Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

A high school student in the District of Columbia was sexually assaulted by a classmate in a school bathroom. The student’s mother reported the incident to school officials, prompting an investigation by the District. The District ultimately found the assault claim credible and took steps to support the student, including offering counseling and a school transfer. However, the school principal, before any investigation, expressed disbelief in the student’s claim, made derogatory remarks about her, and attempted to undermine the investigation, even after video evidence corroborated the student’s account. The principal’s conduct included misleading superiors and withholding information. The student and her mother later learned of these actions, which caused them significant distress.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed the student’s claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress (NIED) for failure to state a claim, finding that the school-student relationship alone did not create a special duty under D.C. law. After discovery, the court granted summary judgment to the defendants on the intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) and Title IX claims, holding that the District’s response was not deliberately indifferent and that the principal’s conduct did not meet the standard for IIED because the remarks were made outside the student’s presence.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the NIED claim and the grant of summary judgment to the District on the Title IX claims, finding the District’s overall response was not clearly unreasonable and that the principal’s actions could not be attributed to the District for Title IX retaliation. However, the appellate court reversed the grant of summary judgment on the IIED claim against the principal, holding that a reasonable jury could find her conduct was extreme and outrageous, intended or recklessly caused severe emotional distress, and remanded for further proceedings on that claim. View "Doe v. DC" on Justia Law

A Liechtenstein-based satellite company was developing a network of low-Earth-orbit satellites and had obtained radio-frequency usage rights through a contract with another company, TRION AG. In 2021, a competitor, Rivada Networks, Inc., took over TRION and TRION’s board terminated the contract with the satellite company, transferring the frequency rights to Rivada. The legality of this transfer is being contested in European litigation. Shortly after the contract termination, Rivada’s CEO made public statements on an industry podcast, asserting that the satellite company no longer had usage rights and suggesting it planned to move its operations to China. These statements were broadcast during a major satellite industry conference, after which manufacturers expressed doubts about the satellite company’s viability and some refused to partner with it.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed the satellite company’s defamation lawsuit against Rivada. The court assumed, without deciding, that the statements were false and defamatory, but found they were not defamatory per se and that the complaint failed to adequately allege special damages, specifically a causal link between the statements and any harm suffered.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo. The appellate court agreed with the district court that the statements were not defamatory per se, as they did not inherently impute professional misconduct or dishonesty. However, the appellate court found that the complaint plausibly alleged special damages, specifically that the statements caused the loss of business relationships with satellite manufacturers, leading to identifiable economic harm. The court held that the complaint’s factual allegations were sufficient to support a plausible inference of causation at the pleading stage.The appellate court affirmed the dismissal in part, reversed in part, and remanded the case for further proceedings on the special damages theory. View "KLEO AG v. Rivada Networks, Inc." on Justia Law

The plaintiff, representing herself and a proposed class, alleged that she was exposed to ethylene oxide (EtO), a carcinogenic gas, due to emissions from a plant in South Charleston, West Virginia, operated by the defendants from 1978 to 2019. She claimed that this exposure increased her risk of developing serious diseases, necessitating ongoing medical monitoring and diagnostic testing, for which she sought compensation under West Virginia common law.The United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia recognized that West Virginia law allows for medical monitoring claims but held that the plaintiff lacked Article III standing because she did not have a manifest physical injury. The district court also excluded the plaintiff’s expert, Dr. Sahu, finding his testimony unreliable, and granted summary judgment to the defendants. The court reasoned that the plaintiff’s alleged injury—an increased risk of future illness—was not concrete or ripe, relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. It held that, under West Virginia law, the injury in a medical monitoring claim is the tortious exposure to a hazardous substance and the present need for medical testing, not the manifestation of disease. The court found that this injury is concrete and actual, satisfying Article III standing requirements. The Fourth Circuit also determined that the district court abused its discretion in excluding Dr. Sahu’s expert testimony, as its criticisms went to the weight, not the admissibility, of his opinions. The Fourth Circuit reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment and exclusion of the expert, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Sommerville v. Union Carbide Corp." on Justia Law

While incarcerated at a North Carolina state prison in February 2016, Manuel Moreno developed flu-like symptoms and sought medical attention. A nurse examined him and recorded slightly elevated respiration, but otherwise normal vital signs. Dr. Carol Bosholm, the on-duty physician, did not personally examine Moreno but reviewed the nurse’s notes, diagnosed sinus congestion and pharyngitis, and prescribed antibiotics. That same day, several inmates from Moreno’s housing area also reported similar symptoms, and some tested positive for influenza. Dr. Bosholm ordered Moreno and others to be quarantined for seventy-two hours, leaving general instructions for monitoring but no specific orders to check oxygen saturation or respiratory rates. Over the weekend, medical staff made routine rounds, but there is no record that Moreno’s oxygen or respiration were measured, nor that he reported worsening symptoms. By Monday, Moreno’s condition had deteriorated significantly, leading to hospitalization, a seizure, and long-term complications.Moreno filed suit in the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, alleging state law medical malpractice and gross negligence, as well as a federal claim for deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The district court excluded his expert’s testimony on the standard of care for the malpractice claim, finding the expert did not meet North Carolina’s requirements for such testimony. At trial, the court granted Dr. Bosholm’s motion for judgment as a matter of law on all claims, concluding Moreno failed to present sufficient evidence of causation, breach of the standard of care, or the heightened culpability required for gross negligence and deliberate indifference.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court held that Federal Rule of Evidence 601 required application of North Carolina’s expert competency rule for medical malpractice claims, and that Moreno’s expert was properly excluded. The court also found insufficient evidence to support the gross negligence and deliberate indifference claims, upholding judgment for Dr. Bosholm. View "Moreno v. Bosholm" on Justia Law

After a car accident in January 2017, Lee Scheurer was injured and Ann Maland was found to be at fault. Scheurer submitted a written notice of claim to Maland’s insurer in September 2017 and later made a settlement offer in July 2020. The parties could not agree on damages, and Scheurer filed a negligence lawsuit against Maland in November 2020. After Maland’s death, her estate was represented by a special administrator. The case proceeded to a jury trial, which awarded Scheurer $292,340 in damages. The district court subsequently reduced the award to $194,631 to account for collateral source payments, such as insurance, and awarded Scheurer $53,320 in preverdict interest.The Minnesota District Court determined that preverdict interest began accruing when Scheurer commenced the action, not when he served his notice of claim, because he did not file the lawsuit within two years of the notice. The court also held that preverdict interest should be calculated on the reduced judgment amount after deducting collateral sources. Scheurer appealed, arguing that interest should accrue from the notice of claim and be calculated on the full jury verdict. The Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed the district court on the accrual issue but reversed on the calculation issue, holding that interest should be calculated on the jury verdict before collateral source reductions.The Minnesota Supreme Court reviewed both issues. It held that, under Minnesota Statutes section 549.09, subdivision 1(b), the requirement that an action be commenced within two years of a written notice of claim for interest to accrue from the notice applies even if a written settlement offer is made. The court also held that preverdict interest is to be calculated on the judgment after collateral source deductions, not on the full jury verdict. The decision of the court of appeals was affirmed in part and reversed in part, reinstating the district court’s calculation of interest. View "Scheurer vs. Shrewsbury" on Justia Law

The case concerns the death of Skyler A. Womack, a dependent adult with disabilities who resided at a 24-hour skilled nursing facility operated by Silverscreen Healthcare, Inc. After Skyler’s death, his parents filed suit against the facility, alleging that neglect—including understaffing, failure to maintain the facility, and inadequate provision of basic needs—led to his injuries and death. The claims included survivor actions and a wrongful death claim. Notably, Skyler had signed an arbitration agreement upon admission, which stated that any medical malpractice disputes would be subject to arbitration and purported to bind his heirs.In the Los Angeles County Superior Court, Silverscreen moved to compel arbitration of all claims based on the arbitration agreement and the California Supreme Court’s decision in Ruiz v. Podolsky. The trial court compelled arbitration of the survivor claims but denied arbitration for the parents’ wrongful death claim, reasoning that the claim was based on neglect under the Elder Abuse Act, not professional negligence. The California Court of Appeal reversed, holding that the wrongful death claim was subject to arbitration because it was based on professional negligence as defined by the agreement and relevant statutes.The Supreme Court of California reviewed the case and reversed the Court of Appeal’s decision. The Court held that the exception recognized in Ruiz v. Podolsky applies only to wrongful death claims that are based on medical malpractice as defined by the Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act (MICRA), specifically disputes about whether medical services were improperly rendered. The Court clarified that not all wrongful death claims against health care providers fall within this exception—claims based on custodial neglect, as opposed to professional negligence in medical care, are not subject to arbitration under section 1295 and Ruiz. The Court remanded the case to allow plaintiffs to amend their complaint to clarify the basis of their wrongful death claim. View "Holland v. Silverscreen Healthcare, Inc." on Justia Law

An elderly man with multiple health conditions, including Parkinson’s disease and COPD, was admitted to a hospital due to worsening symptoms and hallucinations. During his stay, he became agitated and aggressive, prompting hospital staff to administer Zyprexa, a chemical restraint, after obtaining consent from his daughter. The medication was ordered as “every 4 hours,” but there was disagreement over whether this meant scheduled or as-needed administration. The patient received two doses, after which he suffered respiratory distress, was transferred to another hospital, and died a few days later from septic shock related to aspiration pneumonia.The Superior Court, Addison Unit, Civil Division, presided over a jury trial in August 2023. Both parties presented expert testimony on the standard of care for chemical restraints, and the plaintiff also introduced the hospital’s policy. The jury was asked whether the plaintiff had proven the applicable standard of care and answered “no.” As a result, the jury did not consider whether the standard was breached, causation, or damages. The plaintiff moved for a new trial under Vermont Rule of Civil Procedure 59, arguing that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence. The trial court denied the motion, finding that the evidence was conflicting and that the jury’s verdict was not clearly wrong or unjust.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion for a new trial. The Court held that the trial court acted within its discretion, as the evidence regarding the applicable standard of care was conflicting and not so clear as to require overturning the jury’s verdict. The Supreme Court affirmed the denial of a new trial. View "Watrous v. Porter Medical Center" on Justia Law

Two individuals who were active in efforts to incorporate the community of Erda, Utah, alleged that three other residents defamed them and placed them in a false light. The plaintiffs had been involved in organizing the incorporation, including gathering signatures and working with property owners. After the incorporation was approved by voters, a local ranch company filed lawsuits alleging fraud in the incorporation process, specifically that signatures had been misused or altered. The defendants, in various public forums and on social media, accused the plaintiffs of fraud, forgery, and other misconduct related to the incorporation and subsequent community disputes.The Third District Court in Tooele County dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims. It found that the statements made by two defendants were not capable of defamatory meaning, were privileged, and that the false light claims failed for the same reasons. For the third defendant, the court granted judgment on the pleadings under Utah’s Anti-SLAPP Act, concluding that his statements were protected as participation in the process of government and that the lawsuit was intended to chill such participation.The Supreme Court of the State of Utah reversed and remanded. It held that at least some of the statements by the first two defendants were capable of defamatory meaning and were not constitutionally protected opinions. The court also held that it was improper to dismiss the claims on privilege grounds at the motion to dismiss stage, as privilege is an affirmative defense that must be raised and supported by the defendant. Regarding the third defendant, the court held that the Anti-SLAPP Act did not apply because his statements were not made while participating in the process of government as defined by the statute. The court ordered that the case proceed on all claims. View "Mathews v. McCown" on Justia Law

A man named Donald Prater, Jr. was found partially nude and behaving erratically after leaving a hospital, having previously told a deputy he had used methamphetamine and was hallucinating. Law enforcement officers from the City of Paintsville and Johnson County, along with emergency medical personnel, responded to reports of his behavior. When officers attempted to arrest Prater on a public street, he resisted and force was used, including a taser, pepper spray, and baton strikes. After being handcuffed, Prater stopped breathing and, despite immediate lifesaving efforts, died. The medical examiner found no lethal trauma and attributed the death to excited delirium syndrome, with other health factors possibly contributing.The personal representative of Prater’s estate filed a wrongful death suit in Johnson Circuit Court against various city and county entities and their employees, alleging excessive force, negligence, and wrongful death. The circuit court granted summary judgment to all defendants, finding the officers and emergency personnel were entitled to qualified official immunity, that the force used was reasonable, and that there was no evidence their actions caused Prater’s death. The court also dismissed claims against the city and county entities, including those for negligent hiring and supervision, on the basis that no underlying tort had been established.On appeal, the Kentucky Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that some claims against the city and police department for negligent hiring and supervision could proceed, and that the officers’ entitlement to qualified immunity required further factual findings. The Supreme Court of Kentucky reviewed the case and held that all defendants were properly dismissed. The Court concluded that the officers’ actions were discretionary, performed in good faith, and within the scope of their authority, entitling them to qualified official immunity. The Court reversed the Court of Appeals in part, affirmed in part, and remanded for any necessary proceedings. View "CITY OF PAINTSVILLE V. HANEY" on Justia Law

Two minor plaintiffs attended a four-day overnight science camp operated by a private entity and organized by their public school district. After returning home, they and their parents alleged that, during the camp, they were exposed to discussions and lessons about gender identity, including being introduced to counselors who used “they/them” pronouns and being asked to state their own preferred pronouns. The plaintiffs also claimed they were not allowed to contact their parents to discuss these matters due to a camp policy prohibiting calls home. They asserted that these experiences caused them severe emotional distress and initiated professional therapy.The plaintiffs filed suit in the Superior Court of Orange County, asserting claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) and negligent infliction of emotional distress (NIED) against both the camp operator and the school district. The camp operator responded with a special motion to strike under California’s anti-SLAPP statute (Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16), arguing that the claims arose from protected speech on matters of public interest—specifically, gender identity discussions. The trial court denied the anti-SLAPP motion, finding that the claims were not based on protected activity but rather on the lack of disclosure to parents and the prohibition on contacting them. The court also denied the plaintiffs’ request for attorney fees, finding the anti-SLAPP motion was not frivolous.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, held that the trial court erred in denying the anti-SLAPP motion in its entirety. The appellate court found that the IIED and NIED claims, to the extent they were based on exposure to gender identity discussions, arose from protected activity and lacked minimal merit, both factually and legally, under California public policy. However, claims based solely on the prohibition of calls home or sleeping arrangements did not arise from protected activity and could proceed. The order was affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with directions. View "Sandoval v. Pali Institute" on Justia Law