Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the order of the district court denying Polk County's motion to dismiss this tort action under Iowa Code 670.4A, a new provision of the Iowa Municipal Tort Claims Act, and Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.421, holding that only two of the four counts met the applicable pleading standards.Plaintiff, a former County employee, brought this tort action against the County and members of the Polk County Board of Supervisors challenging his termination. In denying Defendants' motion to dismiss, the district court concluded that Iowa's recently-enacted qualified immunity provision did not apply retrospectively and that Plaintiff satisfied section 670.4A's new pleading requirement for qualified immunity defenses. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decision allowing counts one and four to proceed and reversed the district court with respect to the five remaining counts, holding (1) because the legislature did not expressly make subsection 670.4A(3) retrospective, it could not be applied in this case; and (2) of the petition's seven counts, only counts one and four met the applicable pleading standards and survived Defendants' motion to dismiss as a matter of law. View "Nahas v. Polk County" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the summary judgment granted by the district court in favor of the City of Muscatine on claims seeking to hold the City vicariously liable for a former police officer's sexual assault, holding that Plaintiff was not entitled to relief as to her allegations of error.Plaintiff, who was drunk, was offered a ride to a hotel by a police officer. The officer followed Plaintiff to her room and raped her. The officer was convicted of third-degree sexual abuse of an incapacitated person. Plaintiff later sued the officer and the City alleging several tort causes of action. The district court granted summary judgment to the City, determining that Plaintiff failed to prove that the assault was within the scope of the officer's employment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court (1) did not err in determining that Plaintiff's sexual assault fell outside his scope of employment; and (2) this Court declines to adopt Plaintiff's proposed aided-by-agency theory to impose vicarious liability on the City. View "Martin v. Tovar" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment of the trial court dismissing FCA US LLC from the underlying tort lawsuit, holding that Massachusetts had personal jurisdiction over FCA US under the Commonwealth's long-arm statute, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 223A, 3, and the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.Paul Doucet was the passenger in a car that was involved in an accident in New Hampshire, rendering him incapacitated. Doucet's guardians filed suit against FCA US, the vehicle's manufacturer, and the Massachusetts distributor-dealership Sudbay Chrysler Dodge, Inc. FCA US, a Delaware limited liability company with its principal place of business in Michigan, filed a motion to dismiss for want of personal jurisdiction. The trial judge granted the motion and dismissed FCA US as a party to the case, concluding that Massachusetts lacked personal jurisdiction under both the long-arm statute and the due process clause of the United States Constitution. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment below, holding that personal jurisdiction existed in Massachusetts over FCA US for the underlying claims pursuant to both the Commonwealth's long-arm statute and the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause. View "Doucet v. FCA US LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court denied a writ of prohibition sought by the West Virginia Division of Corrections and Rehabilitation (DCR) that would effectively dismiss a wrongful death lawsuit filed against it by Mary Jane McComas, administratrix of the estate of Deanna McDonald, holding that DCR failed to establish that it was entitled to the writ.McComas, as administratrix of McDonald's estate, sued DCR alleging state law and common law claims and causes of action, including intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress and wrongful death. DCR filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the amended complaint asserted claims sounding in medical professional liability under the Medical Professional Liability Act (MPLA) that could not be brought against DCR. The circuit court denied the motion to dismiss, after which DCR filed its writ of prohibition. The Supreme Court denied the requested writ, holding that the MPLA does not apply to DCR, and therefore, the circuit court did not commit clear error as a matter of law in declining to dismiss the amended complaint. View "State ex rel. W. Va. Division of Corrections & Rehabilitation v. Honorable Ferguson" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the circuit court concluding that the Raleigh County Housing Authority (RCHA) was entitled to qualified immunity in the underlying wrongful death and negligence action, holding that RCHA was a "political subdivision" as defined in the Governmental Tort Claims and Insurance Reform Act, W. Va. Code 29-12A-1 to 18.Edward S. And Rachel K. lived in a rental house with their three children with assistance from the RCHA. Two of the children died and Edward and a third child were seriously injured when the house caught fire. Edward sued RCHA alleging two counts of wrongful death and one count of negligence. The circuit court granted summary judgment for RCHA, concluding that RCHA was not a political subdivision as defined by the Tort Claims Act and that RCHA was qualifiedly immune. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that RCHA was a political subdivision under the Tort Claims Act. View "Edward S. v. Raleigh County Housing Authority" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the circuit court concluding that Speedyway LLC was partially at fault for the death of Kevin Jarrett, holding that the circuit court erred in concluding that Speedway had a legal duty in this case.While driving her vehicle after leaving work at Speedway and running a personal errand, Brandy Liggett collided with Jarrett's motorcycle, killing him. Respondent, as the executrix of Jarrett's estate, brought this action alleging that Speedyway was negligent in Jarrett's death because at the time of the accident and during her shift at Speedway, Liggett was under the influence of illegally obtained prescription drugs. The circuit court found Speedyway to be thirty percent at fault in Jarrett's death. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the evidence at trial failed to demonstrate that Speedway engaged in affirmative conduct that created an unreasonable risk of harm to Jarrett and the rest of the motoring public. View "Speedway LLC v. Jarrett" on Justia Law

In November 2013, plaintiff Philip Pantano, a mechanic employed by Container Services of New Jersey (CSNJ), was injured at work while attempting to move a heavy piece of industrial equipment. Lawrence Giamella, who was also working on the site that day, tried to help plaintiff move the equipment with a forklift; plaintiff’s foot was crushed in the process. Plaintiff collected workers’ compensation benefits from his employer, CSNJ. He and his wife also brought a personal injury action against numerous defendants, including Marine Transport, Inc. (MT). MT and CSNJ were related companies owned by the same person. The core of the parties’ dispute concerned which entity or entities employed Giamella at the time of the accident: MT, CSNJ, or both. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of CSNJ because of the statutory bar established by N.J.S.A. 34:15-8. MT also moved for summary judgment, arguing that it was not Giamella’s employer and was therefore not vicariously liable for his negligence. Although Giamella was on MT’s payroll, MT raised the affirmative defense that he was a “borrowed servant” or “special employee” working for CSNJ at the time of the accident, applying the multi-factor test set forth in Galvao v. G.R. Robert Construction Co., 179 N.J. 462 (2004). The pretrial judge denied MT’s motion. At the close of plaintiff’s case, MT moved for judgment pursuant to Rule 4:40-1, founded on the same borrowed-employee theory it had raised earlier in its summary judgment motion. The trial judge did not rule on the motion, reserving judgment for after the jury verdict. The jury awarded plaintiff damages for pain and suffering, lost wages, and loss of consortium. Pursuant to an agreement reached by counsel, the jury was asked to presume that MT was vicariously liable and was not asked to resolve the borrowed-employee question. Instead, counsel assented to have the court resolve the borrowed-employee argument through the mechanism of MT’s yet-to-be-decided Rule 4:40-1 motion. The trial judge vacated the verdict and awarded judgment to MT, concluding that Giamella was a borrowed employee working for CSNJ when the accident occurred. The Appellate Division reversed, vacated the directed verdict, and reinstated the jury verdict in plaintiff’s favor. Finding no reversible error in the appellate court's judgment, the New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed. View "Pantano v. New York Shipping Association" on Justia Law

After Talevski’s move to a nursing home proved problematic, Talevski sued a county-owned nursing home (HHC) under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming that HHC’s actions violated rights guaranteed him under the Federal Nursing Home Reform Act (FNHRA). The Seventh Circuit reversed the dismissal of the suit, concluding that the FNHRA rights cited by Talevski—the right to be free from unnecessary chemical restraints and rights to be discharged or transferred only when certain preconditions are met, “unambiguously confer individually enforceable rights on nursing home residents,” presumptively enforceable via section 1983.The Supreme Court affirmed. The FNHRA provisions at issue unambiguously create section 1983-enforceable rights. There is no incompatibility between private enforcement under section 1983 and the remedial scheme that Congress devised. The Court rejected HHC’s argument that, because Congress apparently enacted the FNHRA pursuant to the Spending Clause, Talevski cannot invoke section 1983 to vindicate rights recognized by the FNHRA. FNHRA lacks any indicia of congressional intent to preclude section 1983 enforcement, such as an express private judicial right of action or any other provision that might signify that intent. HHC cited the comprehensiveness of FNHRA’s enforcement mechanisms, but implicit preclusion is shown only by a comprehensive enforcement scheme that is incompatible with individual enforcement under section 1983. There is no indication that private enforcement under section 1983 would thwart Congress’s scheme by circumventing the statutes’ pre-suit procedures, or by giving plaintiffs access to tangible benefits otherwise unavailable under the statutes. View "Health and Hospital Corp. of Marion County v. Talevski" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court denied a petition for a writ of certiorari or, in the alternative, a writ of prohibition, writ of mandamus or other supervisory writ, holding that the circuit court did not misinterpret the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure in the underlying discovery matter.Respondents filed a complaint against Monsanto Company alleging claims for design defect, failure to warn, negligence, breach of implied warranties, violation of the Arkansas Deceptive Trade Practices Act, and loss of consortium. After Respondents served Monsanto with a deposition notice Monsanto moved for a protective order arguing that the deposition was not permitted. The circuit court denied Monsanto's motion for protective order. Monsanto then brought this petition. The Supreme Court denied the petition, holding that Monsanto was seeking to control the circuit court's exercise of its discretion in this discovery matter and that mandamus will not lie for this purpose. View "Monsanto Co. v. Kilgore" on Justia Law

At the start of the COVID-19 pandemic, Amazon.com, Inc. (“Amazon”) stopped providing “Rapid Delivery”1 to Amazon Prime (“Prime”) subscribers. Because Prime subscribers were not notified of the suspension and continued to pay full price for their memberships, Plaintiff and others brought a putative class action against Amazon alleging breach of contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, violation of the Washington Consumer Protection Act (“WCPA”), and unjust enrichment. The district court granted Amazon’s motion to dismiss the First Amended Complaint for failure to state a claim with prejudice because it found that Amazon did not have a duty to provide unqualified Rapid Delivery to Prime subscribers.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court first wrote that it is allowed to use its “experience and common sense” to acknowledge the COVID-19 pandemic even though it was not included as a factual allegation in the First Amended Complaint. The court dispensed with this argument because Amazon’s prioritization of essential goods during the COVID-19 pandemic obviously did not harm the public interest. Further, the court explained that Plaintiffs specifically incorporated the terms of their contract with Amazon as part of their unjust enrichment count. So, while Plaintiffs may plead breach of contract and unjust enrichment in the alternative, they have not done so. Instead, Plaintiffs pleaded a contractual relationship as part of their unjust enrichment claim, and that contractual relationship defeats their unjust enrichment claim under Washington law. View "Andrez Marquez, et al v. Amazon.com, Inc." on Justia Law