Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

Twenty-eight individuals and businesses commenced this citizen suit under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (“RCRA”), which creates a private right of action against any entity that has “contributed . . . to the past or present handling, storage, treatment, transportation, or disposal of any solid or hazardous waste which may present an imminent and substantial endangerment to health or the environment.” Plaintiffs complained of elevated levels of radiation detected on their land and seek to hold responsible three entities that operated nearby chemical plants during the twentieth century. The district court dismissed their complaints, holding, among other things, that the radioactive materials found on the plaintiffs’ properties fall outside the scope of RCRA because they were recycled industrial byproducts rather than discarded waste. Defendants raised a host of additional arguments in support of dismissal.   The Second Circuit affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. The court explained that as to Defendants Union Carbide Corporation and Occidental Chemical Corporation, the complaint plausibly alleged the elements of a citizen suit under RCRA, or the Plaintiffs have identified extrinsic evidence that may render amendment fruitful. However, as against defendant Bayer CropScience Inc., there are no particularized allegations from which liability can reasonably be inferred. The court reasoned that there is one probative allegation implicating Bayer: Stauffer’s Lewiston plant was located within 2,000 feet of the Robert Street properties and within a mile of four of the Plaintiffs’ other properties. But proximity alone is insufficient to make Bayer’s contribution plausible. View "Talarico Bros. Bldg. Corp., et al. v. Union Carbide Corp., et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed individual and class claims in Montana state court against GEICO after GEICO failed to advance pay Plaintiff’s medical bills and lost wages following a car accident caused by GEICO’s insured. GEICO removed the lawsuit to federal court, asserting jurisdiction under the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA). Neither Plaintiff nor the district court questioned whether CAFA jurisdiction was proper.   The Ninth Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded for the district court to conduct the necessary evidentiary inquiry and determine whether GEICO can sufficiently establish that more than $5 million is in dispute. The panel held that it could sua sponte question a defendant’s allegation of CAFA jurisdiction. The panel further concluded that the current record did not sufficiently demonstrate that CAFA’s amount-in-controversy requirement was met because it was not evident from the face of the complaint and the nature of the class claims that this controversy involved more than $5 million, nor did GEICO’s notice of removal and supporting declaration satisfactorily establish that more than $5 million was in dispute. View "BRANDON MOE V. GEICO INDEMNITY COMPANY, ET AL" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals reversing the judgment of the trial court determining that Plaintiff could not recover under a commercial general-liability (CGL) insurance policy issued by United Specialty Insurance Company, holding that when a CGL insurance policy excludes coverage for injuries arising out of an "assault or battery," the subjective intent of the person who committed the assault or battery is irrelevant.Brown County Care Center, an adult care facility, contracted with United for CGL insurance. The policy excluded coverage for bodily injury arising from "any actual, threatened or alleged assault or battery." Plaintiff was living at the Center when he was attacked by another resident, who was later found by the trial court to be not guilty of felonious assault by reason of insanity. Plaintiff sued, and he and the Center entered into a settlement. Plaintiff later brought a declaratory judgment action against United to collect on the judgment. The trial court determined that Plaintiff could not recover under the policy. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the attack on Plaintiff qualified as a civil-law assault; and (2) because the policy excluded coverage for bodily injuries arising for civil assaults the trial court did not err in its judgment. View "Krewina v. United Specialty Insurance Co." on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court granting summary judgment for the City of Worcester and several of its officers and dismissing Plaintiff's constitutional and tort claims, holding that the individual defendants were entitled to qualified immunity and that neither they, nor the City, were liable for the alleged torts.The Worcester police used a SWAT team to execute a warrant at a residential apartment where they expected to find a rape suspect but instead found Plaintiff, who was nineteen years old, thirty-eight weeks pregnant, and not conversant in English. Plaintiff began experiencing contractions shortly after the entry, and gave birth the following day. Plaintiff, who was later diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder, brought this lawsuit. The district court granted summary judgment for Defendants, concluding that the officers did not violate Plaintiff's constitutional rights and that, even if they did, they were entitled to qualified immunity. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that Plaintiff's claims failed. View "Penate v. Sullivan" on Justia Law

While plaintiff-appellee Jesse Wise was a pretrial detainee at Creek County Jail in Oklahoma, Officer Don Caffey performed a knee strike on Wise when he was seated on the ground and handcuffed. Officer Caffey subsequently resigned his employment at Creek County Jail as a result of an investigation into the incident. Wise sued Officer Caffey and Creek County Sheriff Bret Bowling under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging excessive-force and supervisory-liability claims against Officer Caffey and Sheriff Bowling, respectively. At the summary-judgment stage, the court held Officer Caffey’s knee strike was excessive as a matter of law and that he and Sheriff Bowling were not entitled to qualified immunity. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of summary judgment as to Officer Caffey’s qualified-immunity defense because the “facts that the district court ruled a reasonable jury could find would suffice to show a legal violation.” View "Wise v. Caffey, et al." on Justia Law

Drago and Blaga Kostadinovski brought a medical malpractice action against Steven Harrington, M.D. and Advanced Cardiothoracic Surgeons, PLLC, asserting six specific theories with respect to how the doctor breached the standard of care throughout the course of Drago’s mitral-valve-repair surgery in December 2011, during which Drago suffered a stroke. Plaintiffs timely served defendants with a notice of intent (NOI) to file suit, timely served the complaint, and timely served the affidavit of merit. Following the close of discovery, defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that plaintiffs’ experts were unable to validate or support the six theories asserted by plaintiffs in the NOI, affidavit of merit, and complaint. Plaintiffs agreed to the dismissal of their existing, unsupported negligence allegations and complaint but moved to amend the complaint to assert a new theory. The court denied the motion to amend the complaint, reasoning that amendment would be futile given that the existing NOI would be rendered obsolete because it did not include the new theory. Plaintiffs appealed and defendants cross-appealed. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded to the trial court for it to apply MCL 600.2301 in considering whether plaintiffs should be allowed to amend the NOI. In a footnote to the opinion, the Court of Appeals rejected plaintiffs’ argument that MCL 600.2912b simply required the service of an NOI before suit was filed and that once a compliant and timely NOI is served, as judged at the time suit is filed and by the language in the original complaint, the requirements of the statute have been satisfied. On remand, the trial court denied plaintiffs’ motion to amend, concluding that amendment would be futile and that amending the complaint would contravene MCL 600.2912b. Plaintiffs appealed. In an unpublished per curiam opinion, the Court of Appeals affirmed. The Michigan Supreme Court concluded MCL 600.2912b did not apply where a plaintiff seeks to amend their complaint against an already-named defendant after suit has already commenced. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "Kostadinovski v. Harrington" on Justia Law

Plaintiff used Roundup on his lawn for thirty years until 2016, when he was diagnosed with malignant fibrous histiocytoma, a form of cancer. He sued Monsanto, Roundup’s manufacturer, in the district court. He alleged that Monsanto knew or should have known that Roundup was carcinogenic but did not warn users of that danger. The question on appeal is whether, under an express preemption provision, a federal agency action that otherwise lacks the force of law preempts the requirements of state law. The district court ruled that a provision of the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. Section 136v(b), expressly preempts some of Plaintiff’s claims under Georgia law because the Environmental Protection Agency had approved a label for Roundup that lacked a cancer warning and the Agency classifies Roundup’s main ingredient—glyphosate—as “not likely to be carcinogenic.” Plaintiff argued that his suit is not preempted.   The Eleventh Circuit concluded that the question at issue must be answered by recourse to ordinary principles of statutory interpretation, and the court remanded this appeal to the panel to decide whether Plaintiff’s suit is preempted. The court explained that a conflict between a state-law rule that has the force of law and a federal agency rule that does not have the force of law is not the type of conflict between state and federal legal obligations that the Supremacy Clause addresses. But this reasoning does not extend to express-preemption cases the meaning of the express-preemption provision—not conflicting federal and state legal obligations—triggers preemption. View "John D. Carson v. Monsanto Company" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs are practitioners of Falun Gong, a religion originating in China in the 1990s. They allege that they or family members are victims of human rights abuses committed by the Chinese Communist Party and Chinese government officials. The alleged abuses, Plaintiffs contend, were enabled by the technological assistance of Defendants, U.S. corporation Cisco Systems, Inc., and two Cisco executives (collectively, “Cisco”). Plaintiffs initiated this lawsuit more than a decade ago, alleging that Cisco aided and abetted or conspired with Chinese officials in violation of the Alien Tort Statute (“ATS”), the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991 (“TVPA”), and other federal and state laws. The district court dismissed Plaintiffs’ claims under the ATS, ruling that Plaintiffs did not allege conduct sufficient to satisfy the standard for aiding and abetting liability.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Plaintiffs’ claims under the Alien Tort Statute against the Cisco executives; reversed the dismissal of Plaintiffs’ Alien Tort Statute claims against corporate defendant Cisco; reversed the dismissal of one Plaintiff’s claims under the Torture Victim Protection Act against the Cisco executives; and remanded for further proceedings. The panel held that under Nestle USA, Inc. v. Doe, 141 S. Ct. 1931 (2021), corporations may be held liable under the ATS. The panel held that Plaintiffs’ allegations against Cisco were sufficient to meet the applicable aiding and abetting standard. Recognizing that the ATS does not apply extraterritorially, the panel held that this case involved a permissible domestic application of the ATS against Cisco because much of the corporation’s alleged conduct constituting aiding and abetting occurred in the United States. View "DOE I, ET AL V. CISCO SYSTEMS, INC., ET AL" on Justia Law

In 2014, decedent Aaron Martineau, age 28, arrived at the McKenzie-Willamette Hospital emergency room, complaining of sudden onset chest pain, shortness of breath, and other symptoms. He was seen by a physician assistant and by a physician, defendant Gary Josephsen, M.D.; both worked for defendant Doctor’s Emergency Room Corporation, P.C. (collectively, the ER defendants). Defendants did not adequately review the x-ray or refer decedent for further imaging or other tests to rule out or confirm the presence of serious cardiovascular or cardiopulmonary conditions. Instead, they diagnosed him with noncardiac chest pain and discharged him from the hospital. Approximately 24 hours after being discharged, decedent died from an aortic dissection in his heart. In this wrongful death action, two issues were presented for the Oregon Supreme Court's review: (1) whether the trial court erred when it instructed the jury that physicians “are not negligent merely because their efforts were unsuccessful” and that a physician “does not guarantee a good result by undertaking to perform a service;” and (2) whether plaintiff had alleged a lost chance claim under Oregon’s survival statute, ORS 30.075, that was separately cognizable from her wrongful death claim under ORS 30.020. The trial court dismissed plaintiff’s lost chance claim before trial. Later, when submitting the wrongful death claim to the jury at the close of trial, the court included the challenged instruction—which was taken from Uniform Civil Jury Instruction (UCJI) 44.03 at defendants’ request—in its instructions to the jury. After the jury returned a verdict in defendants’ favor, plaintiff appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed, concluding the trial court had erred in dismissing plaintiff’s lost chance claim and by including UCJI 44.03 in the jury instructions. After its review, the Supreme Court concluded plaintiff did not allege a lost chance claim that was cognizable under Oregon law, and, further, the trial court did not err when it included UCJI 44.03 in the jury instructions. The Court therefore reversed the Court of Appeals and affirmed the trial court. View "Martineau v. McKenzie-Willamette Medical Center" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was whether the Oregon legislature intended to create an exception to ORS 656.018, the so-called “exclusive remedy” provision of the Workers’ Compensation Law, for injured workers whose claims have been deemed noncompensable on “major contributing cause” grounds. While employed by defendant Shore Terminals, LLC as a terminal operator, plaintiff Danny Bundy was assigned to stay and monitor the air quality from malfunctioning machinery without being given safety equipment, and he was exposed to dangerous levels of diesel, gasoline and ethanol fumes. After that incident, defendant initially accepted a workers’ compensation claim for "non-disabling exposure to gasoline vapors." Later, plaintiff asked defendant to accept and pay compensation for additional conditions arising out of the same incident, including "somatization disorder" and "undifferentiated somatoform disorder." Defendant specified that it was treating each of plaintiff’s subsequent requests as a "consequential condition claim" and was denying those claims on the basis that plaintiff’s work exposure was not the major contributing cause of the subsequent conditions. Plaintiff challenged those denials through the workers’ compensation system, but he was unable to establish that the work incident was the major contributing cause of his somatoform disorders. The Workers’ Compensation Board ultimately issued a final order determining that the disorders were not compensable conditions because plaintiff failed to establish that his work-related incident was the major contributing cause. Plaintiff acknowledged that the Workers’ Compensation Law generally immunized covered employers against civil liability for injuries arising out of a worker’s employment. Plaintiff argued, however, that his case fell within a statutory exception to that rule and that the trial court and Court of Appeals, both of which ruled in defendant’s favor on that legal question, erred in concluding otherwise. The Oregon Supreme Court concluded that plaintiff’s statutory argument failed, and that the trial court and Court of Appeals therefore did not err. View "Bundy v. NuStar GP LLC, et al." on Justia Law