Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

A sixteen-year-old boy and his friend were waiting for transportation under a carport near the boy’s home when they were approached by an off-duty Baltimore City police officer who had just returned from firearms training. The officer, dressed in plain clothes and carrying a loaded handgun, questioned the boys about their presence in the neighborhood. After a brief exchange, the officer brandished his gun at “low ready,” causing the boys to fear for their lives. The incident had a lasting traumatic effect on the boy, resulting in emotional distress, behavioral changes, and ultimately leading him to attend a boarding school to distance himself from the event.The boy filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Maryland state law against the officer, the Baltimore Police Department, the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, and the State of Maryland. All claims against the institutional defendants were dismissed by the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, and some claims against the officer were dismissed at summary judgment. At trial, the district court submitted to the jury both constitutional claims and state law gross negligence claims, including gross negligence in the officer’s capacity as a private person. The jury found for the officer on constitutional claims but found him grossly negligent as a private person, awarding $250,000 in compensatory damages for emotional harm. The officer moved to alter or amend the judgment or for a new trial, arguing lack of notice on the private person claim and excessiveness of damages, but the district court denied the motion.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court held that the complaint sufficiently alleged gross negligence as a private person and that the officer had notice of this claim. The court rejected the officer’s arguments regarding supplemental jurisdiction, plain error in jury instructions, and excessiveness of damages, finding no abuse of discretion or plain error by the district court. The judgment was affirmed. View "Nicholson v. Durant" on Justia Law

A Nevada resident was injured when a lithium-ion battery exploded in his pocket, causing severe burns. He had purchased the battery individually from a local vape shop, with no warnings or instructions provided. The battery in question was manufactured by a South Korean company and its American subsidiary, which design and sell these batteries as industrial components intended for integration into products such as power tools, not for standalone consumer use. Despite efforts by the manufacturer to prevent individual sales and warn against improper use—including sending cease-and-desist letters and posting warnings online—third-party retailers in the United States, including Nevada, sold the batteries individually.After the injury, the plaintiff filed a products liability suit in Nevada’s Eighth Judicial District Court against the manufacturer and its subsidiary. The defendants moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, arguing that they did not sell or market individual batteries for standalone use in Nevada. The district court agreed, finding that the plaintiff failed to demonstrate that his injuries arose out of or were related to the manufacturer’s contacts with Nevada, and dismissed the case. The dismissal was certified as final, and the plaintiff appealed.The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed the case de novo. It held that, while the manufacturer purposefully availed itself of Nevada’s market by selling batteries as components for incorporation into end products, the plaintiff’s injuries resulted from a standalone battery acquired through a different, unauthorized stream of commerce. Because there was no evidence that the manufacturer placed individual battery cells into the Nevada consumer market, the court found no sufficient connection between the company’s forum contacts and the plaintiff’s injury. The Supreme Court of Nevada affirmed the district court’s dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction. View "Franceschi v. LG Chem, LTD." on Justia Law

A carpenter employed by a subcontractor was injured after falling from a ladder owned by another subcontractor, DAL Electrical Corporation, while working on a renovation project at an office building. The injured worker was using his own employer’s equipment in the morning but, after lunch, returned to the worksite without his equipment and used an unattended DAL ladder, which was defective and marked with blue tape. He was injured when the ladder wobbled and he fell, impaling himself on a tool in his belt. The worker brought claims under New York Labor Law and for common-law negligence against the project’s general contractor, premises owner, and DAL, asserting the defective ladder caused his injuries. The general contractor and owner sought indemnification from DAL under their subcontract.The Supreme Court of Bronx County granted the worker’s motion for partial summary judgment on one Labor Law claim and denied DAL’s motion to dismiss other claims and cross-claims by the general contractor and owner. The court also granted the general contractor and owner summary judgment on their contractual indemnification claim against DAL. The Appellate Division, First Department, modified this order by denying summary judgment on contractual indemnification and granting summary judgment for DAL on all claims and cross-claims against it. The general contractor and owner appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision. The Court held that none of the indemnification provisions in the subcontract required DAL to indemnify the general contractor or owner for the worker’s injuries because the injuries did not arise from DAL’s performance of its contractually defined work. The Court also found that DAL did not owe a duty of care in tort to the injured worker, as the facts did not fit within any recognized exception to the general rule against extending contractual duties to non-contracting third parties. The certified question was answered in the affirmative. View "Dibrino v Rockefeller Ctr. N., Inc." on Justia Law

A motorcyclist attending the Sturgis Motorcycle Rally in South Dakota was injured in a 2017 collision when another driver allegedly pulled out in front of him. The injured party, a resident of Canada, filed a negligence lawsuit against the driver in July 2020. Shortly thereafter, the plaintiff’s counsel granted the defendant’s insurance carrier an open-ended extension to file an answer, due to ongoing medical treatment and uncertainty about the extent of injuries. The parties operated under this informal agreement while the plaintiff continued treatment and sought additional information related to his injuries and damages.Over the next several years, the Meade County clerk of courts issued three notices of intent to dismiss the case for inactivity, to which the plaintiff timely objected, citing the ongoing extension and the need to collect further information. In August 2024, the defendant retained counsel, who acknowledged and reaffirmed the open-ended extension agreement. However, two months later, the defendant moved to dismiss for failure to prosecute. The Circuit Court of the Fourth Judicial Circuit, Meade County, granted the dismissal with prejudice under SDCL 15-11-11 and SDCL 15-6-41(b) (Rule 41(b)), concluding there was unreasonable and unexplained delay.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota held that dismissal was improper. The Court found that the mutual open-ended extension agreement between the parties constituted good cause for delay under SDCL 15-11-11. Additionally, the Court determined that the plaintiff’s conduct did not rise to the level of egregiousness required for dismissal with prejudice under Rule 41(b), especially given the reaffirmed extension and lack of prejudice to the defendant. The Supreme Court reversed the dismissal and remanded for further proceedings. View "Arrowsmith v. Odle" on Justia Law

A patient was admitted to a hospital for liver disease and, while in an altered mental state, fell while accompanied by a caregiver. She suffered a fractured hip, requiring surgery, and was later discharged. The patient filed a negligence lawsuit against the hospital, alleging a failure to prevent or appropriately respond to her fall. During discovery, she requested all incident reports related to her fall. The hospital identified an Incident Report and a Root Cause Analysis but refused to produce them, invoking federal and state privileges that protect certain internal analyses and reports of medical errors.The McCracken Circuit Court ordered the hospital to produce the Incident Report and to provide the Root Cause Analysis with redactions for portions covered by federal privilege. The trial court found that the Incident Report and parts of the Root Cause Analysis contained factual information not otherwise available in the patient's medical records and ruled that such information should be discoverable. The Court of Appeals reviewed the trial court's order after the hospital sought a writ of prohibition. It held that the Incident Report was not privileged under federal or state law but concluded the Root Cause Analysis was fully protected by federal privilege, even its factual portions, and thus could not be disclosed.Upon review, the Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed the Court of Appeals. The court held that the federal Patient Safety and Quality Improvement Act privilege protected the entire Root Cause Analysis from disclosure, with no exception for factual information within the document. However, it held that the Incident Report was not protected by either the federal or state privileges because it was generated in compliance with regulatory obligations, not as part of the hospital's privileged peer review or patient safety evaluation system. As a result, the Incident Report was discoverable, while the Root Cause Analysis was not. View "BAPTIST HEALTHCARE SYSTEM, INC. V. KITCHEN" on Justia Law

An elderly woman with significant medical issues, including heart and lung conditions, was a resident at a nursing home from 2018 until her death in December 2020. In late November 2020, she tested positive for COVID-19 and was transferred to a COVID unit within the facility. On December 3, 2020, she was found unresponsive by staff but did not receive immediate medical intervention for nearly five hours. She was eventually transported to a hospital, where she died the same day from acute respiratory distress. Her medical records indicated care being provided after her death, raising questions about record accuracy. Her estate administrator brought suit against the nursing home and related parties, alleging negligence, medical negligence, wrongful death, and other claims, asserting that her death resulted from neglect rather than COVID-19 itself.The case was first reviewed by the Graves Circuit Court, which granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, holding that they were immune under Kentucky’s COVID-19 immunity statute (KRS 39A.275). The court found that the decedent died from COVID-19 as evidenced by her death certificate and that no gross negligence had been sufficiently shown. The Kentucky Court of Appeals affirmed this decision, reasoning that immunity applied under the statute because COVID-19 was a factor and that the plaintiff failed to present sufficient proof of gross negligence.Upon further review, the Supreme Court of Kentucky reversed the lower courts’ decisions. It held that summary judgment was inappropriate because there remained genuine issues of material fact as to whether the woman's injuries and death were actually caused by COVID-19 or by the nursing home's alleged neglect. The Court clarified that the immunity statute requires a causal connection between the harm and COVID-19, and does not automatically apply to all injuries during the emergency period. The case was remanded for additional proceedings and further discovery. View "JACKSON V. MAYFIELD KY OPCO, LLC" on Justia Law

David Kaplan brought a lawsuit against MedStar Georgetown Medical Center, Inc. and an affiliated medical group, alleging that they failed to meet the national standard of care in treating his Crohn’s disease and did not obtain his informed consent for treatment. As a result of the alleged medical negligence, Kaplan endured prolonged use of steroids, which did not alleviate his condition and ultimately led to the complete deterioration of his hip bones. He subsequently required three hip replacement surgeries, experiencing significant physical pain, emotional distress, and limitations on his lifestyle and activities.The Superior Court of the District of Columbia presided over a jury trial, where the jury found MedStar liable for both breaching the standard of care and failing to obtain informed consent. The jury awarded Kaplan $4 million in damages, allocating separate amounts for past and future physical injury and for past and future emotional distress. MedStar timely objected to the verdict form, aspects of Kaplan’s closing argument, and the amount of damages, and subsequently filed a post-trial motion seeking judgment as a matter of law or, alternatively, a reduction in damages. The trial court denied these motions.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case and affirmed the Superior Court’s judgment. The appellate court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by allowing the verdict form to separately list damages for physical injury and emotional distress, as these are conceptually distinct forms of harm. The court further found that any improper argument in Kaplan’s closing was adequately addressed by curative instructions, and that the damages award was not so excessive as to shock the conscience or require remittitur. The judgment in favor of Kaplan was affirmed in its entirety. View "Medstar Georgetown Medical Center, Inc. v. Kaplan" on Justia Law

A motor vehicle accident occurred in Butte, Montana, when a snow grader operated by a city employee backed into a sedan driven by the plaintiff at a very low speed. The grader was engaged in snow removal operations, reversing in the process, and displaying flashing lights and a backup alarm. The plaintiff, after passing the grader, positioned her car behind it and came to a stop. The grader then struck her vehicle. Testimony at trial included differing accounts of whether warning devices were observable and whether the plaintiff was attentive to the grader’s movements. The plaintiff claimed injuries resulting from the collision, though evidence regarding the severity and causation of her injuries was contested.The Second Judicial District Court, Butte-Silver Bow County, conducted a jury trial. The jury found the plaintiff 54% negligent and the city 46% negligent, barring her recovery under Montana’s comparative negligence statute. The plaintiff moved for a new trial, arguing irregularity in the proceedings and insufficient evidence to support the verdict. The District Court granted the motion for a new trial on both grounds, relying on statements made by the city’s counsel during closing arguments and finding the evidence did not support the jury’s comparative negligence finding.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed whether the District Court erred in granting a new trial. The Supreme Court held that the plaintiff had not preserved her objections to alleged irregularities in the proceedings because she failed to object contemporaneously or through a specific motion in limine. The Court also determined that the plaintiff had judicially admitted that comparative negligence was a factual issue for the jury, thereby waiving her right to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence. Furthermore, the Supreme Court found that there was substantial evidence supporting the jury’s verdict. The Supreme Court reversed the District Court’s order granting a new trial and reinstated the jury’s verdict. View "Shahood v. Butte-Silver Bow" on Justia Law

A teenage patient experienced persistent back pain and, in 2010, was treated by an orthopedic physician at a medical clinic. The physician misdiagnosed her condition and performed unnecessary surgeries in 2010 and 2012. Over the following years, internal complaints and concerns surfaced among other physicians and administrators at the clinic regarding this doctor’s substandard care, but the clinic did not take corrective action until the physician resigned in 2013. Subsequent medical evaluations revealed the original diagnosis was incorrect and the surgeries were not properly performed, resulting in further harm to the patient.The patient and her parents brought suit in Wake County Superior Court in 2016, alleging medical malpractice against the physician, and both vicarious liability and direct claims—specifically negligent retention and supervision—against the clinic. The trial court dismissed the malpractice claims as untimely under North Carolina’s four-year statute of repose, but allowed the negligent retention and supervision claims to proceed. On summary judgment, however, the trial court concluded that all remaining claims were also time-barred. The North Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed summary judgment on most claims but reversed as to the negligent retention claim, reasoning that such a claim against a corporate medical practice was not subject to the statute of repose for medical malpractice actions.On discretionary review, the Supreme Court of North Carolina held that a negligent retention claim against a corporate medical practice qualifies as a “medical malpractice action” under N.C.G.S. § 90-21.11, and thus is subject to—and barred by—the statute of repose in N.C.G.S. § 1-15(c). The court reversed the Court of Appeals’ decision on this point, holding that summary judgment was properly granted on the negligent retention claim. The court declined to review the dismissal of other tort claims. View "Cottle v. Mankin" on Justia Law

Pedro Castaneda died in a traffic accident at an intersection on State Highway 249 that was under construction. At the time, the intersection’s traffic lights were installed but not yet operational, and there was a dispute about whether they were properly covered to indicate their status. Castaneda’s family sued the contractors involved in the project, SpawGlass Civil Construction, Inc. and Third Coast Services, LLC, alleging that negligence in the construction and installation of the traffic signals contributed to the fatal accident. The construction project was governed by an agreement between the Texas Department of Transportation (TxDOT) and Montgomery County, with the County responsible for the project’s design and construction, but with TxDOT retaining authority over the adjacent frontage roads and final approval of plans.The trial court denied the contractors’ motions for summary judgment that sought dismissal under Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code Section 97.002, which grants immunity to contractors under certain conditions. The contractors appealed. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding that Section 97.002 applies only to contractors who are in direct contractual privity with TxDOT, and since neither contractor had a direct contract with TxDOT, they could not invoke the statute’s protection.The Supreme Court of Texas reversed the court of appeals. It held that Section 97.002 does not require direct contractual privity with TxDOT for a contractor to qualify for statutory immunity. The court determined that, based on the summary judgment record, SpawGlass and Third Coast performed work "for" TxDOT within the meaning of the statute, as their activities directly related to frontage roads that TxDOT would own and maintain. The court remanded the case to the court of appeals to determine whether the contractors met the remaining requirements of Section 97.002. View "THIRD COAST SERVICES, LLC v. CASTANEDA" on Justia Law