Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

Relying on its holding in Cameron v. State of California, 7.Cal.3d 318 (1972), the Supreme Court held that design immunity does not categorically preclude failure to warn claims that involve a discretionarily-approved element of a roadway and declined to overrule its prior precedent.At issue was whether design immunity is limited to claims alleging that a public entity created a dangerous roadway condition through a defective design or whether the statutory defense of design immunity also extends to claims alleging that a public entity failed to warn of a design element that resulted in a dangerous roadway condition. The Supreme Court held (1) the effect of Cameron is that, while Cal. Gov. Code 830.6 shields public entities from liability for injuries stemming from the design of a roadway's physical features, they nonetheless have a duty to warn of known dangers the roadway presents to the public; and (2) this Court declines the invitation of City of Rancho Palo Verdes to overrule Cameron. View "Tansavatdi v. City of Rancho Palos Verdes" on Justia Law

In these consolidated cases in which both plaintiffs sought to recover for injuries sustained during organized sports practices for high school athletic teams and appealed from orders granting Defendants' motions for summary judgment, the Court of Appeals addressed the primary assumption of risk doctrine and held that material questions of fact remained in one case.The two cases considered by the Supreme Court provided an opportunity to apply the principles of the primary assumption of the risk doctrine in the context of organized practice drills for high school athletic teams. The Court rejected the dissent's suggestion to abandon the doctrine and held (1) in the first case, the primary assumption of the risk doctrine applied, and therefore, summary judgment was properly granted; and (2) in the second case, material issues of fact remained to be resolved by a jury. View "Grady v. Chenango Valley Central School District" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals' judgment denying this original action brought under Ky. R. Civ. P. (CR) 76.36 seeking to prohibit Edmonton Circuit Court Judge Timothy Coleman from proceeding with a defamation suit, holding that Appellant had an adequate remedy by appeal for all the errors he claimed.Appellant and his law firm represented Kenneth Walker in a criminal case for the shooting of John Mattingly and in two separate civil actions, one in state court and the other in federal court. In the state action, Walker named Mattingly as a defendant, and Mattingly counterclaimed for personal injuries. After Appellant made a responsive statement on a news report Mattingly filed a complaint alleging that Appellant's statements were defamatory. Appellant filed a motion to dismiss the action based on improper venue and failure to state a claim, but the circuit court denied the motion. Appellant then filed a writ of mandamus or prohibition, which the court of appeals denied. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a writ of prohibition was not available to remedy the errors alleged by Appellant. View "Romines v. Honorable Coleman" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the order of the circuit court failing to rule on Plaintiffs' contract claim, holding that the court of appeals correctly found that Plaintiffs waived their breach of contract claim.Plaintiffs, who leased property owned by Defendants, brought this action alleging wrongful eviction, breach of contract, and defamation. The trial court granted summary judgment to Defendants on the wrongful eviction claim and then dismissed Plaintiffs' defamation claims. The court of appeals affirmed and ruled that Plaintiffs waived their breach of contract claim. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court of appeals correctly held that Plaintiffs waived their contract claim. View "Wieland v. Freeman" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the opinion of the Kentucky Court of Appeals affirming the decision of the Workers' Compensation Board affirming the opinion and order of an administrative law judge (ALJ) awarding permanent partial disability income and medical benefits to Claimant, holding that there was no error.Claimant alleged that his bilateral knee injuries had been caused by cumulative trauma while working exclusively for Employer as a firefighter and EMT paramedic. Following a final hearing, the ALJ determined that Claimant's bilateral knee condition was caused by work-related cumulative trauma and awarded him benefits. Employer appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the ALJ did not err in finding that Claimant had sustained an "injury" as defined under Ky. Rev. Stat. 342.0011(1); (2) the ALJ's findings regarding causation were supported by substantial evidence; and (3) the ALJ's findings of fact were sufficiently specific. View "Lexington Fayette Urban County Government v. Gosper" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court dismissing Plaintiff's malicious prosecution claim after finding that claim preclusion applied and that the complaint failed to state a claim, holding that claim preclusion applied.Plaintiff twice sued Defendant, her former employer, for malicious prosecution seeking damages based on her criminal prosecution, which occurred in Johnson County. After the Johnson County district court dismissed the civil action with prejudice for failure to state a claim Plaintiff sued in Lancaster County. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss and asked the court to consider public records from the Johnson County civil and criminal proceedings involving Defendant. The district court dismissed the complaint. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court properly dismissed the second malicious prosecution action because the dismissal with prejudice of Defendant's first malicious prosecution action became a judgment on the merits, and the other elements of claim preclusion were satisfied. View "Bohling v. Tecumseh Poultry LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellant Jayde Downey appealed the dismissal of her case after a trial court sustained without leave to amend the demurrers of defendants-respondents Ara and Vahram Sevacherian (collectively, Sevacherian) and the City of Riverside (City) to Downey’s operative complaint. Downey alleged causes of action for dangerous condition of property and negligence arising out of an automobile collision involving Downey’s daughter, Vance. In that pleading, Downey alleged the collision occurred “because [City] created or permitted to exist, a dangerous condition of public property” and because Sevacherian maintained vegetation and trees on their property so as to cause an unsafe obstruction to the view of vehicular traffic. She alleged that because she was on the phone with Vance and heard the sounds of the crash and its aftermath, she was “present, or virtually present” at the scene when the collision happened, thereby causing Downey "serious emotional injuries and damages." The trial court ruled Downey’s allegations were “insufficient to show that Downey had a contemporaneous awareness of the injury-producing event—not just the harm Vance suffered, but also the causal connection between defendants’ tortious conduct and the injuries Vance suffered.” Downey contended the court erred; that because she contemporaneously perceived the event causing injury to Vance, she adequately alleged a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress as a bystander. The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court, finding that under the circumstances, Downey should be given an opportunity to allege facts establishing she had the requisite “‘contemporaneous sensory awareness of the causal connection between the negligent conduct and the resulting injury.’” View "Downey v. City of Riverside" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs are 21 U.S. citizens who were harmed, and the estate and family members of a U.S. citizen who was killed in rocket attacks carried out in Israel in 2006 by the terrorist organization Hizbollah. Plaintiffs alleged that the Lebanese Canadian Bank (“LCB”) provided extensive financial assistance to Hizbollah in the years leading up to the attacks. In 2011, Defendant Société Générale de Banque au Liban SAL (“SGBL”) acquired all of LCB’s assets and liabilities in a transaction conducted under the laws of Lebanon. Plaintiffs sued for damages under the Anti-Terrorism Act of 1990 and sought to hold SGBL liable as LCB’s successor. The district court dismissed the complaint, concluding that SGBL did not inherit LCB’s status for purposes of personal jurisdiction when it acquired LCB’s assets and liabilities.   The Second Circuit concluded that Plaintiffs’ successor-jurisdiction theory raises an important and unresolved issue under New York law. Accordingly, the court certified the following two questions to the New York Court of Appeals:1. Under New York law, does an entity that acquires all of another entity’s liabilities and assets, but does not merge with that entity, inherit the acquired entity’s status for purposes of specific personal jurisdiction? 2. In what circumstances will the acquiring entity be subject to specific personal jurisdiction in New York? View "Lelchook v. Société Générale de Banque au Liban SAL" on Justia Law

Louis DeGidio, the father of Plaintiffs, began purchasing, distributing, and servicing Industrial Combustion, LLC’s (“IC”) burners for institutional boiler systems in a sales area including most of Minnesota. IC’s non-exclusive distributors are responsible for installing and servicing the IC burners they sell. In 1996, the family incorporated Louis DeGidio, Inc. (“LDI”) and Louis DeGidio Services, Inc. (“LDSI”). LDI continued purchasing burners from IC. LDSI installed and serviced the burners LDI sold, purchasing replacement parts from IC. The two corporations shared the same location, officers, and shareholders. Plaintiffs were joint 50% shareholders and key officers of both. Whatever written agreement was then in effect is not in the record, but it is undisputed that LDI was the distributor. At issue is whether a manufacturer collects an indirect “franchise fee” within the meaning of the Minnesota Franchise Act if it charges the distributor a price based on the retail price the manufacturer paid a third-party vendor for the parts.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed and agreed with the district court the answer is clearly no, and therefore, the distributorship agreement here at issue was not a franchise. The court further agreed that the manufacturer did not breach an oral implied-in-fact contract and was not barred by promissory estoppel when it terminated the DeGidio sales representative without cause. Applying Minnesota law and reviewing de novo, the court affirmed the grant of summary judgment in favor of IC and its parent company, Cleaver-Brooks, Inc. View "Louis DeGidio, Inc. v. Industrial Combustion, LLC" on Justia Law

Birmingham attorney Daniel Flickinger posted a message on his personal Facebook social-media page in which he appeared to reference the death George Floyd, which occurred while Floyd was being arrested and was recorded. The social-media post, along with an allegedly "counterfeit" social-media "profile," was later shared with Flickinger's supervising attorney at his law firm by Lawrence Tracy King, an attorney with the Birmingham law firm of King Simmons Ford & Spree, P.C. Shortly thereafter, Flickinger was forced to resign. Flickinger's post was also shared by members of a "private" Facebook group, who then posted a series of offensive comments about him both personally and professionally. Flickinger sued King and the King law firm asserting claims of defamation, invasion of privacy, and tortious interference with a business relationship. The King defendants filed a motion to dismiss Flickinger's claims pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), Ala. R. Civ. P., and the circuit court granted the motion. After review, the Alabama Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's judgment insofar as it dismissed Flickinger's defamation and invasion-of-privacy claims. However, the Court reversed the trial court's judgment insofar as it dismissed Flickinger's tortious-interference claim, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Flickinger v. King" on Justia Law