Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs allege that Boeing and Southwest Airlines defrauded them by, among other things, concealing a serious safety defect in the Boeing 737 MAX 8 aircraft. The district court certified four classes encompassing those who purchased or reimbursed approximately 200 million airline tickets for flights that were flown or could have been flown on a MAX 8.In reviewing Defendants' interlocutory appeal, the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court. The court found that Plaintiffs lacked Article III standing because they failed to allege any concrete injury. View "Earl v. Boeing" on Justia Law

Plaintiff and another man engaged in a fistfight at a gas station owned by defendant Costco Wholesale Corporation (Costco). Defendant a Costco gas station attendant, stopped the fight by physically separating the two men. Plaintiff later sued for negligence and related causes of action, alleging he was injured when Defendant pulled him away from the other man. Costco and the gas station attendant each moved for summary judgment. The trial court granted Defendants’ motions. Plaintiff appealed. His primary contention is the court erroneously concluded the Good Samaritan law of Health and Safety Code section 1799.102 shielded Defendant from liability.   The Second Appellate District affirmed the trial court’s judgment. The court explained that The undisputed facts established the fistfight at the gas station constituted an emergency as defined by section 1797.70. But for Defendant’s intervention, the fight would have continued. Therefore, by intervening to end the fight, Defendant was rendering emergency nonmedical assistance while at the scene of an emergency under section 1799.102, subdivision (b). Thus, the court held that the trial court did not err in concluding there was no triable issue of fact that Defendant was shielded from liability as a Good Samaritan. View "Valdez v. Costco Wholesale Corp." on Justia Law

This case presented the questions of whether and how Alaska Statute 09.55.548(b) applied when the claimant’s losses were compensated by an employer’s self-funded health benefit plan governed by the federal Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA). The Alaska Supreme Court concluded that an ERISA plan did not fall within the statute’s “federal program” exception. Therefore AS 09.55.548(b) required a claimant’s damages award to be reduced by the amount of compensation received from an ERISA plan. But the Supreme Court also concluded that the distinction the statute draws between different types of medical malpractice claimants was not fairly and substantially related to the statute’s purpose of ensuring claimants do not receive a double recovery — an award of damages predicated on losses that were already compensated by a collateral source. "Because insurance contracts commonly require the insured to repay the insurer using the proceeds of any tort recovery, claimants with health insurance are scarcely more likely to receive a double recovery than other malpractice claimants. The statute therefore violates the equal protection guarantee of the Alaska Constitution." View "Knolmayer, et al. v. McCollum" on Justia Law

Progressive Direct Insurance Company ("Progressive") appealed a circuit court order granting a motion for a partial summary judgment filed by Madison Keen and joined by Robert Creller and Alfa Mutual Insurance Company ("Alfa"); the trial court certified its order as final pursuant to Rule 54(b), Ala. R. Civ. P. In September 2019, Keen was involved in a motor-vehicle accident. She sought compensation from Creller, who was the driver of the other vehicle involved in the accident. The vehicle Creller was driving was owned by his parents and was insured by Alfa. The evidence suggested that Creller and his spouse were living with Creller's parents at the time of the accident. Alfa paid Keen the limits of the insurance policy, and Keen executed a settlement agreement and a release in favor of Creller and Alfa. In June 2021, Keen filed the lawsuit at issue here seeking underinsured-motorist benefits from two different policies, namely, a policy issued by Progressive covering the vehicle Keen was driving at the time of the accident and a policy issued by State Farm Automobile Insurance Company ("State Farm") covering a second vehicle in Keen's household. Because Keen was driving the vehicle insured by Progressive at the time of the accident, her Progressive underinsured-motorist coverage was the primary insurance and the State Farm underinsured-motorist coverage was the secondary insurance. During the litigation, Creller was deposed and revealed the existence of an additional insurance policy covering his spouse's vehicle, which had been issued by Allstate Insurance Company ("Allstate") and which identified Creller as a named insured. The discovery of the Allstate policy raised the possibility that Creller might have had additional liability insurance coverage that could have compensated Keen for her injuries. Based on the alleged existence of additional insurance benefits, she asserted that there had been a mutual mistake among the parties to the settlement agreement and the release. Keen eventually moved for partial summary judgment, arguing the Allstate policy did not provide coverage. For its part, Progressive opposed Keen's motion, because the availability of benefits under the Allstate policy might affect Progressive's interests with respect to Keen's underinsured- motorist claim. The trial court granted Keen's motion and certified its order as final pursuant to Rule 54(b). Progressive appealed. Because it appeared there was a question of fact based on the evidence before the trial court existed when it entered the partial summary judgment, the Alabama Supreme Court reversed that judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Progressive Direct Ins. Co. v. Keen, et al." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed in part the judgment below and remanded this case for further proceedings that will allow the district court to render a judgment that complies with the periodic-payments statute, holding that the district court erred in how it structured the periodic payments in this case.A.M.A. was diagnosed with cerebral palsy after being deprived of oxygen during extended periods during his mother's labor. A jury awarded future healthcare expenses in the amount of almost $10,000,000. The trial judge ordered the award structured into periodic payments. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that there was nothing in the evidence that justified the way the trial court ordered the periodic payments to be structured. View "Columbia Valley Healthcare System, L.P. v. A.M.A." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals granting a writ of mandamus ordering the Industrial Commission of Ohio to reverse its decision awarding Appellant temporary-total-disability (TTD) compensation after sustaining a work injury, holding that the Commission's order was neither unsupported by evidence in the record nor was it contrary to law.Appellant gave Appellee two weeks' notice of her intention to resign and subsequently sustained a work injury. The Commission awarded Appellant TTD compensation. The court of appeals granted a writ ordering the Commission to reverse its decision because Appellant had resigned from her employment prior to her injury. Relying on the Supreme Court's opinion in State ex rel. Klein v. Precision Excavating & Grading Co., 119 N.E.3d 386 (Ohio 2018), the court of appeals granted the writ. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the decision in Klein did not redefine voluntary abandonment of the workforce as voluntary abandonment of the injured worker's position; and (2) the Commission did not abuse its discretion in determining that, but for her work injury, Appellant would have remained gainfully employed. View "State ex rel. Ohio State University v. Pratt" on Justia Law

After being arrested twice in a two-day span, once in Lauderdale County (Mississippi) and once in Jones County, for being suspected of driving under the influence and public intoxication, Shelley Rose allegedly drove a rental van the wrong way down Interstate 59 in Pearl River County. A motor vehicle collision ensued, killing Jada Bright. Plaintiff Estate of Jada Bright (Bright) filed a wrongful death suit at the Pearl River County Circuit Court against Defendants Estate of Shelley Rose; EAN Holdings, LLC; Enterprise Leasing Company-South Central, LLC; Elco Administrative Services Company; Enterprise Holdings, Inc.; National Car Rental System, Inc.; Lauderdale County; Jones County; City of Ellisville; Beech’s Towing & Recovery LLC; ABC 1-5; and John Does 1-5, and asserted that venue was proper per Mississippi Code Section 11-11-3 (Rev. 2019) because the claim arose out of a motor vehicle accident which occurred in Pearl River County. Defendants Jones County, Lauderdale County, and the City of Ellisville, filed motions to change venue, alleging that they had not been sued in the proper venue, based on the specific venue statute, Mississippi Code Section 11-46-13(2) (Rev. 2019), of the Mississippi Tort Claims Act. The trial court ultimately denied the motions, and the Counties and City petitioned for an interlocutory appeal. After review, the Mississippi Supreme Court reversed the circuit court’s judgment denying the change of venue motions, and remanded the case with instructions to transfer venue either to Jones County or Lauderdale County. View "Jones County, et al. v. Estate of Jada Bright, et al." on Justia Law

Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part three orders issued by two separate judges presiding over two separate but related cases in the circuit court, holding that remand was required.Specifically, the Supreme Court held that the circuit court (1) did not err in denying Praetorian Insurance Company's motion to intervene in Plaintiff's wrongful death action against its insured, Air Cargo Carriers, LLC for lack of standing to assert Air Cargo's right to workers' compensation immunity; (2) erred in denying Praetorian's motion for summary judgment as to count one of its declaratory judgment complaint; and (3) correctly dismissed count two of Praetorian's declaratory judgment complaint on the grounds that Praetorian lacked standing. View "Praetorian Insurance Co. v. Chau" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the circuit court denying Defendants' motion to dismiss the claims brought against them on grounds of workers' compensation immunity and immunity under the Governmental Tort Claims and Insurance Reform Act, W. Va. Code 29-12A-1, et seq., holding that the circuit court erred.Plaintiff, whose husband died in a workplace accident, sued Defendants, two of her husband's supervisors, claiming that they were liable for his death based on theories of deliberate intent under W. Va. Code 23-4-2-(d)(2)(A) and the tort of intentional and reckless conduct. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the claims against them, but the circuit court denied the motion, finding that they could be held personally liable. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) workers' compensation immunity insulated Defendants from liability for claims other than for a claim under section 23-4-2(d)(2)(A); and (2) under no set of facts consistent with Plaintiff's allegations could she prove the elements of a claim for heightened deliberate intent. View "Edwards v. Star" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that the circuit court erred in its application of "the open and obvious doctrine" but correctly granted summary judgment for Defendants because there was no genuine issue for trial on the issue of negligence.Plaintiff brought this civil complaint for damages arising from injuries he sustained in a fall on Defendants' property. The circuit court granted summary judgment for Defendants on all claims, ruling that Plaintiff's claims were barred by application of W. Va. Code 55-7-28(a), otherwise known as the open and obvious doctrine, and that Plaintiff had failed to produce evidence of negligence on the part of Defendants. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court erred in its application of the open and obvious doctrine as a basis for granting summary judgment to Defendants; but (2) summary judgment was proper because none of the evidence produced by Plaintiff in response to Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment show that there was a genuine issue for trial on the issue of negligence. View "Butner v. Highlawn Memorial Park Co." on Justia Law