Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court reversed the portion of the circuit court's order dismissing Plaintiff's claim for negligence against the Logan County Board of Education under W. Va. Code 29-12A-4(c)(2), holding that Plaintiff's allegations were sufficient to permit the inference that the duty and proximate cause elements of a claim for negligence existed.Plaintiff brought this action against the Board alleging that he was severely bullied by his classmates while he was a student at Logan Middle School and that school officials knew of the bullying but maintained that nothing could be done about the problem. The circuit court dismissed Plaintiff's claims under W. Va. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), concluding, as relevant to this appeal, that Plaintiff had not adequately pleaded the duty and causation elements of his negligence claim. The Supreme Court reversed the portion of the circuit court's order dismissing Plaintiff's negligence claim, holding that Plaintiff's allegations were sufficient to permit the inference that the duty and proximate cause elements of a claim for negligence existed. View "Jones v. Logan County Bd. of Education" on Justia Law

Pakistan International Airlines (“PIA”) failed to transport the body of N.B. to Pakistan for burial due to a miscommunication by employees of Swissport USA, PIA’s cargo loading agent. N.B.’s family members sued PIA and Swissport in New York state court under state law; PIA removed the action to the district court. Following cross-motions for summary judgment and an evidentiary hearing, the district court held that Plaintiffs’ claims are preempted by the Montreal Convention and dismissed the suit. On appeal, Plaintiffs argued that the Montreal Convention, which preempts state-law claims arising from delayed cargo, does not apply because human remains are not “cargo” for purposes of the Montreal Convention and because their particular claims are not for “delay.”   The Second Circuit affirmed. The court explained that human remains are cargo for purposes of the Montreal Convention; and on the facts found by the district court, the claims arise from delay. The claims are therefore preempted by the Montreal Convention. The court further wrote that it was Plaintiffs who cut off PIA’s ability to perform under the terms of the waybill. That decision was understandable given the need to bury N.B. quickly, and it cannot be doubted that Plaintiffs found themselves in a hard situation. But their only recourse against PIA and Swissport was a claim under the Montreal Convention, a claim which they have consistently declined to assert. View "Badar v. Swissport USA, Inc." on Justia Law

This case arises out of a police shooting that resulted in the death of decedent. Decedent’s parents filed a complaint against police officers involved in the shooting (the officers) and their employer, the City of Santa Maria (City). The officers and City are collectively referred to as “Respondents.” The complaint consists of four causes of action: (1) battery; (2) negligence – wrongful death; (3) negligent hiring, supervision, and training; and (4) violation of the Bane Act. Decedent’s father appeals from the judgment entered after the trial court granted Respondents’ motion for summary judgment.   The Second Appellate District affirmed the finding that no reasonable trier of fact could find that Respondents were negligent or that their conduct was not reasonable. The court explained that the officers patiently waited approximately 40 minutes before resorting to less-than-lethal weapons. The negotiations with the decedent had been futile. He was armed with a deadly weapon, was behaving erratically, and was also suicidal. He presented an immediate threat of physical harm to himself. At any time he could have used the knife to inflict a grievous injury upon himself. Instead of calming down, he appeared to be growing more agitated. There was no legitimate reason to continue a hopeless standoff that had disrupted the flow of traffic and was consuming police resources. Thus because Plaintiff did not carry his burden “to make a prima facie showing of the existence of a triable issue of material fact” whether the officers’ use of force was negligent or unreasonable the trial court properly granted Respondents’ motion for summary judgment. View "Villalobos v. City of Santa Maria" on Justia Law

Plaintiff woke up in an Illinois motel room without any feeling in his arms; he was later diagnosed in Missouri with bilateral shoulder impingement syndrome. Four years later, Plaintiff and his wife filed an action against Cottrell, Inc., the manufacturer of the ratchet system that allegedly caused Plaintiff’s injury. In granting Cottrell’s motion for summary judgment, the district court found that Illinois’s two-year statute of limitations applied to Plaintiff’s cause of action instead of Missouri’s five-year statute of limitations, thus barring Plaintiff’s and his wife’s claims. Plaintiff and his wife appealed, arguing that the district court erred in not applying Missouri’s statute of limitations. At issue is when—or where in this context—the statute of limitations began to run on Plaintiff’s cause of action, which depends upon the proper interpretation and application of Missouri’s borrowing statute.   The Eighth Circuit reversed, concluding that the matter is a fact question for the jury to decide. The court explained that it must determine whether the “evidence was such to place a reasonably prudent person on notice of a potentially actionable injury” in Illinois, where Plaintiff woke up to complete numbness in his arms. The court reasoned that on the three facts the district court contemplated the court cannot say as a matter of law that a reasonable person in Plaintiff’s position would have been on notice of a potentially actionable injury in Illinois. View "Gregory Burdess v. Cottrell, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff claimed that Defendant used excessive force while attempting an arrest on June 10, 2018, in Berdoo Canyon, which is considered BLM land. Plaintiff and her husband failed to yield to a park ranger, at which point Defendant was called to assist. As Defendant was trying to stop Plaintiff's vehicle, he fired several shots, hitting her in the hand and grazing her head.Plaintiff filed a Sec. 1983 claim against Defendant. The district court denied Defendant's motion for summary judgment related to Plaintiff's excessive force claim and Defendant appealed.On appeal, the Tenth Circuit reversed, declining to extend Bivens. The existence of alternative remedial structures is reason enough to not infer a new Bivens cause of action. Similarly, uncertainty about the potential systemwide consequences of implying a new Bivens cause of action is by itself a special factor that forecloses relief. The panel held that there was no Bivens cause of action for Plaintiff’s claim, which presented a new context. View "DENISE MEJIA V. WESLEY MILLER, ET AL" on Justia Law

T&J White, LLC, d/b/a Brown Heating & Cooling ("Brown Heating & Cooling"), and its employee, Bobby Morse ("the defendants"), appealed a circuit court’s denial of their motions seeking a judgment as a matter of law ("JML") and a new trial following the entry of judgment on a jury verdict against the defendants and in favor of the plaintiff, Timothy Williams. Morse, while engaged as an employee of Brown Heating & Cooling, rear-ended Williams in a motor-vehicle collision. Thereafter, Williams filed a complaint asserting, among other things, negligence and wantonness claims against the defendants. The case proceeded to trial. After the trial court instructed the jury but before the jury retired, counsel for the parties discussed the verdict form and the jury instructions that had been given. Ultimately, the defendants requested, and received, an additional blank line on the verdict form to allow the jury to award compensatory/nominal damages with respect to the wantonness claim; this additional line was placed just before the line for an award of punitive damages. The court then read the final verdict form to the jurors, and no objections were made. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Williams, awarding the following: $500,000 in compensatory damages for negligence, $250,000 in compensatory damages for wantonness, and $750,000 in punitive damages for wantonness. After the jury was polled, defense counsel orally renewed its motion for a JML based on, among other grounds, the alleged insufficiency of the evidence of wantonness and alleged inconsistency of the verdict. The court denied the motion, concluded the trial proceedings, and entered a final judgment on the verdict. The defendants, appealing the denial of a JML on the wantonness claim and that the trial court exceeded its discretion by denying their motion for a new trial. Finding no reversible error, the Alabama Supreme Court affirmed the trial court. View "Brown Heating & Cooling v. Williams" on Justia Law

Ramirez, a self-employed contractor, was hired by a shopping center’s tenant to remove an exterior sign after the tenant vacated its space. While searching for the sign’s electrical box, he entered a cupola on the shopping center’s roof and fell through an opening built into the cupola’s floor, sustaining serious injuries. In a suit against Kimco, which owns and operates the shopping center, the trial court granted Kimco summary judgment based on the Privette doctrine, which creates “a strong presumption under California law that a hirer of an independent contractor delegates to the contractor all responsibility for workplace safety[,] . . . mean[ing] that a hirer is typically not liable for injuries sustained by an independent contractor or its workers while on the job.”The court of appeal reversed and remanded. Kimco did not hire its tenant or Ramirez to perform the work. Kimco did not delegate its own responsibility for the roof’s condition to Ramirez through an employment relationship, as contemplated by Privette. Nor did Kimco delegate such responsibility by virtue of its landlord-tenant relationship. The court acknowledged “the strong possibility that Kimco will prevail under general principles of premises liability. “ View "Ramirez v. PK I Plaza 580 SC LP" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a premises liability claim against Defendant after she fell on an asphalt patch in front of Defendant's property. The trial court granted defendant's motion for summary judgment, finding that the condition of the sidewalk was a trivial defect. The Second Appellate District reversed, holding that Defendant failed to carry the burden of establishing that the defect was trivial as a matter of law. View "Fajardo v. Dailey" on Justia Law

Tamatha Hennessey alleged a radiology technician sexually assaulted her during her visit to the University of Kansas hospital for emergency medical care. Proceeding pro se, Hennessey brought a civil action for negligent supervision against the University of Kansas Hospital Authority (“UKHA”), which oversaw operation of the hospital. UKHA moved to dismiss the action, arguing Hennessey failed to plead facts supporting subject matter/diversity jurisdiction and that it was entitled to sovereign immunity. UKHA premised both arguments on it being an arm of the state of Kansas and therefore entitled to the same immunities as the state. But the Tenth Circuit found UKHA failed to support its motion with any evidence demonstrating it was an arm of the state or any analysis of the factors governing whether a state-created entity is an arm of the state. The district court, relying on the statutory scheme creating UKHA, Kan. Stat. Ann. §§ 76-3301–3323 (the “University of Kansas Hospital Authority Act” or the “Act”), found the Act characterized UKHA as an entity of the state, UKHA was not autonomous from the state, and UKHA was concerned with state-wide rather than local functions. Therefore, the district court concluded UKHA was an arm of the state and, therefore, dismissed Hennessey’s action. Hennessey appeals, arguing: (1) a procedural argument that the burden was on UKHA to demonstrate it was an arm of the state and it failed to meet this burden by not presenting any evidence and not arguing the factors governing the arm-of- the-state analysis; (2) a substantive argument that, regardless of the burden, the University of Kansas Hospital Authority Act supported the conclusion that UKHA was not an arm of the state; and (3) a fallback argument that a remand for limited discovery and presentation of evidence was appropriate. The Tenth Circuit concluded the burden fell on the entity asserting it was an arm of the state, and UKHA did not meet its burden. While Tenth Circuit precedent permitted a district court to raise the issue sua sponge, the Tenth Circuit found the district court erred in concluding UKHA was not autonomous under the language of the Act. The district court’s order granting UKHA’s motion to dismiss was vacated, and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "Hennessey v. University of Kansas Hospital Authority" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellee Michaella Surat filed suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendant-Appellant Officer Randall Klamser, alleging he violated her right to be free from excessive force during her arrest for misdemeanor charges of obstructing a peace officer and resisting arrest. Officer Klamser moved to dismiss, arguing Surat’s claim was barred by her underlying convictions. The district court granted Officer Klamser’s motion, in part, holding that Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994) did not bar Surat’s claim that Officer Klamser used excessive force to overcome her resistance when he slammed her face-first into the ground. Officer Klamser then moved for summary judgment based on qualified immunity, but the district court denied his motion. The district court concluded a reasonable jury could have found Officer Klamser used excessive force to overcome Surat’s resistance to arrest. Additionally, the district court determined Officer Klamser’s force violated clearly established law. In this interlocutory appeal of the denial of summary judgment, Officer Klamser claimed the district court erred because his use of force was reasonable and, alternatively, because the law did not clearly establish that his action during the arrest violated the Fourth Amendment. Although the Tenth Circuit agreed with the district court that Officer Klamser’s use of force violated the Fourth Amendment, it disagreed that clearly established law existing at the time of the incident would have put a reasonable officer on notice that his conduct was unlawful. Accordingly, judgment was reversed. View "Surat v. Klamser" on Justia Law