Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

On interlocutory appeal and cross-appeal of a ruling on a motion to dismiss the state constitutional tort and common law claims arising out of a warrantless arrest of Plaintiff's spouse the Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the district court erred in denying Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiff's claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) and trespass.Plaintiff brought this lawsuit against law enforcement officials and their employers asserting state constitutional tort claims, as well as common law claims for assault, trespass, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss. The district court granted the motion as to the state constitutional tort claims but denied it as to the common law claims. Plaintiff applied for, and Defendants' cross-applied for, interlocutory appeal. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the district court's dismissal of Plaintiff's state constitutional tort claims and assault claim, holding there was no error; and (2) reversed the denial of Defendants' motion to dismiss the IIED and trespass claims, holding that there was sufficient evidence to support this claim. View "White v. Harkrider" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court denied Plaintiffs' pending motion to dismiss this appeal for lack of a final judgment and transferred the case to the appellate court for further proceedings, holding that Defendant asserted a colorable claim to a right to avoid litigation under the anti-SLAPP statute, Conn. Gen. Stat. 52-196a.Plaintiffs brought this action claiming that Defendant made false accusations against them and alleging defamation, invasion of privacy by false light, and other claims. Defendant filed a special motion to dismiss under section 52-196a, arguing that his challenged conduct arose from the exercise of his constitutional rights to free speech, to petition the government, and to associate as a member of a labor union. The trial court denied the motion. The Supreme Court transferred the case to the lower court for further proceedings, holding that Defendant failed to meet his burden of showing, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the complaint was based on the exercise of his right of free speech, to petition the government, or of association. View "Robinson v. V.D." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court transferred this appeal to the appellate court for further proceedings, holding that the trial court erred in denying Defendants' special motion to dismiss the action under Conn. Gen. Stat. 52-196a because Defendants asserted a colorable claim that they were entitled to a right to avoid litigation under the anti-SLAPP statute.Plaintiffs, including The Churchill Institute, Inc., brought this action against Defendants, students at Trinity College in Hartford, alleging libel per se, libel per quod, and negligent infliction of emotional distress. Defendants filed a special motion to dismiss under the anti-SLAPP statute, arguing that their disputed conduct was a lawful exercise of their rights of free speech and association. The Supreme Court transferred the appeal and held that the denial of a special motion to dismiss based on a colorable claim of a right to avoid litigation under section 52-196a is an immediately appealable final judgment under the second prong of State v. Curcio, 463 A.2d 566 (Conn. 1983). View "Smith v. Supple" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the appellate court dismissing Defendants' appeals from the order of the trial court denying their specials motions to dismiss the underlying civil action brought against them by Plaintiff, holding that a trial court's denial of a colorable special motion to dismiss filed pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. 52-196a is an appealable final judgment under State v. Curcio, 453 A.2d 566 (Conn. 1983).Plaintiff brought this action against claiming that Defendants breached a nondisparagement provision of the parties' settlement agreement, caused him to suffer economic damages, and deprived him of the benefit of the agreement. Defendants filed separate special motions to dismiss the action as a SLAPP suit pursuant to Conn. Gen. Conn. 52-196a. The trial court denied the special motions. The appellate court reversed and granted Plaintiff's motions to dismiss. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court's denial of Defendants' colorable special motions to dismiss constituted an appealable final judgment under State v. Curcio, 463 A.2d 566 (Conn. 1983). View "Pryor v. Brignole" on Justia Law

In 2020, challenger Joe E. Collins III and incumbent Maxine Waters competed for a seat in Congress. During the campaign, Waters accused Collins of a dishonorable discharge from the Navy. Collins shot back that he had not been dishonorably discharged. He showed Waters a document saying so. Collins sued Waters for defamation during the campaign, but Waters convinced the trial court to grant her special motion to strike his suit.   The Second Appellate District reversed the trial court’s order. The court explained that the document apparently was official. There was nothing suspicious about its appearance. The document, if genuine, would have established without doubt that Defendant’s charge was false. Waters easily could have checked its authenticity but did not. Her appellate briefing asserts that today, years later, she still does not know the truth about whether Collins’s discharge was dishonorable. The court wrote that this disinterest in a conclusive and easily-available fact could suggest willful blindness. The court explained that the preliminary posture of the case required the court to accept Plaintiff's evidence as true. His evidence created a possible inference of Defendant’s willful blindness, which is probative of actual malice. Thus, the court concluded that it was error to grant Defendant’s anti-SLAPP motion. View "Collins v. Waters" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the superior court in this personal injury action against Philip Morris USA Inc., holding that Philip Morris was not entitled to relief on its allegations of error.Plaintiff, who smoked Marlboro brand cigarettes for several decades and was eventually diagnosed with lung cancer, brought this action. The jury returned a verdict for Philip Morris on Plaintiff's negligence and breach of warranty claims but found for Plaintiff on her civil conspiracy claims. The trial judge subsequently entered judgment for Plaintiff on her Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A claim. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) the jury verdict against Philip Morris for civil conspiracy and the trial judge's finding of liability under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A were supported by the evidence; (2) Philip Morris waived its argument regarding a contested jury instruction; and (3) the twelve percent pre- and post judgment statutory interest rates pass rational basis review and, thus, are constitutional. View "Greene v. Philip Morris USA Inc." on Justia Law

David Kutcka, Tammy Dejno, as personal representative of Austin Dejno’s estate, and Tammy Dejno, as wrongful death plaintiff (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) appealed the dismissal of their negligence claims against Gateway Building Systems (“Gateway”). Plaintiffs argued the district court erred in concluding Gateway was Kutcka’s and Austin Dejno’s statutory employer entitling Gateway to immunity from suit under the workers’ compensation act. The North Dakota Supreme Court reversed, concluding that Gateway, the general contractor, was not the statutory employer of its subcontractor’s employees, Kutcka and Dejno, entitling it to immunity under the exclusive remedy provisions of N.D.C.C. § 65-04-28, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Kutcka, et al. v. Gateway Building Systems, et al." on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment entered in the district court granting Pat Doe a protection from abuse (PFA) order against Thomas Lindahl, holding that remand was required.In January 2022, Doe filed her first PFA. The complaint was denied because Doe failed to prove her allegations. In April 2022, Doe filed the PFA complaint at issue. After the hearing, the trial court granted the PFA for one year, finding that there was a basis to Plaintiff's complaint under Me. Rev. Stat. 19-A, 4002(1)(B). The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the order, holding (1) the court's finding of abuse relied upon an erroneous assumption that the events Doe described as happening on April 22, 2022 occurred on May 13 2022, in violation of an amended temporary protection order; and (2) therefore, remand for clarification was required. View "Doe v. Lindahl" on Justia Law

Farm Family Casualty Insurance Company (“Farm Family”) appealed after the district court granted summary judgment to Nodak Insurance Company (“Nodak”) and denied, in part, summary judgment to Farm Family. This case arose from an April 6, 2019 motor vehicle accident. Samuel Hamilton was the son of Bruce and Diana Hamilton. At the time of the April 2019 accident at issue, Samuel was a resident of North Dakota, and his parents were residents of Montana. Before the accident, Farm Family issued an automobile insurance policy to Bruce and Diana with an effective policy period of October 19, 2018 to April 19, 2019. The policy insured a 2011 pickup truck. After moving to Montana, the Hamiltons obtained an insurance policy from Mountain West Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company (“Mountain West”) that also insured the 2011 pickup truck with a term running from December 2, 2018 to June 2, 2019. In April 2019, Samuel was driving the insured 2011 pickup truck in Williams County, North Dakota. Samuel reportedly ran a stop sign while intoxicated and struck another vehicle; H.W. was seriously injured and A.M. was killed. Nodak insured the vehicle H.W. and A M. occupied at the time of the accident. Nodak filed suit seeking a declaration Farm Family’s automobile policy was in effect at the time of the April 2019 accident, Farm Family’s policy could not be retroactively cancelled, and the vehicle driven by the insureds’ son was not an “underinsured motor vehicle” under North Dakota law. The North Dakota Supreme Court concluded the automobile policy Farm Family issued to its insureds had not “ceased” under the policy language and remained in effect at the time of the April 2019 motor vehicle accident. View "Nodak Ins. Co. v. Farm Family Casualty Ins. Co., et al." on Justia Law

Moses attended a gathering at a condominium Roger-McKeever rented. Two years later, Moses filed suit for injuries. Moses alleged that, upon her arrival, she mentioned to Roger-McKeever that the entryway was dark. Roger-McKeever “was apologetic indicating that there was an electrical problem” and explained that her landlord had not been responsive in repairing the light. A photograph depicted three steps leading up from a street sidewalk, to a short walkway that ended at a door to Roger-McKeever’s condominium. Moses stated that when she was leaving, she could not see the second step and fell. She provided a declaration from a mechanical engineer that the steps were non-compliant with the building code and that the absence of a handrail and the riser heights were probable causes of the accident. Roger-McKeever submitted a declaration and the depositions of two individuals who attended the meeting, indicating that the walkway was not noticeably dark that night.The court granted Roger-McKeever summary judgment, finding that Roger-McKeever was a tenant who did not have control over the steps or the outside lighting and had no duty to maintain or repair that area. Roger-McKeever did not have a duty to warn Moses because she did not have prior notice that the steps were a “non-obvious” dangerous condition. The court of appeal affirmed. Moses did not raise a triable issue of material fact as to whether Roger-McKeever owed her a duty of care to protect her against the allegedly dangerous condition of the walkway. View "Moses v. Roger-McKeever" on Justia Law