Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

Fatima Shaw-McDonald filed a medical malpractice lawsuit against Eye Consultants of Northern Virginia, P.C. after suffering vision loss following cataract surgery. While the lawsuit was pending, she filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy but did not initially disclose the lawsuit in her bankruptcy filings. Eye Consultants moved to dismiss the lawsuit, arguing that Shaw-McDonald no longer had standing to pursue it because her interest in the lawsuit had transferred to the bankruptcy trustee. Shaw-McDonald later amended her bankruptcy filings to include the lawsuit and obtained a discharge from the bankruptcy court.The circuit court dismissed the medical malpractice case, concluding that Shaw-McDonald lost standing when she filed for bankruptcy. The court relied on the precedent set by Kocher v. Campbell, which held that a plaintiff loses standing when a cause of action becomes part of the bankruptcy estate. Shaw-McDonald appealed the decision.The Court of Appeals of Virginia reversed the circuit court's decision, holding that Shaw-McDonald had standing to maintain her medical malpractice action. The court reasoned that once the bankruptcy trustee abandoned the claim, it reverted to Shaw-McDonald as if no bankruptcy petition had been filed.The Supreme Court of Virginia reviewed the case and affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision. The court held that Shaw-McDonald did not lose standing permanently when she filed for bankruptcy; rather, her standing was temporarily suspended. The court concluded that the appropriate remedy was to hold the medical malpractice case in abeyance until the bankruptcy proceedings were resolved, rather than dismissing it. The case was remanded to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Eye Consultants of Northern Virginia P.C. v. Shaw-McDonald" on Justia Law

A personal representative of a deceased resident's estate filed a complaint against a hospital district and its associated rehabilitation center, alleging negligence and vicarious liability for injuries suffered by the resident due to physical abuse by a temporary certified nursing assistant (CNA). The hospital district denied liability, claiming the CNA was an independent contractor. After a six-day trial, the jury found the CNA was an agent of the hospital district, and her negligence was a proximate cause of the resident's damages. The jury apportioned fault between the CNA and the hospital district, awarding $660,000 in damages to the estate.The district court reduced the damages by the percentage of fault attributed to the CNA, leading to an appeal by the personal representative, who argued the reduction was contrary to Wyoming law and inconsistent with the jury's verdict. The hospital district cross-appealed, asserting the district court should not have allowed the jury to consider whether the CNA was an agent and should have granted its motion for judgment as a matter of law.The Wyoming Supreme Court reviewed the case and found the district court did not err in denying the hospital district's motion for judgment as a matter of law. The court held there was sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find in favor of the personal representative on both direct and vicarious liability claims. The court also found the jury instructions adequately informed the jury of the applicable law and did not cause confusion.However, the Supreme Court determined the district court erred in reducing the damages. The jury found the CNA's conduct was negligent and that she was an agent of the hospital district, making the hospital district vicariously liable for her actions. The court reversed the judgment and remanded the case with instructions to enter a judgment for the full $660,000 in favor of the estate. View "Campbell County Hospital District v. Elsner" on Justia Law

Ethel Barry Masters filed a petition against Jacob Dawson in 2019, alleging replevin, conversion, and unjust enrichment after Dawson refused to surrender possession of four vehicles that belonged to Masters' deceased long-term companion. Dawson disputed ownership and obstructed the legal process, including failing to respond to requests for admissions and barricading the vehicles to prevent towing. The circuit court granted partial summary judgment in favor of Masters, ordering Dawson to surrender the vehicles, which he did not comply with. Dawson's attorney withdrew due to ethical concerns, and subsequent attorneys also withdrew due to Dawson's failure to pay legal fees.The Circuit Court of St. Louis County scheduled multiple trial dates, which were postponed due to Dawson's actions, including retaining new attorneys and filing motions for continuance. Dawson failed to appear for a pretrial conference, leading the circuit court to cancel the jury trial and enter a default judgment in favor of Masters, awarding her $83,035.41 in actual damages and an equal amount in punitive damages. Dawson's conduct was deemed contemptuous, justifying punitive damages to deter similar behavior.The Supreme Court of Missouri reviewed the case and found that Dawson's constitutional claims regarding the right to a jury trial were unpreserved because he did not adequately raise them in his motion for a new trial. The court held that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion by sanctioning Dawson due to his pattern of obstructive behavior. The Supreme Court of Missouri affirmed the circuit court's judgment, upholding the damages awarded to Masters. View "Masters v. Dawson" on Justia Law

In March 2016, thirteen-year-old J.R. Gustafson was accidentally shot and killed by his fourteen-year-old friend at a residence in Mt. Pleasant, Pennsylvania. J.R.'s parents, Mark and Leah Gustafson, filed a lawsuit against Springfield Armory, the manufacturer of the firearm, and Saloom Department Store, the retailer that sold the firearm. They alleged defective design, negligent design and sale, and negligent warnings and marketing. The trial court dismissed the complaint with prejudice, citing the Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act (PLCAA), which bars certain civil actions against firearms manufacturers and sellers.The Gustafsons appealed, and the Superior Court reversed the trial court's decision, remanding the case for further proceedings. The Superior Court's en banc panel issued a per curiam order, with no single rationale garnering majority support. Some judges found the PLCAA barred the claims but was unconstitutional, while others found the PLCAA did not bar the claims or was constitutional. The Superior Court's order was challenged, leading to the current appeal.The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reviewed the case and determined that the PLCAA barred the Gustafsons' action. The court found that the action constituted a "qualified civil liability action" under the PLCAA, as it was a civil action against a manufacturer and seller of a qualified product for damages resulting from the criminal or unlawful misuse of a firearm. The court also concluded that the product liability exception did not apply because the discharge of the firearm was caused by a volitional act that constituted a criminal offense.The court further held that the PLCAA was a valid exercise of Congress's Commerce Clause authority and did not violate the Tenth Amendment or principles of federalism. Consequently, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania vacated the Superior Court's order and remanded the case for reinstatement of the trial court's dismissal of the Gustafsons' complaint. View "Gustafson v. Springfield, Inc." on Justia Law

Raymond Tackett, an inmate with the Indiana Department of Corrections (IDOC), suffered from Hepatitis C (HCV) and did not receive direct-acting antivirals (DAAs), a treatment that cures HCV. He died on November 29, 2019, from complications related to HCV. His daughter, Skyler Tackett, as the personal representative of his estate, filed an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim and a state law medical malpractice claim against the medical professionals who treated him, Wexford Health Services, and Dr. Kristen Dauss, the Chief Medical Officer of the IDOC. She later dismissed all claims except the deliberate indifference claim against Dr. Dauss.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana granted summary judgment in favor of Dr. Dauss, finding that she took reasonable steps to expand access to DAAs and was not responsible for the treatment decisions that led to Mr. Tackett’s death. Ms. Tackett appealed the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court found that Ms. Tackett presented insufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find Dr. Dauss liable in her individual capacity. The court noted that Mr. Tackett was in a treatment priority group and that Nurse Myers had requested DAAs for him, but there was no evidence that Dr. Dauss’s actions or the IDOC policy prevented him from receiving the treatment. The court concluded that while Mr. Tackett’s death was tragic, there was no evidence that Dr. Dauss’s actions amounted to deliberate indifference under the Eighth Amendment. View "Tackett v Dauss" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs, Kandi Terry-Smith and Roy A. Smith, Jr., filed a complaint against Mountain View Hospital (MVH) and Idaho Falls Community Hospital (IFCH) alleging medical malpractice after Kandi suffered an injury while a patient at MVH. The complaint was filed on March 11, 2022, and a second, identical complaint was filed on September 8, 2022. The first case was dismissed for inactivity, but the district court granted an extension for service of process. The process server, Tony Mares, filed an affidavit claiming he served MVH, but deficiencies were later found.In the district court, MVH moved to dismiss the second case as time-barred and the first case for insufficient service of process. The district court denied the Smiths' motion to consolidate the cases and dismissed the second case. The district court granted MVH’s motion to dismiss the first case for insufficient service of process, finding that the Smiths failed to properly serve MVH. The Smiths' subsequent motions for reconsideration, to amend the complaint, and for additional extensions were denied. The district court also denied the Smiths' I.R.C.P. 60(b) motion for relief from the order denying reconsideration and judgment.The Idaho Court of Appeals reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court held that the Smiths failed to show good cause for the failure to timely serve MVH and did not exercise due diligence. The court also found no excusable neglect and determined that the Smiths' attorney's reliance on the process server’s affidavit was unreasonable. The court denied MVH’s request for attorney fees in the district court due to the lack of a cross-appeal but granted attorney fees and costs on appeal, finding the Smiths' appeal frivolous and without foundation. View "Smith v. Mountain View Hospital, LLC" on Justia Law

Talos ERT, L.L.C. (Talos) hired DLS, L.L.C. (DLS) to remove corroded piping from an oil-and-gas platform off the Louisiana coast. During the project, a 129-pound pipe fell and struck Walter Jackson, a DLS employee, resulting in his death. Jackson’s widow, Vantrece Jackson, and his son, Y.J., represented by his mother, Anika Warner, sued Talos for wrongful death. The suits were consolidated, and the case proceeded to trial.The jury found Talos 88% at fault for Jackson’s death and awarded significant damages to both plaintiffs. Y.J. was awarded $120,000 in special damages and $20,000,000 in general damages. Mrs. Jackson was awarded $987,930 in special damages and $6,600,000 in general damages. Talos filed a renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law (JMOL) and alternatively moved for a new trial or remittitur. The district court denied the JMOL and new trial motions but granted a partial remittitur, reducing Y.J.’s general damages to $4,360,708.59 and Mrs. Jackson’s to $5,104,226.22. Plaintiffs declined a new trial on damages.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court’s denial of Talos’s renewed JMOL motion, finding sufficient evidence to support both theories of liability: vicarious liability and independent negligence. The court also upheld the denial of a new trial on liability, noting the jury’s verdict was supported by the evidence.Regarding damages, the court found no abuse of discretion in the district court’s application of the maximum recovery rule for Y.J.’s award, using a factually similar case, Rachal v. Brouillette. However, the court vacated Mrs. Jackson’s general damages award and remanded for redetermination of remittitur, as the district court’s comparison case, Zimko v. American Cyanamid, was not factually similar. The court found no plain error in the alleged prejudicial statements made by Plaintiffs’ counsel during the trial. View "Warner v. Talos ERT" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Francisco Lorenzo and Angelina Nicolas sued Core/Related Grand Avenue Owner, LLC, Tishman Construction Corporation of California, and Calex Engineering, Inc. for wrongful death after their daughters were killed by a dump truck driven by Stanley Randle, an employee of a subcontractor. The truck was traveling from an unpermitted off-site staging area to a construction project in downtown Los Angeles. Plaintiffs argued that the defendants' decision to use an unpermitted staging area was negligent and led to the accident.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, concluding that they did not owe a duty of care to the decedents. The court found that the defendants' actions were not the proximate cause of the accident and that the defendants did not have a duty to ensure the safety of the decedents under the circumstances.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division One, reversed the lower court's decision. The appellate court held that the defendants did owe a duty of care to the decedents. The court reasoned that Civil Code section 1714 establishes a general duty to exercise reasonable care for the safety of others, and the defendants' decision to establish an unpermitted staging area foreseeably created a risk of harm. The court also found that the Rowland factors did not justify an exception to this duty. The court further rejected the defendants' argument that their conduct did not proximately cause the accident, concluding that there were triable issues of fact regarding causation. The judgment was reversed, and the case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Lorenzo v. Calex Engineering, Inc." on Justia Law

Joe and Lora Killoran, along with their businesses, Maple Valley Ag Products, LLC, and Maple Valley Ag Chemicals, Inc., sued Kip Kaler for slander, intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED), and unlawful interference with business. The Killorans alleged that Kaler made defamatory statements during Co-op meetings, calling them "crooks and thieves" and advising others not to do business with them. These statements allegedly caused significant reputational harm, economic losses, and mental distress to the Killorans and their businesses.The District Court of Cass County dismissed the complaint with prejudice. The court found that the slander claim was not well-pled, as the Killorans failed to provide sufficient factual support for the statements made by Kaler and did not adequately plead the falsity of the statements. The IIED claim was dismissed because the court determined that Kaler's conduct was not extreme and outrageous enough to permit recovery. The unlawful interference with business claim was dismissed due to the lack of an independent tort to support it, following the dismissal of the slander and IIED claims.The Supreme Court of North Dakota reviewed the case. The court affirmed the dismissal of the IIED claim, agreeing that Kaler's conduct did not meet the threshold for extreme and outrageous behavior. However, the court reversed the dismissal of the slander claim, finding that the district court had improperly applied the pleading standards and failed to accept the allegations as true. The court also reversed the dismissal of the unlawful interference with business claim, as the potential for an independent tort (slander) existed. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the Supreme Court's opinion. View "Killoran v. Kaler" on Justia Law

A 10-year-old student at an elementary school in Lincoln, Nebraska, was injured during a game of tag in a physical education class. The student was holding a pool noodle to tag classmates when another student, K.H., grabbed the pool noodle, causing the student to fall and hit her head. The student's mother sued the school district for negligence. The school district claimed sovereign immunity under the Political Subdivisions Tort Claims Act (PSTCA), arguing the claim arose from a battery.The district court overruled the school district's motion for summary judgment, finding a factual dispute about whether the pool noodle was part of the student's body. The court noted that while K.H. intentionally grabbed the pool noodle without the student's consent, it was unclear if this contact constituted a battery since the pool noodle was not necessarily part of the student's person.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case. The court noted that public school districts are political subdivisions under the PSTCA and that if a claim falls within an exemption, the political subdivision is not liable. The court examined whether the contact with the pool noodle could be considered offensive contact with the student's body, which would constitute a battery. The court found that whether an object is part of a person's body is determined on an objective reasonable person basis and that there was a genuine issue of material fact regarding this question.The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decision, holding that the factual dispute about whether the pool noodle was part of the student's body precluded summary judgment. The case was allowed to proceed to determine if the school district retained sovereign immunity. View "Scott v. Lancaster Cty. Sch. Dist. 0001" on Justia Law