Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

Duniver, lost his leg during a 2017 workplace accident. In 2019, Duniver filed a personal injury lawsuit seeking recovery from multiple defendants. Weeks later, Duniver filed for Chapter 13 bankruptcy protection and failed to disclose the personal injury lawsuit, answering “no” when asked whether he was suing anyone. He then checked “[y]es” in response to a question asking if he had “Other contingent or unliquidated claims of every nature, including counterclaims of the debtor and rights to set off claims.” Duniver listed: Workman’s Comp. On another form, he checked “[y]es” in response to: “Within 1 year before you filed for bankruptcy, were you a party in any lawsuit, court action, or administrative proceeding,” A collections action filed against Duniver was listed, but the personal injury case was not included.The defendants argued judicial estoppel prohibited Duniver from pursuing his personal injury lawsuit and that Duniver lacked standing to sue them where the injury claim belonged to the bankruptcy estate. Duniver then filed amended bankruptcy schedules disclosing his personal injury case. The bankruptcy case was dismissed. The circuit court granted the defendants summary judgment, finding Duniver “blatantly deceived” the bankruptcy trustee and that any claim would have to be pursued on behalf of the bankruptcy estate. The appellate court reversed. The Illinois Supreme Court agreed. Duniver had standing and the evidence failed to show an intent to deceive or mislead. View "Duniver v. Clark Material Handling Co." on Justia Law

General Motors (“GM”) installed Generation IV 5.3 Liter V8 Vortec 5300 LC9 engines (“Gen IV engine”) in seven different GMC and Chevrolet trucks and SUVs in model years 2010 to 2014 (the “affected vehicles”). In 2016, representatives from various States filed a putative class action alleging that the affected vehicles contain a defect that causes excess oil consumption and other engine damage (the “oil consumption defect”). Plaintiffs appealed only the dismissal of their Missouri Merchandising Practice Act (MMPA) claim, stating that “the sole issue presented on appeal is whether the district court improperly applied the concept of puffery to  their deceptive omissions claims under the MMPA.”   The Eighth Circuit reversed the dismissal of the MMPA claims. The court concluded that advertising “puffery” does not affect an MMPA claim based on omission of a material fact, at least in this case, and the court agreed that Plaintiffs’ Class Action Complaint alleges sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state an omissions claim to relief that is plausible on its face. View "Michael Tucker v. General Motors LLC" on Justia Law

W.S. alleged that a teacher at Myron L. Powell Elementary School, defendant Derek Hildreth, sexually assaulted him during the 1996-1997 school year when plaintiff was in sixth grade. Both parties agree that plaintiff’s claim accrued in 2016, when W.S. was about thirty years old. In January 2017, W.S. moved for leave to file a late notice of tort claim. The trial court denied W.S.’s motion without prejudice to W.S.’s refiling it to comply with the requirements of N.J.S.A. 59:8-9 within ninety days of the accrual of his cause of action. W.S. never refiled the motion or appealed the motion order. On December 1, 2019, several amendments to the Child Sexual Abuse Act (CSAA), Charitable Immunity Act (CIA), and Tort Claims Act (TCA) went into effect. In January 2020, W.S. sued defendants, Hildreth, and others, alleging violations of the CSAA and the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (LAD), as well as several common law claims. Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to file a TCA notice of claim within ninety days. The motion judge denied the motion, holding that the 2019 amendments applied to W.S.’s complaint and W.S. was therefore not required by the TCA to file a notice of claim. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed the Appellate Division, finding that the plain meaning of the relevant statutes dictated that child sexual abuse survivors who file a CSAA complaint against a public entity after December 1, 2019 -- even if their cause of action accrued much earlier -- need not file a TCA notice of claim before filing suit. View "W.S. v. Hildreth" on Justia Law

Appellee a middle school teacher in Pender County, North Carolina, when she was physically attacked by a special education student in her language arts class. There is no dispute that the student was known to have been violent on prior occasions. At the time of the incident involving Appellee, Appellant was the principal of the school where the attack occurred.   Appellee asserted the following five 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 claims: (1) a substantive due process claim; (2) a deliberate indifference claim; (3) a supervisory liability claim against Superintendent Hill; (4) a claim seeking personal liability against Superintendent Hill; and (5) a claim seeking personal liability against Appellant. Relevant here, the personal liability claim against Appellant alleges that Appellant knew or should have known that her actions and inactions could have led to a violation of Appellee’s constitutional rights.   The Fourth Circuit reversed and remanded. The court held that Appellee failed to sufficiently allege that Appellant violated her constitutional rights, thus Appellant is entitled to qualified immunity. The court explained that here, Appellee’s state-created danger claim centers on a series of alleged choices or inactions by Appellant which are far removed from TB’s physical attack on Appellee. Specifically, Appellee attempts to recast Appellant’s knowledge of TB’s prior acts of violence and creation of the staffing schedule which required Appellant to teach TB on the day of the incident -- without a second teacher in her classroom -- as affirmative acts. But Appellee fails to point to any action by Appellant which created the danger that resulted in Appellee’s injuries. View "Kimberly Burns-Fisher v. Anna Romero-Lehrer" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court granting Defendant's motion for a directed verdict against Plaintiffs on their claims for negligence, holding that the district court did not err in granting a directed verdict or in instructing the jury to disregard the testimony of Plaintiffs' expert.Plaintiffs, Alpha Wealth Advisors, LLC and Michael Hall, sued Defendant for negligence following a traffic accident, alleging that they lost commissions because, for several weeks, Hall's injuries from the accident kept him from meeting with clients. The district court granted Defendant's motion for a directed verdict against Plaintiffs on those claims because the evidence was insufficient to submit those claims to a jury. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in granting a directed verdict or in instructing the jury to disregard the testimony of Plaintiffs' expert. View "Alpha Wealth Advisors v. Cook" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court granting a summary judgment rejecting Plaintiffs' negligence claim against a university, holding that the district court did not err in granting summary judgment.The university student in this case, a soccer player, was injured while he engaged in a mandatory strength and conditioning workout. The student and his mother (together, Plaintiffs) sued the university, alleging negligence. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the university, ruling the claim was barred by the "Assumption of Risk and Waiver of Liability Release" signed by the student and his mother before he started school. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the release was valid and enforceable and relieved the university of liability for its ordinary negligence; and (2) the district court did not err in granting summary judgment for Plaintiffs. View "Sinu v. Concordia University" on Justia Law

Residents of the Royal Palm Village Mobile Home Park in Haines City, Florida, sued the Park’s owners in federal court. The residents alleged that the owners had engaged in fraud by, among other things, illegally passing on costs to the residents, embellishing lot descriptions to justify increased rents, and falsely promising to upgrade roads and other common areas. The residents filed an amended complaint alleging violations of a slightly different collection of state and federal statutes: four counts under both the federal and Florida RICO statutes—as well as one under the ADA. The owners moved to dismiss. The district court dismissed the amended complaint for essentially the same reasons that it had dismissed the initial complaint. The owners now appeal the district court’s rejection of their fee requests pertaining to the first and second amended complaints. Those complaints, the owners argue, were also “to enforce” the FMHA because the residents predicated the RICO claims in those complaints on violations of the FMHA.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling. The court explained that here the alleged FMHA violations set out in the residents’ amended complaints were not independent legal claims, but rather components of other claims (e.g., the RICO claims). The amended complaints did not seek any relief under the FMHA. Nor did they request compliance with the FMHA. Those complaints, therefore, were not “proceeding[s] to enforce provisions” of the FMHA. The district court correctly denied fees to the owners as to those complaints under Section 723.068. View "Royal Palm Village Residents, Inc., et al v. Monica Slider, et al" on Justia Law

Delaura Norg called 911 seeking emergency medical assistance for her husband, Fred. She gave the 911 dispatcher her correct address, which the dispatcher relayed to emergency responders from the Seattle Fire Department (SFD). The Norgs’ apartment building was three blocks away from the nearest SFD station, but it took emergency responders over 15 minutes to arrive. This delay occurred because the SFD units failed to verify the Norgs’ address and, instead, went to a nearby nursing home based on the mistaken assumption that the Norgs lived there. The Norgs sued the City for negligence, alleging that SFD’s delayed response aggravated their injuries. The City pleaded the public duty doctrine as an affirmative defense and both parties moved for summary judgment on the question of duty. The trial court granted partial summary judgment in the Norgs’ favor and struck the City’s affirmative defense. The Court of Appeals affirmed on interlocutory review. The Washington Supreme Court held that the trial court properly granted partial summary judgment to the Norgs on the question of duty. In doing so, the Court expressed no opinion on the remaining elements of the Norgs’ claim (breach, causation, and damages). The Supreme Court thus affirmed the Court of Appeals and remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Norg v. City of Seattle" on Justia Law

Respondent Stephany Connelly was a passenger in a vehicle driven by co-worker Freya Trezona during the course and scope of their employment when Trezona negligently caused the accident, injuring Connelly. Because workers’ compensation benefits did not fully redress Connelly’s injuries, she made a claim for bodily injury and uninsured motorist (UM) benefits with her own insurance carrier and with Trezona’s carrier. Both companies denied the claim, contending Connelly’s sole remedy lay with the South Carolina Workers’ Compensation Act. Connelly filed suit seeking a declaration that both policies provided coverage. The parties agreed the dispute turned on the interpretation of the phrase “legally entitled to recover” found in the UM statute. The trial court ruled in favor of Connelly, and the court of appeals concurred the phrase was legally ambiguous. The South Carolina Supreme Court found the phrase unambiguous: the amount a plaintiff is “legally entitled to recover” under a UM provision of an insurance policy is the amount for which the plaintiff has secured a judgment against the at-fault defendant. Because the Act prevents Connelly from ever becoming “legally entitled to recover” from Trezona under the facts of this case, the Court reversed the trial court. View "Connelly v. Main Street America Group" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an investor and venture capitalist and the CEO of InterOil Corporation (“InterOil”), developed a business relationship. Throughout that relationship, Plaintiff (and “entities controlled and beneficially owned by him”) provided loans, cash advances, and funds to the CEO and InterOil. Plaintiff and the CEO continued to have a business relationship until 2016, at which point the CEO’s actions and words made Plaintiff concerned he would not receive his shares back from the CEO. In late 2017, as part of a larger suit against the CEO, Plaintiff and Aster Panama sued the J.P. Morgan Defendants for (1) breach of trust and fiduciary duty, (2) negligence, and (3) conspiracy to commit theft. The district court granted summary judgment on all counts relating to the J.P. Morgan defendants and awarded them attorneys’ fees under the Texas Theft Liability Act (“TTLA”).   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. Under Texas law, the only question is whether the J.P. Morgan Defendants expressly accepted a duty to ensure the stocks were kept in trust for Plaintiff or Aster Panama. That could have been done by express agreement or by the bank’s acceptance of a deposit that contained writing that set forth “by clear direction what the bank is required to do.” Texas courts require a large amount of evidence to show that a bank has accepted such a duty. Here, no jury could find that the proffered statements and emails were sufficient evidence of intent from the J.P. Morgan Defendants to show an express agreement that they “owe[d] a duty to restrict the use of the funds for certain purposes.” View "Civelli v. J.P. Morgan Chase" on Justia Law