Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff was taking a testosterone replacement therapy drug (“TRT”) called Androderm when he suffered a heart attack. The resulting lawsuits against TRT-producing pharmaceutical companies were consolidated as multidistrict litigation (“MDL”), and Plaintiff filed his lawsuit as part of that MDL. When Defendant Actavis, the company that produces Androderm, reached a global settlement with most of the MDL plaintiffs, Plaintiff opted to take his case to trial. Plaintiff’s attorney filed a motion for a new trial, alleging that Actavis had intentionally withheld evidence to protect its defense strategy against Plaintiff. Plaintiff’s attorney received the last documents in a months-overdue discovery production for another Androderm case in the MDL on which he was also lead counsel. These documents included a previously undisclosed letter from the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) requiring Actavis to conduct a trial to study a potential causal link between Androderm and high blood pressure. The district court denied the motion, holding that the evidence did not warrant a new trial.The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the FDA letter would probably not have resulted in a verdict in Plaintiff’s favor. The court explained that even if the high blood pressure evidence had been more important to the trial, the considerations highlighted in Marcus make clear that the FDA study would not have made a new outcome probable. Removing Actavis’s blood pressure argument would leave seven alternative causes for Plaintiff’s heart attack. And the significance of Plaintiff’s blood pressure had already been undercut throughout trial. Taken together, the introduction of the FDA letter simply would not make a different outcome probable. View "Brad Martin v. Actavis Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff initially brought this product liability action in state court against Edward Orton, Jr. Ceramic Foundation (“Orton”). She alleged that her late husband, Bruce Johnson, contracted mesothelioma as a result of exposure to asbestos contained in vermiculite packaging material used by Orton. Orton removed the action to federal court, and, in due course, the district court granted summary judgment for Orton. It held that, under applicable Illinois state law, Orton did not owe a duty to Mr. Johnson.   The Seventh Circuit reversed the judgment of the district court and remanded this case. The court explained that the district court should not have granted summary judgment on the issue of Orton’s duty in the period after September 1981. Orton had actual knowledge during that time period that the W.R. Grace vermiculite was contaminated with asbestos, and there is a genuine issue of triable fact as to Orton’s continued use of W.R. Grace vermiculite after receiving the Data Sheet. Further, the court reasoned that the district court, because it concluded that Orton did not owe a duty to Mr. Johnson, did not reach the question of whether Ms. Johnson can establish causation. The court wrote it declined to consider the issue of causation in the first instance. View "Deborah Johnson v. Edward Orton, Jr. Ceramic Foundation" on Justia Law

After Appellant Crystal Guilbeau suffered a miscarriage, Hospital employees photographed the child's remains and presented the images to her as part of Hospital's bereavement program. Appellant sued Hospital and unnamed employees on theories of negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED). The trial court dismissed the negligence claims. Appellant later dismissed the remaining IIED claim without prejudice, and without appealing the trial court's dismissal of her negligence claims. In a subsequent lawsuit, Appellant re-alleged all of her original claims, added a new claim of invasion of privacy, and added Armor, a Hospital employee, as a defendant. The trial court granted Defendants' partial motions to dismiss. The Court of Civil Appeals affirmed, finding that: (1) Appellant was precluded from re-asserting her negligence claims in the second lawsuit, because she never sought review of the trial court's dismissal of those claims in the first lawsuit; (2) Appellant's addition of an invasion-of-privacy claim in the second lawsuit was not time-barred; however, (3) the invasion-of-privacy claim was properly dismissed because Appellant had no personal cause of action on these facts; and finally, (4) the addition of Armor as a defendant in the second lawsuit was barred by the statute of limitations. The Oklahoma Supreme Court found the Court of Civil Appeals correctly decided the procedural claims, but erred in concluding that, as a matter of law, no claim for invasion of privacy could lie on the available facts. View "Guilbeau v. Durant, HMA" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the appellate court affirming the decision of the Compensation Review Board upholding the finding and award of the Workers' Compensation Commissioner for the Second Districting ordering the town of Waterford to accept as compensable Plaintiff's claim for heart disease benefits pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. 7-433c, holding that the appellate court erred.In concluding that Plaintiff was entitled to benefits the Commissioner determined that section 7-433c does not define the phrase "uniformed member of a paid municipal fire department." The appellate court affirmed. On appeal, the town argued that the appellate court erred in determining that the definition of "member" in Conn. Gen. Stat. 7-425(5) does not govern whether the plaintiff was a uniformed member of a paid municipal fire department for purposes of section 7-433c. The appellate court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the definition of "member" in section 7-425(5) governs eligibility for benefits under section 7-433c. View "Clark v. Waterford, Cohanzie Fire Dep't" on Justia Law

In January 2022, plaintiffs A.S. and her husband B.S. brought a claim under the Child Sexual Abuse Accountability Act (CSAAA or “Act”) against a former high school athletic coach and a school district, alleging that the coach sexually abused A.S. between 2001 and 2005 when she was a minor. At the time plaintiffs filed suit, any previously available claims for this alleged abuse was time-barred. The issue this case presented for the Colorado Supreme Court’s review was whether the CSAAA was unconstitutionally retrospective to the extent it created a new cause of action for conduct that predated the Act, and for which any previously available claims would be time-barred. The Supreme Court concluded that because the CSAAA created a new cause of action for child sexual abuse, the Act created a new obligation and attached a new disability with respect to past transactions or considerations to the extent it permitted victims to bring claims for which any available cause of action would have been time-barred. Therefore, the CSAAA amounted to unconstitutional retrospective legislation as applied to the plaintiffs’ claim under the Act. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the district court’s order granting defendants’ motions to dismiss. View "Aurora Public Schools v. A.S. & B.S." on Justia Law

E.G. fell from a roof and became paralyzed from the waist down, never to walk again. Within months, his medical bills climbed past $400,000, and future costs projected into the millions. Three insurance companies potentially provided coverage for the man. This appeal is a battle between the two of them. The primary insurer for E.G.’s company was Southern-Owners Insurance Company. E.G. was performing subcontracting work for Beck Construction, which had a policy with American Builders Insurance Company and an excess policy with Evanston Insurance Company. Southern-Owners refused to pay any amount to settle the claim, and American Builders and Evanston ponied up a million dollars apiece instead. American Builders then sued Southern-Owners for common law bad faith under Florida’s doctrine of equitable subrogation. Southern-Owners moved for summary judgment, but the district court denied the motion. A federal trial jury heard the case and found in favor of American Builders.  Southern-Owners sought judgment as a matter of law or, in the alternative, a new trial. The district court denied those motions, too. On appeal, Southern-Owners challenges the denials of its summary judgment and post-trial motions.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court held that the evidence is not “so overwhelmingly in favor of [Southern-Owners] that a reasonable jury could not” have ruled for American Builders on bad faith and against Southern-Owners on breach of contract. Further, the court held that the jury’s verdict was not against the clear weight of the evidence, and the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Southern-Owners’ Rule 59 motion. View "American Builders Insurance Company v. Southern-Owners Insurance Company" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a Baton Rouge police officer, sued Defendant, the organizer of a protest after Plaintiff was seriously injured by a protestor at a protest Defendant arranged. After a lengthy procedural history, the case came back to the Fifth Circuit after the Supreme Court of Louisiana affirmed that state law recognizes a negligence cause of action in the circumstances alleged in Plaintiff's complaint.In turn, the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court's order dismissing Plaintiff's negligence claim. Additionally, due to these developments, the district court also erred in failing to grant Plaintiff leave to amend his complaint. Otherwise, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of Plaintiff's other claims. View "Doe v. Mckesson, et al" on Justia Law

Believing that two men were about to engage in the armed robbery of a gas station, defendant police officers ("Defendants") approached the Plaintiff's’ vehicle with guns pointed and forcibly removed him. The district court denied the Defendants' claim to qualified immunity, and the Defendants appealed.On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed. First, it was not clearly established that the officers lacked an objectively reasonable belief that criminal activity was about to occur. Second, clearly established law did not prevent the officers from suspecting Plaintiff might be armed. Here, Defendants believed Plaintiff was about to commit and armed robbery, which is a crime typically involving the use of a weapon. Nothing gave the panel any reason to second guess the officer's "on the ground" determination.The court also rejected Plainitff's claim that it was a violation of a clearly established right to point a firearm at the Plaintiff and demand he exits his vehicle without first identifying themselves as law enforcement. View "DEJUAN HOPSON V. JACOB ALEXANDER, ET AL" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs-Appellants are American victims and the relatives and estates of victims of terrorist attacks in Israel between 2001 and 2003. Plaintiffs alleged that Palestine Investment Bank ("PIB") facilitated the attacks, in violation of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 18 U.S.C. 2213-39D. The district court dismissed the case on the ground that it lacked personal jurisdiction over PIB.Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k)(1)(A) permits a federal court to exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant to the extent allowed by the law of the state in which it sits. New York's long-arm statute, C.P.L.R. 302(a)(1) authorizes personal jurisdiction over a foreign defendant for causes of action that arise out of “transact[ing] any business within the state,” whether in person or through an agent. in this context, transacting business means “purposeful activity—some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State," invoking the benefits of the state's laws.Here, the PIB's actions indicated that it availed itself of the benefits of New York's financial system and that Plaintiff's claim arose from these activities. View "Spetner v. PIB" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals and reinstated the opinion and award filed by the North Carolina Industrial Commission in favor of Plaintiff following a tractor-trailer accident in which Plaintiff, an employee a trucking company, sustained injury, holding that the agency's decision should not have been disturbed by the lower appellate court.After the accident, Plaintiff provided notice to her employer and its insurance carrier of the accident and of the injury her husband received in the accident but did not report injury to herself. The Commission concluded that Plaintiff's injury was causally related to the accident, that Plaintiff had a reasonable excuse for not providing notice of her injury until two years later, that Defendants were not prejudiced, and that Plaintiff was totally disabled as a result of her injury. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that there was no error in either the Commission's findings of fact or in its conclusions of law. View "Sprouse v. Turner Trucking Co." on Justia Law