Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the superior court granting summary judgment in favor of Defendant in this personal injury action, holding that Plaintiff failed to establish the existence of a legal duty on the part of Defendant.Plaintiff purchased fish at Defendant's supermarket and allegedly became ill after he ate the fish. Plaintiff brought this negligence action alleging that Defendant breached its alleged duty to him to "process, prepare, cook and sell food free from unreasonably dangerous defects." The hearing justice granted summary judgment for Defendant. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) there was no error in the hearing justice's ruling as regarding Defendant's duty; and (2) the hearing justice did not commit reversible error by denying Plaintiff's motion invoking Rule 56(f) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure. View "Meeks v. Stop & Shop Supermarket Co., LLC" on Justia Law

This case arose from a car accident in which respondenr Miriam Gonzalez Carmona ran a red light and hit petitioner Kylie Hanson’s car. At the time, Carmona was driving home from an out of town work training, driving a car owned by her employer, Southeast Washington Office of Aging and Long Term Care (SEW ALTC). Hanson filed a complaint against Carmona individually and the SEW ALTC Advisory Council (Advisory Council), under a theory of vicarious liability alleging Carmona was acting within the scope of her employment at the time of the accident. The Advisory Council and Carmona moved for summary judgment because Hanson did not comply with RCW 4.96.020(4)’s presuit notice requirement to sue a government entity or its employees for tortious conduct and the statute of limitations had run. Hanson then amended her complaint to remove all references to the Advisory Council and the allegations that Carmona was acting in the scope of employment. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the Advisory Council, but it allowed the case to proceed forward against Carmona in her individual capacity. The Court of Appeals reversed. After review, the Washington Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals, but on different grounds. The Supreme Court held that RCW 4.96.020(4) applied when an employee is acting within the scope of employment but is sued in their individual capacity. "The plain language of the statute encompasses acts within the scope of employment and the government entity, not the employee, is bound by any judgment, even if not technically sued. Accordingly, the legislature can require presuit notices for employee acts committed within the scope of employment." View "Hanson v. Carmona" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Homolka, Homolka P.A., Watts Guerra, and Watts, alleging he is owed (1) $10,000 per month as leasing payments from October 2015, the first month he stopped receiving payments, until the September 2017 settlement; (2) a promised $50,000 truck reimbursement; and (3) a $3.4 million bonus. The jury returned a unanimous verdict for Plaintiff, finding that Homolka breached the oral contract, acting as an agent of Homolka P.A. and Watts Guerra. The jury awarded $175,000 in compensatory damages with no prejudgment interest. The district court denied Watts Guerra’s renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law and Plaintiff’s motion for a new trial. Watts Guerra and Plaintiff cross-appealed these rulings.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court held that it agreed with the district court that the jury reasonably found Watts Guerra liable on an ostensible agency theory for Homolka’s breaches of the contract underlying the jury’s award of $175,000 in compensatory damages. The court reasoned that in considering these issues, “we start with the assumption jurors fulfilled their obligation to decide the case correctly,” and “we defer second to the trial court, which has a far better sense of what the jury likely was thinking and also whether there is any injustice in allowing the verdict to stand.” Applying these deferential standards, the court wrote that it has no difficulty concluding the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Plaintiff’s motion for a new trial. The jury verdict awarding $175,000 compensatory damages was neither inadequate nor the product of an inappropriate compromise. View "Lowell Lundstrom, Jr. v. Watts Guerra LLP" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court’s decision dismissing her claims against New York University (NYU) and declining to allow her to amend her complaint to add another plaintiff. Plaintiff s a parent of an adult student who attended New York University (NYU) (Defendant-Appellee) during the Spring 2020 semester—a semester during which NYU suspended its in-person operations and transitioned to remote instruction. Alleging breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and other claims, Plaintiff brought a putative class action suit against NYU to partially recover the tuition and fees she paid for her daughter’s Spring 2020 semester. The district court granted NYU’s motion to dismiss on the basis that Plaintiff lacked standing and denied Plaintiff’s motion to amend her complaint to add a current NYU student as an additional plaintiff because it concluded that amendment would be futile.   The Second Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court in part, vacated in part, and remanded for further proceedings. The court concluded that the district court correctly determined that Plaintiff lacks standing to bring her breach of contract and unjust enrichment claims because she has not alleged an injury-in-fact to herself, rather than to her daughter. The court held that Plaintiff fails to plausibly allege a claim for conversion. The court wrote that for these reasons, the district court properly dismissed her claims. However, the court concluded that amending the complaint to add a current student as plaintiff would not be futile. The student plaintiff plausibly alleged claims for breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and money had and received that would survive a motion to dismiss. View "Christina Rynasko v. New York University" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming the decision of the Workers' Compensation Board affirming an administrative law judge's finding that Claimant's total knee replacement was compensable, holding that Claimant was not entitled to relief on his claims of error.Claimant injured his knee while at work and received workers' compensation benefits. Claimant continued to experience knee pain after surgery and ultimately underwent a total knee replacement. Employer filed a medical fee dispute, and an ALJ found that the total knee replacement was compensable. The Board and court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the ALJ had sufficient evidence to conclude that Claimant's total knee replacement was reasonable and necessary and was within his discretion to make inferences. View "Perry County Bd. of Education v. Campbell" on Justia Law

In this case arising the death of James Savage after he was thrown from his motorcycle and run over by Oscar Ramos, the Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the court of appeals remanding this case back to the circuit court for a new trial, holding that remand was required under the circumstances.Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) Property & Casualty Insurance Company of Hartford was not the owner of the Jeep Wrangler at issue according to Ky. Rev. Stat. 186A.530(3), and Co-part of Connecticut, Inc. was required to obtain proof of insurance pursuant to sections 186A.215 and 186A.220; (2) the court of appeals improperly engaged in fact-finding that affected its judgment on other issues; (3) the court of appeals erred in ruling that the trial court abused its discretion by allowing Co-part to withdraw an admission; (4) strict liability does not apply as a matter of law for violations of Ky. Rev. Stat. 186A.500; and (5) Aull v. Houston, 345 S.W.3d 232 (Ky. App. 2010) is hereby abrogated to the extent that it can be read to hold that Social Security Disability benefits are inadmissible in a damages calculation in a wrongful death suit. View "Savage v. Co-Part of Connecticut, Inc." on Justia Law

Two years after an unfortunate single-boat accident, one of the boat’s two occupants died as a result of his injuries. The boat in which he was a passenger had struck a warning sign that was totally submerged at the time of the allision between the boat and sign. His estate and survivors sued the companies responsible for the sign in question. The district court granted summary judgment to the Defendants on the ground that the incident occurred on water governed by Louisiana law rather than federal. The parties agree that if Louisiana law governs, the claims are barred. At issue in this appeal is whether or not the allision occurred in “navigable” waters such that federal law governs.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed, holding that the allision occurred on non-navigable waters. The first ground on which the Plaintiffs claim that the allision took place on navigable water is that the “navigational servitude” for the Refuge is alleged to be 65 feet above the mean sea level (“MSL”). The court explained that the parties agree that the Corps has not in fact permanently flooded the refuge; the water may not be said to be navigable under this theory. Further, the unvegetated channel establishes the ordinary high-water mark of the Bayou; water outside of that channel is not navigable. Finally, the court held that Plaintiffs here fail to present even slight evidence concerning a commercial purpose for the channel in question. View "Newbold v. Kinder Morgan SNG Operator" on Justia Law

Honey Bum, a rival fast-fashion retailer, alleged that Fashion Nova organized a per se unlawful group boycott by threatening to stop purchasing from certain clothing vendors unless they, in turn, stopped selling to Honey Bum. The district court granted summary judgment on Honey Bum’s Sherman Act § 1 group boycott claim, concluding that Honey Bum failed to create a material dispute as to the existence of a horizontal agreement between the vendors themselves, to boycott Honey Bum. The district court also granted summary judgment on Honey Bum’s California business tort claims.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s summary judgment in favor of Fashion Nova, Inc., et al. in an antitrust action brought by Honey Bum, LLC. The panel held that Sherman Act Section 1 prohibits contracts, combinations, and conspiracies that unreasonably restrain trade. In determining the reasonableness of a restraint, two different kinds of liability standards are considered. Some restraints are unreasonable per se because they always or almost always tend to restrict competition and decrease output. Most restraints, however, are subject to the so-called Rule of Reason, a multi-step, burden-shifting framework. The panel held that a group boycott is an agreement among multiple firms not to deal with another firm (the target). Some group boycotts are per se unlawful, while others are not. The panel affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment on Honey Bum’s claim for tortious interference with prospective economic relations because that claim required a showing of independent unlawfulness. View "HONEY BUM, LLC V. FASHION NOVA, INC., ET AL" on Justia Law

Insureds – who operate an annual motorcycle rally in Pattersonville, New York (the “Harley Rendezvous”) – appealed from the district court’s entry of summary judgment in favor of Covington Specialty Insurance Company (“Covington”) in this insurance-coverage dispute. Specifically, the parties disagree as to Covington’s duties, under a general commercial liability policy issued to the Insureds (the “Policy”), to defend and indemnify the Insureds against personal-injury claims asserted in a separate, state-court action by two motorcycle riders who were struck by another attendee’s automobile at the Harley Rendezvous. The district court found that a provision of the Policy (the “Absolute Auto Exclusion”) unambiguously excluded liability coverage for automobile accidents, regardless of whether the Insureds themselves owned or operated the vehicle at issue. On appeal, the Insureds argued that the district court was bound by – and erroneously failed to follow – a case in which a New York intermediate appellate court found ambiguity in a similarly worded exclusion provision in a different insurance policy.   The Second Circuit affirmed and found that Grande Stone Quarry is inapposite here and that countless other decisions by New York courts support the district court’s reading of the Absolute Auto Exclusion. The court explained the district court’s “task” here was simply “to determine how the New York Court of Appeals would decide” the issue. Here, the record reflects that the district court carried out that task soundly and carefully. The court concluded that under New York law, the Absolute Auto Exclusion unambiguously precludes coverage of the Insureds’ defense and indemnity in the Underlying Action. View "Covington Specialty Ins. Co. v. Indian Lookout Country Club, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the order of the trial court granting judgment to the Estate of Daniel Keith Huck in this insurance dispute, holding that there was no error.Huck was killed by a motorist while he performed his job duties for the Village of Mount Pleasant. The Estate first received worker's compensation from Huck's employer's worker's compensation insurer (WC insurer) and then a settlement from the tortfeasor's insurer. By receiving the settlement from the tortfeasor the Estate was statutorily obligated to reimburse the WC insurer from the settlement. The Estate did as required and reimbursed the WC insurer $9,718.73 (the disputed amount). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Secura Supreme Insurance Company, from whom Huck had purchased an automobile insurance policy, was not statutorily authorized to reduce its liability limits by the total worker's compensation and tortfeasor settlement payments the Estate initially received but was obligated in part to reimburse. View "Secura Supreme Insurance Co. v. Estate of Huck" on Justia Law