Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

In three personal injury actions, the defendants required the plaintiffs to submit to a defense medical examination (DME). Plaintiffs, who had alleged cognitive limitations, psychological impairments, or language barriers, sought to record the examinations or to be accompanied by a third-party observer (TPO) at the examination. After various trial court rulings, the Appellate Division consolidated the cases for purposes of its opinion, and remanded all three for reconsideration in light of its six-part holding. The New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed the Appellate Division’s core holding that trial courts determine on a case-by-case basis what conditions, if any, to place on a DME -- including who may attend and whether it may be recorded -- with no absolute prohibitions or entitlements. The Court further affirmed that video recording, in addition to audio recording, should be included in the range of options; that the parties shall enter into a protective order when a defense expert is concerned about the disclosure of proprietary information; that when third-party observation is permitted, the trial court shall impose reasonable conditions to prevent any disruption of or interference with the exam; and that, if a foreign or sign language interpreter is needed, a neutral interpreter shall be selected by the parties or, failing agreement, by the court. The Court departed from the Appellate Division only in declining to place the burden on the plaintiff to show special reasons why third-party observation or recording should be permitted in each case. Instead, once the defendant issues notice to the plaintiff of a Rule 4:19 exam, the plaintiff should inform the defendant if they seek to bring a neutral observer or unobtrusively record the examination. If the defendant objects, the two sides should meet and confer to attempt to reach agreement. If agreement is impossible, the defendant may move for a protective order under Rule 4:10-3 seeking to prevent the exam from being recorded, or to prevent a neutral third-party observer from attending. View "DiFiore v. Pezic; Deleon v. The Achilles Foot & Ankle Group; Remache-Robalino v. Boulos" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the opinion of the court of appeals in this case involving the concept of "waste" as it exists in Kentucky law, holding that Ky. Rev. Stat. 381.350 is applicable only in instances in which a party has pled voluntary waste.Under Ky. Rev. Stat. 381.350, a life tenant who commits waste against the corpus of an estate shall "lose the thing wasted and pay treble the amount at which the waste is assessed." At issue was when the statute of limitations began to run in this case, a question that required resolution of the concept of "waste" as it exists in Kentucky law, which required the Supreme Court either to affirmed its longstanding distinction between voluntary and permissive waste or to collapse the two categories into simply "waste." The Supreme Court held (1) long-standing case law continues to be accurate statements of the law of waste as it exists in Kentucky, therefore, section 381.350 continues to apply only to claims of voluntary waste; and (2) the trial court correctly determined that the plaintiff in this case stated claims for voluntary waste. View "Ferrill v. Stock Yard Bank & Trust Co." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the opinion of the court of appeals that because an insurance company's coverage under its policy had never been finally adjudicated, a third-party claimant's bad faith claim was premature, holding that the court of appeals erred.Relying on Pryor v. Colony Insurance Co., 414 S.W.3d 424 (Ky. App. 2013), the court of appeals held that the circuit court improperly allowed Plaintiffs to pursue their bad faith claims because coverage had not been established when they filed their third-party bad faith complaint. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Pryor should not be construed as requiring a final judicial determination of coverage prior to filing a third-party tort claim against an insurer, and instead, this Court continues to apply the requirements of Wittmer v. Jones; and (2) the court of appeals erred concluding that the circuit court improperly permitted Plaintiffs to pursue their bad faith claims in violation of Pryor because coverage had not been established when they filed their third-party bad faith complaint. View "Estate of Bramble v. Greenwich Insurance Co." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming the decision of the trial court to utilize Ky. R. Civ. P. 37.02(3) to assess attorney's fees against a non-party after the non-party failed to obey an order to comply with a subpoena duces tecum, holding that the plain language of CR 34.07(3) applies only to parties to an action.Plaintiffs brought two actions related to an automobile collision against their insurer, Allstate Property & Casualty Insurance Company, among others. Allstate disputed the charges assessed by Dr. David Megronigle for his chiropractic treatment to Plaintiffs, alleging that they were not properly compensable. Plaintiffs later filed a notice of voluntary dismissal as to Megronigle. Thereafter, Allstate filed a motion for attorney's fees under CR 37.02(3). The court granted the motion and ordered Megronigle to pay Allstate the amount of $816. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the plain language of CR 37.07(3) applies only to parties to an action; and (2) Megronigle was not a party to the underlying action because he was involved solely by virtue of the subpoenas served upon him by Allstate. View "Megronigle v. Allstate Property & Casualty Insurance Co." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the circuit court in favor of Secura Supreme Insurance Company as the underinsured motorists' (UIM) carrier for Viviane Renot, holding that the trial court erroneously permitted Dr. David Porta to testify about medical questions beyond his qualifications.Renot was allegedly injured in a vehicle collision and brought this action against Secura as her UIM carrier. During trial, Secura called Porta, a biomechanics expert, to testify regarding his biomechanics and anatomical opinions relative to the mechanism of injury in the collision. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Secura, finding that the collision had not been a substantial factor in Renot's injuries. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that the trial court erroneously permitted Dr. Porta to invade the exclusive province of medical doctors in determining medical causation, and the error required a new trial. View "Renot v. Secura Supreme Insurance Co." on Justia Law

This consolidated appeal arose from personal injuries Adrian Carillo Alcala (“Carillo”) suffered at a potato packaging plant, SunRiver of Idaho, Inc. (“SunRiver”), after his head and shoulders were crushed by a box palletizer designed, manufactured, delivered, and installed by a Dutch company, Verbruggen Emmeloord, B.V. (“VE”), along with its United States affiliate, Verbruggen Palletizing Solutions, Inc. (“VPS”). The box palletizer was one of seven machines SunRiver purchased in a transaction with Volm Companies, Inc. (“Volm”). Because this was a workplace injury, Carillo received worker’s compensation benefits through his employers, SunRiver, Employers Resource Management Company, and Employers Resource of America, Inc.—and the surety American Zurich Insurance Company (collectively “the SunRiver Plaintiffs”). Afterwards, the SunRiver Plaintiffs jointly with, and in the name of Carillo, sued Volm, VE, and VPS. Pursuant to a stipulation and compromise agreement, Volm was dismissed from this suit before this appeal. The district court granted summary judgment to Respondents and dismissed all claims after concluding that VE and VPS were Carillo’s statutory co-employees immune from common law liability under Richardson v. Z & H Construction, LLC, 470 P.3d 1154 (2020). On appeal, the SunRiver Plaintiffs and Carillo argued that the transaction between SunRiver and Volm did not make Carillo, VE, and VPS statutory co-employees because it was a “hybrid” transaction consisting of goods with incidental services under Kelly v. TRC Fabrication, LLC, 487 P.3d 723 (2021). VE and VPS cross-appealed the district court’s denial of attorney fees under Idaho Code section 12-120(3). The Idaho Supreme Court agreed with the SunRiver Plaintiffs and Carillo. VE and VPS were “third parties” and were not entitled to immunity from suit in tort under the Worker’s Compensation law. The district court’s judgment dismissing all claims was vacated, the grant of summary judgment to VE and VPS was reversed, and this case was remanded for further proceedings. The Supreme Court also rejected VE’s and VPS’s argument that the SunRiver Plaintiffs’ subrogation interest was barred at summary judgment. The Court found evidence in the record sufficient to create a disputed issue of material fact over whether the SunRiver Plaintiffs had any comparative fault for Carillo’s accident. As for the cross-appeal, the Court vacated the district court’s decision denying attorney fees under section 12-120(3) below because there was not yet a prevailing party. View "Alcala v. Verbruggen Palletizing Solutions, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the ruling of the circuit court dismissing Petitioner's complaint seeking declaratory relief regarding the ownership of real property located in Martinsburg, holding that the circuit court did not err in dismissing the complaint.Petitioner brought this complaint seeking a declaratory judgment that she was entitled to ownership of the disputed real property and alleging claims of breach of fiduciary duty, tort of outrage, conversion, and tort damages. The circuit court granted Respondent's motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, under the facts of this case, Petitioner was not entitled to ownership of the real property or any of its household belongings. View "Gabbert v. Richard T. Coyne Trust" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of Supreme Court in favor of Plaintiff Wilmington Savings Fund Society, FSB in this case involving a dispute over payments due under a promissory note relating to Defendants' mortgage, holding that summary judgment was improperly granted under the terms of this case.Plaintiff's predecessor filed a complaint against Defendants alleging breach of contract. The hearing justice granted summary judgment in favor of Plaintiff. Defendants appealed, arguing that the issue of whether Plaintiff complied with the note's notice provisions was a question of material fact precluding summary judgment. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment below, holding that Plaintiff's failure to send the notice of default to the property address referred to in the note was not in accordance with the terms of the note, and therefore, summary judgment should not have been granted. View "Wilmington Savings Fund Society, FSB v. Cavalloro" on Justia Law

In this defamation suit involving a music producer and the singer and songwriter known as "Kesha" the Court of Appeals reversed the order of the appellate division reversing Supreme Court's decision granting Defendant's motion for a ruling that 2020 amendments to the anti-SLAPP statute applied to this action and then granting Defendant leave to file a counterclaim, holding that the appellate division's orders were not properly made.Plaintiff, the producer, brought this action alleging that statements made by Defendant with respect to an alleged sexual assault were defamatory. The parties cross-moved for summary judgment, Defendant arguing that Plaintiff was a public figure and that some of her alleged defamatory statements were privileged. Supreme Court granted partial summary judgment for Plaintiff. While Defendant's appeal was pending, the Legislature amended the anti-SLAPP statute. Defendant then moved in Supreme Court for a ruling that the amendments applied to this action and for leave to assert counterclaims as permitted by the amended statute. The court concluded that the amendments applied retroactively. The appellate division reversed. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) Plaintiff was a limited-purpose public figure, requiring proof that the allegedly defamatory statements were made with actual malice; and (2) the strong presumption against retroactive legislation was not overcome with respect to the amendments to the anti-SLAPP statute. View "Gottwald v. Sebert" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs are the legal representatives and family members of two individuals killed using guns that had been listed on armslist.com, an online firearms marketplace. Plaintiffs each sued Armslist LLC and its member manager, Jonathan Gibbon, in separate diversity actions, alleging negligence and other Wisconsin state law claims. Plaintiffs asserted that Defendants designed the website to encourage and assist individuals in circumventing federal and state law regulating firearms. Defendants argued that Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted because publishing third-party offers to sell firearms does not establish tort or other liability under Wisconsin law. The district court dismissed the negligence claim in both cases, concluding that Plaintiffs failed to plausibly allege the website’s design caused the deaths. The remaining claims were also dismissed, and Gibbon was dismissed from the lawsuit for lack of personal jurisdiction.   The Seventh Circuit reversed the decision in Webber that personal jurisdiction exists over Gibbon. Further, the court wrote that because Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, it affirmed the dismissal in each case. The court explained that Plaintiffs have not alleged an act or omission occurring within the state or solicitation or service activities outside of the state by Gibbon that would bring him within the grasp of Wisconsin’s long-arm statute. Moreover, the court wrote that Plaintiffs have failed to plausibly plead that the deaths would not have occurred but for Armslist LLC’s failure to permit users to flag illegal conduct. View "Richard Webber v. Armslist, LLC" on Justia Law