Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

The plaintiff sought medical care for severe headaches and related symptoms from various providers in Oklahoma and Missouri, including Freeman Health System (FHS) and Dr. Gulshan Uppal in Joplin, Missouri. After multiple visits and treatments, she was ultimately diagnosed with serious neurological conditions and suffered lasting health consequences. She alleged that several healthcare providers, including FHS and Dr. Uppal, negligently diagnosed, treated, and discharged her.She filed suit in the District Court of Ottawa County, Oklahoma, naming multiple defendants. FHS and Dr. Uppal moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, arguing their actions and contacts were insufficient for Oklahoma courts to exercise jurisdiction. The district court granted the motion, finding it lacked both general and specific personal jurisdiction over these defendants, primarily because the relevant treatment occurred in Missouri and the claims did not arise from FHS’s Oklahoma contacts. The Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals affirmed this decision.The Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma reviewed the case on certiorari. It held that the district court erred by only considering whether the suit “arose out of” the defendants’ contacts with Oklahoma, and not whether it “related to” those contacts, as required by the two-pronged standard for specific personal jurisdiction clarified in Ford Motor Co. v. Montana 8th Judicial District Court. The Supreme Court found that the plaintiff met her burden regarding FHS’s contacts with Oklahoma, warranting further proceedings to determine if her claims “relate to” those contacts. However, the plaintiff failed to show sufficient contacts for personal jurisdiction over Dr. Uppal. The Supreme Court vacated the appellate court’s opinion, affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Dr. Uppal, reversed the dismissal of FHS, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Barfell v. Freeman Health System" on Justia Law

After tripping and falling on a raised portion of sidewalk in front of a residence, the plaintiff sued the owners of the adjacent properties and the City for negligence and premises liability. The claim against one property owner, Goode, was based on the theory that a tree in the parkway in front of her house had roots extending under the sidewalk where the plaintiff fell, potentially causing the damage. The City maintained and inspected the tree and sidewalk, but the plaintiff alleged Goode’s ownership of the tree contributed to the dangerous condition.The Ventura County Superior Court granted summary judgment in favor of Goode, finding no triable issue of material fact regarding her liability. The plaintiff did not oppose Goode’s motion for summary judgment, but the City did file an opposition and attempted to file a cross-complaint against Goode. The trial court declined to consider the City’s opposition, ruling that the City lacked standing because it had not filed a cross-complaint, and rejected the cross-complaint on procedural grounds.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Six, reviewed the case. It held that a codefendant with an adverse interest has standing to oppose a motion for summary judgment, regardless of whether a cross-complaint has been filed. The court further found that the City’s cross-complaint was properly filed and should not have been rejected. However, after reviewing the evidence de novo, the appellate court concluded that Goode could not be held liable as a matter of law because she did not own, control, or maintain the sidewalk or tree in a manner that created the dangerous condition. The judgment granting summary judgment in favor of Goode was affirmed. View "Bean v. City of Thousand Oaks" on Justia Law

A flight attendant on a Delta Air Lines flight observed a 13-year-old passenger crying during turbulence and believed the man accompanying her was behaving inappropriately. Concluding that the man was sexually assaulting and trafficking the child, the attendant reported her concerns to the flight captain, who relayed the information to a station manager. The manager contacted local police, who detained and questioned the man, Nicholas Cupp, and his daughter upon landing. After investigation, police determined Cupp was the child’s father and released him without charges. Cupp later filed suit, alleging the report was false and reckless, and claimed significant emotional distress and harm to his relationship with his daughter.The case was initially filed in the Circuit Court of Newport News, Virginia, but was removed to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia based on diversity jurisdiction. The defendants moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), arguing immunity under Virginia Code § 63.2-1512 for good-faith reports of suspected child abuse. The district court granted the motion, finding the immunity statute applicable even though the report was made to law enforcement rather than directly to social services, and concluded that Cupp had not sufficiently alleged bad faith or malicious intent.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed whether a nonmandatory reporter who makes a good-faith complaint of suspected child abuse to law enforcement, rather than directly to social services, is entitled to immunity under Virginia Code § 63.2-1512. Finding no controlling Virginia precedent, the Fourth Circuit certified this question to the Supreme Court of Virginia, as its answer will determine whether the district court’s dismissal should be affirmed or reversed. View "Cupp v. Delta Air Lines, Inc." on Justia Law

A woman was injured while visiting a property owned by a couple who were seeking tenants for a mobile home located on their land. The injury occurred when she stepped into a gap between the entryway stairs and the mobile home, a gap created during ongoing repairs. The couple had a homeowners insurance policy with State Mutual Insurance Company, but the policy’s declarations page listed a different property as the covered premises. The injured woman sued the couple for negligence, and the parties later entered into a settlement and stipulated judgment, with the couple paying part of the judgment and the woman seeking the remainder from the insurer under Maine’s reach-and-apply statute.The Superior Court of Waldo County granted summary judgment in favor of the insurer, finding that the insurance policy did not cover the property where the injury occurred. The court determined that the property was not an “insured location” under the policy and that the injury arose out of a condition of the uninsured premises, thus falling within a policy exclusion. The woman appealed this decision.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case de novo, considering both the interpretation of the insurance policy and the application of the reach-and-apply statute. The court held that the policy unambiguously excluded coverage for bodily injury arising out of a premises owned by the insured but not listed as an insured location. The court also found that the property in question was not an “insured location” because the insureds did not reside there and it was not listed in the policy declarations. Accordingly, the court affirmed the grant of summary judgment in favor of the insurer, holding that the policy did not provide coverage for the injury. View "Rowe v. State Mutual Insurance Company" on Justia Law

A patient with a long history of severe depression and multiple suicide attempts underwent 95 electroconvulsive therapy (ECT) treatments at a Nebraska hospital between 2014 and 2016. The ECT was administered using a device manufactured by Somatics, LLC. After the treatments, the patient experienced significant memory loss and was diagnosed with a neurocognitive disorder. In 2020, he filed suit against Somatics in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida, alleging negligence, strict product liability, breach of warranties, violation of Nebraska’s Consumer Protection Act, and fraudulent misrepresentation, primarily claiming that Somatics failed to adequately warn of the risks associated with ECT.The district court dismissed the claims under Nebraska’s Consumer Protection Act and for fraudulent misrepresentation, merged the strict liability and breach of implied warranty claims, and granted summary judgment to Somatics on the design defect, manufacturing defect, and breach of express warranty claims. The remaining claims for negligence and strict liability, both based on failure to warn, were merged for trial. The jury found that while Somatics failed to provide adequate warnings, this failure was not the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injuries, and awarded no damages. The district court denied the plaintiff’s post-trial motions, including for a new trial.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the district court’s decisions de novo for summary judgment and for abuse of discretion on evidentiary and procedural rulings. The Eleventh Circuit held that the district court properly granted summary judgment on the design defect claim, correctly merged the negligence and strict liability claims, gave an appropriate jury instruction on proximate cause, and did not abuse its discretion in excluding certain evidence and expert testimony. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "Thelen v. Somatics, LLC" on Justia Law

Several minors were injured at trampoline parks operated by Sky Zone in Philadelphia. In each instance, only one parent signed a “Participation Agreement, Release and Assumption of the Risk” on behalf of the minor child. The Agreement included a release of liability and an arbitration provision requiring all claims to be resolved by arbitration, waiving the right to a jury trial. After the injuries, lawsuits were filed by both the injured minors’ non-signing parents and the minors themselves, seeking damages for the injuries sustained.The Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County reviewed the cases and denied Sky Zone’s petitions to compel arbitration. The trial courts found that the Agreements were enforceable only against the signing parent, not the non-signing parent or the minor child. The courts reasoned that there was no evidence of agency between spouses that would allow one parent to bind the other, and that parents do not have the legal authority to waive a minor’s right to pursue personal injury claims or to bind a minor to an arbitration agreement. The Superior Court of Pennsylvania affirmed these rulings, emphasizing that agency cannot be inferred from marriage alone and that parents, as natural guardians, lack authority over a minor’s property interests, including legal claims, without court approval.The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reviewed the consolidated appeals. It held that the arbitration agreement signed by one parent is not enforceable against the non-signing parent or the minor child. The Court found that a marital relationship alone does not create an agency relationship, and there was no evidence of express, implied, apparent, or estoppel-based agency. Additionally, the Court held that parents, as natural guardians, lack inherent authority to bind their minor children to arbitration agreements that forfeit the right to a judicial forum and the procedural protections afforded to minors in court. The orders of the Superior Court were affirmed. View "Santiago v. Philly Trampoline Park" on Justia Law

Several minors were injured at trampoline parks operated by Sky Zone in Philadelphia. In each instance, only one parent signed a “Participation Agreement, Release and Assumption of the Risk” on behalf of their child, which included an arbitration provision waiving the right to sue in court. After the injuries, both the signing and non-signing parents, along with the injured minors, brought lawsuits seeking damages for the injuries sustained at the facilities.The Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County reviewed petitions by Sky Zone to compel arbitration and stay the litigation, relying on the signed agreements. The trial courts denied these petitions, finding that the agreements were enforceable only against the signing parent. The courts determined that a spouse does not have authority to act as the agent of the other simply by virtue of marriage, and Sky Zone had not provided evidence of agency. Additionally, the courts held that parents do not have the legal authority to waive a minor’s right to pursue personal injury claims or to bind a minor to an arbitration agreement that would require waiving the right to a judicial forum.The Superior Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the trial courts’ decisions, holding that neither the non-signing parents nor the minors were bound by the arbitration provisions. The Superior Court reasoned that agency cannot be inferred from family ties alone and that parents, as natural guardians, lack inherent authority to manage a minor’s property, including legal claims, without court approval.The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reviewed the case and affirmed the Superior Court’s orders. The Court held that a parent who signs an arbitration agreement cannot bind a non-signing spouse or a minor child to its terms. Specifically, parents lack the authority to bind a minor to an agreement to arbitrate, as this would deprive the minor of judicial protections and oversight designed to safeguard their interests. View "Shultz v. Sky Zone, LLC" on Justia Law

A catastrophic multi-vehicle collision occurred in Westmoreland County, Pennsylvania, involving a motorcoach bus, FedEx and UPS tractor-trailers, and other vehicles. The crash resulted in five deaths and numerous injuries, requiring a large emergency response and extensive investigation. Plaintiffs, who resided in various locations across the country and abroad, filed civil lawsuits in the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas against several corporate defendants, all of which conduct business nationwide. The defendants sought to transfer the cases to Westmoreland County, arguing that the majority of witnesses, including first responders and investigators, were located there and would face significant hardship if required to travel over 200 miles to Philadelphia for trial.The Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas granted the defendants’ petitions to transfer venue, finding that the burden on witnesses was substantial and that the doctrine of forum non conveniens warranted transfer. The court noted that the defendants had identified numerous witnesses whose testimony would be material and who would be significantly inconvenienced by the distance. The plaintiffs appealed, and the Superior Court of Pennsylvania reversed, holding that the defendants failed to show that the identified witnesses were “key witnesses” whose testimony was “critical” to the defense, and that the affidavits did not sufficiently detail the necessity of their testimony.The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reviewed the case and reversed the Superior Court’s order. The Court held that the Superior Court’s imposition of a “key witness” requirement was inconsistent with Pennsylvania precedent. The Supreme Court clarified that a petitioner seeking transfer for forum non conveniens must identify the burdened witnesses and provide a general statement of their expected testimony, but need not show that their testimony is “critical” or “necessary” to the defense. The trial court’s decision to transfer the cases to Westmoreland County was found to be a proper exercise of discretion. View "Tranter v. Z&D Tour, Inc." on Justia Law

A licensed veterinarian developed and manufactured undetectable performance enhancing drugs (PEDs) for use in professional horse racing, selling them to trainers who administered them to horses to gain a competitive edge. His salesperson assisted in these activities, operating a company that distributed the drugs without prescriptions or FDA approval. The drugs were misbranded or adulterated, and the operation involved deceptive practices such as misleading labeling and falsified customs forms. The PEDs were credited by trainers for their horses’ successes, and evidence showed the drugs could be harmful if misused.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York presided over two separate trials, resulting in convictions for both the veterinarian and his salesperson for conspiracy to manufacture and distribute misbranded or adulterated drugs with intent to defraud or mislead, in violation of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act. The district court denied motions to dismiss the indictment, admitted evidence from a prior state investigation, and imposed sentences including imprisonment, restitution, and forfeiture. The court calculated loss for sentencing based on the veterinarian’s gains and ordered restitution to racetracks based on winnings by a coconspirator’s doped horses.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the statute’s “intent to defraud or mislead” element is not limited to particular categories of victims; it is sufficient if the intent relates to the underlying violation. The court found no error in the admission of evidence from the 2011 investigation or in the use of gain as a proxy for loss in sentencing. However, it vacated the restitution order to racetracks, finding no evidence they suffered pecuniary loss, and vacated the forfeiture order, holding that the relevant statute is not a civil forfeiture statute subject to criminal forfeiture procedures. The convictions and sentence were otherwise affirmed. View "United States v. Fishman" on Justia Law

An adolescent female, who was continuously enrolled as a dependent under her mother’s Kaiser health care plans from 2005 to 2023, received gender-affirming medical care between the ages of 13 and 17. After experiencing negative outcomes and later detransitioning, she filed a medical malpractice lawsuit against Kaiser Foundation Hospitals, The Permanente Medical Group, and several individual providers. The claims alleged that the care provided was not medically justified, that risks were not adequately disclosed, and that the providers failed to meet the standard of care in both treatment and informed consent.The Superior Court of San Joaquin County reviewed Kaiser’s petition to compel arbitration, which was based on arbitration provisions in the health plan documents. Kaiser argued that the plaintiff, as a dependent, was bound by arbitration agreements incorporated in the evidence of coverage and benefits booklets for both the union-based and self-funded plans. The trial court found that Kaiser failed to establish the existence of a valid agreement to arbitrate, noting that the relevant documents referenced in the enrollment forms were not provided, and there was no evidence of the plaintiff or her mother expressly agreeing to the specific arbitration provisions Kaiser sought to enforce. The court denied the petition to compel arbitration and later denied Kaiser’s motion for reconsideration.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, affirmed the trial court’s order. The appellate court held that Kaiser did not meet its burden to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, the existence of a valid and binding arbitration agreement covering the controversy. The court emphasized that mere enrollment and general references to arbitration were insufficient; the precise arbitration provision must be clearly incorporated and agreed to. The order denying the petition to compel arbitration was affirmed. View "Brockman v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals" on Justia Law