Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

Farm Family Casualty Insurance Company (“Farm Family”) appealed after the district court granted summary judgment to Nodak Insurance Company (“Nodak”) and denied, in part, summary judgment to Farm Family. This case arose from an April 6, 2019 motor vehicle accident. Samuel Hamilton was the son of Bruce and Diana Hamilton. At the time of the April 2019 accident at issue, Samuel was a resident of North Dakota, and his parents were residents of Montana. Before the accident, Farm Family issued an automobile insurance policy to Bruce and Diana with an effective policy period of October 19, 2018 to April 19, 2019. The policy insured a 2011 pickup truck. After moving to Montana, the Hamiltons obtained an insurance policy from Mountain West Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company (“Mountain West”) that also insured the 2011 pickup truck with a term running from December 2, 2018 to June 2, 2019. In April 2019, Samuel was driving the insured 2011 pickup truck in Williams County, North Dakota. Samuel reportedly ran a stop sign while intoxicated and struck another vehicle; H.W. was seriously injured and A.M. was killed. Nodak insured the vehicle H.W. and A M. occupied at the time of the accident. Nodak filed suit seeking a declaration Farm Family’s automobile policy was in effect at the time of the April 2019 accident, Farm Family’s policy could not be retroactively cancelled, and the vehicle driven by the insureds’ son was not an “underinsured motor vehicle” under North Dakota law. The North Dakota Supreme Court concluded the automobile policy Farm Family issued to its insureds had not “ceased” under the policy language and remained in effect at the time of the April 2019 motor vehicle accident. View "Nodak Ins. Co. v. Farm Family Casualty Ins. Co., et al." on Justia Law

Moses attended a gathering at a condominium Roger-McKeever rented. Two years later, Moses filed suit for injuries. Moses alleged that, upon her arrival, she mentioned to Roger-McKeever that the entryway was dark. Roger-McKeever “was apologetic indicating that there was an electrical problem” and explained that her landlord had not been responsive in repairing the light. A photograph depicted three steps leading up from a street sidewalk, to a short walkway that ended at a door to Roger-McKeever’s condominium. Moses stated that when she was leaving, she could not see the second step and fell. She provided a declaration from a mechanical engineer that the steps were non-compliant with the building code and that the absence of a handrail and the riser heights were probable causes of the accident. Roger-McKeever submitted a declaration and the depositions of two individuals who attended the meeting, indicating that the walkway was not noticeably dark that night.The court granted Roger-McKeever summary judgment, finding that Roger-McKeever was a tenant who did not have control over the steps or the outside lighting and had no duty to maintain or repair that area. Roger-McKeever did not have a duty to warn Moses because she did not have prior notice that the steps were a “non-obvious” dangerous condition. The court of appeal affirmed. Moses did not raise a triable issue of material fact as to whether Roger-McKeever owed her a duty of care to protect her against the allegedly dangerous condition of the walkway. View "Moses v. Roger-McKeever" on Justia Law

A tractor-trailer truck rear-ended a stopped car at a construction site, injuring the driver of the car. The injured driver was a successful surgeon, who suffered permanent injuries that limited her ability to practice medicine. She sued the truck driver and his employer for damages, including medical expenses, pain and suffering, lost earnings, and lost future earning capacity. After a bench trial, the superior court awarded damages for all categories except lost future earning capacity. Even though the court found that the surgeon had proven her injuries permanently impaired her future earning capacity, the court concluded that the surgeon had failed to prove the amount of her future lost earning capacity with reasonable certainty. The court reconsidered the defendants’ motion to dismiss several categories of damages, which it had previously denied, and dismissed the claim for lost future earning capacity. The court then found neither party was a prevailing party and ordered each side to be responsible for its own fees and costs. The surgeon appealed, arguing the superior court erred by requiring her to prove the amount of her future lost earnings to a “reasonable certainty.” She also argued that the court erred by not finding she was the prevailing party for purposes of attorney’s fees. The Alaska Supreme Court concluded it was legal error to require proof of the amount of lost future earnings to a reasonable certainty and not to award at least nominal damages to the surgeon for the proven harm to her future earning capacity from her injuries. The Court therefore reversed the dismissal of the lost earning capacity claim and remanded for calculation of damages based on the appropriate standard of proof. As a result, the Court vacated the award of attorney’s fees pending the court’s determination on remand. View "Downing v. Shoreside Petroleum, Inc., et al." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court conditionally granted relief in this mandamus proceeding concerning a motion to compel a medical examination under Tex. R. Civ. P. 204.1, holding that the trial court clearly abused its discretion in denying the motion.Marcos Acosta brought this action alleging that he was injured in an automobile accident caused by the negligence of Roberto Hernandez, who was working for The Sherwin-Williams Company at the time, and seeking damages for, among other things, medical expenses and physical pain. The defendants moved to compel a medical examination of Acosta by their designated expert, but the trial court denied the motion to compel the exam. The court of appeals denied mandamus relief. The Supreme Court conditionally granted relief and directed the trial court to issue an order compelling Acosta to submit to the proposed examination, holding that the defendants showed good cause to compel a medical examination of Acosta. View "In re Sherwin-Williams Co." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the district court granting summary judgment to Defendants and dismissing Plaintiff's various legal theories of direct damages liability under the Iowa Constitution, holding that Godfrey v. State, 898 N.W.2d 844 (Iowa 2017), is hereby overruled.Plaintiff, a garbage truck driver, was stopped on a busy high by a Iowa Department of Transportation (IDOT) officer for a cracked windshield. During the interaction, Plaintiff was arrested and later charged with interference with legal acts. He was later acquitted of the charge, and subsequently sued the State and the IDOT officer, arguing that his passive noncooperation did not give the officer probable cause to arrest him. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants. Plaintiff appealed and asked the Court to endorse his constitutional tort claim under Godfrey. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) this Court overrules Godfrey and restores the law as it existed before 2017; and (2) this Court no longer recognizes a standalone cause of action for money damages. View "Burnett v. Smith" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court in this medical malpractice action brought by Parents against the two doctors involving in the birth and emergency care of their infant son, holding that Parents were not entitled to relief on their allegations of error.On appeal, Parents argued that the district court abused its discretion by excluding expert testimony concerning causation due to a lack of pretrial disclosure and lack of foundation and that a reasonable jury could have found in their favor of their malpractice claims. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court (1) did not abuse its discretion by excluding the expert testimony; and (2) the district court correctly directed verdicts for the defendants because Parents failed to present sufficient evidence to allow a reasonable jury to make findings in their favor on each element of their malpractice claims. View "Carson v. Steinke" on Justia Law

Todd and Rae Andreacchio sued Joel Wagner for intentional infliction of emotional distress, gross negligence, invasion of privacy, and civil conspiracy. Wagner published portions of the investigative file of their son’s death on the internet. The Mississippi Supreme Court found the investigative file was clearly was a public record that was furnished to Wagner by the Mississippi Attorney General’s Office, making Wagner’s publication of portions of the file constitutionally protected. Because the Andreacchios based all their claims on Wagner’s publication of legally obtained public information, their complaint against him failed as a matter of law. The Supreme Court therefore reversed the trial court’s ruling denying Wagner’s motion to dismiss and rendered judgment in Wagner’s favor, dismissing all claims against him. View "Wagner v. Andreacchio" on Justia Law

On April 7, 2020, Matthew Wallace was hired by the Centreville Police Department, located in the Town of Centreville, Mississippi. In 2021, Wallace was dispatched with a Town of Centreville certified police officer, to a scene involving multiple juveniles riding all-terrain vehicles in the town limits. An altercation occurred; at some point during the altercation, Wallace went to the patrol unit to retrieve the police-issued pepper spray. Upon returning to the scene, Wallace released the pepper spray. Sometime following the incident, one of the juveniles and his mother filed charges against Wallace for simple assault on a minor. The issue presented for the Mississippi Supreme Court's review centered around a probable cause hearing pursuant to Mississippi Code Section 99-3-28. Before the hearing, the State petitioned the circuit court to determine whether Wallace was entitled to a probable cause hearing, alleging Wallace was not a sworn law enforcement officer. At the hearing, the circuit determined that Wallace was not a sworn law enforcement officer and, therefore, was not entitled to a probable cause hearing. Wallace moved the circuit court for a probable cause hearing for the same underlying incident. The circuit court denied the motion, finding, again, that Wallace was not a sworn law enforcement officer and, therefore, was not entitled to a probable cause hearing under Section 99-3-28. Wallace appealed. The Supreme Court held that a law enforcement officer who is not certified pursuant to Mississippi Code Section 45-6-11(3)(a) is not entitled to a probable cause hearing under Mississippi Code Section 99-3-28(1)(a)(i). Further, the Court held Wallace was not entitled to a probable cause hearing under Section 99-3-28(1)(a)(i) because he was not a law enforcement officer as defined by Mississippi Code Section 45-6-3(c). View "Wallace v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court dismissing a complaint for forum non conveniens, holding that the district court abused its discretion by granting the motion because the moving parties failed to meet their evidentiary burden by not including a supporting affidavit.C.R. England, Inc., a trucking company incorporated and headquartered in Utah, hired Tesfaye Alamin, a Nevada resident, as a driver. Eric Pepper, a Texas resident, collided with Alamin's semitruck, and his family members (collectively, Pepper) brought a wrongful death lawsuit in Nevada against C.R. England and Alamin. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss for forum non conveniens, arguing that Texas was a more appropriate forum. The motion, however, failed to include any supporting attachments or exhibits. The district court granted the motion. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that where the underlying motion to dismiss for forum non conveniens lacked a supporting affidavit, the district court abused its discretion in granting the motion. View "Pepper v. C.R. England" on Justia Law

In 2018, Terri Richardson Mattson (“Mattson”) and her husband filed this action against the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare, and its employee, Laurie Gallegos, a certified physician assistant (“Defendants”), alleging medical malpractice and failure to obtain informed consent related to outpatient mental health services Mattson received from Defendants. As a part of those services, Gallegos prescribed Mattson Prozac (fluoxetine), an antidepressant. Roughly one month later, the day of her follow up appointment with Gallegos, Mattson woke up, took a firearm from her gun cabinet, went to the liquor store, bought a bottle of vodka, drank the entire bottle while driving to her follow up appointment, and when she arrived in the Department’s parking lot, fired the gun into her head. Mattson survived but suffered extensive injuries. Subsequently, Mattson and her husband filed this action. The district court granted summary judgment to Defendants on two grounds: (1) Defendants were immune from liability under the Idaho Tort Claims Act (“ITCA”) because Mattson’s claims arose out of injuries sustained while she was receiving services from a “mental health center”; and (2) the “reckless, willful and wanton conduct” exception to immunity did not apply as a matter of law. The Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s decision that Mattson’s and her husband’s claims fell within the purview of the “mental health center, hospital or similar facility” immunity provision in Idaho Code section 6-904A(2). However, the Court reversed the district court’s decision that there was no triable jury question under the “reckless, willful and wanton conduct” exception to immunity. The Supreme Court found Mattson alleged sufficient facts at summary judgment to demonstrate that a reasonable person could find that Defendants’ acts or omissions were “reckless, willful and wanton[.]” Thus, the Court vacated the judgment and remanded this case for further proceedings. View "Mattson v. IDHW" on Justia Law