Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

Three cases presented an opportunity for the Georgia Supreme Court to explore the scope and nature of the liability faced by premises owners, occupiers, and security contractors in cases involving personal injuries arising from third-party criminal conduct. Although the underlying appeals varied with respect to their facts and specific issues presented, the resolution of each appeal "necessitates consideration of fundamental principles of premises liability under Georgia law." The Court clarified that the reasonable foreseeability of a third-party criminal act is a determination linked to a proprietor’s duty to keep the premises and approaches safe under OCGA § 51-3-1, and that the totality of the circumstances informs whether a third-party criminal act was reasonably foreseeable. Moreover, the question of reasonable foreseeability is generally reserved to the trier of fact, but the trial court may resolve the issue as a matter of law where no rational juror could determine the issue in favor of the non-moving party. View "Georgia CVS Pharmacy, LLC v. Carmichael" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs’ son suffered serious injuries when a soccer goal tipped over at the Little Rock Air Force Base where Plaintiffs were stationed. Although he sued the Air Force for negligently failing to secure the goal to the ground and warn of the potential danger, the district court concluded that the Federal Tort Claims Act stood in the way.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that nothing about the soccer-goal-safety statute alters the “plain and unambiguous” language of the recreational-use statute. And the only way to conclude otherwise is to recognize a tort-based enforcement scheme for a statute without one—something the court cannot do.   Further, the court explained that Plaintiffs lived in on-base “military housing” when the accident occurred. Even assuming that living there made them tenants of the Air Force, Warfit Field is not part of “the base housing area.” Rather, it is a facility that they were “invited or permitted” to use because they are a military family. The court held that Plaintiffs cannot show that a private party in the Air Force’s shoes would have been liable for the injuries suffered by their son. As tragic as the circumstances of this case are, there has been no waiver of sovereign immunity. View "Andrew Hutchinson v. United States" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court approved the decision of the First District Court of Appeal affirming the trial court's judgment concluding that this negligence action was untimely filed, holding that Fla. Stat. 733.710(1) extinguished the claim at issue in this case.Petitioners, who were injured in an accident by Thomas Morton, sued Morton's estate for negligently operating the car and his employer, the Lewis Bear Company (LBC), for vicarious liability under the doctrines of respondeat superior and dangerous instrumentality. The trial court ruled (1) section 733.710(1) barred Petitioners' action against the estate because they failed to file their claims within two years of Morton's death; and (2) because the Estate could not be held liable, LBC could not be held vicariously liable. The court of appeal affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) because Petitioners' claims against the estate were filed beyond section 733.710(1)'s deadline and did not qualify under an exception, they were barred; and (2) the court of appeal correctly held that section 733.710(1)'s statute of non claim exonerated LBC from vicarious liability for Morton's negligence. View "Tsuji v. Fleet" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment for Defendants on Plaintiffs' respondeat superior-related claims, holding that the district court correctly held that respondeat superior principles did not make the remaining defendants in this case vicariously responsible for the abuse committed by a physician assistant and that the Utah Physician Assistant Act did not change that conclusion.Plaintiff brought an action against Alta Pain Physicians; Oscar Johnson, a physician assistant; and Dr. Michael Chen, Johnson's supervising physician, alleging that Johnson subjected her to sexual harassment and abuse when she saw him for pain treatment at Alta Pain. After Plaintiff settled her claims against Johnson the district court granted the motion for summary judgment filed by Chen and Alta Pain on Plaintiff's claims of sexual assault, sexual battery, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err in entering summary judgment on Plaintiff's respondeat superior-based claims; and (2) Plaintiff did not met her burden of convincing the Court to overturn precedent and use a foreseeability test for plaintiffs to recover against employers of abusive employees. View "Burton v. Chen" on Justia Law

Divine Food and Catering, LLC (Divine) appeals from the dismissal of its malicious prosecution complaint against defendants and respondents the Western Diocese of the Armenian Church of North America (the Diocese), St. John Armenian Church (St. John), Archpriest Manoug Markarian (Archpriest Manoug), and Harout Markarian (collectively, defendants). The trial court dismissed the complaint after granting Defendants’ special motion to strike under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, the anti-SLAPP statute. Divine was a commercial tenant of St. John’s banquet hall. St. John and the Diocese (the church entities) filed an unlawful detainer action seeking to evict Divine based on a purported oral month-to-month lease. Following trial, the unlawful detainer court found the written lease was valid and granted judgment for Divine. Divine then filed its malicious prosecution complaint, alleging Defendants brought the unlawful detainer action in order to extort money from Petros Taglyan, the father of Divine’s owner. Divine alleged Defendants had no probable cause to bring the unlawful detainer action.   The Second Appellate District reversed. The court held that the triggers for the interim adverse judgment rule are limited to actual judgments and rulings on dispositive motions. The trial court, therefore, erred by applying the rule based on the unlawful detainer court’s sua sponte comments during trial. Alternatively, Divine has made an adequate showing for anti-SLAPP purposes that the unlawful detainer court’s comments were the product of fraud or perjury, which precludes application of the interim adverse judgment rule. Defendants have shown no other valid basis to support their anti-SLAPP motion. View "Divine Food and Catering v. Western Diocese of the Armenian etc." on Justia Law

The estate of Joseph A. Muff brings three conversion claims against Wells Fargo Bank for allegedly failing to detect that Joseph’s stepson, Josh Paige, was stealing money from Joseph by way of fraudulently endorsed checks. After denying the estate’s motion to amend its complaint, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of Wells Fargo on all three claims. The estate appealed.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded to the district court. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the estate’s motion to amend its complaint. Further, the court explained that because the Muff Corporate and Muff Farm accounts were not controlled by Wells Fargo, any injury to those accounts under a theory of conversion is not fairly traceable to Wells Fargo. In other words, the estate has not demonstrated a “causal connection” between the “injury”—Josh’s inappropriately removing funds from said accounts—and the “conduct complained of”—Wells Fargo’s allegedly allowing this to take place. Moreover, even assuming the existence of a confidential relationship under Iowa law could give the estate standing to sue, the factual record fails to support the existence of a confidential relationship in the first place. Because the estate has not demonstrated standing, the court wrote that it lacks jurisdiction over Count 3. As with Count 2, the district court should have dismissed the claim instead of entering summary judgment for Wells Fargo. However, unlike Counts 2 and 3, the estate has standing to pursue Count 1 in federal court. View "Larry Muff v. Wells Fargo Bank NA" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court held that, under the circumstances of the underlying case, the Graves Amendment, 49 U.S.C. 30106, protected an automobile dealership from being held vicariously liable for the tortious conduct of the driver of its courtesy vehicle.An automobile dealership based in New Jersey provided a courtesy vehicle to a customer while it serviced the customer's vehicle in its automobile service center. Contrary to the terms of the courtesy vehicle agreements, the customer drove the vehicle beyond the permitted radius of travel and into the Commonwealth, where the vehicle struck one of the plaintiffs, causing serious injuries. Plaintiffs brought a negligence action against the dealership and the customer. The superior court granted summary judgment for Defendants, concluding that the dealership, as the owner of the courtesy vehicle, was presumptively vicariously liable for the injuries caused by the customer's wife. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment for the dealership and vacated the judgment for the customer, holding (1) the Graves Amendment protected the dealership from liability in this case; and (2) there was a dispute of material fact as to the negligent entrustment claim against the customer. View "Garcia v. Steele" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court dismissing the appeal brought by the Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities in this housing discrimination case, holding that this Court was compelled to affirm.For several years, Richard Cantillon harassed his neighbor, Kelly Howard, by making obscene gestures, calling her racial epithets, and physically menacing Howard. Howard eventually filed a neighbor versus neighbor claim with the Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities, alleging that Cantillon had violated her civil rights on account of her race. Cantillon defaulted, and the referee awarded Plaintiff $15,000 in damages. The Commission appealed the award as insufficient, but neither Howard nor Cantillon participated in the appeal. The trial court dismissed the appeal, concluding that there was no legal basis for it to second-guess the amount of the award. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the appellate court appropriately resolved the Commission's claims under the circumstances of this case. View "Comm'n on Human Rights & Opportunities v. Cantillon" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that absolute immunity attaches to statements made in judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings and that while Jane Doe was not entitled to absolute immunity, a qualified privilege is appropriate for alleged victims of sexual assault presented in the context of this case.In disciplinary proceedings conducted at Yale University by the University-Wide Committee on Sexual Misconduct (UWC) Doe accused Plaintiff of sexual assault, resulting in Plaintiff's expulsion from Yale and criminal charges being brought against him. Plaintiff was acquitted. At issue in this appeal was whether Doe, who enjoyed absolute immunity in a subsequent civil action challenging her testimony given during Plaintiff's criminal proceeding, should likewise be afforded absolute immunity from suit for her statements made during the UWC proceeding. The Supreme Court held (1) absolute immunity attaches to statements in judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings; (2) the USC's proceeding did not meet the conditions necessary to be considered quasi-judicial, and therefore, Doe was not entitled to absolute immunity; but (3) due to the public interest in encouraging the proper reporting of sexual assaults a qualified privilege is appropriate for alleged victims of sexual assault at institutions of higher education. View "Khan v. Yale University" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court denying Plaintiff's challenge to the constitutional validity of Mo. Rev. Stat. 303.390, which prohibited Plaintiff from collecting noneconomic damages in her personal injury lawsuit filed against Defendant, with whom she had been in a motor vehicle accident, holding that Plaintiff was not entitled to relief.At the time of the underlying accident, Plaintiff was an uninsured motorist prohibited from recovering noneconomic damages under section 303.390. The circuit court awarded Plaintiff economic damages for her medical bills but denied her renewed motion to strike Defendant's affirmative defense regarding section 303.390. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Plaintiff failed properly to preserve her constitutional argument for appellate review. View "Bridegan v. Turntine" on Justia Law