards.Plaintiff, a former County employee, brought this tort action against the County and members of the Polk County Board of Supervisors challenging his termination. In denying Defendants' motion to dismiss, the district court concluded that Iowa's recently-enacted qualified immunity provision did not apply retrospectively and that Plaintiff satisfied section 670.4A's new pleading requirement for qualified immunity defenses. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decision allowing counts one and four to proceed and reversed the district court with respect to the five remaining counts, holding (1) because the legislature did not expressly make subsection 670.4A(3) retrospective, it could not be applied in this case; and (2) of the petition's seven counts, only counts one and four met the applicable pleading standards and survived Defendants' motion to dismiss as a matter of law. View "Nahas v. Polk County" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the summary judgment granted by the district court in favor of the City of Muscatine on claims seeking to hold the City vicariously liable for a former police officer's sexual assault, holding that Plaintiff was not entitled to relief as to her allegations of error.Plaintiff, who was drunk, was offered a ride to a hotel by a police officer. The officer followed Plaintiff to her room and raped her. The officer was convicted of third-degree sexual abuse of an incapacitated person. Plaintiff later sued the officer and the City alleging several tort causes of action. The district court granted summary judgment to the City, determining that Plaintiff failed to prove that the assault was within the scope of the officer's employment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court (1) did not err in determining that Plaintiff's sexual assault fell outside his scope of employment; and (2) this Court declines to adopt Plaintiff's proposed aided-by-agency theory to impose vicarious liability on the City. View "Martin v. Tovar" on Justia Law