Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

The Board of Trustees of the Nebraska State Colleges (“NSCS”) appealed from a jury verdict finding it acted with deliberate indifference after Jane Doe (“Doe”) was sexually assaulted while attending Chadron State College (“Chadron”). On appeal, NSCS raised three claims: (1) the Title IX claim fails as a matter of law; (2) the district court erred when it admitted the expert testimony of Dr. Charol Shakeshaft; and (3) the district court erred in awarding attorney’s fees. We begin with NSCS’s paramount claim that, as a matter of law, it was not deliberately indifferent after Doe reported being sexually assaulted.   The Eighth Circuit reversed and remanded with directions that the district court enter judgment in favor of NSCS and vacated the award of Doe’s attorney fees. The court explained that viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the jury’s verdict, the uncontradicted evidence demonstrates that Chadron acted promptly—nearly immediately—upon learning of the assault. Chadron issued a mutually binding no-contact order between Doe and the accused, which was served on the accused at the end of his police interview. Chadron verified that the two students did not share the same classes and promptly initiated an investigation to determine what happened. Chadron interviewed Doe, explained the investigatory process to her, banned the accused from Andrews Hall, and accommodated Doe academically. Further, the court held that Doe cannot show a causal nexus between Chadron’s actions and the sexual assaults or harassment. View "Jane Doe v. Board of Trustees of the Nebraska State Colleges" on Justia Law

Burns, working as a truck driver for a transportation company, made a delivery to the Bolingbrook, Illinois Sherwin-Williams store. Burns and a store employee used the company’s walkie—a hand-operated electric forklift—to move pallets holding the products from Burns’s truck, up a small ramp, and into the store’s warehouse. When they finished unloading, Burns backed the walkie down the ramp in reverse to return the empty pallets to his truck. He moved in the direction of a dumpster and other pallets that were on the ground beside it. Burns miscalculated how long it would take to stop the walkie as he approached the pallets, trapped his foot, and broke his ankle.Burns sued Sherwin-Williams, alleging that the company failed to exercise ordinary care by leaving the empty pallets in the work area and providing an unsafe walkie. The district court granted Sherwin-Williams summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Under Illinois law, Sherwin-Williams owed no duty to Burns. The discarded pallets were an open and obvious condition. The court declined to apply the doctrine’s deliberate encounter exception: “Where the possessor of land has reason to expect that the invitee will proceed to encounter the known or obvious danger because, to a reasonable man in his position, the advantages of doing so would outweigh the apparent risk.” The court upheld the exclusion of expert testimony that the walkie was unsafe as unreliable under Rule 702. View "Burns v. Sherwin-Williams Co." on Justia Law

Ponderay Police Department Officer Michael Watkins injured his knee while chasing a suspect. Because Watkins was injured during the performance of his duties as a police officer, he was eligible to receive his full base salary during the period of his disability under the Peace Officer and Detention Officer Temporary Disability Act. Rather than receive payments under the Act, Watkins accepted worker’s compensation benefits from the Idaho State Insurance Fund. Nearly a year later, Watkins filed a complaint against the City of Ponderay seeking payment of his full base salary. The Commission fashioned a remedy which required the City to pay Watkins his full base salary, but reduced that amount by the worker’s compensation payments Watkins had already received. Watkins appealed, arguing the Commission failed to follow the Act and exceeded its authority by ordering that the City receive a credit for benefits Watkins received. Finding the Commission erred in ordering the City receive a credit for the worker's compensation benefits, the Idaho Supreme Court reversed. View "Watkins v. City of Ponderay" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court granting Defendant's motion to dismiss Petitioner's petition for judicial review of a decision of a hearing examiner with the Fire and Police Employees' Retirement System for the City of Baltimore denying Petitioner's request for line-of-duty disability retirement, holding that the petition was untimely.Petitioner, a police officer, sustained an injury during a car accident that occurred while he was responding to an emergency call. A copy of the hearing examiner's decision denying line-of-duty disability retirement but granting him non-line-of-duty disability retirement. At issue was whether former Chief Judge Mary Ellen Barbera's administrative tolling order issued in response to the COVID-19 pandemic applied to Defendant's case. The circuit court concluded that the extension applied only to deadlines that were tolled during the closure of the clerks' offices between March 16, 2020 and July 20, 2020. The appellate court certified the question of whether the fifteen-day extension applied to all cases whose statute of limitations and deadlines related to initiation expired between those dates. The Supreme Court answered the question in the negative, holding that the fifteen-day extension under the administrative tolling orders applied only to cases with deadlines that were suspended during the closure of the clerks' offices between the relevant dates. View "In re Hosein" on Justia Law

Plaintiff brought a three-count maritime negligence action against Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd. (“Royal Caribbean”) after she fell aboard one of its cruise ships. She alleged that during the ship’s muster drill, a Royal Caribbean employee rushed her down a set of stairs—causing her to fall and severely injure her neck. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Royal Caribbean. First, on Count I (general negligence) and Count II (negligent failure to warn), the district court found that Plaintiff failed to show that Royal Caribbean had notice of the dangerous conditions that allegedly caused her fall. Second, on Count III (general negligence against Royal Caribbean for its employee’s conduct under a theory of vicarious liability), the district court determined that Plaintiff put forth insufficient evidence of medical causation.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court explained that looking to Florida negligence law: non-readily observable injuries require expert medical evidence to prove causation. The court concluded that Plaintiff failed to adduce sufficient medical evidence to satisfy proximate cause. And because proximate cause must be satisfied for each of Plaintiff’s three negligence-based claims to prevail, the court affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Royal Caribbean. View "Judith Willis v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, LTD." on Justia Law

While at his job as a correctional officer at the Lancaster State Prison in August 2002, respondent Michael Ayala was severely injured in a preplanned attack by inmates. He filed a workers’ compensation claim and alleged that the injury was caused by the serious and willful misconduct of his employer, petitioner California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR). Such an allegation was significant because Labor Code section 4553 provided that “[t]he amount of compensation otherwise recoverable shall be increased one-half . . . where the employee is injured by reason of serious and willful misconduct” by the employer. Ayala and CDCR agreed that the injury caused Ayala 85 percent permanent disability, but they could not agree whether CDCR engaged in serious and willful misconduct. Over a dissent, a Board majority found that CDCR “failed to act on a credible threat of inmate violence that was specifically reported to be planned for the day of the attack and took the facility off lockdown despite this threat even though it possessed additional information . . . that this had long been planned.” Ayala contended that, for the period before his permanent disability, his base compensation was his full salary. He was paid his full salary because he was on industrial disability leave and enhanced industrial disability leave, which were alternatives to temporary disability. CDCR contended the base compensation was only what Ayala would have been entitled to on temporary disability. Assuming that Ayala would have been entitled to temporary total disability, the base compensation would have been two-thirds of his salary, subject to statutory limits. The workers’ compensation judge agreed with CDCR and found that the base compensation was what Ayala would have been paid in temporary disability. But on reconsideration, the Board again rescinded and reversed the workers’ compensation judge’s decision, this time finding that the base compensation was what Ayala was paid on industrial disability leave and enhanced industrial disability leave. The Court of Appeal held that industrial disability leave and enhanced industrial disability leave were not “compensation” as that term was used in section 4553 and annuled the Board’s contrary decision. View "Cal. Dept. Corrections & Rehabilitation v. Workers' Comp. App. Bd." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that the Maryland Tort Claims Act's (MTCA), Md. Code Ann. State Gov't (SG) 12-104(a)(1), waiver of sovereign immunity as to a "tort action" does not extend to federal statutory claims.Plaintiff brought this action against Defendants, her former employer and supervisor, regarding her termination from Morgan State University (MSU). Because Plaintiff included claims of retaliation in violation of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), 41 U.S.C. 4712, and the American Recovery and Reinvestment (ARRA), Pub. L. No. 11-5, 1553 Defendants removed the suit to federal district court. The district court dismissed the action with prejudice. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit vacated the district court's order and remanded the matter with directions to address whether Maryland has waived state sovereign immunity against federal whistleblower claims by enacting the MTCA. The district court answered the question in the negative. The Supreme Court answered an ensuing certified question by holding that "a tort action" under the MTCA does not include federal statutory claims. View "Williams v. Morgan State University" on Justia Law

Plaintiff contracted hepatitis C after participating in drug trials and screenings at Pharma Medica Research, Inc. (Pharma Medica) and other companies. He sued Pharma Medica for negligence, and a jury found in favor of Pharma Medica. Challenging the jury instructions and the district court’s evidentiary rulings, Plaintiff filed a motion for a new trial, which the district court denied. Plaintiff appealed.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. Plaintiff argued that the district court should have struck the expert testimony of Dr. Aronsohn and Glasgow-Roberts because Pharma Medica failed to timely disclose that it had sent the two witnesses certain documents, like the deposition transcript of Plaintiff’s expert witness and Plaintiff’s hepatitis C testing records, for review before they testified at trial. The court explained that even assuming Pharma Medica violated Rule 26(e), Plaintiff failed to articulate how Pharma Medica’s nondisclosures were prejudicial. Dr. Aronsohn’s opinion did not change after he reviewed the non-disclosed documents. And his trial testimony was consistent with his deposition testimony, which was given before he received the non-disclosed documents. There was no “unfair surprise” to Plaintiff, then, when Dr. Aronsohn’s opinion remained unchanged. View "Ian Wallace v. Pharma Medica Research, Inc." on Justia Law

Hoping to minimize her risk of suffering serious complications from future blood clots, Johnson underwent surgery to implant a retrievable intravascular filter–a medical device that is placed in the inferior vena cava to prevent blood clots that develop in the lower body from flowing into the heart and lungs. Johnson’s doctor selected the Meridian filter, which was supposed to be temporary and easily removable. Johnson’s filter migrated and fractured, leaving shards embedded in the wall of her heart and elsewhere. Her surgeon was unable to remove the device safely and fully. As a result, Johnson faces an ongoing risk of infection, pain, and other complications.Johnson sued the manufacturers of the Meridian filter (Bard), claiming that they defectively designed the Meridian filter and failed to warn medical providers about the device’s risks, in violation of Wisconsin law. A jury rejected most of Johnson’s theories but returned a $3.3 million verdict in her favor on her strict liability failure-to-warn count. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, stating that its decision “should not be misinterpreted as our endorsement of some of Johnson’s counsel’s trial tactics.” There was no reversible error in instructing the jury or in permitting certain testimony, in alleged violation of expert witness disclosure requirements. View "Johnson v. C. R. Bard, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff sustained a spinal injury during a rollover car accident in Mexico. Plaintiff, along with his wife (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) filed a claim for damages against General Motors, LLC (“GM”) on theories of strict liability, negligence, and loss of consortium. The district court applied the law of Coahuila, Mexico, under Missouri’s choice of law principles and granted GM’s motion for summary judgment. Plaintiffs appealed the district court’s choice of law decision.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that its conclusion in Azarax that the district court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to allow a party to rely on foreign law does not lead to the conclusion the district court abused its discretion here when it decided the opposite under different facts. Further, the court wrote that after considering the Section 6 factors and the parties’ arguments, it concluded Missouri’s relationship to this case does not overcome the presumption that the place of the injury—Coahuila, Mexico—is the place with the most significant relationship to the parties and occurrence. View "Nicolas Valadez Rey v. General Motors, LLC" on Justia Law