Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

The Federally Supported Health Centers Assistance Act (“FSHCAA”) provides that health centers receiving funding under Section 330 of the Public Health Service Act (“PHSA”) may be deemed Public Health Service (“PHS”) employees. Plaintiffs alleged that Defendants violated their duty to report a court-ordered Lane County Mental Health patient’s refusal to comply with the terms of his probation. Plaintiffs alleged they were injured as a result of Defendants’ failure to report a patient’s repeated failures to comply with his mental health treatment plan. Defendants contended that they were entitled to Section 233 immunity. The district court held that Section 233 immunity did not apply to Defendants and remanded to state court.   The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s order remanding to state court Plaintiffs’ action alleging negligence and wrongful death claims against federally funded community health centers and their employees (“Defendants”), and remanded to the district court to enter an order substituting the United States as the defendant and deeming the action as one brought under the Federal Tort Claims Act. The panel first addressed whether there was jurisdiction to review the district court’s remand order. Ordinarily, a remand order is not reviewable on appeal, except for cases removed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1442. The panel agreed with Defendants that Section 233 immunity did not turn on who brings the claim, but rather on whether the conduct giving rose to the claim arose out of the Defendants’ performance of “medical, surgical, dental or related functions.” View "SAM FRIEDENBERG, ET AL V. LANE COUNTY, ET AL" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Ava Morton appealed the denial of her complaint for an order against stalking. In May 2022, plaintiff’s mother filed a complaint on behalf of plaintiff, who was then seventeen years old, seeking an anti-stalking order against defendant Mayah Young. The affidavit attached to the complaint alleged that in April 2022, defendant had posted a video on the social media platform TikTok that included a half-naked picture of plaintiff. Plaintiff’s mother called the police, who went to defendant’s home, directed her to delete plaintiff’s picture from her phone, and warned her that she could end up in a lot of trouble because plaintiff was a minor. The complaint alleged that afterward, defendant posted another video in which she threatened to hurt plaintiff, followed by two more videos in which she suggested that she still had the picture and might send it to others. The civil division declined to issue a temporary order, concluding that the alleged conduct did not fall within the definition of stalking. Finding no reversible error in the civil division's judgment, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed. View "Morton v. Young" on Justia Law

Defendant Brian Gates appealed a trial court’s extension and modification of three stalking orders against him. he parties are longtime neighbors who lived on the same street in Mendon, Vermont. Defendant owned a home on the street; he also owns a vacant lot next to the home of plaintiffs Elizabeth Swett and Doug Earle. In January 2021, plaintiffs sought stalking orders against defendant, alleging defendant was engaging in aggressive and intimidating behavior, including yelling and swearing at them, firing his gun to intimidate them, and otherwise acting in ways that made them fear for their physical safety. Gates raised numerous arguments, many of which related to the requirements for the issuance of initial stalking orders rather than extensions of those orders. The Vermont Supreme Court concluded the court acted within its discretion in extending and modifying the orders and therefore affirmed. View "Swett, et al. v. Gates" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court dismissing Appellant's wrongful conviction action brought under Kan. Stat. Ann. 60-5004 for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, holding that Appellant was not entitled to relief on his allegations of error.On appeal, Appellant argued that the district court incorrectly dismissed his suit because, among other things, factual questions remained over the application of Kan. Stat. Ann. 60-515(a) and the doctrine of equitable tolling. The Supreme Court disagreed and affirmed, holding (1) Appellant failed to show that the district court erred by declining to apply the doctrine of equitable tolling to his claim; and (2) the district court correctly dismissed Appellant's complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. View "In re Wrongful Conviction of Bell" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, a group of current and former professional models, appealed the district court’s judgment against them on a variety of claims arising from the use of their images in social media posts promoting a “gentlemen’s club” operated by Defendants. On appeal, Plaintiffs argued, among other things, that the district court misapplied this Court’s framework for evaluating the likelihood of consumer confusion in the context of a Lanham Act false endorsement claim, misconstrued Supreme Court guidance constraining the Lanham Act’s reach in the false advertising context, and applied the wrong statute of limitations to Plaintiffs’ state law right of publicity claims.   The Second Circuit affirmed. The court concluded that the district court properly granted summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ federal claims and the majority of their state law claims and permissibly declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over their remaining claims. The Plaintiff’s argument is foreclosed in this specific context by Electra, which held under effectively identical circumstances that the same three factors were sufficient to definitively tilt the Polaroid balance at the summary judgment stage. Further, the court held that here, there is no evidence that Plaintiffs – professional models who have brought this lawsuit precisely because they object to the suggestion that they are even associated with Defendants’ marketplace – directly compete with Defendants. The district court was, therefore, correct to grant summary judgment to Defendants on Plaintiffs’ false advertising claims. Finally, the court wrote that the district court correctly determined the majority of Plaintiffs’ right of publicity claims to be time-barred and permissibly declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining timely claims. View "Souza v. Exotic Island Enterprises, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals in this products-liability case concluding that the exercise of personal jurisdiction over Defendants was consistent with due process, holding that the minimum-contacts analysis requires evaluation of a defendant's contacts with the forum - Texas - as a whole.Plaintiff was injured when he used a lithium-ion battery that he bought at a store in Texas and used it to charge his e-cigarette. Although Defendants sold and distributed the batteries to manufacturers in Texas they argued that Texas courts lacked personal jurisdiction because they did not send the batteries to Texas for resale to individual consumers to use with e-cigarettes. Specifically, Defendants argued that Plaintiff's claims arose out of the use of the battery in a way Defendants never intended by an individual consumer they never targeted. The lower courts concluded that the exercise of personal jurisdiction over Defendants was consistent with due process. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the relatedness prong of the minimum-contacts analysis does not require that the plaintiff's claims arose out of a set of facts mirroring the defendant's expectations about the course its product would follow after entering the state of Texas. View "LG Chem America, Inc. v. Morgan" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court granting summary judgment to a police detective and his city employer in this case alleging defamation, abuse of process, and malicious prosecution, holding that there was no error.Plaintiff, who was acquitted of a sexual assault charge, sued county prosecutors and city police for allegedly pursuing the case against him. The Supreme Court held that the county prosecutors were entitled to dismissal from the case but rejected the investigating detective's arguments for dismissal on the pleadings. The district court ultimately granted summary judgment to the detective and the city. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court (1) properly granted summary judgment to the city defendants on Plaintiff's continuing malicious prosecution claim; and (2) did not err in dismissing Plaintiff's direct claims for damages under the Iowa Constitution. View "Venckus v. City of Iowa City" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court denying the motion filed by the Council Bluffs Water Works' to dismiss the claim brought by Jim and Angela Sutton for strict liability, holding that the district court did not err in failing to dismiss Suttons' strict liability claim.After an underground water main broke near the Suttons' home the Suttons sued Water Works for the ensuing damage to their house, alleging strict liability and negligence. Water Works moved to dismiss the strict liability claim on the grounds that the Iowa Municipal Tort Claims Act, Iowa Code ch. 670, did not permit a strict liability claim against it. The district court denied the motion, and Water Works filed an application for interlocutory appeal. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Act does not allow a claim for strict liability against a municipality for damage caused by an underground water main break. View "Sutton v. Council Bluffs Water Works" on Justia Law

This lawsuit arises from a motor vehicle accident that Plaintiff alleges occurred when a tractor-trailer rear-ended the school bus she was driving. Plaintiff and a passenger on the school bus (collectively, Plaintiffs), sued the tractor-trailer driver, and his employer, Randy’s Trucking, Inc. (collectively, Defendants), alleging personal injuries and emotional distress from the accident. Defendants filed a motion for an order compelling Plaintiff to undergo a mental examination by their neuropsychologist after. Defendants asked the trial court to prohibit the provision of raw test data, test materials, and other documents containing proprietary information to anyone other than a licensed psychologist or neuropsychologist. The trial court granted the motion to compel the examination, but it ordered Defendants’ neuropsychologist to transfer raw data and an audio recording of the examination to Plaintiffs’ attorney subject to a protective order (the transmission order).   The Fifth Appellate District found no abuse of discretion and denied the writ. The court explained that Defendants failed to establish that the trial court was required to (1) order the raw data and audio recording be transmitted only to a licensed psychologist or neuropsychologist or (2) grant reconsideration and modify the transmission order to so provide. Consequently, “they have not demonstrated in this writ proceeding that the superior court was under a legal duty to order, or that its discretion could be legally exercised only by ordering,” transmission only to a licensed psychologist or neuropsychologist. Moreover, Defendants have not demonstrated there is no “plain, speedy, and adequate remedy, in the ordinary course of law” available to them. View "Randy's Trucking v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Plaintiff was a resident at a residential skilled nursing facility when she sustained injuries in a fall. She sued the facility, Capistrano Beach Care Center, LLC dba Capistrano Beach Care Center (CBCC), and its operator, Cambridge Healthcare Services, LLC (collectively, Defendants). Defendants petitioned to compel arbitration, claiming Plaintiff was bound by arbitration agreements purportedly signed on her behalf by her adult children. The trial court denied the petition, concluding defendants had failed to prove Plaintiff’s adult children had actual or ostensible authority to execute the arbitration agreements on Plaintiff’s behalf.   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court explained that CBCC did not meet its initial burden to make a prima facie showing that Plaintiff agreed to arbitrate by submitting arbitration agreements signed by Plaintiff’s adult children. CBCC presented no evidence that the children had actual or ostensible authority to execute the arbitration agreement on Plaintiff’s behalf beyond their own representations in the agreements. The court wrote that a defendant cannot meet its burden to prove the signatory acted as the agent of a plaintiff by relying on representations of the purported agent alone. View "Kinder v. Capistrano Beach Care Center" on Justia Law