Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

Valley Hospital admitted Ann as a resident to recover from hip surgery. Weeks later, Valley discharged Ann to an assisted living facility, where she died five days later. This suit alleges that Ann, unable due to dementia to communicate her needs, lost 40 pounds and became severely dehydrated at Valley, resulting in acute renal failure and that Valley, billing Medicare until her eligibility expired, "dumped" her at a non-medical facility, "misrepresenting to the family and facility that [Ann] was stable and healthy enough” for the transfer.Valley submitted an arbitration agreement that John had signed on Ann’s behalf. The agreement stated that residents were not required to sign as a condition of admission. The court sent the suit to arbitration. The plaintiffs paid their portion of the arbitration filing fee. Valley did not timely pay the balance. More than 30 days after the deadline, citing Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.98, the plaintiffs moved to vacate the stay of litigation and to withdraw from arbitration. Valley paid its fees that day. The court of appeal affirmed an order permitting the resumption of litigation. The statute provides that a business pursuing arbitration under a pre-dispute arbitration agreement is in material breach of that agreement—thereby waiving its right to arbitrate—if it fails to timely pay its share of arbitration fees; it does not require an arbitrator’s determination of default and it is not limited to only to mandatory pre-dispute agreements. View "Williams v. West Coast Hospitals, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court finding that Tonya Edwards and Jennifer Edwards failed to state a claim for contribution or indemnity and denying the Edwardses' claim for subrogation, holding that there was no error.The Edwardses, as assignees of Douglas County, brought complaints against the estate of Kenneth Clark seeking to recover expenses that County incurred in defending and settling lawsuits the Edwardses brought against it for allegedly responding negligently to acts of assault and battery committed by Clark. The district court concluded that the County was immune under the Political Subdivisions Tort Claims Act from claims arising out of battery, and therefore, the County did not have a common liability with Clark's estate. The court thus denied the claims for contribution or indemnity and for subrogation. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in dismissing the Edwardses' complaint. View "Edwards v. Estate of Clark" on Justia Law

In 2011, plaintiff R. Kemp was convicted, released from prison, and placed on parole. In 2020, Amazon.com, Inc. (Amazon) offered Kemp a job in Sacramento. Defendant Accurate Background LLC (Accurate) provided a background report to Amazon revealing Kemp’s criminal conviction. Amazon then withdrew its job offer. Because Kemp’s 2011 conviction predated the 2020 report by more than seven years, he filed a complaint alleging Accurate: (1) violated the California Investigative Consumer Reporting Agencies Act (ICRAA); (2) violated the California Consumer Credit Reporting Agencies Act (CCRAA); and (3) derivatively violated the state’s Unfair Competition Law (UCL). Accurate filed a demurrer: Kemp’s parole ended in 2014, which predated the 2020 report by less than seven years. Accurate argued under the ICRAA and the CCRAA, “the term ‘parole’ refers to the end of the parole period,” thus barring liability. Alternatively, Accurate argued the federal Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) preempted the state ICRAA, and therefore Kemp’s ICRAA claim was barred as a matter of law. The trial court overruled Accurate’s demurrer, in part, finding “the plain meaning of ‘from the date of . . . parole’ refers to the start date of conditional release.” The court sustained Accurate’s demurrer, in part, finding “the FCRA preempts the ICRAA claim.” Accurate and Kemp both filed petitions for extraordinary writ relief to the Court of Appeal. The Court held the phrase "from the date of parole" referred to the start date of parole, and the FCRA did not preempt Kemp’s ICRAA claim. Thus, the appellate court directed the trial court to vacate its prior order, which partially sustained Accurate’s demurrer, and to issue a new order overruling the demurrer in its entirety. View "Kemp v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

John MM. Doe, by and through his guardian ad litem, C.M. (Doe’s mother), and B.S. (Doe’s father) (collectively real parties in interest), sued petitioner Victor Valley Union High School District (the district) for negligence and other causes of action arising from an alleged sexual assault on Doe while he was a high school student. During discovery, real parties in interest learned video that captured some of the events surrounding the alleged sexual assault had been erased. Real parties in interest moved the superior court for terminating sanctions or, in the alternative, evidentiary and issue sanctions against the district under Code of Civil Procedure section 2023.030. The trial court concluded the erasure of the video was the result of negligence, and not intentional wrongdoing, and denied the request for terminating sanctions. However, the court granted the request for evidentiary, issue, and monetary sanctions because it concluded that, even before the lawsuit was filed, the district should have reasonably anticipated the alleged sexual assault would result in litigation and, therefore, the district was under a duty to preserve all relevant evidence including the video. On appeal in the Court of Appeal's original jurisdiction, the district argued the trial court applied the wrong legal standard when it ruled the district had the duty to preserve the video before it was erased and, therefore, that the district was not shielded from sanctions by the safe-harbor provision of section 2023.030(f). After considering real parties in interest's opposition to the petition and the district's reply, the Court of Appeal found the extant record did not support the trial court’s ruling that, at the time the video was erased, the district was on notice that litigation about Doe’s alleged sexual assault was reasonably foreseeable. The Court granted the district's petition and directed the trial court to vacate its sanctions order and reconsider its ruling. View "Victor Valley Union High School Dist. v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of court of appeals denying a writ of mandamus sought by Waste Management of Ohio, Inc. ordering the Industrial Commission of Ohio to reverse its decision granting T.A.'s application for benefits, holding that the Commission did not abuse its discretion.Travis Gelhausen died shortly after getting into an accident while driving a truck for Waste Management of Ohio, Inc. T.A. applied for benefits on behalf of her and Gelhausen's minor daughter, S.G., for Gelhausen's loss of the use of his arms and legs before his death. The Commission granted the application. Waste Management sought a writ of mandamus ordering the Commission either to vacate its award or to limit the award. The court of appeals denied the writ. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Commission's award was proper. View "State ex rel. Waste Management of Ohio, Inc. v. Industrial Commission" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming the judgment of the trial court granting summary judgment for employees of a children's services agency and dismissing the wrongful death action against them, holding that genuine issues of material fact existed, barring summary judgment.Appellant, the grandmother of Harmony Carsey, who was two years old when she died at her mother's home, brought a wrongful death action against employees of Perry County Children's Services (Appellees). Appellees moved for summary judgment, arguing that as children's services workers, they were immune from liability because they had not acted recklessly or wantonly or violated their duty of care. The trial court granted the motion, concluding that Appellees were immune from liability. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that there were genuine issues of material fact as to whether the conduct of one or more of the agency employees was reckless or wanton. View "Smathers v. Glass" on Justia Law

Plaintiff claimed a law enforcement officer violated his Fourth Amendment rights by punching him in the face, knocking him to the pavement, then standing over him for a time. The officer punched Plaintiff because he had not moved his vehicle quickly enough at an airport passenger pickup area. The district court dismissed on the pleadings.   The Fifth Circuit reversed the judgment for the officer, and affirmed judgment for the city. The court concluded that the allegations in the complaint present a plausible claim that, viewed objectively, the excessive force used by the law enforcement officer was not just to insist the vehicle be moved, but it constituted a seizure that would prolong the encounter. On the other hand, Plaintiff does not sufficiently allege a municipal policy to support a claim against the city defendant. View "Vardeman v. City of Houston" on Justia Law

Plaintiff alleged that toxic chemicals used during the carpet manufacturing process have been allowed to seep into the rivers that supply drinking water to communities near Dalton, including Rome, Georgia and the rest of Floyd County. On behalf of himself and a proposed class of water subscribers and ratepayers, he sued Dalton Utilities, a municipal corporation that operates Dalton’s wastewater treatment system, for violating the Clean Water Act and for creating a public nuisance. His lawsuit claims that Dalton Utilities has caused the City of Rome’s domestic water supply to be contaminated with dangerously high levels of toxic chemicals.   The question before the Eleventh Circuit was whether Dalton Utilities is entitled to municipal immunity from Plaintiff’s nuisance abatement (injunctive relief) claim. The Eleventh Circuit denied Plaintiff’s motion to dismiss Dalton Utilities’ appeal for lack of jurisdiction. However, the court affirmed district court’s order denying Dalton Utilities’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s nuisance abatement claim on municipal immunity grounds. The court explained that at oral argument counsel for Dalton Utilities conceded that if Phillips is still good law, Plaintiff has properly alleged a Phillips kind of nuisance claim for personal injury. The court agreed and held that municipal immunity does not shield Dalton Utilities from Plaintiff’s nuisance abatement claim. View "Jarrod Johnson v. Water, Light, and Sinking Fund Commission of City of Dalton" on Justia Law

This insurance coverage dispute arises from underlying litigation in a single-vehicle accident that led to a lawsuit by J.O. against his employer, Riata Cattle Company, Inc. (“Riata”). J.O. sued Riata in Texas state court, alleging that he suffered bodily injury when Riata’s truck, which he was driving, malfunctioned and crashed due to Riata’s failure to repair and maintain it. J.O. also alleged that Riata committed negligence and gross negligence by failing to provide him with safety equipment, failing to warn him of any dangers, failing to inspect or repair the equipment, and other negligence theories. Riata sought coverage defense from its auto liability insurer, National Liability & Fire Insurance Company (“National Liability”), which is currently defending Riata in the underlying litigation under a reservation of rights letter. National Liability subsequently filed a declaratory judgment action in federal court, seeking a determination that it owes Riata neither a defense nor indemnity under the insurance policy (the “Policy”). National Liability contends it is entitled to a declaratory judgment because the Policy excludes coverage for employees of Riata. Riata seems to concede this argument but contends that the “Form F” endorsement on the Policy compels National Liability to defend and indemnify Riata.The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that J.O. is an employee of Riata, and according to the applicable Policy, National Liability is excluded from providing insurance coverage to Riata for the underlying litigation. And Form F does not change the employee exclusion in the Policy. View "Ntl L & Fire Ins Co v. Riata Cattle Co" on Justia Law

The First Circuit vacated the judgment of the district court substituting the United States as a defendant in the place of the physician that Plaintiff originally sued for wrongful death and vacated the district court's subsequent grant of the Government's motion to dismiss the amended complaint for failure to state a claim, holding that gaps in the evidentiary record must be filled by further proceedings in the district court.Plaintiff brought a wrongful death action in state court alleging medical malpractice against a physician who worked for a federally-funded health center. Plaintiff's decedent, the patient, was unaffiliated with the health center. When the United States removed the action to federal court it sought to substitute itself for the physician as a defendant. The district court invoked the Federal Employees Liability Reform and Tort Compensation Act of 1988 (the Westfall Act), 28 U.S.C. 2679, made the substitution, and dismissed the complaint. The First Circuit vacated the judgment below, holding that because the district court repudiated its earlier reliance on the Waterfall Act, new issues that have emerged must now be resolved. View "O'Brien v. United States" on Justia Law