Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

Crounse delivered barges to Mulzer, which cleaned the barges, loaded them with Mulzer’s crushed stone, delivered the stone, cleaned the barges again, and released the barges to Crounse. Crounse’s barges were used by other companies to haul other materials. Barges carrying coal sometimes returned with as much as a foot of coal remaining in the hopper. Mulzer would clear the coal and sell it for a profit. Mulzer's employee, Smith, was operating a skid steer with a “blade” positioned at its lowest height to push coal to the front of the hopper for removal with a broom. The blade hit a "scab." Smith was propelled forward. Smith’s seatbelt failed; he was injured when he hit a safety bar. The hopper floor scab resulted from a split seam, 12-14 inches long, and a few inches tall. The barge was 24 years old. Crounse had procedures for regularly inspecting and repairing its barge, including the hopper. Crounse had received no reports of damage to the barge; 23 days before Smith’s accident, the barge had been cleaned by a blade without incident.Smith sued Crounse under the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. 901, and general maritime law. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of Crounse. Smith lacked evidence that Crounse’s inspection and repair procedures were inadequate; that Crounse had actual knowledge or should have known of the defect in the exercise of ordinary care; and did not demonstrate that Crounse failed to comply with its turnover duties. View "Smith v. Crounse Corp." on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the superior court entered upon a jury verdict in favor of Mainely Media, LLC on the tort claims brought by Norman Gaudette, a former Biddeford police officer, and his wife Joanne, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting certain testimony.The Gaudettes brought this action claiming defamation, false light, and loss of consortium alleging that Mainely Media had published incorrect information indicating that Norman had sexually abused minors years earlier while he was a police officer. The trial court entered judgment in favor of Mainely Media. On appeal, the Gaudettes argued that the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to strike a detective's testimony that an earlier investigation of Norman did not exonerate him. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the superior court did not abuse its discretion when it admitted the detective's testimony. View "Gaudette v. Mainely Media, LLC" on Justia Law

The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) provides subsidies to encourage telecommunication companies to expand high-speed broadband internet services in rural areas where customer revenues would otherwise be insufficient to justify the cost of doing business. Venture Communications Cooperative (“Venture”) provides broadband services to rural South Dakota customers. James Valley Cooperative Telephone Company and its wholly owned subsidiary, Northern Valley Communications (collectively, “Northern Valley”), is a competing provider. Venture filed this lawsuit against Northern Valley. The primary claim is that Northern Valley violated 47 U.S.C. Section 220(e) by filing a Form 477 that “intentionally, deliberately, fraudulently, and maliciously misrepresented” information “for the sole unlawful purpose of harming [Venture]” by depriving Venture of FCC subsidies in census blocks where Northern Valley was deemed to be an unsubsidized competitor. The district court granted Northern Valley summary judgment, concluding “there is no evidence that Northern Valley willfully overreported its broadband capabilities.”   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Venture’s claim of intent to injure is belied by Northern Valley helping Venture by filing a letter with the FCC clarifying that Northern Valley did not offer voice service in the Overlap Area. The court likewise affirmed the dismissal of Venture’s tortious interference and civil conspiracy claims under South Dakota law. The court agreed with the district court that Venture proffered no evidence of an “intentional and unjustified act of interference” because Northern Valley complied with all FCC reporting requirements. As Northern Valley complied with the Telecommunications Act in filing Form 477 at issue, there is no plausible underlying tort alleged. Summary judgment is warranted on this claim. View "Venture Comm. Co-Op, Inc. v. James Valley Co-Op Telephone Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, through his estate, sued Ford Motor Company, inter alia, for wrongful death and product liability pursuant to the Alabama Extended Manufacturer’s Liability Doctrine (AEMLD). He alleged that a faulty seatbelt design in his 2003 Ford Mustang caused his fatal injury. At trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Ford. Plaintiff now appealed, arguing that the district court erroneously ruled on several evidentiary issues, a motion for judgment as a matter of law (JMOL), and a motion for a new trial. Ford filed a cross-appeal in anticipation of a possible reversal, challenging the district court’s denial of its motion to exclude expert testimony at trial.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the rulings challenged by Plaintiff. As for Ford’s cross-appeal,  the court dismissed for lack of standing. Here, the working seatbelt from the crash was admitted into evidence alongside expert testimony opining that the driver likely caused the excess webbing. A reasonable jury could have weighed this evidence against the evidence introduced by Plaintiff and “might reach different conclusions” about whether Plaintiff was contributorily negligent. Id. Therefore, JMOL is not proper, and the court affirmed the district court’s denial of Plaintiff’s motion. Further, the court explained that although Ford has identified cases where the court has addressed a victorious Plaintiff’s cross-appeal, the court is not bound by a prior decision’s sub silentio treatment of a jurisdictional question. View "Mark Henderson v. Ford Motor Company" on Justia Law

Jaranowski worked as a conductor for the Railroad for 22 years. While operating a railroad switch in 2020, he seriously injured his neck. He sued the railroad under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act (FELA), 45 U.S.C. 51, alleging that he was injured because the railroad failed to maintain the switch properly. He accused the railroad of ordinary negligence and negligence per se based on alleged violations of Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) Track Safety Standards, 49 C.F.R. 213. The district court concluded that Jaranowski had failed to present evidence that would support a finding that the railroad had actual or constructive notice of any defect in the switch before he was injured and granted the Railroad summary judgment.The Seventh Circuit reversed. Actual or constructive notice is required to violate the federal Track Safety Standards, however, Jaranowski presented sufficient evidence to create a genuine dispute as to whether the railroad at least should have known that the switch was defective before he was injured. A reasonable jury could accept Jaranowski’s account of the facts and the report of his expert, who examined the switch, to conclude that the Railroad’s prior inspection was performed without due care. View "Jaranowski v. Indiana Harbor Belt Railroad Co." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the district court granting summary judgment in favor of Defendant and dismissing Plaintiffs' complaint seeking to recover damages for the emotional distress they allegedly suffered when their dogs died after becoming entangled in Defendant's snares, holding that there was no error.In his motion for summary judgment, Defendant asserted that Plaintiffs' emotional distress were not compensable because dogs are considered property. The district court granted the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) under Wyoming law, dogs are property; (2) while Plaintiffs might be entitled to emotional damages for their own injuries, the impact rule did not extend their recovery to emotional damages caused by the dogs' death; and (3) Plaintiffs' argument that recovery for emotional distress damages should be allowed when animate property is negligently harmed is best made to the legislature. View "Cardenas v. Swanson" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals granting Appellee's requested writ of mandamus ordering the Industrial Commission of Ohio to reinstate an order of its staff hearing officer denying Appellee's request for temporary total disability (TTD) compensation, holding that Appellee demonstrated a clear legal right to the relief requested and a clear legal duty on the Commission's part to provide that relief.In granting the writ, the court of appeals concluded that the Commission incorrectly applied the law of voluntary abandonment, as set forth in State ex rel. Klein v. Precision Excavating & Grading Co., 1993 N.E.3d 386. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Commission misinterpreted and misapplied the law of voluntary abandonment as it related to Appellant's request for TTD compensation. View "State ex rel. Quest Diagnostics, Inc. v. Industrial Comm'n" on Justia Law

After sustaining a knee injury during a mandatory eighth-grade physical education class’s touch football unit, Plaintiff sued, among others, defendants Burbank Unified School District (the District) and his physical education teacher. A jury returned verdicts in Plaintiff’s favor against Defendants, finding that the District breached a mandatory duty under the Education Code, the teacher was negligent, and Plaintiff suffered resulting harm. Defendants appealed from the judgment, contending: there was insufficient evidence that the District’s breach of a mandatory duty proximately caused Plaintiff’s injury; the special verdict form was fatally defective because it failed to specify whether the District’s breach of a mandatory duty or the teacher’s negligence was a substantial factor in causing Plaintiff’s injuries; the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury on the primary assumption of risk doctrine; and the court erred by not allowing the jury to apportion fault to the student who ran into Plaintiff (the Student), thus precluding Defendants from reducing liability for noneconomic damages.   The Second Appellate District reversed and remanded for the trial court to enter judgment in favor of the District and to hold a new trial limited to the issue of apportionment of fault between the teacher and student. The court explained that the Student’s act of intentionally running into Plaintiff was a substantial causative factor in Plaintiff’s injury and the teacher, therefore, should have been entitled to seek allocation of fault pursuant to Civil Code section 1431.2.11 Because the trial court failed to instruct the jury on comparative fault principles, the court remanded for retrial on the apportionment of fault. View "Nigel B. v. Burbank Unified Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellant Xingfei Luo appealed pro se a district court's order granting Paul Wang’s motion to reconsider the court’s order allowing Luo to proceed in this case using a pseudonym. Luo filed a federal action pro se against Wang in 2020, using the pseudonym "Jane Doe." Before serving Wang with the complaint, Luo asked to proceed under that pseudonym. Luo stated she had been the victim of a sexual assault, and she sought “to protect her privacy and prevent further harm from the stigma that can attach to victims of sexual assault.” The magistrate judge entered a protective order (PO); the order did not advise Wang of a 14-day deadline to object under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(a). Luo did not serve Wang with the complaint until January 25, 2021. After initially proceeding pro se, Wang retained counsel in March. The magistrate judge appointed pro bono counsel for Luo, who entered an appearance in April. In late August 2021, Wang moved to reconsider the PO, contending he had not been served with the complaint when Luo moved to proceed under a pseudonym or when the magistrate judge entered the PO. The magistrate judge recognized he must consider the specific circumstances of this case and weigh Luo’s asserted privacy interest against the public’s right of access to these proceedings. In doing so, the magistrate judge took judicial notice of Luo’s other lawsuits, “several of which involve circumstances similar to this case.” He found that Wang’s claim Luo was a vexatious litigant “goes directly to [her] credibility.” In sum, the magistrate judge “considered the totality of the circumstances” in this “unusual case,” and concluded that “the balance of all facts before the Court weighs in favor of disallowing [Ms. Luo] from continuing to proceed under ‘Jane Doe.’” Finding no reversible error in the magistrate judge's order, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. View "Doe v. Wang" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the district court dismissing this putative action asserting various state law claims in relation to a data breach that allegedly exposed Plaintiffs' personally identifiable information (PII) and that of more than 75,000 other patients of Injured Workers Pharmacy, LLC (IWP), holding that remand was required.Plaintiffs brought a class action complaint against IWP, a home-delivery pharmacy service registered and headquartered in Massachusetts, asserting state law claims for negligence, breach of implied contract, unjust enrichment, invasion of privacy, and breach of fiduciary duty. Plaintiffs sought to certify a class of United States residents whose PII was compromised in the data breach at issue. The district court granted IWP's motion to dismiss for lack of Article III standing. The First Circuit reversed in part, holding (1) the complaint plausibly demonstrated Plaintiffs' standing to seek damages; and (2) Plaintiffs lacked standing to pursue injunctive relief because their desired injunctions would not likely redress their alleged injuries. View "Webb v. Injured Workers Pharmacy, LLC" on Justia Law