Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

This case presented a question of whether Mississippi courts had personal jurisdiction over a South Korean battery manufacturer whose goods were in the stream of commerce in Mississippi. The Mississippi Plaintiff, Melissa Dilworth, was seriously injured when one of LG Chem Ltd.’s (LG Chem) lithium-ion batteries exploded in her vaping pen. LG Chem and its Georgia-based subsidiary, LG Chem America, argued successfully before the circuit court that they lacked sufficient minimum contacts with Mississippi to satisfy the constitutional standard for exercising personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendants. On appeal, the Mississippi Supreme Court found that manufacturer LG Chem purposefully availed itself of the market for its product in Mississippi such that the exercise of specific personal jurisdiction comported with due process principles. The Supreme Court also found that dismissal of subsidiary LG Chem America was premature; therefore, judgment was reversed and the matter remanded for jurisdictional discovery. View "Dilworth v. LG Chem, Ltd. et al." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals concluding that prevailing parties who were awarded reasonable attorney fees and punitive damages in a tort case involving malicious conduct may not also recover the attorney fees that they incur in successfully defending their judgment, holding that the court of appeals erred.The trial court awarded the prevailing parties attorney fees and expenses, but the court of appeals reversed the trial court's decision regarding attorney fees. On remand, the prevailing parties moved to modify their motion for attorney fees to include a request for "fees incurred in appellate litigation." The court of appeals reversed the portion of the award of attorney fees for appellate work, concluding that Ohio law does not permit recovery of attorney fees incurred at the appellate level except when a remedial statute so provides. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that when parties are awarded punitive damages at trial, they may also recover reasonable attorney fees that they incur successfully defending their judgments on appeal. View "Cruz v. English Nanny & Governess School" on Justia Law

Two former students of Tulane University, on behalf of a putative class of current and former students, sued the University for failing to provide a partial refund of tuition and fees after Tulane switched from in-person instruction with access to on-campus services to online, off-campus instruction during the COVID-19 pandemic. The district court agreed with Tulane that the student's complaint should be dismissed for failure to state a claim.   The Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded. The court concluded that the claim is not barred as a claim of educational malpractice because the Students do not challenge the quality of the education received but the product received. Second, the court rejected Tulane’s argument that the breach-of-contract claim is foreclosed by an express agreement between the parties because the agreement at issue plausibly does not govern refunds in this circumstance. And third, the court concluded that Plaintiffs have not plausibly alleged that Tulane breached an express contract promising in-person instruction and on-campus facilities because Plaintiffs fail to point to any explicit language evidencing that promise. But the court held that Plaintiffs have plausibly alleged implied-in-fact promises for in-person instruction and on-campus facilities. Moreover, the court found that the Students’ alternative claim for unjust enrichment may proceed at this early stage. Finally, genuine disputes of material fact regarding whether Plaintiffs saw and agreed to the A&DS preclude reliance on the agreement at this stage. Thus, Plaintiffs have plausibly alleged a claim of conversion. View "Jones v. Admin of the Tulane Educ" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court granting Defendants summary judgment on Plaintiffs' negligence-based tort claims, breach of contract claims, and Montana Consumer Protection Act (MCPA) claims, holding that the district court did not err or abuse its discretion.Specifically, the Supreme Court held that the district court (1) did not erroneously grant summary judgment to Defendants on the causation element of Plaintiffs' asserted negligence-based claims; (2) did not erroneously grant summary judgment to Defendants on Plaintiffs' asserted breach of contract claim; and (3) did not err in granting summary judgment to Defendants on Plaintiffs' asserted MCPA claim. View "Kostelecky v. Peas in a Pod LLC" on Justia Law

In this civil suit against Ottawa County, an uncharted county, the Supreme Court held that the County was not sui juris and therefore must be sued in the name of its board of commissioners.Plaintiff filed a complaint against Ottawa County for negligence, wrongful death, and violation of a nursing home resident's rights. As defendant, Plaintiff named "County of Ottawa d/b/a Ottawa County Riverview Nursing Home" but did not name the Ottawa County Board of Commissioners. Riverview was owned and run by the County, and its employees were employees of the County. Riverview moved for summary judgment, arguing that the County may be sued only by naming its board of commissioners as the defendant because an uncharted county is not sui juris. The trial court granted summary judgment without addressing the sui juris issue. The court of appeals reversed, rejecting Riverview's sui juris argument. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case, holding that Ottawa County is not sui juris, and the court of appeals erred in determining otherwise. View "Estate of Fleenor v. Ottawa County" on Justia Law

Christopher Ellis worked for CSX Transportation, Inc. as a remote-control foreman at CSX's Montgomery yard. While riding on the ladder of a railcar during the course of his employment with CSX, Ellis was struck in the torso by the broken door handle and latch assembly of a railcar on an adjacent track. The impact of the blow knocked Ellis off the railcar on which he was riding, causing him to suffer significant injuries. On November 17, 2020, Ellis sued CSX asserting claims under the Federal Employers' Liability Act ("FELA"), and the Safety Appliance Act ("the SAA"). Ellis propounded 25 multipart interrogatories and 62 requests for production to CSX with his complaint. CSX petitioned the Alabama Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus directing the Montgomery Circuit Court to, among other things, vacate its order granting Ellis's motion to compel discovery and either enter an order denying Ellis's motion to compel or a protective order barring production of materials CSX contends to be protected work product or patently irrelevant. The Supreme Court granted the petition for mandamus relief in part and directed the trial court to vacate its order to the extent that it requires the production of materials contained in the company's risk management system ("RMS") in violation of the work-product doctrine. The Court denied the petition in all other respects. View "Ex parte CSX Transportation, Inc." on Justia Law

Premier Plastic Surgery, P.C. ("Premier") petitioned the Alabama Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus directing the Jefferson Circuit Court to vacate its order denying Premier's motion for a change of venue in this medical-malpractice action brought by plaintiff Deborah Bush, and to enter an order transferring the action to the Shelby Circuit Court. Premier offered cosmetic and reconstructive surgery at its medical facility located in Shelby County. Bush went to Premier's medical facility to receive a consultation from Dr. Peter Van Hoy. It is undisputed that all of Bush's treatment by Dr. Van Hoy occurred at Premier's medical facility. In December 2017, Dr. Van Hoy died. Because he was Premier's sole shareholder, director, and owner, Premier was dissolved in September 2018. In June 2019, Bush filed suit at the Jefferson Circuit Court relating to her surgical procedure and treatment by Dr. Van Hoy. Bush's complaint also alleged that she was a resident of Jefferson County. Premier denied all allegations and argued that because the surgical procedure and treatment at issue in Bush's action occurred at Premier's medical facility in Shelby County, venue was proper in Shelby County. In her response to Premier's motion, Bush did not dispute that Shelby County was the proper venue for the action. Instead, she argued that because Premier's motion was filed almost three years after the litigation began and only three weeks before the scheduled trial, the motion cannot be deemed timely. The Supreme Court concurred that Premier's challenge to venue had been waived and denied the petition for mandamus relief. View "Ex parte Premier Plastic Surgery, P.C." on Justia Law

The Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board decided that a carpenter who admitted using alcohol and cocaine before his injury had a compensable disability because it determined the accident would have happened regardless of his drug and alcohol use. The Workers’ Compensation Benefits Guaranty Fund, which was responsible for payment if an employer defaults, appealed, arguing that the employee’s intoxication barred compensation. The Workers’ Compensation Appeals Commission affirmed the Board’s decision because substantial evidence supported it. The Alaska Supreme Court affirmed the Commission’s decision. View "Alaska Workers' Compensation Benefits Guaranty Fund v. Adams, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff brought suit against LAMMICO d/b/a Lammico Risk Retension Group, Inc. (LAMMICO); Mercy Hospital-Fort Smith (Mercy); various doctors, Mercy Clinic Fort Smith Communities; and John Does 1-10, alleging liability under the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act (EMTALA), 42 U.S.C. Section 1395dd. Plaintiff claimed that Mercy made an “inappropriate transfer”. Plaintiff alleged that the delay in receiving vascular surgery within a six-hour window after the injury caused her leg to be amputated. Plaintiff further alleged that Mercy’s statutory duty under EMTALA is strict or absolute.”   The district court granted summary judgment. On appeal, Plaintiff argued that the district court erred in granting summary judgment to Defendants. Further, she argued that EMTALA imposes a strict liability standard for noncompliance with its directions.    The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained EMTALA’s aim is to discourage bad-faith hospitals from dumping patients. Imposing liability upon a hospital’s good-faith effort to secure appropriate care for a patient that is beyond its capabilities is off the mark. Such liability would run contrary to EMTALA’s purpose and would undermine the express target of securing adequate care for patients who could not otherwise afford it. EMTALA’s “appropriate transfer” requirement should be assessed from the perspective of a reasonable transferring hospital at the time the hospitals agreed to the transfer and the patient departed the transferring hospital. Under this standard, Mercy effected an “appropriate transfer”: it sent Plaintiff to a hospital that, based on the information conveyed to it by the hospital, had “qualified personnel” for her treatment. View "Kimberly Ruloph v. LAMMICO" on Justia Law

After D.G. was injured in a car accident involving a rental car driven by I.M. H.A. rented the car involved in the accident from Enterprise Rent-A-Car Company of Los Angeles (ERAC-LA). I.M. was listed as an additional authorized driver in the rental agreement between H.A. and ERAC-LA. At the time of rental, I.M.  presented ERAC-LA with a facially valid driver’s license issued by Kyrgyzstan and a local California address on the rental paperwork. D.G. sued ERAC-LA, I.M., and EAN Holding, LLC (EAN) for negligence. Specifically, D.G. alleged ERAC-LA negligently entrusted I.M. with the rental vehicle, and therefore proximately caused her injuries. ERAC-LA filed a petition for writ of mandate in this court to reverse the trial court’s order denying its motion for summary judgment.   The Second Appellate District issued a writ of mandate directing respondent court to vacate its May 24, 2022 and July 29, 2022 orders denying ERAC-LA’s motion for summary judgment and enter a new order granting the motion. The court held that requiring a rental car agency to investigate whether a prospective renter who presents a facially valid foreign driver’s license is still a resident of that jurisdiction at the time of rental goes beyond the scope of duties prescribed by the Legislature. The court further concluded that D.G. failed to carry her burden to demonstrate a triable issue of material fact exists regarding ERAC-LA’s compliance with section 14608, subdivision (a)(2). View "Enterprise Rent-A-Car of L.A. v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law