Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the circuit court concluding that the Raleigh County Housing Authority (RCHA) was entitled to qualified immunity in the underlying wrongful death and negligence action, holding that RCHA was a "political subdivision" as defined in the Governmental Tort Claims and Insurance Reform Act, W. Va. Code 29-12A-1 to 18.Edward S. And Rachel K. lived in a rental house with their three children with assistance from the RCHA. Two of the children died and Edward and a third child were seriously injured when the house caught fire. Edward sued RCHA alleging two counts of wrongful death and one count of negligence. The circuit court granted summary judgment for RCHA, concluding that RCHA was not a political subdivision as defined by the Tort Claims Act and that RCHA was qualifiedly immune. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that RCHA was a political subdivision under the Tort Claims Act. View "Edward S. v. Raleigh County Housing Authority" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the circuit court concluding that Speedyway LLC was partially at fault for the death of Kevin Jarrett, holding that the circuit court erred in concluding that Speedway had a legal duty in this case.While driving her vehicle after leaving work at Speedway and running a personal errand, Brandy Liggett collided with Jarrett's motorcycle, killing him. Respondent, as the executrix of Jarrett's estate, brought this action alleging that Speedyway was negligent in Jarrett's death because at the time of the accident and during her shift at Speedway, Liggett was under the influence of illegally obtained prescription drugs. The circuit court found Speedyway to be thirty percent at fault in Jarrett's death. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the evidence at trial failed to demonstrate that Speedway engaged in affirmative conduct that created an unreasonable risk of harm to Jarrett and the rest of the motoring public. View "Speedway LLC v. Jarrett" on Justia Law

In November 2013, plaintiff Philip Pantano, a mechanic employed by Container Services of New Jersey (CSNJ), was injured at work while attempting to move a heavy piece of industrial equipment. Lawrence Giamella, who was also working on the site that day, tried to help plaintiff move the equipment with a forklift; plaintiff’s foot was crushed in the process. Plaintiff collected workers’ compensation benefits from his employer, CSNJ. He and his wife also brought a personal injury action against numerous defendants, including Marine Transport, Inc. (MT). MT and CSNJ were related companies owned by the same person. The core of the parties’ dispute concerned which entity or entities employed Giamella at the time of the accident: MT, CSNJ, or both. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of CSNJ because of the statutory bar established by N.J.S.A. 34:15-8. MT also moved for summary judgment, arguing that it was not Giamella’s employer and was therefore not vicariously liable for his negligence. Although Giamella was on MT’s payroll, MT raised the affirmative defense that he was a “borrowed servant” or “special employee” working for CSNJ at the time of the accident, applying the multi-factor test set forth in Galvao v. G.R. Robert Construction Co., 179 N.J. 462 (2004). The pretrial judge denied MT’s motion. At the close of plaintiff’s case, MT moved for judgment pursuant to Rule 4:40-1, founded on the same borrowed-employee theory it had raised earlier in its summary judgment motion. The trial judge did not rule on the motion, reserving judgment for after the jury verdict. The jury awarded plaintiff damages for pain and suffering, lost wages, and loss of consortium. Pursuant to an agreement reached by counsel, the jury was asked to presume that MT was vicariously liable and was not asked to resolve the borrowed-employee question. Instead, counsel assented to have the court resolve the borrowed-employee argument through the mechanism of MT’s yet-to-be-decided Rule 4:40-1 motion. The trial judge vacated the verdict and awarded judgment to MT, concluding that Giamella was a borrowed employee working for CSNJ when the accident occurred. The Appellate Division reversed, vacated the directed verdict, and reinstated the jury verdict in plaintiff’s favor. Finding no reversible error in the appellate court's judgment, the New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed. View "Pantano v. New York Shipping Association" on Justia Law

After Talevski’s move to a nursing home proved problematic, Talevski sued a county-owned nursing home (HHC) under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming that HHC’s actions violated rights guaranteed him under the Federal Nursing Home Reform Act (FNHRA). The Seventh Circuit reversed the dismissal of the suit, concluding that the FNHRA rights cited by Talevski—the right to be free from unnecessary chemical restraints and rights to be discharged or transferred only when certain preconditions are met, “unambiguously confer individually enforceable rights on nursing home residents,” presumptively enforceable via section 1983.The Supreme Court affirmed. The FNHRA provisions at issue unambiguously create section 1983-enforceable rights. There is no incompatibility between private enforcement under section 1983 and the remedial scheme that Congress devised. The Court rejected HHC’s argument that, because Congress apparently enacted the FNHRA pursuant to the Spending Clause, Talevski cannot invoke section 1983 to vindicate rights recognized by the FNHRA. FNHRA lacks any indicia of congressional intent to preclude section 1983 enforcement, such as an express private judicial right of action or any other provision that might signify that intent. HHC cited the comprehensiveness of FNHRA’s enforcement mechanisms, but implicit preclusion is shown only by a comprehensive enforcement scheme that is incompatible with individual enforcement under section 1983. There is no indication that private enforcement under section 1983 would thwart Congress’s scheme by circumventing the statutes’ pre-suit procedures, or by giving plaintiffs access to tangible benefits otherwise unavailable under the statutes. View "Health and Hospital Corp. of Marion County v. Talevski" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court denied a petition for a writ of certiorari or, in the alternative, a writ of prohibition, writ of mandamus or other supervisory writ, holding that the circuit court did not misinterpret the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure in the underlying discovery matter.Respondents filed a complaint against Monsanto Company alleging claims for design defect, failure to warn, negligence, breach of implied warranties, violation of the Arkansas Deceptive Trade Practices Act, and loss of consortium. After Respondents served Monsanto with a deposition notice Monsanto moved for a protective order arguing that the deposition was not permitted. The circuit court denied Monsanto's motion for protective order. Monsanto then brought this petition. The Supreme Court denied the petition, holding that Monsanto was seeking to control the circuit court's exercise of its discretion in this discovery matter and that mandamus will not lie for this purpose. View "Monsanto Co. v. Kilgore" on Justia Law

At the start of the COVID-19 pandemic, Amazon.com, Inc. (“Amazon”) stopped providing “Rapid Delivery”1 to Amazon Prime (“Prime”) subscribers. Because Prime subscribers were not notified of the suspension and continued to pay full price for their memberships, Plaintiff and others brought a putative class action against Amazon alleging breach of contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, violation of the Washington Consumer Protection Act (“WCPA”), and unjust enrichment. The district court granted Amazon’s motion to dismiss the First Amended Complaint for failure to state a claim with prejudice because it found that Amazon did not have a duty to provide unqualified Rapid Delivery to Prime subscribers.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court first wrote that it is allowed to use its “experience and common sense” to acknowledge the COVID-19 pandemic even though it was not included as a factual allegation in the First Amended Complaint. The court dispensed with this argument because Amazon’s prioritization of essential goods during the COVID-19 pandemic obviously did not harm the public interest. Further, the court explained that Plaintiffs specifically incorporated the terms of their contract with Amazon as part of their unjust enrichment count. So, while Plaintiffs may plead breach of contract and unjust enrichment in the alternative, they have not done so. Instead, Plaintiffs pleaded a contractual relationship as part of their unjust enrichment claim, and that contractual relationship defeats their unjust enrichment claim under Washington law. View "Andrez Marquez, et al v. Amazon.com, Inc." on Justia Law

This appeal arises from the tragic death of a man who died while in custody. Appellants appealed the district court’s orders dismissing their claims against the Sheriff and granting summary judgment to the Fulton County Sheriff’s Department Officers, NaphCare, and a NaphCare employee.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the claims against the Sheriff and its grant of summary judgment to both the Officers and the employee. However, the court vacated and remanded the district court’s summary judgment in favor of NaphCare. The court explained that in Appellants’ response to NaphCare’s motion for summary judgment, Appellants relied mainly on the medical report and deposition of Dr. Timothy Hughes but also referred to the report and deposition of two other witnesses, as required by O.C.G.A. Section 9-11-9.1. Dr. Hughes’s report concluded the failure of NaphCare medical staff to properly screen, examine, and treat the decedent was the proximate cause of his death. This testimony is supported by the other witnesses. The court agreed with Appellants that, based on Dr. Hughes’s testimony, there is enough of a genuine issue of material fact for NaphCare’s liability to reach a jury. Dr. Hughes did not solely rest his argument on NaphCare’s failure to sedate the decedent. It was the failure of the staff to follow through with the decedent at all that was the problem. While this included the need for sedation, it also included immediate classification to suicide watch and observation. View "April Myrick, et al v. Fulton County, Georgia, et al" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the rulings of the Workers' Compensation Court (WCC) determining that Johnny Lee Sheldon's claim was compensable, that Contessa Bryer, Sheldon's guardian and conservator, was entitled to her attorney fees, and that a statutory penalty should be imposed against Accident Fund General Insurance Company, holding that the WCC did not err.Sheldon was rendered incapacitated and mentally incompetent after a workplace accident. Because Accident Fund General Insurance Company refused to accept liability for Sheldon's workers' compensation claim Bryer, Sheldon's guardian and conservator, petitioned the WCC for a hearing. The WCC ruled that Accident Fund was liable for Sheldon's injuries and that Bryer was entitled to attorney fees and a statutory penalty. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the WCC did not err when it (1) ruled that the statute of limitations was tolled during the time that Sheldon had no appointed guardian; (2) found that substantial credible evidence supported the WCC's finding that Sheldon was working with argon when the pressure relief valve burst; and (3) awarded attorney fees under Mont. Code Ann. 39-71-611 and by imposing a penalty against Accident Fund under Mont. Code Ann. 39-71-2907. View "Bryer v. Accident Fund General Insurance Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff worked as an electrical foreman for Braaten Electric, Inc. Braaten Electric, Inc. was hired as a subcontractor by Defendant Potential Design, Inc. and its owner to work on electrical installations for two successive silo construction projects at a nut facility in Firebaugh that was owned and operated by Defendant Wonderful Pistachios and Almonds, LLC. Potential Design, Inc. was the general contractor for both construction projects. The nut facility was plagued by flocks of migrating swallows that roosted, over several years, under the roof of an open, barn-like structure (the pole barn), and created sizable accumulations of bird feces. Sometime after Plaintiff’s work at the nut facility was finished, he was diagnosed with a fungal infection, histoplasmosis, which had spread to his brain, resulting in certain permanent impairments. Histoplasmosis is caused by inhalation of airborne spores of a fungus called histoplasma capsulatum or H. capsulatum. Plaintiff sued Defendants, alleging their conduct with respect to the bird infestation and accumulation of bird feces at the nut facility was a substantial factor in causing his histoplasmosis. The trial court excluded the declarations of Plaintiff’s experts and granted Defendants’ motion for summary judgment.   The Fifth Appellate District reversed. The court concluded that the trial court erred in excluding the declarations submitted by Plaintiff’s experts and, further, that summary judgment is not warranted here. Moreover, the court concluded that Plaintiff has raised a triable issue of material fact as to whether there is a reasonable medical probability that Wonderful’s conduct with respect to the birds and bird feces at the Firebaugh Facility was a substantial factor in causing Plaintiff’s illness. View "Beebe v. Wonderful Pistachios etc." on Justia Law

In a putative class action involving a water main break the Supreme Court denied a requested writ of prohibition sought by West Virginia-American Water Company (WVAWC) to preclude enforcement of the circuit court's order certifying an "issues" class pursuant to W. Va. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4), holding that WVAWC failed to demonstrate that the circuit court's class certification was clearly erroneous.The water break in this case and its ensuing repair resulted in water service interruptions that caused outages, inadequate water pressure, and boil water advisories affecting 25,000 WVAWC customers. Respondents filed this putative class complaint on behalf of the putative class asserting breach of contract and other claims. The circuit court certified the "issues" class to determine "the overarching common issues" as to WVAWC's liability, resulting in WVAWC bringing this action. The Supreme Court denied the requested writ of prohibition, holding that WVAWC failed to demonstrate that the circuit court's class certification was clearly erroneous. View "State ex rel. West Virginia-American Water Co. v. Honorable Webster" on Justia Law