Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court reversed in part the opinion of the court of appeals affirming the trial court's judgment rejecting Defendants' requests to apply a settlement against the award against it and to pay the future damages in periodic payments, holding that the lower courts erred. Jo Ann Puente underwent gastric-bypass surgery and developed complications, leading her to a debilitating brain disorder. Puente, who died while this appeal was pending, and her family sued several healthcare providers, seeking damages. Puente settled with certain defendants prior to trial. After trial, the jury entered judgment for Plaintiffs. The remaining defendants (Defendants) moved for a settlement credit, arguing that the $3.3 million settlement should reduce Puente's recovery. The trial court rejected that argument, granted credit of $200,000 for the settlement, and denied Defendants' motion for periodic payment of the award for future medical expenses. The court of appeals largely affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Chapter 33 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code required a credit for the settlement; and (2) the Texas Medical Liability Act required the trial court to order that at least some of the future damages be paid periodically. View "Virlar v. Puente" on Justia Law

In this interlocutory appeal in a case involving claims for injuries resulting from a high-speed chase, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the district court denying the State's motion for summary judgment, holding that the State was entitled to summary judgment under Iowa Code 321.231.Law enforcement officer Brett Tjepkes was chasing Scott Grimes, the perpetrator of a multi-state crime spree, when Grimes crashed head-on with another vehicle. Amber Martinez, the sole occupant of the car he hit, suffered serious injuries. Martinez brought suit, alleging that the Officer Tjepkes acted negligently, causing her injuries. The State moved for summary judgment, arguing that Tjepkes could not be held legally liable as the cause of the crash. The district court denied the motion, finding that a disputed issue of fact existed as to whether Tjepkes's actions were reckless. The State brought this interlocutory appeal. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that no reasonable jury could find that Tjepkes's decision to pursue Grimes was reckless. View "Martinez v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court continuing an ex parte sexual assault protection order, holding that the sexual assault protection order was properly continued.Amanda F. was granted an ex parte sexual assault protection order against Daniel K. At the close of the evidence, the district court found that a statutory sexual assault offense had occurred, concluded that the risk of future harm was not a consideration under Neb. Rev. Stat. 28-311.11, the sexual assault protection order statute, and that the protection order should remain in effect for a period of one year. The Supreme Court affirmed the continuation of the sexual assault protection order, holding that Daniel did not carry his burden to show cause why the protection order should not remain in effect. View "Amanda F. v. Daniel K." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the compensation court concluding that a claimant who sustains injuries along the same extremity sustains an injury to a single member for workers' compensation purposes, holding that the compensation court's decision was based on an incorrect interpretation of Neb. Rev. Stat. 48-121(3).Claimant injured her right wrist and right elbow upon falling at work. Claimant filed a claim for benefits, asserting that the workers' compensation court should award her permanent disability benefits based on her loss of earning capacity. At issue was section 48-121(3), which provides for discretionary loss of earning capacity where there is a "loss or loss of use of more than one member of parts of more than one member[.]" The compensation court refused to consider an award based on the loss of earning capacity because "an injury to the wrist and the elbow of the same arm is still an injury to a single member and does not entitle an employee to a loss of earning power.” The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the compensation court erred in its interpretation of section 48-121(3). View "Espinoza v. Job Source USA, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals holding that the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act, which removes immunity for certain injuries caused by the negligent acts of an employee, lifts immunity for grossly negligent and reckless employee actions in addition to merely negligent ones, holding that the Act's waiver of immunity for "negligent" acts includes only ordinary negligence, not gross negligence or recklessness.Steven Lawson hit a "rock embankment" after a mudslide washed away part of Highway 70 on Clinch Mountain in Hawkins County, flipped down the mountain, and died before help arrived. Plaintiff brought this wrongful death action action against Hawkins County, the Hawkins County Emergency Communications District and the Hawkins County Emergency Management Agency, alleging that Defendants' grossly negligent and reckless conduct caused Lawson's death. The trial court granted Defendants' motions to dismiss, concluding that the Act gave Defendants immunity from recklessness claims and that the public-duty doctrine barred any negligence claims. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the court of appeals erred by holding that the Act allows a plaintiff to sue a governmental entity for employee conduct that exceeds mere negligence. View "Lawson v. Hawkins County" on Justia Law

In Corso v. Merrill, 119 N.H. 647 (1979), the New Hampshire Supreme Court held that a plaintiff need not be in the zone of danger to recover for negligent infliction of emotional distress. Instead, the Court announced a new rule intended to compensate plaintiffs who were not in the zone of danger but nevertheless suffered emotional distress as a result of a defendant’s negligence. In this case, the Court applied the Corso standard to allegations involving medical professionals’ negligent misdiagnosis, which resulted in the death of Lisa Chartier. Lisa’s husband, Marc Chartier, brought this action against defendants, Apple Therapy of Londonderry, LLC (Apple Therapy), Four Seasons Orthopaedic Center, PLLC d/b/a New Hampshire Orthopaedic Center (Four Seasons Orthopaedic), and Dr. Heather Killie. He appealed a superior court order granting defendants’ motion for partial summary judgment with respect to his negligent infliction of emotional distress claim. The Court found plaintiff alleged he suffered severe emotional distress manifested by physical symptoms from contemporaneously perceiving the sudden, unexpected, and shocking suffering and death of his wife. Under these circumstances, Lisa’s pulmonary embolism constituted the “accident” in line with Corso, and subsequent cases. The Court held the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to defendants on the basis that Marc’s emotional distress was too attenuated from defendants’ negligent conduct to permit recovery. On remand, the trial court was instructed to apply the elements of negligent infliction of emotional distress in a manner consistent with the Court’s opinion. View "Chartier v. Apple Therapy of Londonderry, LLC, et al." on Justia Law

After Plaintiff prevailed at trial and was awarded $58,240 in damages, plus post-judgment interest, Plaintiff sought attorneys’ fees in the amount of $701,706, litigation costs in the amount of $43,089.48, and additional filing and transcript-preparation fees in the amount of $1,620.45. The district court ultimately awarded attorneys’ fees in the amount of $570,771 and filing and transcript-preparation fees in the amount of $1,620.45 but denied the request for litigation costs. Defendant BNSF Railway Company (BNSF) appealed, asserting that the district court abused its discretion with respect to the award of attorneys’ fees.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, and reduced the award of fees by $103,642.50. BNSF first argued that the award of fees is unreasonable because Plaintiff only achieved limited success. The court reasoned that Plaintiff undisputedly prevailed at trial on his FRSA claim. As this claim was at the heart of Plaintiff’s case, his degree of success is significant, regardless of the fate of his FELA claim or another theory of liability underlying his FRSA claim.   However, the court found that BNSF’s request for the reduction of fees related to the first trial, however, has merit. The court wrote that Plaintiff undisputedly offered the jury instruction that contained a legal error based on Eighth Circuit precedent, which required vacatur of the judgment. The court agreed with BNSF that Plaintiff is not entitled to fees that were unreasonably caused by his own legal error. View "Edward Blackorby v. BNSF Railway Company" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals reversing the order of the circuit court granting summary judgment to Jefferson County Board of Education (BOE) and dismissing this lawsuit on immunity grounds, holding that the BOE was entitled to summary judgment on its immunity claim.A Western High School student, through his mother and next friend, brought suit against the BOE and Brian Raho, the assistant principal at the high school, for assault and battery. The trial court granted summary judgment for the BOE and Raho, finding that the BOE was entitled to sovereign immunity and that Raho was entitled to qualified official immunity. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals' opinion to the extent that the court reversed the summary judgment to the BOE, holding that, while the trial court cited to the incorrect type of immunity, it correctly found that the BOE was immune from suit. View "Jefferson County Public Schools v. Tudor" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals reversing the judgment of the trial court dismissing Plaintiff's negligence claim against Wal-Mart, holding that the trial court properly held that the volume of third-party criminal acts on Wal-Mart's premises in the past did not create a duty of reasonable care to protect Plaintiff against the crime she suffered.Plaintiff was parked in a Wal-Mart parking lot when she was attacked and robbed by two unknown men in her car. Plaintiff brought this action alleging that Wal-Mart was negligent by not having a security presence outside the store to protect patrons from third-party criminal acts. The trial court granted summary judgment for Wal-Mart, concluding that the store owed Plaintiff no duty. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the court of appeals improperly extended this Court's holding in Shelton v. Kentucky Easter Seals Society, Inc., 413 S.W.3d 901 (Ky. 2013), and incorrectly reversed the trial court's grant of summary judgment in doing so. View "Walmart, Inc. v. Reeves" on Justia Law

Jesse Keidel appealed a district court judgment affirming an administrative law judge’s (ALJ) decision denying Keidel permanent partial impairment (PPI) benefits. In May 1996, Keidel suffered a work-related injury to the meniscus of his left knee. Keidel had surgery in December 1996. In October 1997, Keidel underwent a second surgery to his left knee, a high tibial osteotomy. The doctor performing an independent medical evaluation in May 1998 opined that Keidel’s left knee condition was a “combination of his significant preexisting left knee degenerative joint disease and the work-related permanent aggravation.” Following a permanent impairment evaluation, WSI denied Keidel a PPI award because Keidel’s 15% whole body impairment was below the statutory 16% threshold for an impairment award. In January 2019, Keidel had left total knee replacement surgery. In June 2020, Keidel underwent a second permanent impairment evaluation. The evaluating doctor, Dr. Redington, determined Keidel had a 24% whole person impairment for the left total knee replacement. "Giving [Keidel] the benefit of the doubt, I will apportion 50% of the impairment rating of the left knee to pre-existing conditions." In November 2020, WSI denied an impairment award for Keidel’s left knee because his overall impairment rating after apportionment after the second evaluation was 12%, which was below the 14% threshold for an impairment award under then current version of N.D.C.C. § 65-05-12.2. At a hearing, Keidel argued the apportionment of his left knee impairment due to preexisting arthritis was litigated and decided in a 2000 hearing. Keidel argued administrative res judicata prohibited WSI from litigating whether his permanent impairment could be apportioned to a preexisting condition. The ALJ and district court concluded administrative res judicata did not apply. Finding no error in that judgment, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed. View "Keidel v. WSI, et al." on Justia Law