Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court granting summary judgment to a police detective and his city employer in this case alleging defamation, abuse of process, and malicious prosecution, holding that there was no error.Plaintiff, who was acquitted of a sexual assault charge, sued county prosecutors and city police for allegedly pursuing the case against him. The Supreme Court held that the county prosecutors were entitled to dismissal from the case but rejected the investigating detective's arguments for dismissal on the pleadings. The district court ultimately granted summary judgment to the detective and the city. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court (1) properly granted summary judgment to the city defendants on Plaintiff's continuing malicious prosecution claim; and (2) did not err in dismissing Plaintiff's direct claims for damages under the Iowa Constitution. View "Venckus v. City of Iowa City" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court denying the motion filed by the Council Bluffs Water Works' to dismiss the claim brought by Jim and Angela Sutton for strict liability, holding that the district court did not err in failing to dismiss Suttons' strict liability claim.After an underground water main broke near the Suttons' home the Suttons sued Water Works for the ensuing damage to their house, alleging strict liability and negligence. Water Works moved to dismiss the strict liability claim on the grounds that the Iowa Municipal Tort Claims Act, Iowa Code ch. 670, did not permit a strict liability claim against it. The district court denied the motion, and Water Works filed an application for interlocutory appeal. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Act does not allow a claim for strict liability against a municipality for damage caused by an underground water main break. View "Sutton v. Council Bluffs Water Works" on Justia Law

This lawsuit arises from a motor vehicle accident that Plaintiff alleges occurred when a tractor-trailer rear-ended the school bus she was driving. Plaintiff and a passenger on the school bus (collectively, Plaintiffs), sued the tractor-trailer driver, and his employer, Randy’s Trucking, Inc. (collectively, Defendants), alleging personal injuries and emotional distress from the accident. Defendants filed a motion for an order compelling Plaintiff to undergo a mental examination by their neuropsychologist after. Defendants asked the trial court to prohibit the provision of raw test data, test materials, and other documents containing proprietary information to anyone other than a licensed psychologist or neuropsychologist. The trial court granted the motion to compel the examination, but it ordered Defendants’ neuropsychologist to transfer raw data and an audio recording of the examination to Plaintiffs’ attorney subject to a protective order (the transmission order).   The Fifth Appellate District found no abuse of discretion and denied the writ. The court explained that Defendants failed to establish that the trial court was required to (1) order the raw data and audio recording be transmitted only to a licensed psychologist or neuropsychologist or (2) grant reconsideration and modify the transmission order to so provide. Consequently, “they have not demonstrated in this writ proceeding that the superior court was under a legal duty to order, or that its discretion could be legally exercised only by ordering,” transmission only to a licensed psychologist or neuropsychologist. Moreover, Defendants have not demonstrated there is no “plain, speedy, and adequate remedy, in the ordinary course of law” available to them. View "Randy's Trucking v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Plaintiff was a resident at a residential skilled nursing facility when she sustained injuries in a fall. She sued the facility, Capistrano Beach Care Center, LLC dba Capistrano Beach Care Center (CBCC), and its operator, Cambridge Healthcare Services, LLC (collectively, Defendants). Defendants petitioned to compel arbitration, claiming Plaintiff was bound by arbitration agreements purportedly signed on her behalf by her adult children. The trial court denied the petition, concluding defendants had failed to prove Plaintiff’s adult children had actual or ostensible authority to execute the arbitration agreements on Plaintiff’s behalf.   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court explained that CBCC did not meet its initial burden to make a prima facie showing that Plaintiff agreed to arbitrate by submitting arbitration agreements signed by Plaintiff’s adult children. CBCC presented no evidence that the children had actual or ostensible authority to execute the arbitration agreement on Plaintiff’s behalf beyond their own representations in the agreements. The court wrote that a defendant cannot meet its burden to prove the signatory acted as the agent of a plaintiff by relying on representations of the purported agent alone. View "Kinder v. Capistrano Beach Care Center" on Justia Law

Appalachian runs Whitesburg Hospital. In 2007, Hospital nurses went on strike. Appalachian entered into an agreement, under which Nursing provided nurses and agreed to indemnify and defend Appalachian for the negligence of any of its employees assigned to the Hospital.Profitt, injured at work, was taken by fellow employees to the Hospital. Profitt alleged that his injuries were exacerbated by a nurse who moved him from the car without stabilizing and immobilizing him. Nurses Hurt and Parsons, Appalachian's employees, were dismissed from the suit, based on the lack of evidence that either was the nurse in question. Nurse Foote, a Nursing employee, remained. In a settlement, Appalachian paid Profitt $2 million and incurred $823,522.71 in legal fees and costs.In an ensuing indemnity lawsuit, Appalachian requested that the court preclude testimony that Hurt or Parsons transported Profitt into the ER. Nursing did not address Appalachian’s issue preclusion argument but argued that the alleged conduct of the unknown female, was not a breach of the standard of care nor did it cause an injury. The court granted the motion. A jury ruled in favor of Appalachian.The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The district court erred in giving preclusive effect to the state court’s ruling; Nursing did not have a full and fair opportunity to litigate this issue at the state court level. However, the relevant evidence was not “closely balanced” but clearly identified Nurse Foote. View "Appalachian Regional Healthcare v. U.S. Nursing Corp." on Justia Law

When he was 17 years old, Donald incurred a cervical cord injury, which left him quadriplegic. To reduce Donald’s involuntary muscle spasms, Dr. Espinosa implanted a Medtronic SynchroMed II Infusion System, a programmable pump that delivered doses of baclofen into the intrathecal space of Donald’s spine. The pump was managed by SIU Neurology and required regular refills. A routine refill went wrong, resulting in holes in the pump. Donald died days later.In a wrongful death action, the appellate court affirmed the denial of the plaintiff’s motion under the Code of Civil Procedure, 735 ILCS 5/2-402, to convert a respondent in discovery (Dr. Bakir) to a defendant. Bakir, a pulmonary critical care specialist, was Donald’s supervising physician in the ICU.The Illinois Supreme Court reversed. The plaintiff attached a certificate of merit in which a doctor opined that, within a reasonable degree of medical certainty, Dr. Bakir deviated from the standard of care. The affidavit may not have stated the specific standard of care from which Dr. Bakir deviated, but it did provide the court with sufficient information about what Dr. Bakir failed to do based upon a reasonable degree of medical certainty—timely recognize that Donald suffered from baclofen withdrawal syndrome, timely order treatment, and timely administer that treatment. The trial court mistakenly required evidence that would establish more than a reasonable probability that the defendant could be liable. View "Cleeton v. SIU Healthcare, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals reversing the order of the trial court denying Plaintiff's motion to alter or amend an order of voluntary dismissal, holding that there was no valid order of voluntary dismissal to alter or amend.Plaintiff initiated a healthcare liability action against a physician, a hospital, and two other defendants and then filed an amended complaint naming only the physician as a defendant. Thereafter, Plaintiff filed a notice of voluntary dismissal dismissing all defendants except the physician. The trial court entered an order of voluntary dismissal. The physician sought dismissal under the Governmental Tort Liability Act because the hospital was not a defendant. Plaintiff then filed his motion to alter or amend seeking to set aside the order voluntarily dismissing the hospital from the action. The trial court denied the motion, dismissed the hospital from the action with prejudice, and granted summary judgment for the physician. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Plaintiff's notice of voluntary dismissal and the trial court's order of voluntary dismissal were of no legal effect because Plaintiff removed the hospital from the lawsuit when he filed his amended complaint; and (2) therefore, the trial court correctly denied Plaintiff's motion to alter or amend, albeit for different reasons. View "Ingram v. Gallagher" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the circuit court dismissing Femala Fleming's action against Amateur Athletic Union of the United States, Inc. (AAU) as untimely under Wis. Stat. 893.54, holding that Fleming's negligence claim against AAU was not timely filed.Fleming argued that she timely filed her negligence action because the governing statute of limitations was Wis. Stat. 893.587. Specifically, Fleming argued that because she alleged AAU negligently hired, retained, and supervised the man who sexually assaulted her, section 893.587 governed her claim where her injury was "caused by an act that would constitute a violation of" an offense enumerated in chapter 948. The Supreme Court held (1) section 893.587 did not provide the governing statute of limitations for Fleming's negligence claim because Fleming did not allege that AAU committed an enumerated injury-causing act; (2) the governing time limit was the three-year statute of limitations under section 893.54, as extended by Wis. Stat. 893.16; and (3) therefore, the circuit court correctly granted AAU's motion to dismiss. View "Fleming v. Amateur Athletic Union of United States, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Tenth District Court of Appeals issuing a limited writ of mandamus directing the Industrial Commission of Ohio to vacate its order denying Amanda Carpenter's request for death benefits after her fiancé, Christopher McDonald, died in an industrial accident, holding that a writ of mandamus was appropriate.In denying Carpenter's request for death benefits the Commission determined that Carpenter was not McDonald's surviving spouse. In issuing its limited writ of mandamus the Tenth District concluded that Carpenter could potentially qualify for death benefits as a member of McDonald's family. The court directed the Commission to vacate its order and to determine whether Carpenter was a member of McDonald's family under Ohio Rev. Code 4123.59(D) and, if so, the extent of her dependency. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Carpenter had a clear legal right to have the Commission apply section 4123.59(D) correctly to her claim for death benefits, and the Commission had a clear legal duty to do so. View "State ex rel. McDonald v. Industrial Comm'n of Ohio" on Justia Law

By 2011, due to weathering and aging, the condition of the concrete stairs leading to the entrance of the Oil City Library (the “library”) had significantly declined. Oil City contracted with Appellants Harold Best and Struxures, LLC, to develop plans for the reconstruction of the stairs and to oversee the implementation of those design plans. The actual reconstruction work was performed by Appellant Fred Burns, Inc., pursuant to a contract with Oil City (appellants collectively referred to as “Contractors”). Contractors finished performing installation work on the stairs by the end of 2011. In early 2012, Oil City began to receive reports about imperfections in the concrete surface, which also began to degrade. In September 2013, Oil City informed Burns of what it considered to be its defective workmanship in creating the dangerous condition of the stairs. Between February 28, 2012 and November 23, 2015, the condition of the stairs continued to worsen; however, neither Oil City nor Contractors made any efforts to repair the stairs, or to warn the public about their dangerous condition. In 2015, Appellee David Brown (“Brown”) and his wife Kathryn exited the library and began to walk down the concrete stairs. While doing so, Kathryn tripped on one of the deteriorated sections, which caused her to fall and strike her head, suffering a traumatic head injury. Tragically, this injury claimed her life six days later. Brown, in his individual capacity and as the executor of his wife’s estate, commenced a wrongful death suit, asserting negligence claims against Oil City, as owner of the library, as well as Contractors who performed the work on the stairs pursuant to their contract with Oil City. The issue this case presented for the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was whether Section 385 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts imposed liability on a contractor to a third party whenever the contractor, during the course of his work for a possessor of land, creates a dangerous condition on the land that injures the third party, even though, at the time of the injury, the contractor was no longer in possession of the land, and the possessor was aware of the dangerous condition. To this, the Court concluded, as did the Commonwealth Court below, that a contractor may be subjected to liability under Section 385 in such circumstances. View "Brown v. Oil City, et al." on Justia Law