Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of two California statutes— Civil Code section 3333.2, which caps the number of damages a plaintiff may recoup for noneconomic losses at $250,000 (Civ. Code, Section 3333.2, subd. (b)); and Business and Professions Code section 6146, which sets limits on the amount of contingency fees a law firm may charge in representing a plaintiff in a professional negligence action against a health care provider. (Civ. Code, Section 3333.2 and Bus. & Prof. Code, Section 6146 are sometimes referred to collectively as the challenged statutes.)   The Fifth Appellate District affirmed the trial court’s judgment of dismissal. The court held that Plaintiffs lack standing to challenge civil code section 3333.2 and Business and Professions Code Section 6146. Further, the court held that the heirs do not have standing because the heir’s alleged injuries are insufficient to confer upon them standing to challenge the statutes in question. Moreover, the court could not conclude Plaintiffs will suffer hardship if declaratory relief is withheld. View "Dominguez v. Bonta" on Justia Law

The Port of Corpus Christi Authority of Nueces County, Texas (a governmental entity), sued The Port of Corpus Christi, L.P.(a private entity) and Kenneth Berry in state court. The claims were for trespass and encroachment on its submerged land that resulted from dredge operations occurring in a ship channel. Defendants removed the case, but the district court remanded, holding there was no basis for removal either under the federal officer removal statute or due to a federal question.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in denying removal on the basis of the federal officer removal statute. Further, the court explained that it agreed with the district court that the Port Authority’s complaint “disclaims any issue regarding permit compliance, stating its claim exclusively in terms of Texas state law: common law trespass.” The Port Authority did not allege a violation of either the Clean Water Act or the Rivers and Harbors Act. View "Port of Corpus v. Port of Corpus" on Justia Law

In a case involving the denial of coverage for an automobile accident, the Fifth Circuit addressed whether uninsured motorist coverage can be denied simply because the driver, who was the son of the insured, was not listed on the policy? The court answered that question “no.” The other is whether the policy can be voided because the insured committed a material misrepresentation by failing in her application for insurance to name, as required, those of driving age who lived in her household? The court answered that question, “yes.”   The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling granting Viking Insurance’s motion for summary judgment in Plaintiffs’ suit seeking damages for a wrongful denial of benefits. The court concluded that if an insurer declines to exercise the greater power to void a policy, it still retains the lesser power to exercise a contractual right to deny coverage. The court explained that here, a knowing misstatement in the application about the drivers in the household was material if it would have caused Viking either not to issue the policy or to increase the premium. The court accepted that materiality is not affected by the relationship between the false statement and the specific coverage being sought in litigation. It is enough that the falsity was material to the decision of the company to issue the policy at the agreed price. Consequently, Viking could have voided the policy. By not voiding, Viking’s policy remained in effect. Accordingly, Viking had the right to deny Plaintiffs’ claim. View "Bradley v. Viking Insurance" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the district court dismissing with prejudice Plaintiff's petition asserting claims arising under the Iowa Municipal Tort Claims Act (IMTCA), holding that the district court erred in dismissing the case with prejudice after Plaintiff had already voluntarily dismissed his case without prejudice.Iowa Code 670.4A sets forth a qualified immunity defense to and heightened pleading requirements for claims arising under the IMTCA. Plaintiff sued the City of Waterloo and one of its police officers, alleging that the officer shot him without justification. Defendants moved to dismiss the petition pursuant to section 670.4A. The day before a scheduled hearing on the motion Plaintiff dismissed his petition without prejudice. The district court granted Defendants' motion to set aside the dismissal with prejudice based on Plaintiff's alleged failure to meet the statutory pleading requirement. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that nothing in the language of section 670.4A required dismissal with prejudice. View "Alvarez-Victoriano v. City of Waterloo" on Justia Law

In this wrongful death action, the Supreme Court approved the decision of the Fifth District Court of Appeal reversing as excessive a punitive damages award that exceeded the net compensatory damages award by a ratio of 106.7 to 1, holding that the trial court abused its discretion by denying remittitur of the excessive award.The Fifth District certified to the Supreme Court the question of whether a trial court in a wrongful death action abuses its discretion by denying remittitur of a punitive damages award "that does not bear a reasonable relation to the amount of damages proved and the injury suffered by the statutory beneficiaries." The Supreme Court answered the question in the positive and held that the trial court improperly denied remittitur of the excessive award because no reasonable trial court could have concluded that the necessary relation existed in this case. View "Coates v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs are U.S. service members wounded in terrorist attacks in Iraq and the families and estates of service members killed in such attacks. They appealed from the dismissal of their claims under the Antiterrorism Act (the “ATA”) as amended by the Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act (the “JASTA”), against various financial institutions in the United States and abroad (the “Banks”). As relevant to this appeal, Plaintiffs alleged that the Banks conspired with and aided and abetted Iranian entities to circumvent sanctions imposed by the United States and channel funds to terrorist groups that killed or injured U.S. service members. The district court dismissed Plaintiffs’ JASTA conspiracy claims primarily because Plaintiffs failed to plausibly plead a direct connection between the Banks and the terrorist groups. The district court also declined to consider Plaintiffs’ JASTA aiding-and-abetting claims because they were raised for the first time in Plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration.   The Second Circuit explained that while it disagreed with the district court’s primary reason for dismissing Plaintiffs’ JASTA conspiracy claims, it affirmed the district court’s judgment because Plaintiffs failed to adequately allege that the Banks conspired – either directly or indirectly – with the terrorist groups, or that the terrorist attacks that killed or injured the service members were in furtherance of the alleged conspiracy to circumvent U.S. sanctions. The court agreed with the district court that Plaintiffs forfeited their JASTA aiding-and-abetting claims by raising them for the first time in a motion for reconsideration. View "Freeman v. HSBC Holdings PLC" on Justia Law

A child was severely injured while in his father’s care. The father did not immediately seek medical help and gave conflicting explanations of how his son’s injury occurred. An Alaska superior court found probable cause to believe that the child was in need of aid, limited the father’s contact with the child and mother, and awarded the mother custody. A few months later the father was arrested outside the family home, and evidence suggested that the mother had allowed contact between him and their son in violation of military and civil no-contact orders. The superior court adjudicated the boy as a child in need of aid based on the actions of both parents. The parents separately appealed the adjudication. But after the appeals were filed, the Office of Children’s Services (OCS) informed the superior court that the child could safely be returned to his parents’ care, and the superior court closed the case. On appeal the parents argue that their appeals were mooted by the superior court’s dismissal of OCS’s case and that the Alaska Supreme Court should decline to hear the appeals and vacate the adjudication order to avoid the potential for collateral consequences. In the alternative, they argued that if this case was heard on the merits the Supreme Court should find that the superior court erred in adjudicating their son as a child in need of aid. The Court concluded it should hear the appeals on the merits, and therefore did not vacate the adjudication order. On the merits, the Supreme Court affirmed the order. View "Reed S. v. Alaska Department of Health & Social Services" on Justia Law

A Vermont trial court determined that both the Town of Isle La Motte and the road commissioner Shelby Turner were entitled to qualified immunity and granted their motions for summary judgment after concluding that decisions regarding road alterations were discretionary, “involv[ing] an element of judgment or choice,” rather than ministerial, meaning “prescribe[d].” The underlying tort action in this appeal followed an August 2016 motor vehicle accident in the Town: Plaintiff Paul Civetti was driving a propane truck on Main Street when he lost control of the vehicle causing it to roll over and come to rest on its roof. Plaintiff argued defendants were negligent in failing to widen Main Street in accordance with Vermont Town Road and Bridge Standards, causing his accident. The State of Vermont promulgated Town Road and Bridge Standards to serve as guidance for municipalities when they decide to construct or alter a town highway. Plaintiff filed a negligence claim against defendants the Town of Isle La Motte and Turner, in his capacity as road commissioner, seeking damages for plaintiff’s injuries. The parties disputed what authority, if any, the Town Selectboard delegated to the road commissioner to construct, lay out, and alter Town roadways. The Vermont Supreme Court agreed with the trial court that deciding whether to widen Main Street was discretionary, thus entitling both the Town and the road commissioner to qualified immunity. The Court therefore affirmed. View "Civetti v.Town of Isle La Motte, et al." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals reversing the decision of the trial court granting summary judgment in favor of the company alleged to be a deceased worker's employer and dismissing this vicarious liability case, holding that the court of appeals erred.An oilfield worker was involved in a fatal accident as he was driving to the oilfield drilling site after completing personal errands. At issue was whether the court of appeals erroneously relied upon the "special mission" exception in declining to apply the general rule that an employer is not vicariously liable for negligence arising from employee travel to and from work. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that a personal trip for groceries does not fall within the special mission exception to the general rule that an employer is not vicariously liable for an employee's negligent acts while the employee travels to and from work. View "Cameron International Corp. v. Martinez" on Justia Law

In this personal injury case, the Supreme Court held that a governmental defendant retains its immunity from suit as to a claim that exceeds the applicable damages cap,Plaintiff was crossing the street when he was hit by a bus driven by an employee of Defendant, the Gulf Coast Center, and sued Defendant for his resulting injuries. Defendant answered, claiming that it was a governmental unit, that it was protected from suit and liability by governmental immunity, and that its liability, if any, was limited by the Texas Tort Claims Act. The jury found Defendant negligent and awarded Plaintiff $216,000. Defendant appealed, arguing that the Act capped its liability at $100,000. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Act waives a governmental unit's immunity from suit only to the extent the act waives it immunity from liability, and therefore, courts lack jurisdiction to render a judgment that exceeds the applicable damages cap under Tex. Civ. Proc. & Rem. Code 101.023. View "Gulf Coast Center v. Curry" on Justia Law