Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

Jamie Wallace was biking home from work through the promenade part of the Inner Harbor Park in Baltimore when her bike’s front tire became wedged in a gap between the bricks and granite bulkhead, causing her to fall and sustain injuries. She sued the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore for negligence, alleging the City failed to warn of the gap. The City sought judgment under the Maryland Recreational Use Statute, arguing it owed no duty of care as the promenade was designated for recreational purposes and biking is a recreational activity.The Circuit Court for Baltimore City denied the City’s motion for summary judgment, ruling the statute did not apply because Wallace was commuting, not engaging in recreational activity. The court also denied the City’s motions for judgment during the trial and judgment notwithstanding the verdict after the jury awarded Wallace $100,000 in compensatory damages. The Appellate Court of Maryland affirmed, concluding the promenade functioned primarily as a public pedestrian walkway and shared bicycle path, not a recreational facility, and the statute did not abrogate the City’s common law duty.The Supreme Court of Maryland reviewed the case and held that the Maryland Recreational Use Statute did not shield Baltimore City from liability. The court determined that by incorporating the promenade into its transportation infrastructure, the City established an independent right of access separate from any recreational invitation and assumed the corresponding common law duties. The judgment of the Appellate Court was affirmed, and the City was not protected by the Recreational Use Statute in this instance. View "Mayor of Baltimore v. Wallace" on Justia Law

Roy McAlister invented and patented technologies related to clean fuels and incorporated McAlister Technologies, L.L.C. (MT) to hold and license these patents. In 2009, MT entered into a licensing agreement with Advanced Green Technologies, L.L.C. (AGT), which later retained Loeb & Loeb, L.L.P. for patent matters. Conflicts arose, leading McAlister to terminate the agreement, alleging AGT's breach. McAlister and MT claimed that Loeb & Loeb's actions clouded their patents, causing prospective licensees to back out, resulting in lost profits.The Superior Court in Maricopa County granted summary judgment in favor of Loeb & Loeb on the lost profit damages, finding the plaintiffs' evidence speculative and lacking reasonable certainty. The court excluded the plaintiffs' expert testimony on damages and ruled against them on claims for trespass to chattel, slander of title, and aiding and abetting, but allowed claims for breach of fiduciary duty and negligent supervision to proceed. Plaintiffs conceded no triable damages remained and stipulated to final judgment against them.The Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed the exclusion of the expert testimony and the summary judgment on most lost profit claims but reversed on a $5 million initial payment claim, remanding for further proceedings. It also reversed the summary judgment on trespass to chattel and slander of title claims.The Arizona Supreme Court reviewed the case, focusing on the lost profit damages and trespass to chattel claim. It concluded that the plaintiffs failed to prove the lost profit damages with reasonable certainty, as material terms of the prospective licensing agreement were unresolved. Consequently, the court affirmed the summary judgment in favor of Loeb & Loeb on the lost profit damages and trespass to chattel claim, vacating the relevant parts of the Court of Appeals' decision. The case was remanded to the Superior Court for further proceedings on the slander of title claim. View "McAlister v. Loeb" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, a tenant, brought a personal injury action against the defendants, his landlords, under the Oregon Residential Landlord and Tenant Act (ORLTA). The plaintiff sought damages for injuries sustained when a plastic cover of a light fixture fell from the ceiling of a shared, exterior hallway outside his apartment and struck him on the head. The plaintiff argued that the landlords were liable for his injuries due to their failure to maintain the premises in a habitable condition as required by ORS 90.320(1).The landlords moved for summary judgment, arguing that their habitability obligations under ORS 90.320(1) applied only to the interior of the tenant’s dwelling unit and not to common areas like the hallway. The trial court granted the landlords' motion for summary judgment, agreeing with their interpretation of the statute. The plaintiff appealed, and the Oregon Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision, holding that the landlords' habitability obligations did not extend to areas outside the tenant’s dwelling unit.The Oregon Supreme Court reviewed the case and reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court held that a landlord’s habitability obligations under ORS 90.320(1) do extend to common areas of an apartment building that are adjacent to a tenant’s apartment and used by the tenant to access the apartment. The court concluded that conditions in these common areas can render a dwelling unit unhabitable. The case was remanded to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings consistent with this interpretation. View "Jackson v. KA-3 Associates, LLC" on Justia Law

Jessica Paulsen experienced severe bleeding after giving birth on December 13, 2021, at Avera McKennan Hospital. Dr. Amber Saloum performed a hysterectomy and another surgery on December 14, 2021, to stop the bleeding. Paulsen later claimed she did not consent to the hysterectomy and filed a lawsuit against Avera McKennan, Dr. Saloum, and unnamed parties on December 15, 2023. The defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that Paulsen's claims were barred by the two-year repose period under SDCL 15-2-14.1.The Circuit Court of the Second Judicial Circuit, Minnehaha County, South Dakota, granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment, concluding that Paulsen's lawsuit was filed outside the two-year repose period. Paulsen appealed the decision, arguing that the repose period should be calculated as 730 days and that she should have been allowed additional discovery to potentially establish a continuing tort.The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota reviewed the case de novo. The court held that a "year" is defined as a "calendar year" under SDCL 2-14-2(36), meaning the repose period ends at the exact moment the start date reoccurs on the calendar. Therefore, the two-year repose period began on December 15, 2021, and ended on December 14, 2023. Since Paulsen filed her lawsuit on December 15, 2023, it was one day too late.The court also found that Paulsen's request for additional discovery was speculative and did not demonstrate how further discovery would reveal facts essential to opposing the summary judgment. Consequently, the court affirmed the circuit court's decision to grant summary judgment in favor of the defendants. View "Paulsen v. Mckennan" on Justia Law

In this case, Michael Patrick Murray and other plaintiffs, who either suffer from brain tumors or represent estates of decedents who died from brain cancer, sued Motorola, Inc. and other telecommunications companies. They alleged that long-term exposure to cell phone radiation caused their health issues. The litigation began in 2001 and has been through multiple appeals. In a previous decision, the court allowed the litigation to proceed, and in another, it changed the evidentiary standard for admitting expert testimony from the "general acceptance" test to the "reliability" test.The Superior Court of the District of Columbia, post-remand, denied the plaintiffs' motions for additional discovery and to add new experts, struck portions of their supplemental expert reports, excluded all of their expert testimony under Rule 702, and granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The trial judges ruled that the plaintiffs failed to provide admissible expert testimony on general causation, which was necessary to proceed with the case.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case and affirmed the trial court's decisions. The appellate court found no abuse of discretion in the trial judges' rulings on discovery and expert testimony. The court held that the trial judges correctly applied the legal principles and managed the discovery process appropriately. The appellate court also agreed that the plaintiffs failed to meet the standards set out in Rule 702 for their expert testimony, and thus, summary judgment for the defendants was appropriate. View "Murray v. Motorola, Inc." on Justia Law

Linda Jenkins was injured when she slipped and fell on a wet floor being mopped by an employee of Red Coats, Inc. She did not see a wet floor sign in the area and suffered neck, back, and leg injuries. Jenkins sued Jemal’s Atlantic, LLC, and LPC Commercial Services, Inc. for negligence, but the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, a decision which was affirmed on appeal. Jenkins also sued Red Coats for negligence and negligent hiring, training, retention, and supervision. The trial court dismissed the latter claim, and this dismissal was affirmed on appeal. For the negligence claim, the trial court granted summary judgment for Red Coats, stating Jenkins needed expert testimony to establish the standard of care.The Superior Court of the District of Columbia initially granted summary judgment for Red Coats, stating Jenkins needed expert testimony to establish the standard of care. This decision was vacated and remanded for further consideration. On remand, the trial court reaffirmed its decision, concluding that expert testimony was necessary because the actions Red Coats should have taken beyond placing a wet floor sign were beyond the understanding of an average layperson.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case and found that the trial court abused its discretion. The appellate court held that in typical slip and fall cases, laypeople do not require expert assistance to determine if a warning was adequate. The court concluded that a jury could evaluate whether Red Coats exercised reasonable care in warning passersby of the hazard caused by the wet floor based on common knowledge and everyday experience. Therefore, Jenkins’s failure to provide expert testimony was not fatal to her claim. The judgment of the Superior Court was vacated, and the case was remanded for trial. View "Jenkins v. Red Coats, Inc." on Justia Law

KeraLink International, Inc. operates a network of eyebanks and purchased surgical packs containing eyewash from Stradis Healthcare, LLC. The eyewash, supplied by Geri-Care Pharmaceuticals Corporation, was contaminated, rendering corneal tissue unusable. KeraLink sued Stradis and Geri-Care for strict products liability, and both were held jointly and severally liable for $606,415.49 plus prejudgment interest. Stradis sought indemnification from Geri-Care, claiming Geri-Care's primary culpability as the apparent manufacturer of the eyewash.The United States District Court for the District of Maryland awarded summary judgment to KeraLink on its strict products liability claim against both Stradis and Geri-Care. The court rejected the sealed container defense asserted by both defendants. Stradis then sought implied indemnification from Geri-Care, arguing that its liability was secondary. The district court agreed, granting Stradis summary judgment for indemnification but denied Stradis' request for attorneys' fees incurred in defending against KeraLink's suit.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the district court did not err in awarding Stradis implied indemnification against Geri-Care. The court found that Geri-Care's conduct as the apparent manufacturer of the contaminated eyewash was primarily culpable, while Stradis' conduct was secondary. The court also upheld the district court's denial of Stradis' request for attorneys' fees, citing the American Rule, which generally precludes the recovery of attorneys' fees as compensatory damages unless authorized by statute, rule, or contract. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment in all respects. View "Geri-Care Pharmaceuticals Corp. v. Stradis Healthcare, LLC" on Justia Law

In this case, the families of Michael Jackson, Carl Wiley, Jr., and Rashad Henderson, who were killed during high-speed police chases in Houston, Texas, sued the City of Houston. They alleged that the Houston Police Department (HPD) has a policy of racial profiling that leads to more high-speed chases in predominantly black neighborhoods, resulting in the deaths of their loved ones. The plaintiffs brought several federal municipal liability claims, including violations of equal protection, Title VI, 42 U.S.C. § 1982, and substantive due process, as well as state tort claims.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas granted in part and denied in part Houston's motions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and for judgment on the pleadings. The court dismissed all claims except the equal protection claims and Jackson’s state law claims. Houston then filed an interlocutory appeal, raising issues regarding standing, failure to state federal claims, capacity to sue, and governmental immunity for Jackson’s state law claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court determined that it lacked jurisdiction to review non-final district court orders except under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). The court found that it could only review whether the plaintiffs had standing to assert their equal protection claims. The court held that the plaintiffs lacked standing because their injuries did not stem from unequal treatment based on race. Consequently, the court reversed the district court’s order regarding standing for the equal protection claims and vacated the district court’s decision on governmental immunity for Jackson’s negligence claim, remanding the case for further proceedings. View "Jackson v. City of Houston" on Justia Law

A Wisconsin prisoner, Armin Wand III, developed appendicitis in February 2018. He was seen by Nurse Beckey Kramer on February 13, 2018, but she did not diagnose appendicitis at that time. The next day, February 14, she recognized the symptoms and sent him to the hospital for emergency surgery. Wand sued Kramer and other officials, claiming inadequate medical care under the Eighth Amendment and state law negligence for not recognizing his need for emergency care on February 13.The United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin denied summary judgment for Kramer and another defendant, allowing the case to proceed to trial. The court recruited an experienced lawyer for Wand, but only for settlement purposes. After settlement efforts failed, the lawyer withdrew, and Wand's subsequent motion for recruitment of another lawyer was denied. The court noted Wand's legal blindness and severe stutter but believed he could represent himself with the court's assistance.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that Wand's trial testimony contradicted his earlier claims, stating he did not report lower right quadrant pain to Kramer on February 13, which was crucial for diagnosing appendicitis. The court concluded that Wand's case was substantively weak and that he had not shown prejudice from the lack of recruited counsel. The court affirmed the district court's judgment in favor of Kramer, holding that Wand did not demonstrate a reasonable likelihood that the presence of counsel would have changed the trial's outcome. View "Wand v. Kramer" on Justia Law

Fourteen-year-old Christopher "CJ" Lucero was hit by a car and severely injured while jaywalking across a city-owned street to enter his high school campus. The accident occurred near Betty H. Fairfax High School (BFHS) in Phoenix, which is part of the Phoenix Union High School District No. 210. On the day of the accident, there were no crosswalks, school zone speed limit or warning signs, or traffic lights near the school. CJ attempted to cross the street from a vacant dirt lot opposite the school, which was commonly used by parents to drop off students, although the school did not endorse this practice.CJ, through his father, sued the District for negligence, gross negligence, and premises liability. The Superior Court of Maricopa County denied the District's motion for summary judgment, reasoning that the District was aware of the jaywalking and the associated risks but did nothing to mitigate them. The court of appeals also denied the District's petition for special action relief.The Supreme Court of Arizona reviewed the case and held that the school did not owe CJ a duty of care as he crossed the street. The court reasoned that the risk of harm did not arise within the school-student relationship because CJ was not under the school's custody and control at the time of the accident. The court emphasized that the school did not own or control the street or the dirt lot and had no authority to install safety features. The court concluded that the general rule is that a school has no duty to protect students from hazards encountered while traveling to or from school. Consequently, the court vacated the court of appeals' decision and reversed the trial court's order, instructing the trial court to enter summary judgment in favor of the District. View "Phoenix Union High School District No. 210. v. Sinclair" on Justia Law