Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

A 93-year-old woman with dysphagia was discharged from the hospital with a recommendation to consume puree-based meals and liquid additives produced by a food company. For about a month, her caretakers provided her with six of these meals and four servings of the additive daily. The product labels disclosed their sodium content. The woman suffered multiple cardiac arrests and was diagnosed with hypernatremia before passing away. Her estate, represented by her daughter, alleged that the company’s products caused her death and brought claims including strict products liability, breach of implied warranty, negligence, and wrongful death.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas excluded one of the estate’s expert reports for failing to comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(2)(B), finding it lacked an opinion and was merely a recitation of facts. The court denied the estate’s motion for summary judgment and granted summary judgment to the company on all claims, concluding that the estate failed to provide sufficient evidence or expert testimony to support its claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the district court’s exclusion of the expert report for abuse of discretion and its grant of summary judgment de novo. The appellate court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the expert report, as the estate failed to comply with disclosure requirements and did not show the failure was justified or harmless. The court also affirmed summary judgment for the company, finding the estate did not present evidence that the products were defective or unreasonably dangerous, nor did it provide necessary expert testimony for its claims. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment in full. View "Howard v. Hormel Foods Corporation" on Justia Law

In this case, the plaintiff brought a defamation claim against Donald J. Trump, based on statements he made in June 2019 during his first term as President. The suit was initially filed in New York state court. In September 2020, the Department of Justice, acting under the Westfall Act, certified that Trump was acting within the scope of his employment and removed the case to federal court, seeking to substitute the United States as the defendant. The District Court for the Southern District of New York denied substitution, finding Trump was not acting within the scope of his employment. Trump appealed, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed in part, vacated in part, and certified a question to the D.C. Court of Appeals regarding the scope of employment under D.C. law. The D.C. Court of Appeals clarified the law but did not resolve whether Trump’s conduct was within the scope of employment. The Second Circuit remanded for the District Court to apply the clarified law.On remand, the Department of Justice declined to certify that Trump was acting within the scope of his employment, and neither Trump nor the government sought substitution before trial. The case proceeded to trial, and a jury found in favor of the plaintiff, awarding substantial damages. Trump appealed. After the appeal was fully briefed, and after Trump began his second term as President, Trump and the government jointly moved in the Second Circuit to substitute the United States as a party under the Westfall Act.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit denied the motion to substitute. The court held that the motion was statutorily barred by the Westfall Act because it was not made before trial, that both Trump and the government had waived any right to seek substitution by failing to timely petition the District Court, and that equitable considerations also warranted denial of the belated motion. View "Carroll v. Trump" on Justia Law

A woman, acting individually and as the special administrator of her late husband’s estate, filed a wrongful death and medical malpractice lawsuit against a hospital and an emergency room physician. She alleged that the physician negligently failed to diagnose and treat her husband’s condition after he presented to the emergency room with head and neck pain following a blow to the head. The physician diagnosed abrasions and a closed head injury, but did not order cardiac tests. The patient was discharged and died that night from an apparent heart attack.The case was filed in the District Court for Douglas County, Nebraska. Over several years, the parties engaged in discovery, and the court issued multiple progression orders setting deadlines for, among other things, the disclosure of expert witnesses. The plaintiff did not disclose a medical expert by the required deadline. The defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that without expert testimony, the plaintiff could not prove her malpractice claim. Shortly before the summary judgment hearing, the plaintiff disclosed a new medical expert. The district court excluded the expert’s affidavit, both as a discovery sanction and under its inherent authority to enforce its progression orders, and granted summary judgment for the defendants, dismissing the case with prejudice.The Nebraska Court of Appeals reversed, finding that the district court abused its discretion in excluding the expert’s affidavit as a discovery sanction and remanded for further proceedings. On further review, the Nebraska Supreme Court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the late-disclosed expert under its inherent authority to enforce progression orders. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and remanded with directions to affirm the district court’s judgment granting summary judgment to the defendants. View "Ricker v. Nebraska Methodist Health System" on Justia Law

A citizen of the United Kingdom, who currently resides in Japan, underwent surgery in the United Kingdom to have a medical device implanted. The device was manufactured by a Minnesota-based company, which is a subsidiary of a New Jersey-based parent company. After the device allegedly failed, the plaintiff traveled to Colorado for removal and replacement of the device, but continued to experience problems. He later received additional medical care in Thailand. Dissatisfied with the device’s performance, he filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota, asserting negligence and strict liability claims against both the manufacturer and its parent company.The defendants did not contest jurisdiction or venue in Minnesota, but moved to dismiss the case on the grounds of forum non conveniens, arguing that the United Kingdom was a more appropriate forum. The district court agreed, reasoning that most relevant events and evidence were outside Minnesota, and dismissed the case with prejudice. The court also denied the plaintiff’s request to amend his complaint to add more facts connecting the case to Minnesota, concluding that such an amendment would be futile. The plaintiff’s subsequent request to file a motion for reconsideration was also denied.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case and determined that the district court abused its discretion. The appellate court held that the district court failed to properly hold the defendants to their burden of persuasion on all elements of the forum non conveniens analysis and erred by automatically weighing all contacts outside Minnesota in favor of the United Kingdom, rather than considering contacts with the entire United States. The Eighth Circuit reversed the dismissal and remanded the case for a new forum non conveniens analysis, instructing the district court to apply the correct legal standards and properly weigh the relevant factors. View "Dibble v. Torax Medical, Inc." on Justia Law

In January 2020, Salve Chipola attended a high school basketball game where Sean Flannery made statements to a school official accusing Chipola of being a drug dealer and providing drugs and alcohol to students. As a result, Chipola was later banned from school grounds and questioned by a police officer about these allegations, which he denied. Flannery admitted to making the statements. Nearly two years after the incident, Chipola filed a lawsuit against Flannery for false light invasion of privacy, alleging that the false statements harmed his reputation and caused emotional distress.The Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, granted Flannery’s motion to dismiss, finding that Chipola’s claim was time-barred under the one-year statute of limitations for defamation, as established in Swan v. Boardwalk Regency Corp. The Appellate Division affirmed this decision, reasoning that false light claims are essentially akin to defamation and thus subject to the same one-year limitations period. The court relied on prior case law, including Rumbauskas v. Cantor, which recognized the similarities between false light and defamation claims.The Supreme Court of New Jersey reviewed the case to resolve whether the statute of limitations for false light invasion of privacy should be one year, as for defamation, or two years, as for personal injury. The Court held that the one-year statute of limitations for defamation claims also applies to false light claims. The Court reasoned that the conduct and injuries underlying both torts are closely aligned, and applying a longer limitations period to false light would undermine legislative intent and free speech protections. The judgment of the Appellate Division was affirmed. View "Chipola v. Flannery" on Justia Law

After experiencing shortness of breath and chest pain, Jorge Armenta lost consciousness and his wife called 911. Emergency medical technicians from Unified Fire Authority (UFA) responded, evaluated Armenta, and told him that everything appeared normal, suggesting he had an anxiety attack and did not need to go to the emergency room. A week later, Armenta was hospitalized for a massive heart attack, which resulted in significant and potentially life-shortening heart damage. Armenta filed a negligence suit against UFA, alleging that their failure to properly diagnose and treat him caused his injuries.The Third District Court, Salt Lake County, reviewed UFA’s motion to dismiss, which argued that the Utah Governmental Immunity Act (UGIA) shielded UFA from liability. The district court applied a three-part test, found that UFA’s actions were a governmental function, that immunity was generally waived for such activities, but that an exception for “providing emergency medical assistance” restored immunity. The court dismissed Armenta’s claims against UFA and entered judgment under rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.On direct appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Utah reviewed the district court’s statutory interpretation and dismissal. The Supreme Court held that the district court erred in its interpretation of the “providing emergency medical assistance” exception under the UGIA. The Court determined that, when read in context with related statutory provisions, the exception applies only to medical assistance provided in response to certain types of emergencies, such as disasters or catastrophic events, not to routine emergency medical responses like the one at issue. Therefore, the UGIA does not immunize UFA from Armenta’s suit. The Supreme Court reversed the district court’s dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "ARMENTA v. UNIFIED FIRE AUTHORITY" on Justia Law

Several individuals from five different states purchased ovens with front-mounted burner knobs manufactured by a major appliance company. They allege that these ovens have a defect causing the stovetop burners to turn on unintentionally, sometimes resulting in gas leaks. The plaintiffs claim they were unaware of this defect at the time of purchase, but that the manufacturer had prior knowledge of the issue through consumer complaints sent to the U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC) and reviews posted on the company’s website. The plaintiffs assert that, had they known about the defect, they would have paid less for the ovens or not purchased them at all.The plaintiffs filed a class action in the United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan, alleging violations of federal warranty law, fraud by omission, breach of express and implied warranties, unjust enrichment, and violations of state consumer protection statutes. The district court found that the plaintiffs had Article III standing, as they alleged a concrete injury, but dismissed all claims for failure to state a plausible claim for relief. The plaintiffs appealed the dismissal of their state common law fraud and statutory consumer protection claims, while the manufacturer argued that the plaintiffs lacked standing.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court held that the plaintiffs had Article III standing because they plausibly alleged economic injury from overpaying for a defective product. The court further held that the plaintiffs plausibly alleged the manufacturer’s knowledge of the defect and its safety risks, particularly because the CPSC had sent incident reports directly to the manufacturer. The court reversed the district court’s dismissal of most state law fraud and consumer protection claims, except for the Illinois common law fraud claim, which failed for lack of a duty to disclose under Illinois law. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with these holdings. View "Tapply v. Whirlpool Corp." on Justia Law

A four-year-old child drowned after wandering unattended from the home where she had been placed under temporary custody by order of the Probate Court. The child’s parents had previously lost guardianship, and the court had vested temporary custody in maternal relatives. To determine whether to grant a full transfer of guardianship, the Probate Court ordered the Department of Children and Families (DCF) to investigate the home and report its findings. DCF submitted its report, recommending the placement, but before the court could hold a hearing on permanent guardianship, the child died. The child’s estate, through her father as administrator, alleged that DCF’s negligence in investigating the placement and in making recommendations to the Probate Court was a proximate cause of the child’s death, and also claimed DCF failed to fulfill independent duties to protect the child from abuse and neglect.After the estate received permission from the Claims Commissioner to sue the state, DCF moved to dismiss the action in the Superior Court, arguing that it was entitled to absolute quasi-judicial immunity for actions integral to the judicial process, such as conducting court-ordered investigations and making recommendations. The Superior Court agreed, holding that DCF was protected by absolute quasi-judicial immunity when acting as an arm of the Probate Court, and that the Claims Commissioner could not waive this immunity. The court dismissed the action, finding the complaint’s allegations insufficient to overcome DCF’s immunity.On appeal, the Connecticut Supreme Court held that the Claims Commissioner’s waiver of sovereign immunity under the relevant statute does not preclude the state from asserting absolute quasi-judicial immunity. However, the Court reversed in part, concluding that some of the estate’s allegations may fall outside the scope of quasi-judicial immunity, particularly those involving DCF’s independent statutory duties. The case was remanded for further proceedings to determine which claims, if any, are not barred by quasi-judicial immunity. View "Jamie G. v. Dept. of Children & Families" on Justia Law

A woman brought suit against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) after her child suffered severe and permanent nerve damage during childbirth at a Texas hospital. She alleged that the resident physician who delivered her baby used excessive force in responding to a complication known as shoulder dystocia, and that the attending physician failed to properly supervise. The plaintiff sought compensatory damages for medical care and related expenses.The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas dismissed the case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). The district court, adopting a magistrate judge’s recommendation, determined that shoulder dystocia is always an obstetrical emergency under Texas law. It concluded that, in such emergencies, Texas law requires proof of “willful and wanton negligence” (a heightened standard akin to gross negligence). The court further reasoned that because the FTCA does not waive sovereign immunity for punitive damages, and because damages for willful and wanton negligence are punitive, it lacked jurisdiction to hear the case.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded. The Fifth Circuit held that the district court erred in two respects: first, by presuming as a matter of law that the physician provided emergency medical care in every instance of shoulder dystocia, rather than treating it as a factual question; and second, by conflating the heightened standard of liability (willful and wanton negligence) with the nature of damages recoverable. The Fifth Circuit clarified that compensatory damages for gross negligence are available under Texas law and are not barred by the FTCA, which only precludes punitive damages. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Robledo v. USA" on Justia Law

Burke McCarthy died in October 2018 after receiving medical treatment from Dr. Wesley Hiser at Wyoming Medical Center. Dianna Ellis, McCarthy’s daughter and wrongful death representative, filed a wrongful death lawsuit against Dr. Hiser and the hospital in February 2021, within the two-year statute of limitations. However, Dr. Hiser was never served with the original complaint. Nearly two years later, Ellis voluntarily dismissed her suit against Dr. Hiser. In December 2023, she refiled her complaint, relying on Wyoming’s savings statute to argue she had an additional year to commence a new action. Dr. Hiser was served for the first time in February 2024, more than five years after McCarthy’s death.The District Court of Natrona County granted Dr. Hiser’s motion to dismiss the refiled complaint. The court found that it had never obtained jurisdiction over Dr. Hiser in the original action because he was not served, and therefore the savings statute could not apply to extend the time for refiling. Ellis appealed this decision.The Supreme Court of Wyoming reviewed the case de novo. The court held that Wyoming’s savings statute, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-3-118, does not apply to actions that are voluntarily dismissed by the plaintiff. The court overruled its prior decision in Hugus v. Reeder, 2022 WY 13, which had held that a voluntary dismissal qualified as a “failure otherwise than upon the merits” under the savings statute. The court reasoned that a voluntary dismissal is not a “failure” within the meaning of the statute, as it is a matter of choice rather than an unsuccessful attempt to proceed. Accordingly, the Supreme Court of Wyoming affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Ellis’s refiled complaint. View "Ellis v. Hiser" on Justia Law