Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

Robert Trentham slipped and fell on a pedestrian bridge at the Venue at Cool Springs apartment complex in Franklin, Tennessee, owned by Mid-America Apartments, LP (MAA). The incident occurred on a rainy morning, and Trentham sustained serious injuries. He filed a premises-liability lawsuit against MAA, alleging negligence in maintaining the bridge, which he claimed had microbial growth that caused his fall.The Circuit Court for Williamson County found in favor of Trentham, determining that MAA was on constructive notice of the dangerous condition due to the microbial growth. The court concluded that MAA had breached its duty of care and awarded Trentham damages. MAA appealed the decision, arguing that it was not on constructive notice of the dangerous condition.The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision, agreeing that the evidence supported the finding that MAA was on constructive notice of the microbial growth on the bridge. The appellate court upheld the trial court's conclusions regarding MAA's duty, breach, and the resulting damages.The Supreme Court of Tennessee reviewed the case and held that MAA was on constructive notice of the dangerous condition on the pedestrian bridge. The court referenced Blair v. West Town Mall, which allows for constructive notice to be established by showing a pattern of conduct, a recurring incident, or a general or continuing condition. The court found that the microbial growth on the bridge constituted a general or continuing condition, making it reasonably foreseeable to MAA. Consequently, the Supreme Court affirmed the decisions of the lower courts, holding that MAA breached its duty of care to Trentham. View "Trentham v. Mid-America Apartments, LP" on Justia Law

Jeane Whitfield filed a medical malpractice lawsuit against Dr. Dennis Schimpf and Sweetgrass Plastic Surgery, LLC, alleging negligence in performing breast augmentation-mastopexy surgery and in post-operative care. Whitfield experienced complications post-surgery, including severe pain and wound issues, leading her to seek further medical attention and additional surgeries. She claimed Schimpf's negligence caused her injuries and inadequate post-operative care exacerbated her condition.The jury in the Circuit Court of Charleston County found in favor of Schimpf and Sweetgrass, determining that Whitfield did not prove the defendants deviated from the standard of care. Whitfield appealed, and the South Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision. Whitfield then petitioned for a writ of certiorari to the South Carolina Supreme Court, challenging two evidentiary rulings: the exclusion of evidence to show bias of Sweetgrass' office manager, Vicky Tolbert, and the admission of testimony from Schimpf's expert witnesses based on their Rule 35 examinations of Whitfield.The South Carolina Supreme Court found the Court of Appeals correctly affirmed the admission of the expert testimony but erred in affirming the exclusion of evidence of Tolbert's bias. The Supreme Court held that evidence of Tolbert's sexual relationship with Schimpf, her salary, and the free cosmetic procedures she received was relevant to show potential bias and should have been admitted. The Court determined that excluding this evidence was prejudicial to Whitfield's case, as it impacted the jury's ability to assess Tolbert's credibility. Consequently, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals' decision and remanded the case for a new trial. View "Whitfield v. Schimpf" on Justia Law

In 2018, Gary Washington was released from prison after serving 31 years for murder, following a writ of actual innocence. Washington filed a civil lawsuit against the police officers involved in his case, alleging they coerced a witness into providing false testimony, which was later recanted. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the officers, dismissing Washington's claims of due process violations, malicious prosecution, detention without probable cause, failure to intervene, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The court found Washington was collaterally estopped from relying on the witness's recantation because a prior state court had found it incredible. The district court also dismissed Washington's alternative due process Brady claim and his intentional infliction of emotional distress claim on independent grounds.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the state court decision granting Washington a writ of actual innocence was inconsistent with the prior post-conviction ruling that the recantation was incredible, precluding the application of collateral estoppel. The court also found that applying collateral estoppel to prohibit Washington from litigating the alleged misconduct was incompatible with equitable principles. The court agreed with the district court's dismissal of Washington's alternative due process Brady claim but reversed the dismissal of his intentional infliction of emotional distress claim, finding that wrongful incarceration for 31 years could constitute severe emotional distress.The Fourth Circuit reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment in part and affirmed it in part, allowing Washington's claims of due process violations, malicious prosecution, detention without probable cause, failure to intervene, and intentional infliction of emotional distress to proceed. View "Washington v. Pelligrini" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, Steven Luppold, filed a medical malpractice lawsuit after an above-the-knee amputation of his left leg. He alleged that the negligence of three healthcare providers—Susan Hanlon, a registered nurse; Charles Loucraft, a physician assistant; and Carlos Flores, a nurse practitioner—led to his injury. Luppold visited the emergency department at Lowell General Hospital twice in March 2015, complaining of severe foot pain and discoloration. Despite these symptoms, he was discharged without proper diagnosis or treatment, leading to the eventual amputation.In the Superior Court, a jury awarded Luppold $20 million in damages, finding Hanlon, Loucraft, and Flores negligent. Hanlon moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, to set aside the verdict, or for remittitur, arguing that the trial judge erred in not allowing cross-examination about a high-low settlement agreement between Loucraft and Flores, and that the jury instructions on factual causation were incorrect. The trial judge denied her motion, and Hanlon appealed.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed the case. The court found no abuse of discretion in the trial judge's decision to exclude cross-examination about the high-low settlement agreement, as Hanlon failed to demonstrate how the agreement caused bias or changed testimony. The court also upheld the jury instructions on factual causation, determining that they correctly conveyed the "but-for" causation standard required by law. Additionally, the court rejected Hanlon's argument that she was entitled to judgment notwithstanding the verdict, finding sufficient evidence that her actions fell below the standard of care and contributed to Luppold's injury.Finally, the court affirmed the assessment of prejudgment interest on the entire damages award, including future pain and suffering, as required by Massachusetts law. The judgment and the order denying Hanlon's posttrial motions were affirmed. View "Luppold v. Hanlon" on Justia Law

A three-year-old child, Charlie L., was brought to the emergency department at PIH Health Hospital-Whittier with abdominal pain. The emergency department physician ordered "stat" X-ray and ultrasound images, which were remotely reviewed by Dr. Peyman Kangavari, an on-call radiologist. Dr. Kangavari reported that the images showed no bowel obstruction. The child was discharged but returned to the hospital shortly after with severe symptoms, leading to multiple surgeries and long-term health issues.In the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Charlie L., through his mother, filed a negligence action against Dr. Kangavari, alleging medical malpractice for failing to diagnose the bowel obstruction. Dr. Kangavari moved for summary judgment, supported by an expert declaration from Dr. John Lieu, asserting adherence to the standard of care. Charlie L. opposed the motion with an expert declaration from Dr. Ravi Srinivasa. The trial court ruled that Health and Safety Code section 1799.110 applied, requiring stricter qualifications for expert witnesses in emergency medical cases. The court found Dr. Lieu qualified but Dr. Srinivasa not, and granted summary judgment for Dr. Kangavari.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court held that section 1799.110’s stricter qualifications for expert witnesses apply to on-call radiologists providing emergency medical services. The court found that neither Dr. Lieu nor Dr. Srinivasa met the qualifications required under section 1799.110. Consequently, the court reversed the summary judgment for Dr. Kangavari and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Charlie L. v. Kangavari" on Justia Law

In January 2021, Bertrand Nedoss, an 87-year-old resident of an assisted-living facility in Morton Grove, Illinois, wandered out of the facility, developed hypothermia, and died of cardiac arrest. His estate filed a negligence and wrongful-death lawsuit against Welltower Tenant Group, the facility’s owner, and Frontier Management, its operator. Welltower and Frontier were insured under a "claims made" policy by Church Mutual Insurance Company, effective from July 1, 2020, to July 1, 2021. The estate filed the lawsuit in October 2021, after the policy expired. However, nine days after Bertrand’s death, an attorney for the Nedoss family sent a letter to the facility, claiming an attorney’s lien and demanding evidence preservation.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois ruled that the attorney’s letter qualified as a "claim" under the policy, triggering Church Mutual’s duty to defend. The court entered partial summary judgment for Welltower and Frontier and stayed the rest of the federal case pending the outcome of the state lawsuit.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. On the eve of oral argument, Welltower and Frontier settled with the estate, and the state-court case was dismissed. This development mooted the appeal. The stay order was the only possible basis for appellate jurisdiction, and the partial summary judgment was not a final order. The Seventh Circuit dismissed the appeal as moot, noting that the dismissal of the state-court case removed the justification for the stay and rendered any appellate ruling on the stay irrelevant. View "Church Mutual Insurance Company v. Frontier Management, LLC" on Justia Law

Father Constantine P. Rogakos, an 86-year-old retired Greek-Orthodox priest, visited Bon Secours-DePaul Medical Center for an outpatient abdominal ultrasound. He used a cane due to a shuffled gait and had a history of falls. At the hospital, he was provided a wheelchair to reach the waiting room. In the ultrasound room, he was instructed to change into a medical gown. While changing, he leaned on a wheeled hospital stretcher, which moved, causing him to fall and sustain severe injuries. He later died from these injuries.The Administrator of his estate filed a wrongful death and survivorship action against the hospital, alleging negligence by the sonographer, Joanna Regan, for failing to assist and ensure the stretcher's wheels were locked. The circuit court denied the hospital's motion to strike and refused to allow a hospital stretcher as a demonstrative exhibit. The jury found in favor of the plaintiff, awarding $2,000,000. The hospital's post-trial motions were denied.The Court of Appeals of Virginia affirmed the circuit court's decisions, including the admissibility of Father Rogakos' statements under the Dead Man’s Statute, the refusal to grant a multiple causes jury instruction, and the exclusion of the stretcher as a demonstrative exhibit. The hospital appealed to the Supreme Court of Virginia.The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed the Court of Appeals' judgment. It held that the Dead Man’s Statute did not preclude the introduction of Father Rogakos' statements as they were conveyed by non-interested witnesses. The court also found no error in the circuit court's refusal to grant the multiple causes jury instruction, exclusion of the stretcher as a demonstrative exhibit, and denial of the hospital's motion to strike, as the evidence supported the jury's verdict. View "Bon Secours-DePaul Medical Center v. Rogakos-Russell" on Justia Law

In 2019, Steven Watts, an automotive repair shop owner, was diagnosed with mesothelioma, a cancer caused by asbestos exposure. He and his wife, Cindy Watts, filed a lawsuit against 28 defendants, later adding eight more. By the time of trial, only one defendant, Pneumo Abex, LLC (Abex), a brake linings manufacturer, remained. The jury awarded the plaintiffs $2,943,653 in economic damages, $6.75 million in noneconomic damages, and $1 million for loss of consortium, attributing 60% fault to Abex, 25% to other brake manufacturers, and 15% to Watts.The trial court directed a verdict against Abex on its sophisticated user defense and made several rulings on the allocation of fault. Abex appealed, arguing for a new trial on all issues, particularly challenging the directed verdict on the sophisticated user defense and the allocation of fault.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the case. The court found that the trial court erred in directing a verdict against Abex on the sophisticated user defense, as there was substantial evidence that Watts, as a trained mechanic and business owner, should have known about the dangers of asbestos. The court also found errors in the trial court's rulings on the allocation of fault, including the exclusion of joint compound manufacturers from the verdict form and the preclusion of Watts's interrogatory responses.The appellate court concluded that these errors warranted a new trial. The court reversed the September 15, 2022 judgment, the November 28, 2022 order, and the March 20, 2023 amended judgment, and remanded the case for a new trial. Abex was awarded its costs on appeal. View "Watts v. Pneumo Abex" on Justia Law

Eva Osborne, the plaintiff, sued Pleasanton Automotive Company, LOP Automotive Company LP, HAG Automotive Investments LP, and Bob Slap, alleging workplace misconduct by Slap during her four years as his executive assistant. The claims included discrimination, retaliation, harassment, failure to prevent harassment and retaliation, and wage and hour violations. Slap later filed a cross-complaint against Osborne, alleging libel, slander, intentional infliction of emotional distress, intentional interference with contractual relations, and negligence based on statements Osborne made in a letter to HAG’s HR director.The Alameda Superior Court granted Osborne’s special motion to strike Slap’s cross-complaint under the anti-SLAPP statute, concluding that her statements were protected activity and rejecting Slap’s arguments that they were extortionate and illegal. The court held that Slap could not establish minimal merit in his claims because Osborne’s statements were both absolutely and conditionally privileged under Civil Code section 47, and Slap failed to show malice to overcome the conditional privilege. Slap appealed the decision.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Two, applied de novo review and affirmed the trial court’s decision. The appellate court rejected Slap’s attempt to invoke an exception to the anti-SLAPP statute for activity that is illegal as a matter of law. The court concluded that the litigation privilege barred Slap’s claims, preventing him from meeting his burden under the second step of the anti-SLAPP analysis to show his claims had minimal merit. The court did not address Osborne’s alternative arguments regarding the conditional privilege, malice, or the prima facie showing on Slap’s claims. View "Osborne v. Pleasanton Automotive Co., LP" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Lorenza Maksimow slipped and fell on a patch of ice in a public parking lot in the City of South Lake Tahoe. She sued the City, alleging the ice patch was a dangerous condition of public property under Government Code sections 830 and 835. The City moved for summary judgment, which the trial court granted, entering judgment in favor of the City. Maksimow appealed, arguing there were triable issues of material fact regarding the City’s actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition.The Superior Court of El Dorado County granted the City’s motion for summary judgment, finding that Maksimow failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the City had actual or constructive knowledge of the alleged dangerous condition. The court sustained the City’s objections to certain evidence presented by Maksimow, including climatological data and expert testimony, and found no evidence that the City had actual or constructive notice of the ice patch.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case and affirmed the trial court’s judgment. The appellate court held that there was no triable issue of material fact regarding the City’s actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition. The court found that while City employees may have had general knowledge of snowfall and the presence of the Mitsubishi, there was no evidence they had actual notice of the specific ice patch that caused Maksimow’s fall. Additionally, the court concluded that the evidence did not support an inference that the ice patch existed for a sufficient period of time to impute constructive notice to the City. The judgment in favor of the City was affirmed. View "Maksimow v. City of South Lake Tahoe" on Justia Law