Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

Monty Clarence Petersen filed a complaint on January 27, 2020, alleging that Jennifer J. Simon, APRN, committed medical malpractice by prescribing Lovenox within 24 hours of his surgery on January 25, 2018, causing him injuries. A summons was issued on October 31, 2022, and served on Simon on January 9, 2023. Simon moved to dismiss the complaint because Petersen did not serve it within six months of filing, as required by Montana Code Annotated § 25-3-106.The Fourth Judicial District Court of Missoula County granted Simon's motion and dismissed the complaint with prejudice, citing the expiration of the two-year statute of limitations under § 27-2-205, MCA. The court interpreted the statute to allow dismissal with prejudice if the defendant had made an appearance and other substantive law supported such dismissal.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case. The court held that § 25-3-106, MCA, mandates dismissal without prejudice for untimely service unless the defendant has made an appearance, which only affects the need for service, not the nature of the dismissal. The court found that the district court erred in dismissing the complaint with prejudice based solely on untimely service. The Supreme Court also noted that it could not issue an advisory opinion on whether a new complaint would be barred by the statute of limitations or statute of repose, as no new complaint had been filed.The Supreme Court reversed the district court's order dismissing the complaint with prejudice and remanded the case for entry of an order dismissing the complaint without prejudice. View "Petersen v. Simon" on Justia Law

Darren J. Gray suffered a heart attack while working on a road construction project and applied for workers' compensation benefits. The Wyoming Workers’ Safety and Compensation Division denied his request. After a contested case hearing, the Office of Administrative Hearings also denied the request, and the district court affirmed that decision. Mr. Gray appealed, arguing that his work exertion was unusual or abnormal under Wyoming law.The Office of Administrative Hearings found that Mr. Gray did not meet his burden of proof under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-603(b)(ii) to show that his work exertion was unusual or abnormal for his employment. The Hearing Examiner determined that the tasks Mr. Gray performed on the day of his heart attack, including lifting and slamming metal pipes, were consistent with the job duties of similarly-situated employees. The district court affirmed this decision, agreeing that Mr. Gray's exertion was not clearly unusual or abnormal for his type of employment.The Wyoming Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that the Hearing Examiner's conclusion was supported by substantial evidence, including job descriptions and testimony from Mr. Gray's supervisor. The court found that the tasks Mr. Gray performed were within the normal scope of his employment duties. The court also noted that the independent medical examiner's testimony did not establish that the exertion was unusual. Therefore, the court concluded that Mr. Gray did not meet the statutory requirements for workers' compensation benefits for his heart attack. View "Gray v. State, Ex Rel. Department of Workforce Services, Workers' Compensation Division" on Justia Law

A child in the custody of the Office of Children’s Services (OCS) suffered severe abuse by his adoptive mother. Just before his 21st birthday, he filed a tort suit against OCS and his adoptive mother. OCS moved to dismiss the lawsuit as untimely. The child argued that the statute of limitations should be tolled for three reasons: it was tolled while he was in OCS custody until age 19, collateral estoppel should prevent OCS from arguing he was competent to file suit, and equitable tolling should apply. The superior court rejected these arguments and dismissed the suit as untimely.The Superior Court of the State of Alaska, Third Judicial District, Anchorage, found that the child’s claims were barred by the two-year statute of limitations for tort claims. The court concluded that the statute of limitations was not tolled during the child’s extended foster care past age 18, as the age of majority in Alaska is 18. The court also found that the child was competent to file suit and that equitable tolling did not apply because the child had not demonstrated that extraordinary circumstances prevented him from filing on time.The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska reviewed the case and affirmed the superior court’s decision. The court held that the statute of limitations was not tolled during the child’s extended foster care because the age of majority is 18, and the extended foster care statute does not create an exception. The court also held that OCS was not estopped from arguing the child was competent because the issues in the conservatorship and partial guardianship proceedings were not identical to the issue of competency to file suit. Finally, the court held that equitable tolling did not apply because the child did not demonstrate that extraordinary circumstances made it impossible to file on time. The judgment of the superior court was affirmed. View "Blake J. v. State" on Justia Law

Debra Cullen sued Logan Developers, Inc. for injuries sustained when she fell through a hole in her attic floor, which the defendant had cut to provide access to the home’s air handler. Cullen admitted she did not look before stepping backward into the hole, despite knowing it was unsafe to walk on non-floored parts of the attic. The hole was covered with insulation, making it an open and obvious risk.The Superior Court of Brunswick County granted summary judgment in favor of Logan Developers, finding Cullen contributorily negligent for failing to look where she was stepping and determining there were insufficient facts to support a claim of gross negligence. The Court of Appeals vacated this decision, holding that there were genuine issues of material fact regarding Cullen’s knowledge of the attic’s condition and whether Logan Developers’ actions constituted gross negligence.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed the case and reversed the Court of Appeals' decision. The Supreme Court held that Cullen was contributorily negligent as a matter of law because the hole was an open and obvious risk that she could have avoided by exercising reasonable care. The court also found that Logan Developers did not exhibit the conscious disregard for Cullen’s safety necessary to prove gross negligence, even if they violated the North Carolina Building Code. Therefore, the trial court’s summary judgment in favor of Logan Developers was reinstated. View "Cullen v. Logan Developers, Inc" on Justia Law

Keith Edward Myers posted a negative online review about the legal services provided by Jerry M. Blevins. Blevins, representing himself, sued Myers in the Elmore Circuit Court for defamation per se, invasion of privacy, wantonness, and negligence, seeking damages and injunctive relief. The court sealed the case record and, after unsuccessful attempts to serve Myers, allowed service by publication. Myers did not respond, leading to a default judgment awarding Blevins $500,000 in compensatory damages, $1.5 million in punitive damages, and a permanent injunction against Myers.Myers later appeared in court, filing motions to unseal the record and set aside the default judgment, arguing improper service and venue, among other issues. The trial court unsealed the record but did not rule on the motion to set aside the default judgment. Myers filed for bankruptcy, temporarily staying proceedings, but the bankruptcy case was dismissed. Myers then filed a notice of appeal and a renewed motion to stop execution on his property, which the trial court granted, staying execution pending the appeal.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case. The court dismissed Myers's direct appeal as untimely regarding the default judgment and premature concerning the Rule 60(b) motion, which remained pending in the trial court. The court also dismissed Myers's challenge to the sealing of the record, noting that the trial court had already unsealed it, rendering the issue moot.Blevins's petition for a writ of mandamus to vacate the trial court's order quashing writs of execution was also dismissed as moot. The Supreme Court's resolution of the direct appeal allowed trial court proceedings, including Blevins's execution efforts, to resume, thus granting Blevins the relief he sought. View "Myers v. Blevins" on Justia Law

Retailers House of CB USA, LLC, and Chinese Laundry Lifestyle, LLC, leased commercial space at the Miracle Mile Shops, operated by PHWLV, LLC, which also runs the Planet Hollywood Resort and Casino. On July 8, 2017, a fire-suppression pipe burst, causing significant water damage to the retailers' stores and inventory. The retailers sued PHWLV for negligence in maintaining the fire-suppression system.The Eighth Judicial District Court in Clark County granted partial summary judgment in favor of the retailers on the elements of duty and breach, concluding that PHWLV had a duty to prevent items on its property from damaging others' property and had breached this duty. The case proceeded to a jury trial on causation and damages, resulting in a verdict awarding House of CB $3,133,755.56 and Chinese Laundry $411,581.41. The district court denied PHWLV's motion for a new trial and entered judgment on the jury verdict, also awarding attorney fees and prejudgment interest to House of CB.The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed the case and found that the district court erred in its formulation of PHWLV's duty. The appropriate standard of care was the duty to use reasonable care in servicing and inspecting the fire-suppression system and responding to issues arising from failures within the system. The court reversed the district court's judgment on the jury verdict, vacated the post-judgment orders awarding attorney fees and prejudgment interest, and remanded the case for a new trial. The court also denied PHWLV's request to reassign the case to a different judicial department. View "PHWLV, LLC VS. HOUSE OF CB USA, LLC" on Justia Law

The case involves the plaintiffs, including the estate of Carson Bride and three minors, who suffered severe harassment and bullying through the YOLO app, leading to emotional distress and, in Carson Bride's case, suicide. YOLO Technologies developed an anonymous messaging app that promised to unmask and ban users who engaged in bullying or harassment but allegedly failed to do so. The plaintiffs filed a class action lawsuit against YOLO, claiming violations of state tort and product liability laws.The United States District Court for the Central District of California dismissed the plaintiffs' complaint, holding that Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act (CDA) immunized YOLO from liability. The court found that the claims sought to hold YOLO responsible for third-party content posted on its app, which is protected under the CDA.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court reversed the district court's dismissal of the plaintiffs' misrepresentation claims, holding that these claims were based on YOLO's promise to unmask and ban abusive users, not on a failure to moderate content. The court found that the misrepresentation claims were analogous to a breach of promise, which is not protected by Section 230. However, the court affirmed the dismissal of the plaintiffs' product liability claims, holding that Section 230 precludes liability because these claims attempted to hold YOLO responsible as a publisher of third-party content. The court concluded that the product liability claims were essentially about the failure to moderate content, which is protected under the CDA. View "Estate of Bride v. Yolo Technologies, Inc." on Justia Law

The administrator of a deceased woman’s estate filed a complaint alleging medical malpractice and wrongful death against a doctor, the doctor’s employer, a hospital, and Medicare. The doctor and his employer included the affirmative defenses of insufficiency of process and insufficiency of service of process in their answer. Over two years later, they moved for summary judgment, arguing that the case had not commenced timely because the doctor had not been served with the complaint. The administrator opposed, claiming the doctor waived his defense by participating in the litigation. The trial court granted summary judgment, and the First District Court of Appeals affirmed.The administrator appealed to the Supreme Court of Ohio, urging it to overrule its decision in Gliozzo v. Univ. Urologists of Cleveland, Inc., which held that active participation in litigation does not waive the defense of insufficiency of service of process if properly raised and preserved. The Supreme Court of Ohio declined to overrule Gliozzo, reaffirming that the defense is not waived by participation in litigation if it is properly raised and preserved. The court emphasized that the burden of perfecting service lies with the plaintiff and that the rules of civil procedure govern the conduct of all parties equally.The Supreme Court of Ohio held that Dr. Ahmad properly preserved his insufficiency-of-service-of-process defense and that the administrator never perfected service of the complaint on him. Consequently, the trial court correctly dismissed the claims against Dr. Ahmad and his employer. The judgment of the First District Court of Appeals was affirmed. View "Ackman v. Mercy Health W. Hosp., Inc." on Justia Law

Beverly Dale Jolly worked as an inspector at nuclear plants from 1980 to 1984, where he was exposed to asbestos-containing products manufactured by Fisher Controls International, LLC and Crosby Valve, LLC. In 2016, Dale was diagnosed with mesothelioma. He and his wife Brenda sued multiple defendants, settling with all except Fisher and Crosby for $2,270,000. The jury awarded Dale $200,000 and Brenda $100,000. The Jollys filed a motion for a new trial nisi additur, claiming the verdicts were inadequate. The trial court granted the motion, increasing Dale's award to $1,580,000 and Brenda's to $290,000, while allowing Fisher and Crosby the option to reject the additur for a new trial.The South Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision. Fisher and Crosby appealed, questioning the trial court's grant of the new trial nisi additur and the partial denial of their motion for setoff. The Supreme Court of South Carolina reviewed the case, focusing on whether the trial court applied the correct standard and procedure for a new trial nisi additur and whether it properly allocated the pretrial settlement proceeds for setoff purposes.The Supreme Court of South Carolina affirmed the trial court's decisions. It held that the trial court acted within its discretion in granting the new trial nisi additur, finding the jury's verdicts inadequate but not grossly so. The court also upheld the trial court's allocation of the pretrial settlement proceeds, agreeing that the allocation was reasonable and that the setoff was correctly applied only to the same injury claims. The case was remanded for Fisher and Crosby to either accept the additur or opt for a new trial. View "Jolly v. Fisher Controls International, LLC and Crosby Valve, LLC" on Justia Law

Jeremy Harris filed a lawsuit against City Cycle Sales, Inc. (CCS) in Kansas state court, alleging negligence and a violation of the Kansas Consumer Protection Act (KCPA) due to CCS's failure to repair the Anti-Lock Brake System (ABS) on his motorcycle. Harris was seriously injured when the ABS malfunctioned. He abandoned the KCPA claim before the case went to the jury, which resulted in a final judgment against him on all claims. Harris appealed the adverse judgment on the negligence claim but did not challenge the KCPA claim. After the appellate court reversed the negligence judgment and remanded for a new trial, Harris and CCS stipulated to dismiss the case without prejudice. Harris then filed a new lawsuit in federal district court, again alleging negligence and KCPA violations, and won on both claims.The United States District Court for the District of Kansas denied CCS's motion to dismiss the KCPA claims, reasoning that the law-of-the-case doctrine and preclusion principles did not apply because there was no final judgment on the merits of the KCPA claims. The jury awarded Harris damages, finding CCS liable for both negligence and KCPA violations. CCS appealed, arguing that Harris was barred from raising the KCPA claim in federal court and that there was insufficient evidence to support the negligence claim.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed the judgment on the KCPA claim, holding that Harris was barred from raising the statutory claim in federal court due to his abandonment of the claim in the state trial and appellate courts. The court ruled that the federal district court was required to give full faith and credit to the Kansas proceedings, which had a preclusive effect on the KCPA claim. However, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the judgment on the negligence claim, finding that there was sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude that CCS's negligence caused Harris's injuries. View "Harris v. City Cycle Sales" on Justia Law