Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

When he was 17 years old, Donald incurred a cervical cord injury, which left him quadriplegic. To reduce Donald’s involuntary muscle spasms, Dr. Espinosa implanted a Medtronic SynchroMed II Infusion System, a programmable pump that delivered doses of baclofen into the intrathecal space of Donald’s spine. The pump was managed by SIU Neurology and required regular refills. A routine refill went wrong, resulting in holes in the pump. Donald died days later.In a wrongful death action, the appellate court affirmed the denial of the plaintiff’s motion under the Code of Civil Procedure, 735 ILCS 5/2-402, to convert a respondent in discovery (Dr. Bakir) to a defendant. Bakir, a pulmonary critical care specialist, was Donald’s supervising physician in the ICU.The Illinois Supreme Court reversed. The plaintiff attached a certificate of merit in which a doctor opined that, within a reasonable degree of medical certainty, Dr. Bakir deviated from the standard of care. The affidavit may not have stated the specific standard of care from which Dr. Bakir deviated, but it did provide the court with sufficient information about what Dr. Bakir failed to do based upon a reasonable degree of medical certainty—timely recognize that Donald suffered from baclofen withdrawal syndrome, timely order treatment, and timely administer that treatment. The trial court mistakenly required evidence that would establish more than a reasonable probability that the defendant could be liable. View "Cleeton v. SIU Healthcare, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals reversing the order of the trial court denying Plaintiff's motion to alter or amend an order of voluntary dismissal, holding that there was no valid order of voluntary dismissal to alter or amend.Plaintiff initiated a healthcare liability action against a physician, a hospital, and two other defendants and then filed an amended complaint naming only the physician as a defendant. Thereafter, Plaintiff filed a notice of voluntary dismissal dismissing all defendants except the physician. The trial court entered an order of voluntary dismissal. The physician sought dismissal under the Governmental Tort Liability Act because the hospital was not a defendant. Plaintiff then filed his motion to alter or amend seeking to set aside the order voluntarily dismissing the hospital from the action. The trial court denied the motion, dismissed the hospital from the action with prejudice, and granted summary judgment for the physician. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Plaintiff's notice of voluntary dismissal and the trial court's order of voluntary dismissal were of no legal effect because Plaintiff removed the hospital from the lawsuit when he filed his amended complaint; and (2) therefore, the trial court correctly denied Plaintiff's motion to alter or amend, albeit for different reasons. View "Ingram v. Gallagher" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the circuit court dismissing Femala Fleming's action against Amateur Athletic Union of the United States, Inc. (AAU) as untimely under Wis. Stat. 893.54, holding that Fleming's negligence claim against AAU was not timely filed.Fleming argued that she timely filed her negligence action because the governing statute of limitations was Wis. Stat. 893.587. Specifically, Fleming argued that because she alleged AAU negligently hired, retained, and supervised the man who sexually assaulted her, section 893.587 governed her claim where her injury was "caused by an act that would constitute a violation of" an offense enumerated in chapter 948. The Supreme Court held (1) section 893.587 did not provide the governing statute of limitations for Fleming's negligence claim because Fleming did not allege that AAU committed an enumerated injury-causing act; (2) the governing time limit was the three-year statute of limitations under section 893.54, as extended by Wis. Stat. 893.16; and (3) therefore, the circuit court correctly granted AAU's motion to dismiss. View "Fleming v. Amateur Athletic Union of United States, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Tenth District Court of Appeals issuing a limited writ of mandamus directing the Industrial Commission of Ohio to vacate its order denying Amanda Carpenter's request for death benefits after her fiancé, Christopher McDonald, died in an industrial accident, holding that a writ of mandamus was appropriate.In denying Carpenter's request for death benefits the Commission determined that Carpenter was not McDonald's surviving spouse. In issuing its limited writ of mandamus the Tenth District concluded that Carpenter could potentially qualify for death benefits as a member of McDonald's family. The court directed the Commission to vacate its order and to determine whether Carpenter was a member of McDonald's family under Ohio Rev. Code 4123.59(D) and, if so, the extent of her dependency. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Carpenter had a clear legal right to have the Commission apply section 4123.59(D) correctly to her claim for death benefits, and the Commission had a clear legal duty to do so. View "State ex rel. McDonald v. Industrial Comm'n of Ohio" on Justia Law

By 2011, due to weathering and aging, the condition of the concrete stairs leading to the entrance of the Oil City Library (the “library”) had significantly declined. Oil City contracted with Appellants Harold Best and Struxures, LLC, to develop plans for the reconstruction of the stairs and to oversee the implementation of those design plans. The actual reconstruction work was performed by Appellant Fred Burns, Inc., pursuant to a contract with Oil City (appellants collectively referred to as “Contractors”). Contractors finished performing installation work on the stairs by the end of 2011. In early 2012, Oil City began to receive reports about imperfections in the concrete surface, which also began to degrade. In September 2013, Oil City informed Burns of what it considered to be its defective workmanship in creating the dangerous condition of the stairs. Between February 28, 2012 and November 23, 2015, the condition of the stairs continued to worsen; however, neither Oil City nor Contractors made any efforts to repair the stairs, or to warn the public about their dangerous condition. In 2015, Appellee David Brown (“Brown”) and his wife Kathryn exited the library and began to walk down the concrete stairs. While doing so, Kathryn tripped on one of the deteriorated sections, which caused her to fall and strike her head, suffering a traumatic head injury. Tragically, this injury claimed her life six days later. Brown, in his individual capacity and as the executor of his wife’s estate, commenced a wrongful death suit, asserting negligence claims against Oil City, as owner of the library, as well as Contractors who performed the work on the stairs pursuant to their contract with Oil City. The issue this case presented for the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was whether Section 385 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts imposed liability on a contractor to a third party whenever the contractor, during the course of his work for a possessor of land, creates a dangerous condition on the land that injures the third party, even though, at the time of the injury, the contractor was no longer in possession of the land, and the possessor was aware of the dangerous condition. To this, the Court concluded, as did the Commonwealth Court below, that a contractor may be subjected to liability under Section 385 in such circumstances. View "Brown v. Oil City, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff was injured by fellow fans at the Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum (Coliseum) near the end of a Los Angeles Rams football game. Plaintiff, his wife, and two daughters brought an action against Contemporary Services Corporation (CSC), the Los Angeles Rams (Rams) and the University of Southern California (USC), alleging causes of action for negligence, premises liability and related torts. All three Defendants obtained summary judgment in their favor. This appeal involves two of the defendants: CSC and the Rams. CSC is an entity hired to provide crowd management services at the Coliseum during certain events, including Rams football games. In granting CSC’s and the Rams’ motions for summary judgment, the trial court assumed that both Defendants had a duty to protect Plaintiff and his family and had failed to take the ameliorative steps proposed by Plaintiffs. Nevertheless, the court granted summary judgment on the ground that these failures were not the cause of the assault. Plaintiffs appealed.   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court explained that Plaintiffs do not provide any record citation showing how response time was measured. Plaintiffs seem to assume that response time is measured from when a CSC employee first decides to seek assistance from APEX or LAPD to the time APEX or LAPD personnel arrives. However, the court explained that It is equally, if not more, likely that response time is measured from when APEX or LAPD receive the request for assistance from CSC command. Plaintiffs have not created a triable issue of fact concerning whether improving CSC communications would have prevented the assault View "Romero v. Los Angeles Rams" on Justia Law

Fox TV obtained permission from Superintendent Dixon to film scenes for the television series, Empire, at the Cook County Juvenile Temporary Detention Center. Fox used the Center’s outdoor yard, visitation room, medical office, and certain living spaces for five days and returned to film retakes on seven additional days. During filming, several housing pods housed more detainees than the Center’s policy suggested; some detainees exercised indoors instead of in the outdoor yard; some classes were moved; and the Center postponed or canceled some extra‐curricular activities and held visitation hours in a smaller room.Three detainees filed a proposed class action lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court granted Dixon partial summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds because the plaintiffs had not shown “a clearly established right to be free of the arguably modest disruptions” but did not dismiss state law claims. The court reasoned that Dixon acted as the detainees’ guardian and had a fiduciary duty to “protect [them] from harm.” Under the holding, Dixon would only be entitled to sovereign immunity on the state law breach of fiduciary duty claim if he proved that he did not violate the detainees’ constitutional rights. On interlocutory appeal, the Seventh Circuit held that Dixon is immune from suit under the Illinois State Lawsuit Immunity Act. The alleged wrongful conduct arose from decisions Dixon made within the scope of his authority. View "T. S. v. County of Cook" on Justia Law

Having accidentally locked himself out of his apartment and unable to obtain assistance from the managers of the building, Plaintiff went to the roof of the building and attempted to drop down onto the balcony of his top-floor apartment to enter his unit. He was unsuccessful, instead falling to the ground and suffering injuries. Plaintiff filed this action for negligence and premises liability against 726 Hudson Avenue, LLC, Kohen Investments LLC, the entities and individuals who owned and managed the apartment building (the 726 Hudson defendants). The 726 Hudson defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing Plaintiff could not establish that they owed him a duty of care or that their alleged breaches of that duty caused his injuries. The trial court agreed with them on both issues and granted the motion.   The Second Appellate District reversed. The court held that California law imposes a duty on everyone, including landlords, to exercise reasonable care, and the 726 Hudson defendants have not shown public policy considerations justify departing from that general duty; and causation, as it is in most cases, is a factual issue. The court wrote that Plaintiff created a triable issue by stating in his declaration that, had the 726 Hudson defendants not breached their duty of care to him—by, for example, not having an on-site property manager or an alarm on the roof-access door—he would not have gone onto the roof on the night of his injury. View "Razoumovitch v. 726 Hudson Ave." on Justia Law

Angelia Taylor, as personal representative of the Estate of Willie Latham, appealed the denial by operation of law of her Rule 59(e), Ala. R. Civ. P., motion seeking to vacate an arbitration award entered in favor of Methodist Home for the Aging d/b/a Fair Haven and its administrator, Maria Ephraim (collectively, "Fair Haven"). While a resident, Latham fell and broke her hip. Latham was eventually transported to a hospital for surgery, and she died a few days later. In November 2019, Taylor, as the personal representative of Latham's estate, filed a wrongful-death action under the Alabama Medical Liability Act of 1987. In December 2019, Fair Haven moved to compel arbitration pursuant to an arbitration agreement Latham had signed. The parties filed a joint stipulation to submit the case to arbitration, and in February 2020 the circuit court entered an order compelling arbitration. In November 2021, an arbitrator issued a final award in favor of Fair Haven. A month later, Taylor filed a notice of appeal. Thereafter, she filed a motion to set aside or vacate the arbitration award. In response, Fair Haven filed a motion for the entry of a final judgment. On February 2, 2022, the circuit court entered an order noting that the purported postjudgment motions were not ripe, because the circuit clerk had not entered the arbitration award as a final judgment. On February 22, 2022, the circuit clerk entered the arbitration award as a final judgment. Taylor's motion to vacate was denied by operation of law 90 days later, on May 23, 2022. The Alabama Supreme Court concluded Taylor failed to demonstrate a recognized basis under 9 U.S.C. § 10 for vacating the arbitration award; the denial by operation of law of her Rule 59 motion to vacate the arbitration award was therefore affirmed. View "Taylor v. Methodist Home for the Aging d/b/a Fair Haven, et al." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals on a survival claim brought by the estate of Clark Davis against United Rentals North America, Inc., rendered a take nothing judgment on this claim, and remanded the case to the district court for a new trial on the remaining claims, holding that racial considerations impermissibly tainted the selection of the jury in the underlying trial.During jury selection, Plaintiffs' counsel stated that "the African-American female was the most favorable juror in this case," and this announced preference was consistent with Plaintiffs' peremptory strikes. The jury returned a verdict for Plaintiffs, and the district court awarded $5 million to Davis's estate. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that a new trial was required because counsel stated a racial preference in jury selection, the peremptory strikes were consistent with that preference, and the district court did not remedy the issue. View "United Rentals North America, Inc. v. Evans" on Justia Law