Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court denied Petitioner's petition for a writ of mandamus in this original proceeding involving more than 2,000 cases brought by more than 7,000 plaintiffs represented by more than fifty law firms consolidated in an multidistrict litigation (MDL) court, holding that Plaintiffs did not sufficiently plead their claims.This proceeding arose from explosions occurring in the TPC petrochemical processing plant in Port Neches, resulting in the release of toxic chemicals, extensive personal injury, and property damages. At issue before the Supreme Court was whether Plaintiffs sufficiently pleaded claims that investors in the plant owner were directly liable for damages. The Supreme Court denied mandamus relief, holding that Plaintiffs' petition made no factual allegations to show a cause of action with a basis in law against the investors for TPC's conduct. View "In re First Reserve Management, L.P." on Justia Law

In these two consolidated cases involving claims brought against the Electric Reliability Council of Texas, Inc. (ERCOT) the Supreme Court answered, among other questions, that ERCOT is a governmental unit as defined in the Texas Tort Claims Act and is thereby entitled to pursue an interlocutory appeal from the denial of a plea to the jurisdiction.CPS Energy sued ERCOT and several of its officers for, inter alia, breach of contract. The trial court denied ERCOT'S plea to the jurisdiction. Ultimately, the court of appeals held that ERCOT was a governmental unit entitled to take an interlocutory appeal. In the second case, Panda sued ERCOT for, inter alia, fraud. The trial court denied ERCOT's pleas to the jurisdiction. The court of appeals ultimately held that ERCOT was not entitled to sovereign immunity. The Supreme Court affirmed in the first case and reversed in the other, holding (1) ERCOT was entitled to pursue an interlocutory appeal from the denial of a plea to the jurisdiction; (2) the Public Utility Commission of Texas has exclusive jurisdiction over the parties' claims against ERCOT; and (3) ERCOT was entitled to sovereign immunity. View "CPS Energy v. Electric Reliability Council of Texas" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals reversing the judgment of the trial court granting no-evidence summary-judgment motions in this action alleging that Defendants negligently collected, transported, tested, and reported the results of Plaintiff's hair sample used for a drug and alcohol screening, holding that third-party testing entities hired by an employer do not owe a common-law negligence duty to their clients' employees.Plaintiff, a pipefitter, was directed to report to the Houston Area Safety Council to provide hair and urine samples for drug and alcohol screenings. The Safety Council collected the samples and delivered them to Defendant for laboratory testing. Defendant reported that Plaintiff's hair sample tested positive for cocaine and a cocaine metabolite. Subsequent samples tested positive, but Defendant was required to find work with a different employer. Plaintiff later brought this action. The trial court granted summary judgment for Defendant, concluding that Defendant did not owe Plaintiff a legal duty. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed after considering the competing factors and well-established tort principles, holding that Plaintiff failed to establish that Defendant owed him a legal duty under the circumstances of this case. View "Houston Area Safety Council, Inc. v. Mendez" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the judgment of the district court dismissing Plaintiff's claim alleging she suffered permanent lung injury from toxic vapors that spread throughout the building where she worked, holding that Plaintiff did not present evidence to create a dispute of material fact as to the element of causation.A maintenance worker at the multistory medical office building where Plaintiff worked used a chemical drain cleaner to clear a clogged restroom sink on a lower level. Plaintiff claimed that her inhalation of the fumes the building aggravated her preexisting asthmatic condition and permanently caused reduced pulmonary function. The district court granted Defendant's motion to dismiss, concluding that there was insufficient evidence presented that the chemical fumes caused the lung injury alleged by Plaintiff. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Plaintiff presented insufficient evidence about whether the dose of toxin to which she was exposed was capable of causing her alleged permanent injury. View "Uhler v. Graham Group, Inc." on Justia Law

The Idaho Industrial Commission issued an order denying Veronica Arreola’s petition for a declaratory ruling and motion for reinstatement of compensation. Arreola brought her petition and motion against the Granite State Insurance Co. (“the Surety”), when the Surety, without an order from the Commission invoked I.C. section 72-434 to suspend Arreola’s compensation payments. In the Surety’s unilateral and private determination, suspending Arreola’s compensation payments was appropriate because the Surety had purportedly scheduled Arreola’s Independent Medical Exam (“IME”) with its physician at a “reasonable” time, and Arreola “unreasonably” failed to submit to or had obstructed the scheduled IME by not appearing. Arreola’s petition and motion disputed these private conclusions by the Surety. Arreola also maintained that only the Commission has the authority to adjudicate the underlying medical exam dispute and determine whether there is a factual basis to execute the enforcement mechanisms in Idaho Code section 72-434. The Commission denied the petition and motion, instructing Arreola to instead proceed through a complaint for relief. The Idaho Supreme Court concluded its decision in Brewer v. La Crosse Health & Rehab, 71 P.3d 458 (2003) interpreting Idaho Code section 72-434 was manifestly wrong. "Only the Commission has the authority to adjudicate medical exam disputes, and to enforce that adjudication through the enforcement mechanisms in section 72-434." In light of this, Arreola’s concern that the Surety’s unilateral execution of the enforcement mechanisms in section 72-434 also suspended her right to file a “complaint” to seek relief was now abated. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court did not affirm: given the shift in the legal landscape with Brewer overruled, the Commission’s order denying the petition and motion was vacated, and the case remanded with instructions that the Commission: (1) order payment of prospective compensation payments that might be owed until such time as the Commission determines that payments are not required under section 72-434; (2) reconsider the appropriate procedural mechanism for adjudicating the underlying factual dispute; and (3) instruct the Surety what procedural mechanism it must use to obtain an order authorizing it to lawfully suspend compensation payments. View "Arreola v. Scentsy, Inc." on Justia Law

In this slip-and-fall case, the trial court denied the defendant business Dolgencorp’s summary judgment motion. The judge found there “may be a question of fact.” After de novo review, the Mississippi Supreme Court found clear that plaintiff Patsy Payton failed to present sufficient evidence to establish a material fact issue as to whether the alleged dangerous condition, Carpet Fresh powder on the floor of the main aisle of a Dollar General store, had existed long enough on the ground for the store to have constructive knowledge of the spill. The only evidence Payton produced was her deposition testimony that no other customer was in the store when she arrived. And soon after arriving, she slipped and fell, implying that the substance must have been spilled sometime before she entered the store. Payton admitted she had only been in the store less than a minute when she fell. On these facts, the Supreme Court found Payton's claims failed, and reversed the trial court's denial of Dolgencorp's motion. View "Dolgencorp, LLC v. Payton" on Justia Law

This dispute began in 2016 when Defendants sued a motorist in state court for damages stemming from an automobile accident. The motorist fled the scene of the accident, was criminally charged for failing to provide his name, address, and insurance information, and pleaded nolo contendere to a criminal misdemeanor. The motorist was insured by Allstate Fire & Casualty Insurance Company (“Allstate”). Allstate paid Defendants claims for property damages, but Defendants rejected Allstate’s offers to resolve their physical injury claims, demanding the policy limit of $50,000. The district court determined that it had subject matter jurisdiction over the lawsuit, denying Defendants’ motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). It subsequently granted summary judgment in favor of Allstate, finding that the motorist’s failure to cooperate in the underlying suit prejudiced Allstate and barred any legal obligation to pay Defendants the judgment amount of $163,822.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s determination that it had subject matter jurisdiction. The court held that where the claim under the policy exceeds the value of the policy limit, courts considering declaratory judgments should ask whether there is a legal possibility that the insurer could be subject to liability in excess of the policy limit. The party seeking diversity jurisdiction should establish this possibility by a preponderance of the evidence. View "Allstate Fire and Casualty v. Allison Love" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeal affirming the trial court's judgment in favor of the County of Riverside in this action asserting negligent distress, holding that a provision of the Government Claims Act, Cal. Gov. Code 821.6, does not immunize public employees from claims based on certain injuries inflicted in the course of law enforcement investigations.Plaintiff's husband was shot and killed. When deputies with the Riverside County Sheriff office dragged his body in an attempt to revive him, the movement exposed his naked body. Plaintiff brought this action alleging that the officers and County failed to exercise reasonable care when they left her husband's body exposed for several hours in view of both Plaintiff and the general public. The trial court granted judgment for the County, concluding that Defendants were immune under section 821.6 for "all conduct related to the investigation and filing of charges." The court of appeal affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the court of appeals erred in upholding the application of section 321.6 to confer absolute immunity on the County for negligent infliction of emotional distress arising out of the alleged mishandling of Plaintiff's husband's body because the claims did not concern alleged harms from the institution or prosecution of judicial or administrative proceedings. View "Leon v. County of Riverside" on Justia Law

Plaintiff and her husband purchased a ladder at Home Depot some years ago. Plaintiff’s husband was found dead near the ladder with injuries consistent with a fall. Plaintiff sued Home Depot, alleging that a defect in a ladder caused her husband’s death. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Home Depot, concluding that Plaintiff’s evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to show causation. On appeal, Plaintiff asserted that she provided sufficient evidence that establishes her claims against Home Depot, and, at a minimum, her evidence creates a genuine dispute of material fact making a grant of summary judgment improper.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that here, Plaintiff has failed to negate other causes of the accident. In addition to the unaccounted-for 11-year period between the purchase of the ladder and the accident, the expert hypothesized that an electrical malfunction may have caused the fall. Plaintiff replied that this sort of malfunction would have given her husband electrical burns, which were not observed by the coroner. However, a minor spark that did not contact her husband could have startled him and caused him to lose his balance. Plaintiff has provided no evidence to refute this. The court concluded that there is no proof here sufficient to induce the mind to pass beyond conjecture. View "Martha Hunt v. Home Depot, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court dismissing a Monroe County action with prejudice and denying Appellant's motions to correct error and to amend her complaint, holding that a plaintiff seeking tort damages from both government and non-government defendants must sue all such tortfeasors in one lawsuit.Plaintiff sustained injuries while driving in an I-69 construction zone. Plaintiff obtained a judgment against a non-government defendant in Lake County to satisfy the requirements for obtaining insurance coverage. After Plaintiff and the insurer settled her insurance claims Plaintiff again sued for the same injuries, this time in the Monroe Circuit Court against six other defendants, both government and non-government. The trial court dismissed the action with prejudice, concluding that collateral estoppel and claim splitting barred Plaintiff's claims. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court was correct in dismissing Plaintiff's action on issue preclusion grounds; and (2) Plaintiff was not entitled to relief on her remaining claims of error. View "Davidson v. State" on Justia Law