Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

In June 2011, a fifteen-year-old shot his brother, an eleven-year-old, with a Remington Model 700 rifle equipped with an X-Mark Pro trigger. The boy and his parents (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) sued Remington, the retailer that sold the rifle, and Remington’s predecessors in interest (collectively, “Defendants”) in Mississippi state court. Plaintiffs emphasized that Remington had in April 2014 recalled all Model 700 rifles with X-Mark Pro triggers because the rifles “can and will spontaneously fire without pulling the trigger.” They brought state-law claims for product liability, failure to warn, negligence, and gross negligence.   Defendants moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). In their response to that motion, Plaintiffs asked to file a federal-court complaint to allege additional facts related to the statute of limitations. The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the district court’s subject-matter jurisdiction was based on diversity of citizenship. The court, therefore, applied “federal procedural and evidentiary rules and the substantive laws of the forum state.” Mississippi has a general three-year statute of limitations. For “non-latent injuries” like the one alleged here, the cause of action accrues on the date of the injury. But Plaintiffs, who filed suit in March 2018, argue that the statute of limitations was tolled by Defendants’ fraudulent concealment. The district court rejected that argument. The Fifth Circuit agreed, finding that Plaintiffs failed to meet Rule 9(b)’s requirements. View "Stringer, et al v. Remington Arms, et al" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed from a judgment entered in favor of Defendant, on Plaintiff’s action for medical malpractice after the trial court denied her motion under Batson v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 79 (Batson) and People v. Wheeler (1978) 22 Cal.3d 258 (Wheeler). At issue on appeal is whether under California law an attorney may properly strike a prospective juror based on the disability of the juror’s family member. Historically Batson/Wheeler motions have been analyzed, as the trial court did here, in terms of whether the justification for excusing a prospective juror is race-neutral. However, in 2015 the Legislature expanded the scope of cognizable groups protected under Batson/Wheeler by its enactment of Assembly Bill No. 87 (2015-2016 Reg. Sess.) Section 1 (Assembly Bill 87).   On appeal, Plaintiff argued that Defendant’s striking of the two prospective jurors based on the disabilities of their family members was itself based on protected characteristics. The Second Appellate District reversed the trial court's judgment. The court explained that there is no dispute that the justifications provided for excusing the two jurors were their association with disabled family members. Defendant’s attorney stated that because one of the juror’s children was disabled, Defendant’s attorney “felt that this particular juror may be too sympathetic to this particular plaintiff to make a reasonable decision on the evidence.” Accordingly, the Second Appellate District agreed with Plaintiff and reversed the trial court’s ruling and direct the trial court to vacate its order denying the Batson/Wheeler motion and to enter a new order granting the motion and setting the matter for a new trial. View "Unzueta v. Akopyan" on Justia Law

From August 2018 through January 2019, plaintiffs were six-year-old first grade students who attended Maple Elementary School (Maple) within the Hesperia Unified School District (the District). Pedro Martinez worked at Maple as a janitor. Martinez’s position as a janitor did not require him to have any one-on-one contact with the students. Martinez engaged in a variety of activities with the students that plaintiffs characterized as “‘grooming’ activities” that were “designed to lure minor students, including [p]laintiffs, into a false sense of security around him.” Plaintiffs alleged that numerous District employees who were mandated reporters under the Child Abuse and Neglect Reporting Act (CANRA), witnessed Martinez’s behavior and did not report it to school officials or to law enforcement, in violation of the District’s policies. In January 2019, the State charged Martinez with numerous felonies involving his alleged sexual abuse of minors. In February 2019, plaintiffs filed a lawsuit against the District and Martinez, alleging numerous claims arising from Martinez’s alleged sexual abuse of plaintiffs. The trial court was persuaded by the District's argument, concluding that plaintiffs did not adequately plead a negligence cause of action against the District, because they failed to state any facts “establishing that [the] District knew of any prior acts of sexual abuse by Martinez and/or that the District had actual or constructive knowledge that Martinez was abusing [p]laintiffs so as to impose liability upon [the] District.” One month after plaintiffs sought reconsideration, the trial court entered judgment against plaintiffs. Plaintiffs argued on appeal that they were not required to plead facts demonstrating that the District had actual knowledge of past sexual abuse by Martinez, and that they otherwise pled sufficient facts to state negligence causes of action against the District. The Court of Appeal agreed with plaintiffs on all of those points. The Court disagreed with plaintiffs' contention that the trial court erred by dismissing their sex discrimination claims under Title IX and California Education Code section 220: plaintiffs’ allegations are insufficient to constitute actual notice of a violation of Title IX or Education Code section 220. The judgment of dismissal was reversed, the order sustaining the demurrer to the third amended complaint was vacated, and the trial court was directed to enter a new order sustaining the demurrer without leave to amend as to the causes of action under Title IX, Education Code section 220, and the Unruh Civil Rights Act but otherwise overruling the demurrer. View "Roe v. Hesperia Unified School Dist." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the trial court granting Defendants' motion to dismiss this action brought against Troy University, an accredited, four-year state university with several campuses in Alabama and an office in Fayetteville, North Carolina, alleging various tort claims arising out of his employment and termination, holding that Troy University explicitly waived its sovereign immunity.Plaintiff brought this lawsuit against Troy University and two individual defendants asserting, among other things, claims for wrongful discharge from employment in violation of public policy and negligent retention or supervision of an employee. The trial court dismissed the complaint based on sovereign immunity, citing Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Hyatt, 139 S. Ct. 1485 (2019), which established that states are required to recognize sovereign immunity of other states as a matter of constitutional law. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case, holding (1) Troy University explicitly waived its sovereign immunity and consented to be sued in North Carolina; and (2) therefore, the doctrine of sovereign immunity did not bar Plaintiff's suit against Defendants. View "Farmer v. Troy University" on Justia Law

In this case arising from a fatal vehicle accident the Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court granting a directed verdict in favor of Broken Bow Public Schools (BBPS) and dismissed the cross-appeals as moot, holding that the district court did not err.Michael and Cathy Christensen brought this case individually and as parents of their son, Chad Christensen, who was seriously injured when a BBPS activities van in which Chad was a passenger was head by a truck driven by Albert Sherbeck. The Christensens separately sued the Sherbeck estate. The cases were consolidated. The court of appeals reversed a directed verdict in favor of BBPS. On remand, the district court granted a directed verdict in favor of BBPS and against the Christensens, dismissed the Christensens' complaint, and dismissed as moot the third-party complaint brought by BBPS against the Sherbeck estate. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's directed verdict for BBPS and dismissed the cross-appeals as moot, holding that the district court correctly interpreted the relevant statutes. View "Christensen v. Broken Bow Public Schools" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of a single justice of the court dismissing as moot Petitioner's petition pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws. Ch. 211, 3, holding that the single justice did not err or abuse his discretion in dismissing the petition on the basis that it was moot.In 2018, Petitioner commenced this action against Respondent, alleging several tort claims. Shortly before a scheduled pretrial conference in the trial court, Petitioner filed this petition asking the court to, among other things, sanction Respondent. While the petition was pending the underlying case was dismissed for failure to prosecute. The single justice then dismissed Petitioner's Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211, 3 petition as moot. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the dismissal of the case rendered the issues Petitioner raised on appeal moot. View "Waters v. Kearney" on Justia Law

Amiodarone was developed in the 1960s for the treatment of angina and was released in other countries. Amiodarone is associated with side effects, including pulmonary fibrosis, blindness, thyroid cancer, and death. In the 1970s, U.S. physicians began obtaining amiodarone from other countries for use in patients with life-threatening ventricular fibrillation or ventricular tachycardia who did not respond to other drugs. In 1985, the FDA approved Wyeth’s formulation of amiodarone, Cordarone, as a drug of last resort for patients suffering from recurring life-threatening ventricular fibrillation and ventricular tachycardia. The FDA’s “special needs” approval issued without randomized clinical trials. In 1989, the FDA described Wyeth’s promotional activities as promoting an unapproved use of the drug. In 1992, the FDA objected to promotional labeling pieces for Cordarone. Other manufacturers developed generic amiodarone, which has been available since 1998.Consolidated lawsuits alleged that plaintiffs suffered unnecessary, serious side effects when they took amiodarone, as prescribed by their doctors, for off-label use to treat atrial fibrillation, a more common, less serious, condition than ventricular fibrillation. The FDA never approved amiodarone for the treatment of atrial fibrillation, even on a special-needs basis. The court of appeal affirmed the dismissal of the lawsuits. The claims are preempted as attempts to privately enforce the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. 301, regulations governing medication guides and labeling and have no independent basis in state law. The court also rejected fraud claims under California’s unfair competition law and Consumers Legal Remedy Act. View "Amiodarone Cases" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the decisions of the lower tribunals resolving Claimant's permanent total disability (PTD) claim in his favor after denying his petition to reopen his occupational pneumoconiosis permanent partial disability (OP PPD) claim for further evaluation, holding that the lower tribunals erred in part.At issue in the instant consolidated appeals were Claimant's attempt to reopen his OP PPD claim for further evaluation and his claim for permanent total disability (PTD) due to his various impairments. While Claimant's PTD claim was still being litigated, he unsuccessfully filed two petition to reopen his OP PPD claim. The lower tribunals denied Claimant's reopening petitions but awarded him PTD. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) W. Va. Code 23-4-16(e) does not preclude reopening of a permanent disability claim because another permanent disability claim is pending; and (2) the lower tribunals were not clearly wrong in determining that Claimant was permanently and totally disabled. View "Delbert v. Murray American Energy, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the circuit court denying a motion for summary judgment filed by Adam Goodman and Paul Underwood (collectively, Petitioners) in this personal injury case arising from an accident in which Blake Auton was injured, holding that the allegations against Petitioners were those of pure negligence, which were barred by workers' compensation immunity.In its order denying summary judgment, the circuit court concluded that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Goodman was action within the scope of his employment while he was driving a garbage truck that backed over Auton and that additional discovery was required relating to Underwood's actions. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded with direction for the circuit court to grant summary judgment to Petitioners, holding (1) Petitioners were both clearly acting in furtherance of their employer's business when the accident occurred; and (2) therefore, workers' compensation immunity barred the cause of action and entitled Petitioners to summary judgment. View "Goodman v. Auton" on Justia Law

Under the Government Claims Act, a public entity is not liable for injury except as otherwise provided by statute; a public entity may be vicariously liable for injury caused by an act or omission of its employees acting within the scope of their employment. If a public entity may be sued under a liability statute, the Act also includes immunity provisions that prevail in specified circumstances.Doe alleged that, when she was a minor and ward of the state confined at Napa State Hospital, she was sexually assaulted by a Department counselor between 1997-1999. She claimed that the Department knew or should have known that the counselor had previously engaged in unlawful sexual conduct with other minors and that he continued to do so with Doe. She alleged negligence, negligent supervision/training/hiring/retention, sexual battery, assault, and statutory civil rights violations.The trial court dismissed all except the claim of negligent supervision/training/hiring/retention, with leave to amend, holding that section 815.2 provides minimum personnel standards and triggered the immunity exception. The court of appeal ordered the dismissal of the entire complaint without leave to amend. Doe failed to demonstrate that she can allege the Department’s violation of any minimum standard sufficient to form the basis for liability under Government Code 855(a). View "State Department of State Hospitals v. Superior Court of Napa County" on Justia Law