Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs, thousands of Peruvian citizens, alleged injury from Doe Run’s lead-mining and smelting complex in La Oroya, Peru. Doe Run, based in St. Louis, Missouri, has operated the complex since 1997. The Renco Group owns Doe Run. Plaintiffs sued in Missouri state court, and Defendants removed the case to the District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri. Defendants submitted a report to the district court about allegedly fraudulent conduct by two former “plaintiff recruiters” in Peru. Defendants sought certain discovery in this case. Plaintiffs opposed these efforts and filed for a protective order to bar the defendants from obtaining discovery from the non-trial-pool Plaintiff. Plaintiffs also filed an emergency motion for a protective order to prohibit Defendants’ Peruvian counsel from participating in witness interviews in the Peruvian criminal investigation, claiming that it would be impermissible ex parte communication. Defendants appealed the grant of Plaintiffs’ emergency motion for a protective order. Plaintiffs then filed a motion to dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. But they moved to withdraw their motion to dismiss.   The Eighth Circuit granted Plaintiffs’ motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and denied Plaintiffs’ motion to withdraw their motion to dismiss as moot. The court reasoned that though the order is not appealable merely by virtue of its effect on a foreign criminal investigation, it may nevertheless be appealable if it has the practical effect of an injunction and has serious, irreparable consequences. The court concluded that the order does not have that effect. Moreover, Defendants have not demonstrated that it has serious, irreparable consequences. View "Chris Collins v. Doe Run Resources Corporation" on Justia Law

SE Property Holdings, LLC (“SEPH”) obtained a deficiency judgment against Neverve LLC (“Neverve”) after Neverve defaulted on loans secured by a mortgage on its property. Following this judgment, Neverve received the proceeds from an unrelated settlement. But Neverve transferred those proceeds to attorneys representing Neverve’s principal in payment of attorney’s fees relating to the principal’s personal bankruptcy proceedings. SEPH then sued Neverve based on Neverve’s allegedly fraudulent transfer of those settlement proceeds. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Neverve, finding that the Florida Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act’s (“FUFTA”) “catch-all” provision did not allow for (1) an award of money damages against the transferor, (2) punitive damages, or (3) attorney’s fees. The court also granted summary judgment in favor of Neverve on SEPH’s equitable lien claim, as Neverve no longer possessed the settlement proceeds at issue.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court held that based on the narrow interpretation of FUFTA in Freeman v. First Union National Bank, 865 So. 2d 1272 (Fla. 2004), the court believes the Florida Supreme Court would determine that FUFTA’s catch-all provision does not allow for an award of money damages against the transferor, an award of punitive damages, or an award of attorney’s fees. Thus, the district court was correct in granting summary judgment in favor of Neverve on SEPH’s FUFTA claims. And the court concluded that the district court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of Neverve on SEPH’s equitable lien claim. View "SE Property Holdings, LLC v. Neverve LLC" on Justia Law

In this appeal arising out of the application of a provision of the Minnesota Workers' Compensation Act known as the "assault exception" the Supreme Court held that the assault exception applied and that Relator Deangelo Profit was not entitled to recover workers' compensation benefits under the circumstances of this case.Profit suffered serious injuries when he was attacked at his job site by a mentally ill acquaintance while he was performing his work injuries. Profit sought workers' compensation benefits under Minn. Stat. 176.021, subd. 1, which are to awarded in cases "of personal injury or death of an employee arising out of and in the course of employment." The Workers' Compensation Court of Appeals concluded that Profit was not entitled to recover benefits under the assault exception. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the assault exception did not apply where the assailant "intended to injure [Profit] because of personal reasons" and his acts were "not directed against the employee as an employee, or because of the employment." View "Profit v. HRT Holdings" on Justia Law

Bird Rides, Inc. (Bird) launched its electric motorized scooter rental business in the City of Los Angeles (the City) by deploying hundreds of Bird scooters onto the City’s streets and sidewalks. Plaintiff and her daughter were on a City sidewalk just after twilight. The sidewalk was crowded with holiday shoppers, and Plaintiff did not see the back wheel of a Bird scooter sticking out from behind a trash can. She tripped on the scooter, fell, and sustained serious physical injuries. Plaintiffs sued Bird and the City for negligence and other related claims. The trial court sustained Defendants’ demurrer without leave to amend, concluding neither Bird nor the City owed Plaintiffs a duty of care.   The Second Appellate District concluded that the trial court’s judgment is correct as to the City, but the trial court erred when it dismissed the claims against Bird. Because Plaintiffs’ claims against the City are premised on the public entity’s discretionary authority to enforce the permit, the City is immune from liability under the Government Claims Act. In contrast, regardless of the permit’s terms, Bird may be held liable for breaching its general duty under section 1714 to use “ordinary care or skill in the management of [its] property.” The court explained that having deployed its dockless scooters onto public streets, Bird’s general duty encompasses an obligation, among other things, to use ordinary care to locate and move a Bird scooter when the scooter poses an unreasonable risk of danger to others. The court concluded that Plaintiff is authorized to assert a private action for public nuisance against the company. View "Hacala v. Bird Rides, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court reversing the decision of the workers' compensation commissioner denying the claim filed by the husband of a deceased employee for burial expenses and death benefits as the surviving spouse, holding that the district court did not err.Approximately two and a half years into her marriage Wife left her marital home with Husband, accepted a job in a different city, and moved in with a family friend. Husband and Wife never divorced. Wife was subsequently permanently and totally disabled as a result of a work injury and was awarded workers' compensation benefits. Four years later, Wife died from an overdose. Husband filed a claim for burial expenses and death benefits as the surviving spouse. Employer/Insurer denied the claim. The commissioner upheld the denial, concluding that Husband had willfully deserted Wife without any fault by her and thus was not entitled to benefits under Iowa Code 85.42(1)(a). The district court reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that there was not substantial evidence to support the commissioner's finding that Husband deserted Wife without fault by her under section 85.42(1)(a). View "Blasdell v. Linnhaven, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals reversing the decision of the circuit court granting declaratory judgment for Acuity, a mutual insurance company, in this insurance dispute arising from a fatal automobile accident, holding that the court of appeals did not err.When Douglas Curley lost control of his vehicle and crossed the center line he hit another vehicle, killing Michael Shimeta and seriously injuring Terry Scherr. After Curley's insurer paid Shimeta's estate and Scherr $250,000 each both parties sought additional recovery under a policy that Acuity had issued to Shimeta before the accident. At issue was whether Acuity's underinsured motorist coverage entitled Shimeta's estate and Scherr to an additional $250,000 each from Acuity or whether the payments the parties received from Curley's insurer reduced their recovery to $0. The Supreme Court held that Acuity owed Shimeta's estate and Scherr $250,000 each, thus affirming the court of appeals. View "ACUITY v. Estate of Michael Shimeta" on Justia Law

Helen McNeal, who had been appointed administratrix of Delores Mason’s estate, brought a wrongful death claim against a physician, Dr. Eniola Otuseso. Upon learning that McNeal did not satisfy the qualifications to serve as an administratrix, Otuseso moved to intervene in the estate matter and to strike the letters of administration. The chancellor denied her motion. But the chancellor, upon learning that McNeal was not related to the decedent and that she was a convicted felon, removed McNeal as administratrix and appointed the decedent’s two siblings, who were Delores Mason’s heirs at law, as coadministrators of the estate. Otuseso appealed the chancellor’s decision to deny her motion to intervene and the decision to replace McNeal, with the decedent’s actual heirs at law. Otuseso argued she had a right to intervene in the estate matter and that the chancellor was without authority to substitute the decedent’s heirs as the new administrators. The Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed the chancellor’s decision to substitute and appoint the decedent’s siblings and heirs as the coadministrators of Mason’s estate. Because Otuseso sought to intervene in the estate matter to challenge McNeal’s qualifications as admininstratrix, the Supreme Court found that the question of intervention was moot as it no longer was at issue, due to the chancellor’s rightful removal of the unqualified administratrix and his appointment of successor coadministrators. View "Otuseso v. Estate of Delores Mason, et al." on Justia Law

Betty Smith brought a negligence and wrongful death lawsuit against Belhaven Senior Care, LLC (Belhaven), a nursing home facility in which her mother Mary Hayes had resided shortly before Hayes’s death. Belhaven sought to compel arbitration, citing the arbitration provision in the nursing home admissions agreement Smith signed when admitting her mother. The trial judge denied arbitration, finding that Smith lacked the legal authority to bind her mother to the agreement. Belhaven appealed. The nursing home’s primary argument on appeal was that under the Health-Care Decisions Act (“the Act”), Smith acted as a statutory healthcare surrogate. So in signing the nursing home admission agreement, Smith had authority to waive arbitration on her mother’s behalf. In addition, Belhaven puts forth arguments of direct-benefit estoppel and third-party beneficiary status. The Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed, finding that while Hayes did suffer from some form of dementia, when admitted to the nursing home, she was neither evaluated by a physician nor was she determined to lack capacity. Indeed, her “Admission Physician Orders” were signed by a nurse practitioner. It was not until eleven days later that a physician evaluated Hayes. "And even then, the physician did not deem she lacked capacity. In fact, Belhaven puts forth no evidence that—at any time during her stay of more than a year at Belhaven—any physician ever determined Hayes lacked capacity." The Court determined Belhaven failed to prove the strict requirements of the surrogacy statute to rebut this presumption. Furthermore, the Court found Belhaven’s direct-benefit estoppel and third-party beneficiary arguments were lacking: because Belhaven contends that Hayes was incapacitated, she could not knowingly seek or obtain benefits from the agreement. "Nor does Smith’s largely negligence-based lawsuit seek to enforce the contract’s terms or require determination by reference to the contract. So Smith is not estopped from pursuing these claims." View "Belhaven Senior Care, LLC, et al. v. Smith, et al." on Justia Law

Following a vehicular accident, Martin Peteet entered into a release and settlement agreement with the driver of the other vehicle and her insurer. Peteet did not seek a waiver of subrogation or consent from his own automobile insurer, Mississippi Farm Bureau Casualty Insurance Company (Farm Bureau), prior to executing the release and settlement agreement. After the release and settlement agreement was executed, Peteet filed a complaint against Farm Bureau, seeking damages under the uninsured motorist (UM) provision in his auto policy with Farm Bureau. Farm Bureau moved to dismiss the complaint, and the county court denied the motion. Farm Bureau sought an interlocutory appeal, which the Mississippi Supreme Court granted. After a careful review of the law, the Supreme Court reversed the denial of the motion to dismiss and rendered judgment in favor of Farm Bureau. View "Mississippi Farm Bureau Casualty Insurance Company v. Peteet" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Union Mutual Fire Insurance Company (“Union Mutual”) appealed from a district court judgment. On March 4, 2017, a fire started at Liberty Avenue in Queens, New York, spreading to and damaging four neighboring buildings insured by Union Mutual. After an investigation, the fire marshals concluded, but could not determine with certainty, that the fire originated in the extension cords used by Ace Caribbean Market. Union Mutual paid proceeds to the damaged neighboring buildings and subrogated into their owners’ tort claims. Union Mutual then sued Ace Caribbean Market and others (collectively, “Defendants”), alleging that their negligent use of the extension cords caused the fire. The district court granted summary judgment for Defendants. At issue on appeal is whether evidence that a fire may have originated in the extension cords is sufficient to show that (a) the owners and proprietors were negligent in their use of the extension cords and (b) if they were negligent, that negligence was the cause of the fire.   The Second Circuit affirmed, holding that such evidence is not sufficient. The court held that, at most, Union Mutual produced weak circumstantial evidence that something wrong with the extension cords caused the fire. But, even assuming a reasonable jury could so conclude, Union Mutual showed no evidence of negligence whatsoever on Defendants’ part, and evidence of causation by itself is not evidence of negligence. The court concluded that there may have been negligence and that negligence may have been the cause of the fire. But no inference that it was Defendants’ negligence is permissible on the facts. View "Union Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Ace Caribbean Mkt." on Justia Law