Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

A family leased a home within military housing at the Naval Amphibious Base Coronado in California. Shortly after moving in, they experienced persistent water intrusion and mold contamination, which they alleged damaged their property and affected their health. The family reported these issues to the property manager and the public-private entity responsible for the housing, but claimed that remediation efforts were inadequate and that their concerns were dismissed. After further testing confirmed hazardous mold, the family vacated the property and brought state law claims, including negligence and breach of contract, against the property manager, the public-private housing entity, and a mold remediation company.The defendants removed the case from California state court to the United States District Court for the Southern District of California, asserting federal enclave, federal officer, and federal agency jurisdiction. The district court denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss based on derivative sovereign immunity and, after further proceedings, found that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction on all asserted grounds. Specifically, the court determined there was no evidence that the United States had accepted exclusive jurisdiction over the property, that the defendants failed to show a causal nexus between their actions and federal direction, and that the public-private entity was not a federal agency. The district court remanded the case to state court.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the remand order under an exception allowing appellate review when federal officer removal is asserted. The Ninth Circuit held that the district court correctly found no federal enclave jurisdiction because there was no evidence of federal acceptance of exclusive jurisdiction over the property. The court also held that the defendants did not meet the requirements for federal officer or agency jurisdiction. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s remand to state court. View "CHILDS V. SAN DIEGO FAMILY HOUSING, LLC" on Justia Law

A teacher at a public charter school in Utah was terminated after a series of events involving a student and the student's parent. The teacher, a former Air Force veteran, reprimanded the student for disruptive behavior, leading the student to quit the team and report the incident to his father. The parent, dissatisfied with the teacher's conduct, began raising concerns about the teacher's alleged inappropriate behavior, including claims of physical and verbal abuse, to school administrators and at a school board meeting. The parent also communicated these concerns to the school superintendent and, according to the teacher, made a report to local police. Investigations by both the police and the Division of Child and Family Services found no evidence of abuse, and the teacher was ultimately terminated without a stated reason.The teacher filed suit in the Third District Court, Salt Lake County, alleging defamation, intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED), abuse of process, and tortious interference with economic relations. The parent moved for early dismissal under Utah’s Uniform Public Expression Protection Act (UPEPA), arguing the statute protected his speech and actions. The district court denied the motion, finding UPEPA inapplicable and concluding that the teacher had stated prima facie cases for all claims.On direct appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Utah held that the district court erred in finding UPEPA did not apply, as the parent’s statements concerned a matter of public concern. The Supreme Court also found that the teacher failed to state prima facie cases for IIED and abuse of process, requiring dismissal of those claims. The court vacated the denial of the special motion as to defamation and tortious interference, remanding for further consideration of whether the teacher could establish a prima facie case, particularly regarding privilege. The court ordered costs and fees related to the motion be awarded as provided by UPEPA. View "Mackey v. Krause" on Justia Law

In 2021, a plaintiff filed a complaint against a public school district, alleging that she was repeatedly sexually assaulted by a teacher while attending middle and high school. The complaint asserted that the teacher’s abusive conduct was widely known within the school and that the district either knew or should have known about the abuse but failed to act, allowing the teacher to remain employed. The plaintiff brought claims for negligence and negligent hiring, retention, and supervision, relying on statutory provisions that exempt certain childhood sexual assault claims from the usual requirement to present a claim to the public entity before filing suit.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County reviewed the case after the school district moved for judgment on the pleadings. The district argued that the plaintiff’s claims were only possible due to Assembly Bill 218 (AB 218), which retroactively eliminated the claims presentation requirement for childhood sexual assault claims against public entities. The district contended that AB 218 violated the gift clause of the California Constitution by imposing liability for past acts where no enforceable claim previously existed. The trial court agreed, finding that AB 218 retroactively created liability and constituted an unconstitutional gift of public funds, and dismissed the complaint with prejudice.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the trial court’s decision de novo. The appellate court held that AB 218 does not violate the gift clause because it did not create new substantive liability; rather, it removed a procedural barrier to enforcing pre-existing liability for negligence and negligent hiring, retention, and supervision. The court reversed the trial court’s order and remanded with directions to deny the school district’s motion for judgment on the pleadings. View "O.B. v. L.A. Unified School Dist." on Justia Law

Dr. Padma Rao brought a defamation suit against JP Morgan Chase Bank and its employee, Keifer Krause, after Krause informed the administrator of her late mother’s estate that Rao, acting under a power of attorney, had designated herself as the payable on death (POD) beneficiary of her mother’s accounts. This statement led the estate administrator to accuse Rao of fraud and breach of fiduciary duty in probate court. The dispute centered on whether Rao had improperly used her authority to benefit herself, which would be illegal under Illinois law.The case was initially filed in Illinois state court, but Chase removed it to the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois before any defendant was served, invoking “snap removal.” The district court dismissed all claims except for defamation per se. On summary judgment, the court ruled in favor of the defendants, finding that Krause’s statements were not defamatory, could be innocently construed, and were protected by qualified privilege. Rao appealed both the dismissal of her consumer fraud claim and the grant of summary judgment on her defamation claim.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit first addressed jurisdiction, dismissing Krause as a party to preserve diversity jurisdiction. The court affirmed the dismissal of Rao’s consumer fraud claim, finding she had not alleged unauthorized disclosure of personal information. However, it reversed the summary judgment on the defamation per se claim against Chase, holding that Krause’s statements could not be innocently construed and that a qualified privilege did not apply, given evidence of possible recklessness. The case was remanded for a jury to determine whether the statements were understood as defamatory. View "Padma Rao v J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

A Connecticut resident was injured while participating in a guided horseback ride at a luxury guest ranch in Montana. Prior to the ride, he and his wife signed an agreement acknowledging the inherent risks of equine activities, including the possibility of serious injury or death. During the ride, the plaintiff’s horse stumbled, causing him to fall forward and sustain significant injuries that required surgery. The plaintiff alleged that the ranch’s employee failed to properly address concerns about his saddle and the horse’s behavior, and that the guide’s choices regarding the trail and riding formation contributed to the accident.The plaintiff filed suit in the Montana Fourth Judicial District Court, asserting claims of negligence, premises liability, negligence per se, and negligent infliction of emotional distress. The defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing that the Montana Equine Activities Act shielded it from liability because the plaintiff’s injuries arose from risks inherent in horseback riding. The District Court agreed, finding that the plaintiff’s evidence did not raise a genuine issue of material fact and that the incident fell within the scope of inherent risks as defined by the statute. The court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the District Court’s decision de novo. The Supreme Court held that the plaintiff’s injuries resulted from inherent risks of horseback riding as contemplated by the Montana Equine Activities Act. The Court found no evidence that the ranch’s conduct introduced atypical or uncharacteristic risks or that the guide acted with willful or wanton disregard for the plaintiff’s safety. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the District Court’s grant of summary judgment to the defendant. View "Girasole v. Paws Up" on Justia Law

A woman, acting as conservator for her mother, filed a lawsuit alleging medical malpractice and ordinary negligence against a hospital and a nurse practitioner. The mother had suffered a stroke, became permanently disabled, and was transferred to the hospital for long-term care. During her stay, she developed a severe tongue injury that ultimately required amputation. The conservator was appointed nearly two years after the injury, and the lawsuit was filed more than two years after the alleged malpractice occurred. The plaintiff argued that the statute of limitations should be tolled due to the mother’s mental incompetence.The Superior Court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss, finding that the two-year statute of limitations for medical malpractice actions under Georgia law was not tolled for mental incompetence, based on the “nontolling” provision in OCGA § 9-3-73(b). The court relied on the Supreme Court of Georgia’s prior decision in Deen v. Stevens, which upheld the constitutionality of this provision. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that it was bound by Deen and rejecting the plaintiff’s equal protection challenge to the statute.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed whether Deen controlled the case and whether the statute’s treatment of mentally incompetent medical malpractice plaintiffs violated the Equal Protection Clause. The court held that Deen was controlling and that the statute’s classification was subject to rational basis review. The court found that the legislative decision not to toll the statute of limitations for mentally incompetent plaintiffs in medical malpractice cases was rationally related to legitimate state interests, such as ensuring affordable healthcare and preventing stale claims. The court also rejected new arguments regarding the expert affidavit requirement. The judgment of the Court of Appeals was affirmed. View "WILLIAMS v. REGENCY HOSPITAL COMPANY, LLC" on Justia Law

After being diagnosed with lung cancer, Kirt Bjoin and his wife brought a lawsuit against J-M Manufacturing Company, Inc. (JMM) and others, alleging that Bjoin’s cancer was caused by exposure to asbestos dust generated when he cut JMM’s asbestos cement pipe with a power saw during the 1980s. Bjoin worked for his father’s company and later co-owned a pipe-laying business, during which time he frequently cut asbestos cement pipe without respiratory protection and claimed he was never warned of the associated risks. He argued that JMM should have provided warnings about the dangers of cutting the pipe with a power saw and the need for protective equipment.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County presided over a jury trial in which JMM asserted affirmative defenses, including that Bjoin was a sophisticated user who knew or should have known of the product’s dangers, and that using a power saw to cut the pipe was an unforeseeable misuse. The jury found in favor of JMM on these defenses and on the general negligence claim, concluding that Bjoin was a sophisticated user and that his method of cutting the pipe was not a reasonably foreseeable use. The trial court also granted JMM’s motion for nonsuit on the fraudulent concealment claim. Bjoin’s post-trial motion for a new trial was denied.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, reviewed the case. The court held that Bjoin failed to meet the high burden required to overturn a jury verdict for insufficient evidence, particularly because he did not adequately address evidence supporting JMM’s defenses. The court also found that Bjoin waived his claims regarding the admission of Cal-OSHA regulations and the product misuse instruction by failing to provide proper legal argument and standards. The appellate court affirmed the judgment in favor of JMM, upholding the jury’s findings and the trial court’s rulings. View "Bjoin v. J-M Manufacturing Co." on Justia Law

A computer repair shop owner in Wilmington, Delaware, came into possession of a laptop and data belonging to Robert Hunter Biden in April 2019, after Biden left the device for repair and failed to retrieve it. The shop owner, John Paul Mac Isaac, eventually provided a copy of the data to an attorney for Rudy Giuliani, who then shared it with the New York Post. The Post published a story about the laptop in October 2020, which led to widespread media attention and public identification of Mac Isaac as the source. Subsequent media coverage included a Politico article summarizing a letter from former intelligence officials suggesting the laptop story had the hallmarks of Russian disinformation, and public statements by the Biden campaign and Hunter Biden himself, some of which Mac Isaac alleged were defamatory.Mac Isaac filed suit in the Delaware Superior Court against Politico, Hunter Biden, and the Biden campaign, alleging defamation and related claims. He later amended his complaint to add the Biden campaign as a defendant. The case was briefly removed to federal court and then remanded. The defendants moved to dismiss, and Hunter Biden also filed counterclaims for invasion of privacy, which Mac Isaac moved to dismiss.The Supreme Court of the State of Delaware reviewed the Superior Court’s dismissal of Mac Isaac’s claims and Hunter Biden’s counterclaims. The Court held that the allegedly defamatory statements did not concern Mac Isaac and were not actionable as defamation. It also found that the Superior Court properly dismissed Hunter Biden’s counterclaims as time-barred under the statute of limitations, given the facts known to him by October 2020. The Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court’s order in all respects. View "Isaac v. Politico LLC, et al." on Justia Law

A general contractor was hired to oversee the construction of a hotel in Vermont and subcontracted with a firm to install metal siding panels manufactured by a third party. The subcontractor relied on installation instructions available on the manufacturer’s website, which did not specify the use of a splice plate to connect the panels. The panels were installed without splice plates, and after construction, the panels began to detach from the building, causing some to fall and damage nearby property. The contractor later discovered that the manufacturer had created an instruction sheet in 2006 recommending splice plates, but this information was not publicly available at the time of installation.The contractor initially sued the installer for breach of contract, warranty, and negligence in the Vermont Superior Court, Chittenden Unit, Civil Division. The complaint was later amended to add a product liability claim against the manufacturer. After further discovery, the contractor sought to amend the complaint a third time to add new claims against the manufacturer, arguing that new evidence justified the amendment. The trial court denied this motion, citing undue delay and prejudice to the manufacturer, and granted summary judgment to the manufacturer on the product liability claim and on a crossclaim for implied indemnity brought by the installer, finding both barred by the economic-loss rule.On appeal, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s decisions. The Court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the third motion to amend due to undue delay and prejudice. It also held that the economic-loss rule barred the contractor’s product liability claim, as neither the “other-property” nor “special-relationship” exceptions applied. Finally, the Court found the contractor lacked standing to appeal the summary judgment on the installer’s implied indemnity claim. View "PeakCM, LLC v. Mountainview Metal Systems, LLC" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, after consuming a significant amount of alcohol and becoming heavily intoxicated, joined a group of friends at a municipal golf course and later proceeded to the driving range. While at the driving range, the plaintiff sat in a golf cart, distracted by his phone and unaware of his surroundings. The cart’s exact position was disputed, but evidence showed it was in or near the range of play. Defendant Hendricks, one of the group, hit a golf ball from the tee-off area, which struck the plaintiff in the eye, causing serious injury. The plaintiff did not see the ball coming and was unaware of the risk due to his lack of attention and intoxication.The plaintiff filed a negligence suit in the Superior Court, Wilson County, against both Hendricks and the City of Wilson, alleging negligent conduct and inadequate safety measures. Both defendants raised contributory negligence as a defense, and the City also asserted governmental immunity. The trial court granted summary judgment for both defendants, finding the plaintiff contributorily negligent as a matter of law. The plaintiff appealed, and a divided panel of the North Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the plaintiff’s lack of situational awareness, due in part to intoxication and distraction, barred recovery. The majority also found no genuine issue of material fact regarding the cart’s location or movement and declined to address governmental immunity.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the Court of Appeals. The Court held that the plaintiff was contributorily negligent as a matter of law because the risk of injury was open and obvious, and a reasonably prudent person would have recognized and avoided the danger. The Court did not address the issue of governmental immunity, as contributory negligence was dispositive. View "Moseley v. Hendricks" on Justia Law