Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

The case involves the estate of Penny Ann Simmons, who passed away on July 19, 2018. Dianna Lynn Davenport was appointed as the personal representative of Simmons' estate by the Spencer District Court on September 11, 2018, with the order entered by the Spencer County Clerk on September 21, 2018. Davenport filed a medical malpractice and wrongful death lawsuit against Kindred Hospitals on September 20, 2019. Kindred argued that the lawsuit was filed outside the one-year statute of limitations, which they claimed began when the judge signed the appointment order.The Jefferson Circuit Court granted Kindred's motion for summary judgment, ruling that the lawsuit was indeed filed outside the statute of limitations. The court found that the statute of limitations began when the judge signed the order of appointment, as per KRS 395.105. The Court of Appeals affirmed this decision, referencing its own precedent in Batts v. Illinois Central Railroad Company, but invited the Supreme Court of Kentucky to review the issue.The Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed the lower courts' decisions. The court held that probate proceedings, including the appointment of a personal representative, are special statutory proceedings. Therefore, the procedural requirements of KRS 395.105, which state that the appointment is effective upon the judge's signing, prevail over the Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure. The court also clarified that the one-year limitation period for filing claims, as set forth in KRS 413.180(1), begins at the time of the appointment, which is when the judge signs the order. Thus, Davenport's lawsuit was filed outside the permissible time frame, and the summary judgment in favor of Kindred was affirmed. View "DAVENPORT KINDRED HOSPITALS LIMITED PARTNERSHIP" on Justia Law

The case involves the Estate of Charles Anthony Hurtado, which brought an action against Dr. Jerry A. Smith, alleging that Dr. Smith acted with deliberate indifference to Mr. Hurtado’s serious medical needs. Mr. Hurtado, an inmate, was treated for a perineal abscess at a medical center where Dr. Smith performed a diagnostic needle aspiration but did not find an abscess cavity. Dr. Smith prescribed oral antibiotics and pain medication, and Mr. Hurtado was discharged. Later that evening, Mr. Hurtado returned to the emergency room with intense pain, was diagnosed with sepsis, and underwent surgery. He was later transferred to another hospital where he died from complications related to the abscess and other health issues.The United States District Court for the District of Colorado granted summary judgment in favor of Dr. Smith. The court found no genuine dispute of material fact regarding whether Dr. Smith knew of and disregarded a significant risk to Mr. Hurtado’s health. The court concluded that even if Dr. Smith’s diagnosis and treatment were incorrect, they did not rise to the level of deliberate indifference but were, at most, medical negligence.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the district court’s decision. The appellate court held that there was no evidence from which a jury could infer that Dr. Smith consciously disregarded a substantial risk to Mr. Hurtado’s health. The court noted that Dr. Smith’s treatment was not patently unreasonable and that the expert testimony provided by the plaintiff did not establish deliberate indifference but rather suggested medical negligence. The court emphasized that deliberate indifference requires more than a misdiagnosis or negligence; it requires a showing that the medical professional knew of and disregarded an excessive risk to the inmate’s health. View "Estate of Hurtado v. Smith" on Justia Law

Two plaintiffs, Lester Jenkins and Dwight Siples Jr., participated in the cleanup of the Deepwater Horizon oil spill and later developed chronic sinusitis, which they attributed to exposure to crude oil and dispersants during the cleanup. They filed suits against BP Exploration & Production, Inc. and BP America Production Company, claiming that their medical conditions were caused by this exposure. The plaintiffs relied on expert testimony to establish general causation, which is necessary in toxic-tort cases where the medical community does not recognize the alleged toxins as harmful.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida reviewed the expert testimonies of Dr. Michael Freeman and Dr. Gina Solomon, who opined that a causal relationship existed between the cleanup work and chronic sinusitis. However, the district court excluded their testimonies, finding that neither expert identified a minimal level of exposure at which crude oil, its dispersants, or associated chemicals are hazardous to humans. The court also noted that the experts failed to identify a statistically significant association between the chronic conditions and exposure to crude oil, assess the limitations of various studies, or meaningfully consider causal factors. Consequently, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of BP.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the expert testimonies. It emphasized that in toxic-tort cases, plaintiffs must demonstrate the levels of exposure that are hazardous to humans generally. The court found that the experts failed to establish a harmful level of exposure for crude oil or its dispersants and did not adequately support their causation opinions with reliable scientific evidence. Therefore, the summary judgment in favor of BP was affirmed. View "In Re Deepwater Horizon Belo Cases" on Justia Law

The case involves a wrongful-death lawsuit filed by the executors and an independent administrator of the estates of deceased residents of a nursing home, Geneva Nursing and Rehabilitation Center, LLC, doing business as Bria Health Services of Geneva. The plaintiffs allege that Bria negligently and willfully failed to control the spread of COVID-19, leading to the deaths of the decedents between March and May 2020. The complaints assert that Bria's failure to quarantine symptomatic staff and residents and to implement effective hygiene and equipment procedures caused the decedents to contract COVID-19 and die from related complications.The Kane County Circuit Court denied Bria's motions to dismiss the negligence claims but allowed Bria to file a motion to certify a question for interlocutory appeal. The certified question was whether Executive Order 2020-19 provided blanket immunity for ordinary negligence to healthcare facilities that rendered assistance to the State during the COVID-19 pandemic. The appellate court modified the question to clarify that the immunity in question derived from section 21(c) of the Illinois Emergency Management Agency Act and answered the modified question affirmatively, stating that Bria would have immunity from negligence claims if it could show it was rendering assistance to the State during the pandemic.The Supreme Court of Illinois reviewed the case and agreed with the appellate court's modification of the certified question. The court held that Executive Order 2020-19, which triggered the immunity provided in section 21(c) of the Act, grants immunity for ordinary negligence claims to healthcare facilities that rendered assistance to the State during the COVID-19 pandemic. The court affirmed the appellate court's judgment and remanded the case to the circuit court to determine whether Bria was indeed rendering such assistance. View "James v. Geneva Nursing & Rehabilitation Center, LLC" on Justia Law

Eason Propane, LLC, purchased a new Freightliner propane delivery truck, which caught fire due to Empire Truck Sales, LLC's negligence during repairs. The fire caused significant damage to the truck, leading to extensive business losses for Eason Propane. Eason Propane sued Empire, seeking damages for the truck's diminished value, repair costs, lost profits, and other consequential damages.The case was tried in the Lamar County Circuit Court, where the jury found Empire liable and awarded Eason Propane $263,443.39 in damages. Empire moved for a new trial on damages or a remittitur, arguing that the jury's award was against the overwhelming weight of the evidence. The trial court denied Empire's motion, leading to this appeal.The Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed the case and affirmed the trial court's decision. The court held that the jury's damages award was not manifestly unjust or so excessive as to shock the conscience. The court found that the evidence presented at trial supported the jury's findings, including the testimony of Eason Propane's experts regarding the truck's diminished value and lost profits. The court emphasized that it was within the jury's purview to weigh the credibility of the competing testimonies and evidence.The court concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Empire's motion for a new trial or remittitur. The jury's award of $112,698.46 for the truck's diminished value, $24,744.93 for repair costs, $120,000 for lost profits, and $6,000 for other consequential damages was affirmed. View "Stribling Equipment, LLC v. Eason Propane, LLC" on Justia Law

Jason Scarborough, a police officer, was involved in a car accident with Wanda Logan while responding to an emergency call. Scarborough was driving at 79 miles per hour in a 25-mile-per-hour residential zone with his emergency lights on but no siren. Logan, who was at a stop sign, pulled out in front of Scarborough, leading to a collision. Scarborough sustained severe injuries and sued Logan for negligence, seeking over $3 million in damages. The jury found Scarborough 60% at fault and Logan 40% at fault, awarding Scarborough $1.2 million, which the trial court reduced to $480,000 to reflect Scarborough's apportioned fault.The Rankin County Circuit Court allowed the deposition of Shane Remy, an accident reconstructionist, to be read at trial despite Logan's objection that Remy had not been qualified or tendered as an expert witness. Remy's testimony was crucial in attributing fault to Logan. The jury's verdict reflected a reduction based on Scarborough's fault, but the trial court further reduced the award, leading Scarborough to file a motion to alter or amend the judgment, which was denied.The Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed the case and found that the trial court abused its discretion by allowing Remy's deposition without proper qualification as an expert witness. This error was not harmless, as Remy's testimony was the only evidence of Logan's fault aside from Scarborough's account. The court also found that the trial court erred in further reducing the jury's award, as the jury had already accounted for Scarborough's fault. Consequently, the Supreme Court of Mississippi reversed the trial court's judgment and remanded the case for a new trial, dismissing the direct appeal as moot. View "Scarborough v. Logan" on Justia Law

In 2009, a surgeon performed a shoulder replacement surgery on a patient, during which the patient suffered a fracture and subsequent nerve injury, resulting in permanent radial nerve palsy. The patient sued the surgeon and associated medical entities for professional negligence, claiming vicarious liability. The case went to trial twice; the first trial resulted in a verdict for the defendants, but the court granted a new trial due to juror misconduct. The second trial resulted in a verdict for the patient, awarding significant damages, which the court reduced according to statutory caps.The Eighth Judicial District Court of Clark County oversaw the trials. After the second trial, the court reduced the pain and suffering damages to $350,000 pursuant to NRS 41A.035, awarded attorney fees, and capped expert witness costs. The defendants moved for a new trial based on alleged juror misconduct, which the court denied. Both parties appealed various aspects of the court's decisions, including the application of the damages cap, the res ipsa loquitur instruction, and the award of attorney fees and costs.The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed the case. It held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in giving a res ipsa loquitur instruction despite expert testimony, as the relevant statutory amendments did not apply retroactively. The court affirmed the reduction of pain and suffering damages to $350,000, applying the statutory cap to both the surgeon and the medical entities. The court also upheld the denial of a new trial based on juror misconduct, finding no intentional concealment or prejudice.Regarding attorney fees, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court's award but modified it to comply with NRS 7.095, capping the total recoverable amount. The court found no conflict between NRCP 68 and NRS 18.005 but remanded the case for further proceedings on expert witness fees, requiring a more detailed application of the Frazier factors. The judgment and order denying a new trial were affirmed, the attorney fees award was affirmed as modified, and the order retaxing costs was reversed in part. View "NEVINS VS. MARTYN" on Justia Law

A police officer from the City of Mesa, while driving his patrol car, was involved in a multi-vehicle accident that injured a bicyclist, Philip Rogers. Rogers claimed the officer's negligent driving caused the accident and served notices of claim to the City of Mesa and the officer, offering to settle for "$1,000,000 or the applicable [insurance] policy limits, whichever are greater." Later, Rogers amended his notices to specify a settlement amount of $1,000,000.The Superior Court of Maricopa County denied the City’s motion to dismiss Rogers' complaint, which argued that the initial notices did not comply with Arizona Revised Statutes § 12-821.01(A) because they did not state a specific settlement amount. The City then petitioned for special action review. The Court of Appeals reversed the Superior Court’s decision, directing it to dismiss the complaint, concluding that the notices of claim did not provide a specific amount for settlement as required by the statute.The Supreme Court of Arizona reviewed the case to determine if Rogers' notices of claim complied with § 12-821.01(A). The Court held that the settlement offer of "$1,000,000 or the applicable policy limits, whichever are greater" was insufficiently specific to meet the statutory requirements. The Court emphasized that the statute requires a clear and precise settlement amount, which was not provided in Rogers' notices. Consequently, Rogers was barred from maintaining his lawsuit due to non-compliance with the statutory notice requirements.The Supreme Court of Arizona reversed the Superior Court’s order and remanded the case with instructions to dismiss Rogers' claims. The Court also affirmed in part and vacated in part the opinion of the Court of Appeals. View "CITY OF MESA v. RYAN" on Justia Law

Michael Arneson, while working for GR Management, LLC, suffered an electric shock that he claimed caused atrial fibrillation (AFib) and numbness in his right hand. The employer and its insurer paid for initial medical treatment but denied further benefits, arguing the conditions were not caused by the shock. The Department of Labor found the electric shock was a major contributing cause of both conditions and that Arneson was permanently and totally disabled under the odd-lot category.The employer and insurer appealed to the Circuit Court of the Sixth Judicial Circuit, which found the electric shock was a major contributing cause of Arneson’s hand condition but not his heart condition. The circuit court also determined that Arneson was not permanently and totally disabled. Arneson appealed, and the employer and insurer filed a notice of review.The Supreme Court of South Dakota reviewed the case. It affirmed the Department of Labor’s finding that the electric shock was a major contributing cause of Arneson’s heart condition, based on the testimony of Dr. Holloway, who treated Arneson and found the electric shock likely caused the AFib. The court found Dr. Holloway’s testimony more persuasive than that of the employer’s experts, Drs. Brody and Elkins, who attributed the AFib to hyperthyroidism. The court also affirmed the Department’s finding that the electric shock was a major contributing cause of Arneson’s hand condition.Regarding Arneson’s claim of permanent total disability, the Supreme Court found the Department’s determination that Arneson was obviously unemployable was supported by the evidence, including the testimony of vocational expert Tom Audet. The court concluded that the employer and insurer failed to show suitable employment was available for Arneson within his limitations. The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court’s ruling on Arneson’s heart condition and permanent total disability, reinstating the Department’s original order. View "Arneson v. Gr Management, LLC" on Justia Law

On a snowy day in December 2018, the Superintendent of Highways for the Town of Carmel, Michael J. Simone, drove into an intersection without the right of way and collided with Ana Orellana's vehicle. Simone had been inspecting road conditions during a snowstorm and had directed his team to salt the roads. After completing his inspection, he was returning to his office when the accident occurred. Simone testified that he was not in a rush, did not consider the situation an emergency, and had no intention of conducting further inspections en route.The Supreme Court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment, holding that Simone's conduct was protected under Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1103 (b), which exempts municipal employees from liability for ordinary negligence when "actually engaged in work on a highway." The court denied the plaintiff's cross-motion for summary judgment as academic. The Appellate Division affirmed this decision.The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the case and reversed the lower courts' decisions. The Court held that Simone was not "actually engaged in work on a highway" at the time of the accident, as he had completed his inspection and was merely returning to his office. Therefore, the protections of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1103 (b) did not apply. The Court granted the plaintiff's cross-motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability and denied the defendants' motion for summary judgment. View "Orellana v Town of Carmel" on Justia Law