Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

In this dispute over an arbitration clause within a contract, the Supreme Court held that the minor children who joined Plaintiffs, their parents, in bringing this action seeking damages for construction defects in their home may be compelled to arbitrate along with their parents on the basis of direct-benefits estoppel.Plaintiffs, Jack and Erin Skufca, signed a purchase agreement with Taylor Woodrow Communities-League City, Ltd. to build a home in Texas. The agreement included an arbitration provision. Plaintiffs sued both Taylor Woodrow Communities-League City, Ltd. and Taylor Morrison of Texas, Inc., for construction defects and fraud, alleging that less than a year after they moved in, the home developed mold issues that caused their minor children to be ill. The petition listed Jack and Erin as plaintiffs individually, as well as Erin as next friend of the couple's children. Taylor Morrison moved to compel arbitration, but the trial court denied the motion as it pertained to the children. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the minor children sued based on the contract and were subject to its terms, including the arbitration clause. View "Taylor Morrison of Texas, Inc. v. Skufca" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgments of the district court relying on the single publication rule to determine when the underlying defamation claim accrued, holding that the district court properly applied the single publication rule.In 2019, Roses Roses posted a review on Timothy Ashford's Google business page stating that he was a "disheveled, unorganized, unreliable attorney with questionable ethics...[.]" Ashford filed two separate lawsuits alleging defamation. The district court entered orders granting summary judgment in favor of Defendants. At issue on appeal was the applicability of the single publication rule to allegedly defamatory internet publications. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) there was no error in the district court's application of the single publication rule; and (2) Ashford's remaining assignments of error were without merit. View "Ashford v. Roses" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs-appellants Jennifer Bitner and Evelina Herrera were employed as licensed vocational nurses by defendant-respondent California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR). They filed a class action suit against CDCR alleging that: (1) while assigned to duties that included one-on-one suicide monitoring, they were subjected to acts of sexual harassment by prison inmates; and (2) CDCR failed to prevent or remedy the situation in violation of the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA), Government Code section 12940 et seq. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of CDCR on the ground that it was entitled to statutory immunity under section 844.6, which generally provided that “a public entity is not liable for . . . [a]n injury proximately caused by any prisoner.” Plaintiffs appealed, arguing that, as a matter of first impression, the Court of Appeal should interpret section 844.6 to include an exception for claims brought pursuant to FEHA. Plaintiffs also argued that, even if claims under FEHA were not exempt from the immunity granted in section 844.6, the evidence presented on summary judgment did not establish that their injuries were “ ‘proximately caused’ ” by prisoners. The Court of Appeal disagreed on both points and affirmed the judgment. View "Bitner v. Dept. of Corrections & Rehabilitation" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court in favor of Defendants in this negligence case, holding that the district court did not err or abuse its discretion.Mike Roberts was injured at the home of his son, Benjamin Roberts, when he stepped off the edge of the back porch and fell, injuring his shoulder and foot. Mike brought this lawsuit alleging that his son negligently maintained his yard, causing his injury. The district court ruled in favor of Defendants. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court (1) did not abuse its discretion by barring certain standard of care testimony; and (2) did not abuse its discretion when it admitted evidence of Mike's alcohol consumption. View "Roberts v. Roberts" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was electrocuted by a powerline owned and operated by the City of Sibley, Iowa. Plaintiff sued the City, in relevant part, for negligence and negligence per se. Plaintiff’s wife also brought a loss of consortium claim. The district court granted summary judgment.   The Eighth Circuit reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment as to negligence and affirmed as to negligence per se. The court reinstated the loss of consortium claim. Plaintiff alleged that the City violated the Iowa Administrative Code, specifically (1) its adopted NESC standards and (2) Iowa Administrative Code 199- 25.4(1). The City argued that the NESC, as adopted by Iowa regulations, establishes the standard of care. But it hasn’t pointed to any authority stating that compliance with Iowa regulations is conclusive of the standard of care in ordinary negligence actions. The court reasoned that compliance with Iowa regulations is not dispositive of the standard of care for negligence. Because a jury could find that the City breached its duty, Plaintiff’s negligence claim has genuine issues of fact for trial. Further, the court held that the public-duty doctrine does not bar Plaintiff’s negligence claim because it involves City misfeasance. View "Victor Maldonado v. City of Sibley" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Rodrigo Rodriguez Preciado, Norma Janeth Banda Arreola, Alejandro Rodriguez Banda, and Haydee Antonieta Zumaeta appealed a trial court order quashing service of summons filed by defendant Freightliner Custom Chassis Corporation (FCCC). This litigation arose from a February 22, 2020 bus accident that occurred on Interstate 15 in San Diego County, resulting in the death of Cynthia Karely Rodriguez Banda (Cynthia) and injury to Zumaeta. Approximately one year later, Zumaeta, along with Cynthia’s parents and brother (as survivors), filed a lawsuit against several defendants. As specifically relevant here, the defendants also included FCCC, which manufactured the bus’s chassis. All of the causes of action asserted against FCCC were based on various theories of products liability. FCCC argued that Plaintiffs could not “meet their burden of establishing the requisite connection between FCCC, California, and this litigation to justify general or specific jurisdiction over FCCC.” Plaintiffs contended the trial court erred in concluding that they failed to establish that California had general or specific jurisdiction over FCCC in this action. The Court of Appeal concluded Plaintiffs’ arguments lacked merit, and accordingly it affirmed the order granting FCCC’s motion to quash and dismissing it from this action. View "Preciado v. Freightliner Custom Chassis Corp." on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued the government pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), asserting multiple negligent and intentional tort causes of action after being sexually assaulted by an employee of the United States Department of Veterans Affairs (VA). The government moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The district court granted the government’s motion. Plaintiff appealed the district court’s determination that the assault occurred outside the scope of the employee’s employment.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the FTCA makes clear that the scope-of-employment test is defined by state law, not the employer. Plaintiff argued that the district court erred in concluding that the provider’s duties were restricted to providing battlefield acupuncture therapy (BFA). The court explained that initially, the provider denied sexually assaulting or massaging Plaintiff. He later admitted to the sexual assault and admitted that it was inappropriate for him to massage a patient. He also failed to document anything that occurred after the BFA therapy, including the massage. This is consistent with the finding that the massage and subsequent sexual assault exceeded the scope of his treatment authority. The court explained that in light of the pleadings and undisputed evidence, the district court did not err, determining that the provider acted outside the scope of his employment. View "Jane Doe v. United States" on Justia Law

After a woman developed mesothelioma, she and her husband (Plaintiffs) brought this action in 2020 against a number of entities, including respondent Avon Products, Inc. (Avon). Relying on a declaration (Gallo Declaration) from an employee who did not begin work at Avon until 1994, halfway through the woman’s alleged exposure period, Avon moved for and obtained summary judgment in its favor.   Plaintiffs appealed, contending the trial court erred in overruling their objections to the Gallo Declaration. The trial court found this declaration was the sole evidence which shifted the burden to Plaintiffs to produce evidence sufficient to create a triable issue of material fact. Avon contends that even if the Gallo Declaration was erroneously admitted, summary judgment should still be affirmed on the ground that Plaintiffs’ discovery responses were factually devoid   The Second Appellate District agreed with Plaintiffs that the trial court abused its discretion in overruling Plaintiffs’ objections. The court found that Avon failed to adequately develop this theory in the trial court and on appeal. The court found that Avon did not shift the burden to Plaintiffs. Accordingly, the court wrote that it need not and do not consider Plaintiffs’ argument that the trial court erred in finding they failed to create a triable issue of material fact when they did not offer a statistical analysis showing it was more likely than not asbestos was in the Avon containers actually used by the woman. View "LAOSD Asbestos Cases" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed in part the decision of the appellate court affirming the order of the trial court rendering summary judgment in favor of Defendants in a tort action on the grounds that the claims were barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel, holding that no preclusion doctrine barred Plaintiff from litigating her tortious interference with contractual relations claim.Plaintiff alleged that Defendants tortiously interfered with her contractual relations and right of inheritance by exercising undue influence over her husband, the decent, with respect to a proposed amendment to an antenuptial agreement and a testamentary will. The trial court entered summary judgment for Defendants, ruling that the doctrine of collateral estoppel barred both of Plaintiff's tortious interference claims. The appellate court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) under the circumstances of this case, Plaintiff's claim for tortious interference with contractual relations was not precluded; and (2) Plaintiff was collaterally estopped from relitigating her tortious interference with a right of inheritance claim. View "Solon v. Slater" on Justia Law

In May 2020, Koballa died of COVID-19. Hudak, the executrix of Koballa’s estate, sued, asserting negligence and related state-law claims against Elmcroft, an assisted-living facility. Elmcroft removed the case to federal court under the general removal statute, 28 U.S.C. 1441(a), and the federal-officer removal statute, 28 U.S.C. 1442(a)(1), based on arguments it made under the Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act (PREP), 42 U.S.C. 247d-6d.The district court found that the PREP Act did not provide grounds for removal under either removal statute and remanded the case to state court for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Hudak does not allege that Elmcroft engaged in willful misconduct in the administration or use of a covered COVID-19 countermeasure, so the PREP Act does not “provide[] the exclusive cause of action for the claims” and does not completely preempt Hudak’s state-law claims. Hudak’s state-law claims do not arise under federal law and could not be removed. Elmcroft is not a "federal officer"; it operated a facility that came under significant federal regulation as part of the federal government’s COVID-19 response but did not have an agreement with the federal government, did not produce a good or perform a service on behalf of the government, and has not shown that the federal government exercised control over its operations to such a degree that the government acted as Elmcroft’s superior. View "Hudak v. Elmcroft of Sagamore Hills" on Justia Law