Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

The case concerns the death of Skyler A. Womack, a dependent adult with disabilities who resided at a 24-hour skilled nursing facility operated by Silverscreen Healthcare, Inc. After Skyler’s death, his parents filed suit against the facility, alleging that neglect—including understaffing, failure to maintain the facility, and inadequate provision of basic needs—led to his injuries and death. The claims included survivor actions and a wrongful death claim. Notably, Skyler had signed an arbitration agreement upon admission, which stated that any medical malpractice disputes would be subject to arbitration and purported to bind his heirs.In the Los Angeles County Superior Court, Silverscreen moved to compel arbitration of all claims based on the arbitration agreement and the California Supreme Court’s decision in Ruiz v. Podolsky. The trial court compelled arbitration of the survivor claims but denied arbitration for the parents’ wrongful death claim, reasoning that the claim was based on neglect under the Elder Abuse Act, not professional negligence. The California Court of Appeal reversed, holding that the wrongful death claim was subject to arbitration because it was based on professional negligence as defined by the agreement and relevant statutes.The Supreme Court of California reviewed the case and reversed the Court of Appeal’s decision. The Court held that the exception recognized in Ruiz v. Podolsky applies only to wrongful death claims that are based on medical malpractice as defined by the Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act (MICRA), specifically disputes about whether medical services were improperly rendered. The Court clarified that not all wrongful death claims against health care providers fall within this exception—claims based on custodial neglect, as opposed to professional negligence in medical care, are not subject to arbitration under section 1295 and Ruiz. The Court remanded the case to allow plaintiffs to amend their complaint to clarify the basis of their wrongful death claim. View "Holland v. Silverscreen Healthcare, Inc." on Justia Law

An elderly man with multiple health conditions, including Parkinson’s disease and COPD, was admitted to a hospital due to worsening symptoms and hallucinations. During his stay, he became agitated and aggressive, prompting hospital staff to administer Zyprexa, a chemical restraint, after obtaining consent from his daughter. The medication was ordered as “every 4 hours,” but there was disagreement over whether this meant scheduled or as-needed administration. The patient received two doses, after which he suffered respiratory distress, was transferred to another hospital, and died a few days later from septic shock related to aspiration pneumonia.The Superior Court, Addison Unit, Civil Division, presided over a jury trial in August 2023. Both parties presented expert testimony on the standard of care for chemical restraints, and the plaintiff also introduced the hospital’s policy. The jury was asked whether the plaintiff had proven the applicable standard of care and answered “no.” As a result, the jury did not consider whether the standard was breached, causation, or damages. The plaintiff moved for a new trial under Vermont Rule of Civil Procedure 59, arguing that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence. The trial court denied the motion, finding that the evidence was conflicting and that the jury’s verdict was not clearly wrong or unjust.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion for a new trial. The Court held that the trial court acted within its discretion, as the evidence regarding the applicable standard of care was conflicting and not so clear as to require overturning the jury’s verdict. The Supreme Court affirmed the denial of a new trial. View "Watrous v. Porter Medical Center" on Justia Law

Two individuals who were active in efforts to incorporate the community of Erda, Utah, alleged that three other residents defamed them and placed them in a false light. The plaintiffs had been involved in organizing the incorporation, including gathering signatures and working with property owners. After the incorporation was approved by voters, a local ranch company filed lawsuits alleging fraud in the incorporation process, specifically that signatures had been misused or altered. The defendants, in various public forums and on social media, accused the plaintiffs of fraud, forgery, and other misconduct related to the incorporation and subsequent community disputes.The Third District Court in Tooele County dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims. It found that the statements made by two defendants were not capable of defamatory meaning, were privileged, and that the false light claims failed for the same reasons. For the third defendant, the court granted judgment on the pleadings under Utah’s Anti-SLAPP Act, concluding that his statements were protected as participation in the process of government and that the lawsuit was intended to chill such participation.The Supreme Court of the State of Utah reversed and remanded. It held that at least some of the statements by the first two defendants were capable of defamatory meaning and were not constitutionally protected opinions. The court also held that it was improper to dismiss the claims on privilege grounds at the motion to dismiss stage, as privilege is an affirmative defense that must be raised and supported by the defendant. Regarding the third defendant, the court held that the Anti-SLAPP Act did not apply because his statements were not made while participating in the process of government as defined by the statute. The court ordered that the case proceed on all claims. View "Mathews v. McCown" on Justia Law

A man named Donald Prater, Jr. was found partially nude and behaving erratically after leaving a hospital, having previously told a deputy he had used methamphetamine and was hallucinating. Law enforcement officers from the City of Paintsville and Johnson County, along with emergency medical personnel, responded to reports of his behavior. When officers attempted to arrest Prater on a public street, he resisted and force was used, including a taser, pepper spray, and baton strikes. After being handcuffed, Prater stopped breathing and, despite immediate lifesaving efforts, died. The medical examiner found no lethal trauma and attributed the death to excited delirium syndrome, with other health factors possibly contributing.The personal representative of Prater’s estate filed a wrongful death suit in Johnson Circuit Court against various city and county entities and their employees, alleging excessive force, negligence, and wrongful death. The circuit court granted summary judgment to all defendants, finding the officers and emergency personnel were entitled to qualified official immunity, that the force used was reasonable, and that there was no evidence their actions caused Prater’s death. The court also dismissed claims against the city and county entities, including those for negligent hiring and supervision, on the basis that no underlying tort had been established.On appeal, the Kentucky Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that some claims against the city and police department for negligent hiring and supervision could proceed, and that the officers’ entitlement to qualified immunity required further factual findings. The Supreme Court of Kentucky reviewed the case and held that all defendants were properly dismissed. The Court concluded that the officers’ actions were discretionary, performed in good faith, and within the scope of their authority, entitling them to qualified official immunity. The Court reversed the Court of Appeals in part, affirmed in part, and remanded for any necessary proceedings. View "CITY OF PAINTSVILLE V. HANEY" on Justia Law

Two minor plaintiffs attended a four-day overnight science camp operated by a private entity and organized by their public school district. After returning home, they and their parents alleged that, during the camp, they were exposed to discussions and lessons about gender identity, including being introduced to counselors who used “they/them” pronouns and being asked to state their own preferred pronouns. The plaintiffs also claimed they were not allowed to contact their parents to discuss these matters due to a camp policy prohibiting calls home. They asserted that these experiences caused them severe emotional distress and initiated professional therapy.The plaintiffs filed suit in the Superior Court of Orange County, asserting claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) and negligent infliction of emotional distress (NIED) against both the camp operator and the school district. The camp operator responded with a special motion to strike under California’s anti-SLAPP statute (Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16), arguing that the claims arose from protected speech on matters of public interest—specifically, gender identity discussions. The trial court denied the anti-SLAPP motion, finding that the claims were not based on protected activity but rather on the lack of disclosure to parents and the prohibition on contacting them. The court also denied the plaintiffs’ request for attorney fees, finding the anti-SLAPP motion was not frivolous.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, held that the trial court erred in denying the anti-SLAPP motion in its entirety. The appellate court found that the IIED and NIED claims, to the extent they were based on exposure to gender identity discussions, arose from protected activity and lacked minimal merit, both factually and legally, under California public policy. However, claims based solely on the prohibition of calls home or sleeping arrangements did not arise from protected activity and could proceed. The order was affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with directions. View "Sandoval v. Pali Institute" on Justia Law

A construction worker employed by a subcontractor was injured when a scaffold collapsed at a Manhattan worksite. The worker sued the property owner and general contractor in New York Supreme Court, alleging negligence and violations of state labor laws. The owner’s insurer, Liberty Insurance Corporation, sought a declaration in federal court that the subcontractor’s insurer, Hudson Excess Insurance Company, was obligated to defend and indemnify the owner as an additional insured under the subcontractor’s commercial general liability policy. The subcontract between the general contractor and the subcontractor required the latter to provide insurance coverage for the owner and general contractor.In the New York Supreme Court, summary judgment was granted to the injured worker on some claims, while other claims remained pending. The court denied summary judgment to the owner on its contractual indemnification claim against the subcontractor, finding factual questions about the scope of the subcontractor’s work. Later, after the federal district court’s decision, the state court dismissed all third-party claims against the subcontractor, finding the indemnity provision in the subcontract invalid due to lack of a meeting of the minds.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. It affirmed the district court’s finding, after a bench trial on stipulated facts, that the subcontractor’s actions proximately caused the worker’s injuries and that Hudson owed a duty to indemnify the owner under the policy. The Second Circuit held that the later state court decision did not alter this result. However, the Second Circuit reversed the district court’s award of attorney’s fees to Liberty, holding that Hudson was entitled to a statutory safe harbor under New York Insurance Law, and thus was not required to pay Liberty’s attorney’s fees for the federal action. View "Liberty Insurance Corp. v. Hudson Excess Insurance Co." on Justia Law

Following a motor vehicle accident in which a tractor-trailer driven by Mervin Johnson rear-ended Kacey and Charinrath Green’s Tesla multiple times on I-26, the Greens filed suit against Johnson. The accident resulted in relatively minor property damage and medical expenses totaling approximately $12,826. The Greens testified to ongoing pain and suffering, some loss of income, and property depreciation. Johnson did not respond to the complaint, resulting in a default judgment. At a damages hearing, the master-in-equity awarded the Greens $1.76 million in actual and punitive damages, based largely on their testimony and a video of the accident.After the default judgment, Johnson moved to set aside the entry of default and the damages award, citing health issues and arguing the damages were grossly disproportionate to the actual harm. The master denied relief from default but later reduced the damages to $250,000 ($190,000 actual, $60,000 punitive), finding the original award excessive in light of the evidence. The master omitted a $10,000 property damage award previously included. The Greens moved for reconsideration, which was denied. On appeal, the South Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of relief from default but vacated the reduced award, reinstating the original $1.76 million.The Supreme Court of South Carolina reviewed the case and held that a party in default may satisfy the “meritorious defense” requirement by showing a defense as to the amount of damages or proximate cause, not just fault. The Court affirmed the denial of relief from default, reversed the reinstatement of the $1.76 million award, and reinstated the master’s reduced award with two modifications: the master must allocate the damages between the Greens and add $10,000 for property damage to Mr. Green’s share. The case was remanded for these adjustments. View "Green v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Two drivers, McGee and Hudgins, were involved in a road-rage incident that ended with McGee crashing into Green’s vehicle, causing her injuries. Green and her husband sued both drivers. Before filing suit, Green received $100,000 from McGee’s insurer in exchange for a covenant not to execute judgment against McGee. Green’s underinsured motorist (UIM) carrier, Progressive, defended the suit in McGee’s name. The jury found McGee 60% at fault and Hudgins 40% at fault, and determined both acted recklessly, willfully, and wantonly. The jury awarded Green $88,546.78 in actual damages and $35,000 in punitive damages against each defendant.The Circuit Court for Spartanburg County combined the actual and punitive damages for a total of $158,546.78, subtracted the $100,000 payment from McGee’s insurer, and allocated the remaining $58,546.78 between McGee and Hudgins based on their respective percentages of fault. On appeal, the South Carolina Court of Appeals altered the setoff calculation, allocating the $100,000 payment first to McGee’s share, then applying any remainder to Hudgins’ share, resulting in a net judgment of $58,546.78 against Hudgins and $0 against McGee.The Supreme Court of South Carolina reviewed the setoff calculation. It held that, because the jury found both defendants acted recklessly, willfully, and wantonly, joint and several liability applied to the actual damages, making the percentage allocation of fault irrelevant. The court further held that the $100,000 payment could only be set off against the actual damages, not the punitive damages, as punitive damages are not for the “same injury.” The court reversed the Court of Appeals, holding Green is entitled to a net judgment of $23,546.78 against McGee and $35,000 against Hudgins, and remanded for entry of judgment in those amounts. View "Green v. McGee" on Justia Law

Peter Engilis, Jr. regularly used Roundup, a glyphosate-based herbicide manufactured by Monsanto, at his homes in Florida from 1990 to 2015. In 2014, he was diagnosed with chronic lymphocytic leukemia, a type of non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma. Engilis and his wife filed a lawsuit against Monsanto, alleging that his cancer was caused by exposure to Roundup. To support their claim, they relied on the expert opinion of Dr. Andrew Schneider, who conducted a differential etiology to determine the cause of Engilis’s cancer.The case was transferred to the United States District Court for the Northern District of California as part of multidistrict litigation involving similar claims against Monsanto. Monsanto moved to exclude Dr. Schneider’s specific causation opinion, arguing it was unreliable. The district court initially granted the motion without a hearing, but later vacated that order in part and held a Daubert hearing. During the hearing, Dr. Schneider was unable to reliably rule out obesity as a potential cause of Engilis’s cancer, conceding he could not determine whether Engilis was obese and failing to provide a reasoned basis for dismissing obesity as a risk factor. The district court found that Dr. Schneider’s methodology did not meet the requirements of Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and excluded his testimony. With no admissible evidence of specific causation, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of Monsanto.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court’s exclusion of expert testimony for abuse of discretion and its summary judgment order de novo. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding Dr. Schneider’s opinion because it was not based on sufficient facts or data, as required by Rule 702. The court also clarified that there is no presumption in favor of admitting expert testimony under Rule 702. The summary judgment in favor of Monsanto was affirmed. View "ENGILIS V. MONSANTO COMPANY" on Justia Law

Gary Birdsall was stopped in traffic on the Bay Bridge when his van was rear-ended by Barton Helfet, resulting in serious injuries to Gary and a loss of consortium claim by his wife, Pamela. The Birdsalls’ attorney sent Helfet’s insurer a settlement demand for the $100,000 policy limit, specifying acceptance required delivery of a standard bodily injury release to be executed by both Gary and Pamela, a settlement check, and proof of policy limits by a set deadline. The insurer responded before the deadline with a letter accepting the offer, a release (which mistakenly listed Pamela as a releasee rather than a releasor), the check, and proof of policy limits. A corrected release was sent after the deadline. The Birdsalls’ attorney rejected the settlement, citing the release’s error and the late correction, and returned the check.The Birdsalls filed suit in the San Francisco County Superior Court. Helfet’s answer included affirmative defenses of settlement and comparative fault for Gary’s failure to wear a seat belt. The Birdsalls moved for summary adjudication on the settlement defense, which the law and motion judge granted. At trial, the assigned judge excluded evidence and jury instructions regarding Gary’s seat belt use. The jury found Helfet negligent, awarded substantial damages to both plaintiffs, and judgment was entered. Helfet’s post-trial motions were denied, and he appealed.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the case. It held that summary adjudication of the settlement defense was improper because there was a triable issue of material fact regarding mutual consent to the settlement. The court also found error in excluding seat belt evidence and instructions, holding that such evidence is admissible and, under the circumstances, expert testimony was not required. The judgment and amended judgment were reversed, with instructions for a new trial and denial of summary adjudication. View "Birdsall v. Helfet" on Justia Law