Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

Robert E. Dupuis and twelve other plaintiffs filed lawsuits against the Roman Catholic Bishop of Portland, seeking damages for sexual abuse allegedly perpetrated by the Bishop’s clergy when the plaintiffs were minor children. Their claims were previously barred by the statute of limitations. The Bishop moved for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that 14 M.R.S. § 752-C(3) (2022), which purports to revive the plaintiffs’ claims, deprives the Bishop of a constitutionally protected vested right.The Business and Consumer Docket (McKeon, J.) denied the Bishop’s motions but reported its orders to the Maine Supreme Judicial Court under Maine Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(c). The court accepted the report to determine whether the retroactive application of section 752-C(3) is constitutional.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court held that the retroactive application of section 752-C(3) contravenes centuries of precedent and multiple provisions of the Maine Declaration of Rights, as well as the Constitution’s provisions regarding separation of powers. The court concluded that once a statute of limitations has expired for a claim, a right to be free of that claim has vested, and the claim cannot be revived. Therefore, section 752-C(3) is unconstitutional as applied to expired claims. The court remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Dupuis v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Portland" on Justia Law

Timothy Davis accidentally shot himself in the leg with his Sig Sauer P320 X-Carry pistol while getting out of his truck. Davis claimed the gun was fully holstered and that he did not pull the trigger. He alleged that the P320 was defectively designed, making it prone to accidental discharge, and that alternative designs could have prevented his injury. Davis filed a products-liability lawsuit against Sig Sauer under Kentucky law, citing strict liability and negligence.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky granted Sig Sauer’s motions to exclude Davis’s expert witnesses and for summary judgment. The court found that Davis’s experts, James Tertin and Dr. William J. Vigilante, Jr., did not investigate the exact circumstances of the shooting and thus could not opine on causation. Without expert testimony, the court held that Davis could not pursue his products-liability claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court’s exclusion of the experts’ opinions on causation but reversed the exclusion of their testimonies on design defects and reasonable alternative designs. The appellate court found that the experts’ opinions were admissible to prove that the P320 was defectively designed and that reasonable alternative designs existed. The court held that Davis had demonstrated a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether the P320 was defectively designed and caused his injury. Consequently, the court vacated the district court’s grant of summary judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Davis v. Sig Sauer, Inc." on Justia Law

Devin Nunes, a former Member of Congress, along with NuStar Farms, LLC, and its owners, sued journalist Ryan Lizza and Hearst Magazine Media, Inc., for defamation. The lawsuit stemmed from an article published by Esquire, which implied that Nunes and his family were hiding the fact that NuStar Farms employed undocumented labor. The plaintiffs alleged both express defamation and defamation by implication.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Iowa initially dismissed Nunes's express defamation claim but allowed the defamation by implication claim to proceed. On remand, Nunes filed an amended complaint focusing solely on defamation by implication. NuStar Farms and its owners also filed a new lawsuit alleging both express defamation and defamation by implication. The district court consolidated the cases and ultimately granted summary judgment for the defendants, ruling that the plaintiffs failed to create a genuine dispute of material fact on certain elements of their defamation claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court concluded that Nunes did not present sufficient evidence to prove special damages, which are required under California law for defamation claims when general and exemplary damages are not recoverable due to failure to comply with the notice and demand statute. Nunes's claims of impaired career opportunities and diminished fundraising ability were unsupported by evidence.For the NuStar plaintiffs, the court applied Iowa law and found insufficient evidence of economic harm or reputational damage. The plaintiffs failed to demonstrate a preexisting good reputation that could have been damaged by the article. Consequently, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's summary judgment in favor of the defendants. View "Nunes v. Ryan" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs were injured during a nightclub shooting at a rap concert featuring performers from rival gangs. They sued the nightclub's owner and operators for negligence per se and strict liability on an ultrahazardous activity theory, claiming inadequate event planning and security. The trial court granted summary adjudication for the defendants on the negligence per se claim and judgment on the pleadings for the ultrahazardous activity claim, leading to a judgment in favor of the defendants. Plaintiffs appealed, arguing there were triable issues of fact for both claims.The Superior Court of Riverside County initially reviewed the case. The court granted summary adjudication on the negligence per se claim, finding that the conditional use permit was not designed to prevent the type of injuries sustained by the plaintiffs. Additionally, the court treated the motion regarding the ultrahazardous activity claim as a motion for judgment on the pleadings and granted it without leave to amend, concluding that hosting a rap concert, even with performers from rival gangs, was not an ultrahazardous activity.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court affirmed the lower court's judgment, holding that the plaintiffs failed to establish that the conditional use permit constituted a statute, ordinance, or regulation under the negligence per se doctrine. Furthermore, the court found that the permit was not designed to prevent the specific type of harm suffered by the plaintiffs. Regarding the ultrahazardous activity claim, the court concluded that hosting a rap concert, even with rival gang members, did not constitute an ultrahazardous activity as the risks could be mitigated with proper planning and security measures. The judgment in favor of the defendants was affirmed. View "Carmichael v. Cafe Sevilla of Riverside, Inc." on Justia Law

A motorist struck and injured a pedestrian during rush hour. The motorist claimed the pedestrian stepped out from behind a large truck, obstructing her view. Witnesses and investigating officers corroborated the motorist's account, finding no evidence of speeding, reckless driving, or distraction. The pedestrian sued the motorist and her insurer for negligence, and the motorist raised a contributory-negligence defense.The Hamilton Superior Court initially granted the pedestrian's motion to compel the motorist to produce her iPhone for inspection, limited to the hour surrounding the accident. However, the court reversed its decision upon reconsideration, citing significant privacy concerns and lack of evidence suggesting the motorist was using her phone at the time. The court also granted a motion in limine to exclude any discussion of the phone inspection at trial. A jury found the pedestrian 90% at fault, barring recovery under Indiana's contributory-fault standard. The Indiana Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the burden of the proposed phone inspection outweighed its likely benefit given the motorist's privacy concerns.The Indiana Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision, holding that the pedestrian's discovery request lacked necessary evidentiary support and was overly broad. The court emphasized that privacy concerns are not a per se bar to discovery but must be balanced against the need for information. The court concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to compel, as the pedestrian failed to show that the benefit of inspecting the motorist's phone outweighed her privacy interests. View "Jennings v. Smiley" on Justia Law

Clover Boykin filed a lawsuit against Greenwood Leflore Hospital (GLH) under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that GLH intentionally withheld her medical records, preventing her from filing a medical malpractice suit. Boykin claimed that GLH's actions violated her constitutional right of access to the courts. GLH responded with a motion to dismiss, arguing that Boykin's claims failed as a matter of law, the employee was immune from suit, GLH was never served, and the suit was time-barred.The Leflore County Circuit Court denied GLH's motion to dismiss and granted Boykin additional time to serve GLH. GLH then sought an interlocutory appeal, which the Supreme Court of Mississippi granted. Boykin did not file a brief in response to the appeal.The Supreme Court of Mississippi accepted Boykin's failure to file a brief as a confession of error and found that Boykin's claims failed as a matter of law. The court held that HIPAA does not provide a private right of action and that Boykin could not use § 1983 to enforce a federal statute that does not give her an individual right. The court reversed the trial judge's denial of the motion to dismiss and rendered judgment in favor of GLH. View "Greenwood Leflore Hospital v. Boykin" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs, Norene Rodríguez and Iris Rodríguez, sued Encompass Health Rehabilitation Hospital of San Juan, Inc. and Dr. José Báez Córdova for medical malpractice related to the treatment of their mother, Gloria Rodríguez González, who died after being treated for COVID-19. They alleged negligence in her care, particularly in failing to provide timely prophylactic medication for deep vein thrombosis, which they claimed led to her death.The United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The court concluded that the plaintiffs had not demonstrated any genuine issue of material fact and that the defendants were entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The court also found that Dr. Báez was immune from suit under Puerto Rico law, as he was acting within his duties as a faculty member of the University of Puerto Rico (UPR) at the time of the alleged malpractice. Consequently, Encompass could not be held vicariously liable for his actions. The plaintiffs' remaining claims were deemed waived for lack of development.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court agreed that Dr. Báez was immune from suit under Puerto Rico law, as he was acting in his capacity as a UPR faculty member supervising medical residents. The court also upheld the district court's application of the local anti-ferret rule, which disregarded certain facts not adequately supported by specific citations to the record. The plaintiffs' argument that Encompass was vicariously liable for the actions of other non-immune personnel was deemed waived, as it was not raised in the lower court. The appellate court found no abuse of discretion in the district court's denial of an evidentiary hearing. View "Rodriguez v. Encompass Health Rehabilitation Hospital of San Juan, Inc." on Justia Law

Andre Le Doux was driving on Interstate 81 in Virginia when he encountered a sudden traffic standstill due to a torrential downpour. As he braked, a vehicle behind him pushed his van into another vehicle, leaving his van exposed in the left lane. Ervin Worthy, driving a Western Express tractor trailer, saw the heavy rain and braked, but could not stop in time and collided with Le Doux’s van, causing severe injuries to Le Doux.Le Doux sued Worthy for negligence and willful and wanton negligence, and Western Express for vicarious liability and negligent hiring. The United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia excluded expert testimony from Le Doux’s meteorologist and accident reconstructionist due to gaps in radar data and inaccurate GPS timestamps. The court also excluded testimony from Le Doux’s trucking expert, finding it unnecessary for the jury to understand the standard of care for a tractor trailer driver in rainy conditions. Additionally, the court dismissed Le Doux’s negligent hiring claim against Western Express, reasoning that since Worthy was acting within the scope of his employment, the claim was redundant.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court’s exclusion of the expert testimonies, agreeing that the gaps in data and potential jury confusion justified the decision. The court also upheld the exclusion of the trucking expert’s testimony, finding that the jury could understand the necessary standard of care without it. Finally, the court affirmed the dismissal of the negligent hiring claim, holding that since the jury found Worthy not negligent, Western Express could not be liable for negligent hiring. The Fourth Circuit concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in its rulings. View "Le Doux v. Western Express, Inc." on Justia Law

K.S., a minor, through his guardian James Seeger, sued Richland School District Two, alleging gross negligence in supervising K.S.'s first-grade teacher and seeking liability under respondeat superior for injuries K.S. suffered due to the teacher's actions. The teacher, under personal stress, humiliated K.S. and other students, and physically grabbed K.S., causing him pain. K.S. experienced significant emotional distress and was diagnosed with persistent depressive disorder and anxiety.The trial court granted the District a directed verdict, ruling that the District could not be liable for negligence as K.S. suffered no physical injury. The court also excluded Seeger's expert testimony and ruled that the Safe School Climate Act did not repeal the South Carolina Tort Claims Act. The court of appeals affirmed the directed verdict, agreeing that no physical injury occurred and did not address the expert testimony exclusion or the Safe Schools Act ruling.The South Carolina Supreme Court reviewed the case and reversed the directed verdict, finding that the teacher's forceful grabbing of K.S. constituted sufficient physical harm to support a negligence claim. The court also reversed the exclusion of Seeger's expert, Dr. McEvoy, ruling that his testimony was not needlessly cumulative and would have provided crucial insight into the District's policies and their implementation. The court affirmed the trial court's ruling that the Safe Schools Act did not repeal the Tort Claims Act, maintaining that the Act does not create a private right of action or alter tort liability.The Supreme Court remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion, allowing Seeger's negligence claims to proceed and permitting the District to renew objections to Dr. McEvoy's testimony on remand. View "K.S. v. Richland School District Two" on Justia Law

Megan Miller was arrested and booked into the City of Troy’s pretrial detention facility, where she informed staff that she had been heavily using heroin and expected to go into withdrawal. Over the next two and a half days, Miller vomited continually. On the third day, she was found unconscious and unresponsive in her cell and was pronounced dead shortly after. Despite her continual vomiting, no jail official sought medical care for her, including Julie Green-Hernandez, who was responsible for monitoring detainees on the day of Miller’s death. Miller’s husband sued Green-Hernandez, claiming she violated Miller’s Fourteenth Amendment right to adequate pretrial medical care and acted with gross negligence under Michigan state law.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan denied Green-Hernandez’s motion for summary judgment, concluding she was not entitled to qualified immunity on the Fourteenth Amendment claim or state law immunity on the negligence claim. The court found that there were disputes of material fact regarding whether Green-Hernandez was deliberately indifferent to Miller’s serious medical needs and whether her conduct amounted to gross negligence.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. The court dismissed Green-Hernandez’s appeal regarding qualified immunity due to lack of jurisdiction, as her arguments were based on factual disputes rather than purely legal questions. However, the court reversed the district court’s denial of Michigan governmental immunity. The Sixth Circuit held that while Green-Hernandez’s conduct could be considered grossly negligent, it was not the single most proximate cause of Miller’s death. The court concluded that Miller’s ingestion of fentanyl was the most immediate, efficient, and direct cause of her death, entitling Green-Hernandez to state law immunity. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Gillman v. City of Troy" on Justia Law