Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court concluding that that an insurance policy's "Employer's Liability" exclusion (ELE) was inapplicable to Plaintiff's wrongful death action against Defendant, holding that the circuit court erred.Jeremy Neice was killed in Pennsylvania while working in an underground coal mine owned by Dana Mining Company of Pennsylvania, LLC. The circuit court concluded that Federal Insurance Company owed Dana Mining defense and indemnity pursuant to a liability insurance policy under which Dana Mining was a named assured and that the policy's ELE was inapplicable to the wrongful death action brought by Jenny Neice, the administrator of Jeremy's estate. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Pennsylvania courts would adhere to the majority rule in their interpretation and application of the ELE at issue, finding that it barred coverage for Dana Mining as to Plaintiff's claims. View "Federal Insurance Co. v. Neice" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, on behalf of the Estate of former federal inmate brought suit against the United States and several Federal Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) officials after the decedent was allegedly beaten to death by fellow inmates. The Estate (“Appellant”) alleges that BOP officials violated the Eighth Amendment by failing to protect the decedent from the attack and failing to intervene to prevent his transfer to a “violent” facility. Appellant also sued the United States pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”), alleging that prison officials had been negligent in their failure to intervene and protect the decedent. Appellant argues that its Eighth Amendment claims are cognizable under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) and its progeny.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court concluded that the Appellant’s Bivens claims arise in a new context and that several special factors, including separation-of-power implications and an increased burden on the federal prison system, counsel against an extension of Bivens in this new context. The court also concluded that the discretionary function exception to the FTCA applies to BOP officials’ decisions to transfer Bulger and place him in general population. View "William Bulger v. Hugh Hurwitz" on Justia Law

Jennifer Dell Peach sued, among others, Lester Thomas asserting claims arising from a multivehicle accident that took place after Thomas, a State trooper with the Alabama Law Enforcement Agency, allegedly blocked both lanes of a highway to perform traffic stops of speeding drivers. Thomas moved for a summary judgment, arguing, among other things, that he was entitled to State-agent immunity. The trial court denied that motion. Thomas petitioned the Alabama Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus directing the trial court to enter a summary judgment in his favor on the ground of State-agent immunity. The Supreme Court determined that based solely on the arguments and evidence presented to the trial court, Thomas did not establish a clear legal right to an order granting his motion for a summary judgment based on State-agent immunity. Therefore, Thomas's petition for the writ of mandamus was denied. View "Ex parte Lester Lee Thomas." on Justia Law

Jim Arthaud appeals a district court judgment granting Jim Fuglie’s motion to dismiss. Arthaud sued Fuglie, alleging Fuglie published a defamatory statement in his internet blog titled “A Bridge to Nowhere.” The blog was published in August 2018 on Fuglie’s website, “The Prairie Blog.” Arthaud brought suit on October 5, 2021, asserting he did not learn about the post until September 2021. Fuglie responded and filed a motion to dismiss, arguing Arthaud’s claim was time barred under the applicable statute of limitations. The district court subsequently granted the motion to dismiss, finding Arthaud’s claims were time barred under section 28-01-18(1) of the North Dakota Century Code regardless of whether the discovery rule applied in defamation cases. Arthaud argued the North Dakota Supreme Court should adopt the “discovery rule” when determining whether a litigant has timely brought a defamation claim. The Supreme Court held it was unnecessary to decide whether to adopt the discovery rule for defamation claims because the Uniform Single Publication Act precluded the discovery rule from applying to statements made to the public. View "Arthaud v. Fuglie" on Justia Law

In this dispute over indemnification arising from an underlying negligence case, the First Circuit vacated the decision of the district court as to a contractual crossclaim for indemnification, holding that the district court erred.John Caruso was staying at the Omni Hotel in Providence, Rhode Island when he tripped and fell on a curb separating the hotel's valet from its main entrance. Caruso brought this complaint against the both the hotel's valet operator and its owner, claiming that Defendants negligently maintained the premises and had a duty to warn him of an unreasonably safe condition, causing his injuries. The hotel owner filed crossclaims against the valet in the action, seeking indemnification for its litigation costs. As to the indemnification crossclaims the district court held that Omni was not entitled to relief. The First Circuit vacated the judgment for the valet and directed the district court on remand to enter judgment for the hotel owner, holding that the district court's rejection to the hotel owner's right to contractual indemnification was premised on an incorrect view of both Rhode Island law and the language of the parties' contractual agreement. View "Omni Hotels Management Corp. v. Ultimate Parking, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the order of the circuit court granting partial summary judgment to Plaintiffs in this tort action for damages arising from a motor vehicle accident in which Beverly Winkler sustained fatal injuries and awarding damages to Plaintiffs after a bench trial, holding that the damages award must be recalculated.Plaintiffs sued Defendant, the personal representative of Beverly's estate, for negligence. The circuit court concluded that Beverly was negligent per se upon partial summary judgment, and the parties proceeded to a bench trial on the issue of damages. The circuit court awarded judgment to Plaintiffs and awarded a total of $36,499. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that the circuit court erred by not assessing monetary relief for the cost of replacing a battery to Plaintiffs' tractor, which was damaged in the accident. View "Lamb v. Winkler" on Justia Law

In this slip-and-fall case, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the superior court denying Plaintiff's motion for a new trial following a jury verdict in favor of Defendants, holding that the trial justice did not err in denying the motion.Plaintiff sued the Town of Johnson and some of its officials, alleging that Defendants were negligent in maintaining the premises of the Johnston Town Hall in a safe condition by failing to warn invitees, such as himself, of a "dangerous condition" - namely, curbing that lacked any yellow highlighting or warning. The jury returned a verdict for Defendants. Plaintiff filed a motion for a new trial, which the trial justice denied. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial justice (1) did not err in instructing the jury as to the element of duty; (2) Defendant waived his second claim of instructional error; and (3) the trial justice did not err by concluding that expert testimony was required to establish that the angle of the curb constituted a dangerous condition. View "Mangiarelli v. Town of Johnston" on Justia Law

Core and Main LP (“C&M”) supplies water, wastewater, storm drainage, and fire protection products and services to commercial and governmental customers. C&M acquired the assets of Minnesota Pipe and Equipment Company (“MPE”), which supplied the same products and services in areas of Minnesota and South Dakota. Defendant, one of the shareholders, was part of MPE’s management team. Defendant started work at Dakota Supply Group, Inc. (“DSG”), a C&M competitor. C&M brought a diversity action against Defendant and DSG, asserting breach of the Employment Agreement’s noncompete and confidentiality covenants, tortious interference, and related claims. The district court granted Defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The main issue on appeal is whether the court correctly concluded that the Noncompetition Agreement was a later agreement and, therefore, its Entire Agreement provision superseded the restrictive covenants.   The Eighth Circuit concluded that the breach of contract and tortious interference claims turn on fact-intensive issues that cannot be determined on the pleadings. Accordingly, the court reversed the dismissal of those claims and otherwise affirmed. The court explained that it agreed with C&M that it is at least plausible the two Agreements covered different subject matters, making Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal inappropriate. The Noncompetition Agreement restricting MPE shareholders from engaging or investing in a competing business was geographically broad, but its duration was precisely limited to a specific term for each restricted party. In addition, the court concluded that in the context of the multiple agreements that completed the Asset Purchase transaction, the term “prior or contemporaneous” in the Noncompetition Agreement’s Entire Agreement provision is ambiguous. View "Core and Main, LP v. Ron McCabe" on Justia Law

A U.S. Postal Service (USPS) vehicle allegedly ran over A.M.L.’s foot on July 18, 2018. A.M.L.’s mother sent a Claim for Damage, Injury or Death (Standard Form 95) to USPS in August 2018. A year later, A.M.L.’s attorney sent a demand letter that set forth A.M.L.’s medical expenses. After USPS denied liability, A.M.L. (by and through her parent) filed suit against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA). The government moved to dismiss the suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), arguing that A.M.L. had failed to exhaust her administrative remedies before bringing suit. The district court dismissed the suit, and A.M.L. appealed, arguing that her claims satisfied the FTCA’s presentment requirement.   The Eighth Circuit reversed and remanded. The court held that Sections 2672 and 2675(b) do not require that a claim set forth a single-dollar amount, but that it must express the maximum value of the asserted claim. Accordingly, the expression of a range complies with the statute’s requirements because it presents the maximum value of the claim. A.M.L.’s claim of “$250,000 to $275,000” thus presented a sum certain in compliance with the FTCA’s presentment requirement. View "A.M.L. v. United States" on Justia Law

Plaintiff suffered a stroke on August 18, 2009. He was hospitalized at St. John’s Regional Medical Center for two weeks, followed by a month in St. John’s inpatient rehabilitation facility. He entered Oxnard Manor, a skilled nursing facility, on October 3. Four days later, on October 7, Plaintiff signed an arbitration agreement. It stated that he gave up his right to a jury or court trial, and required arbitration of claims arising from services provided by Oxnard Manor, including claims of medical malpractice, elder abuse, and other torts. Plaintiff remained a resident at Oxnard Manor until his death nine years later, individually and as Plaintiff’s successors in interest, sued Oxnard Manor for elder abuse/neglect, wrongful death, statutory violations/breach of resident rights, and negligent infliction of emotional distress. Oxnard Manor filed a petition to compel arbitration. Both sides relied on medical records to demonstrate whether Plaintiff had the mental capacity to consent to the arbitration agreement.   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court explained that evidence here that Plaintiff scored below the level necessary to “solve complex problems such as managing a checking account” supports the conclusion that he was unable to manage his financial affairs. But regardless of whether the presumption of Civil Code section 39, subdivision (b) applied, substantial evidence established that Plaintiff lacked the capacity to enter an arbitration agreement. View "Algo-Heyres v. Oxnard Manor" on Justia Law