Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

Misty Coleman alleges that she fell and broke her ankle after slipping on a wet shower floor in a county jail. She pursued constitutional claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and negligence claims under Ohio law against the county, corrections officers, and medical personnel. Coleman claimed that the slippery shower violated the Due Process Clause and that a county policy or custom was behind her poor medical care. She also questioned whether the county could invoke state-law immunity from her negligence claim at the pleading stage.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio dismissed all claims against all parties. The court found that Coleman failed to allege a plausible constitutional violation regarding the slippery shower and did not connect the inadequate medical care to a county policy or custom. The court also held that Ohio law granted immunity to Hamilton County on the negligence claim. The court allowed Coleman to conduct limited discovery to identify unnamed officers and nurses, but her subsequent amended complaint was dismissed as it was filed outside the statute of limitations.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. The court agreed with the district court's dismissal, holding that Coleman’s claims accrued on the date of her accident and that her amended complaint did not relate back to the original complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15. The court also found that Coleman did not meet the requirements for equitable tolling, as she did not allege facts showing that she was intentionally misled or tricked into missing the deadline. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of Coleman’s complaint. View "Coleman v. Hamilton County Bd. of County Commissioners" on Justia Law

Marlene Banwart and her husband Richard filed a medical malpractice lawsuit in 2020 against Neurosurgery of North Iowa, P.C., Dr. David Beck, and Dr. Thomas Getta. Marlene had undergone a lumbar laminectomy performed by Dr. Beck in July 2018, followed by severe postoperative pain and complications, including an epidural hematoma that required emergency surgery. The plaintiffs alleged negligence in the surgery and postoperative care by Dr. Beck and Dr. Getta.The Iowa District Court for Cerro Gordo County ruled on cross-motions for summary judgment. The court dismissed the plaintiffs' action as time-barred, concluding that the Iowa Supreme Court's emergency supervisory orders tolling the statute of limitations during the COVID-19 pandemic were invalid. However, the court found that the plaintiffs had substantially complied with Iowa's certificate of merit affidavit statute, despite the certificates not being signed under oath or penalty of perjury. Both parties appealed these rulings.The Iowa Supreme Court reviewed the case and bypassed the statute of limitations issue, focusing on the cross-appeal regarding the certificate of merit. The court held that the plaintiffs' certificates did not substantially comply with Iowa Code section 147.140 because they were not signed under oath or penalty of perjury. The court also rejected the plaintiffs' claims that the statute was void for vagueness and that the defendants had waived their rights by delaying their challenge. Consequently, the court reversed the district court's ruling on the certificates of merit and remanded the case for entry of summary judgment in favor of the defendants. View "Banwart v. Neurosurgery of North Iowa, P.C." on Justia Law

Joyce Pates filed a medical malpractice lawsuit against Community Health Systems, Inc. (CHSI), Affinity Hospital, LLC, d/b/a Grandview Medical Center, Dr. John Kirchner, and Southlake Orthopaedics Sports Medicine and Spine Center, P.C. Pates alleged that after injuring her ankle and undergoing surgery performed by Dr. Kirchner at Grandview Medical Center, she experienced complications leading to an infection and ultimately the amputation of her right leg.The Jefferson Circuit Court denied the defendants' motions to dismiss, which argued that Pates's claims were barred by the two-year statute of limitations under the Alabama Medical Liability Act (AMLA). The court reasoned that Pates's injury began when she was informed of the need for amputation, thus starting the statute of limitations from that point.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case and determined that Pates's claims were indeed barred by the AMLA's statute of limitations. The court found that Pates's injuries, including signs of infection and the need for hardware removal, were evident by November 2020. Therefore, the statute of limitations began at that time, and Pates's complaint filed in February 2023 was outside the two-year limit. The court granted the petitions for writs of mandamus, directing the trial court to dismiss Pates's claims against the defendants. View "Ex parte Affinity Hospital, LLC" on Justia Law

Rebecca Hartzell, a parent of children attending Dove Mountain K-CSTEM school, was banned from the school premises following an incident where she allegedly assaulted the school principal, Andrea Divijak. Hartzell claimed that she was banned in retaliation for her protected speech criticizing the school and its administration. The Marana Unified School District and Divijak argued that the ban was due to Hartzell's conduct, specifically the alleged assault.The United States District Court for the District of Arizona granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants on Hartzell's procedural due process claim, her First Amendment retaliation claim against Divijak, and part of her defamation claim. The court also denied Hartzell's motion to amend her complaint to add a First Amendment theory to her procedural due process claim. At trial, the court precluded Hartzell from pursuing a Monell claim against the District based on a "final policymaker" theory and granted judgment as a matter of law in favor of the District on her First Amendment claim. The jury found in favor of Divijak on the remaining defamation claim.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding Hartzell's "final policymaker" theory but erred in granting judgment as a matter of law on her First Amendment claim against the District. The court found that a reasonable jury could conclude that Hartzell was banned pursuant to an unconstitutional District policy prohibiting "offensive or inappropriate" speech. The court also affirmed the district court's ruling that Divijak was entitled to qualified immunity on the First Amendment claim. Additionally, the court reversed the summary judgment on Hartzell's defamation claim regarding one of the documents sent to her employer, finding it potentially defamatory. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with these findings. View "HARTZELL V. MARANA UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT" on Justia Law

Presley Karlin, a 17-year-old, was injured at Urban Air Springfield, a trampoline and adventure park, due to allegedly inadequate protective cushions. After turning 18, Karlin sued Urban Air for negligence. Urban Air responded by filing a motion to compel arbitration based on an arbitration agreement signed by Karlin’s mother on his behalf. Karlin argued that his mother lacked the authority to sign the agreement and that the agreement only applied to claims arising on the day it was signed, not to his injury four months later.The Circuit Court of Greene County overruled Urban Air’s motion to compel arbitration. Urban Air appealed, limiting its arguments to the arbitration agreement signed by Karlin’s mother. The court reviewed the case de novo, focusing on whether the arbitration agreement contained a delegation clause that required threshold issues of arbitrability to be decided by an arbitrator.The Supreme Court of Missouri found that the arbitration agreement did contain a delegation clause, which required any disputes about the scope, arbitrability, or validity of the agreement to be settled by arbitration. Since Karlin did not specifically challenge the delegation clause itself, the court held that the clause was valid and enforceable. Consequently, Karlin’s claims regarding the validity and scope of the arbitration agreement must be presented to the arbitrator.The Supreme Court of Missouri vacated the circuit court’s order and remanded the case with instructions to sustain Urban Air’s motion to compel arbitration. View "Karlin vs. UATP Springfield, LLC" on Justia Law

In November 2021, Lincoln Medical administered a COVID-19 vaccine to the five-year-old child of Jeremiah Hogan and Siara Jean Harrington at a school clinic without obtaining parental consent. Hogan filed a notice of claim in the Superior Court against the doctor, Lincoln Medical Partners, and MaineHealth, Inc., alleging various torts including professional negligence, battery, and false imprisonment on behalf of the child, and emotional distress and tortious interference with parental rights on behalf of the parents.The Superior Court appointed a chair for the prelitigation screening panel, and Lincoln Medical moved to dismiss the notice of claim, citing immunity under the federal Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness (PREP) Act. The court granted the motion to dismiss, interpreting the PREP Act to provide immunity to the defendants with no applicable exceptions. Hogan appealed the decision.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case and affirmed the Superior Court's judgment. The court held that the PREP Act provides broad immunity to covered persons, including individuals and corporations, from suits related to the administration of covered countermeasures, such as the COVID-19 vaccine. The court found that the federal statute preempts state law that would otherwise allow Hogan to sue, as the claims were directly related to the administration of the vaccine. The court concluded that the defendants were immune from Hogan’s claims under the PREP Act, and the state tort claims were preempted by federal law. View "Hogan v. Lincoln Medical Partners" on Justia Law

John McKnight filed a lawsuit against Anthony Love seeking damages from a vehicular accident. On November 13, 2019, both parties were driving on I-20 in DeKalb County when traffic slowed, and McKnight stopped his vehicle. Love, driving behind McKnight, failed to stop in time and collided with McKnight's vehicle. McKnight sustained injuries and his truck was damaged. Love was cited for following too closely and pleaded guilty to the offense. McKnight sought compensatory and punitive damages, as well as litigation expenses under OCGA § 13-6-11, alleging that Love acted in bad faith by being distracted, possibly using his cell phone at the time of the accident.The trial court denied Love's motion for partial summary judgment on the claim for litigation expenses, finding sufficient evidence to create a jury question regarding bad faith. The evidence included Love's cell phone records and McKnight's testimony suggesting Love was distracted. The trial court also denied Love's motion for summary judgment on claims of negligence per se but granted it on claims for punitive damages and stubborn litigiousness. Love did not challenge the negligence per se rulings, and McKnight's appeal on punitive damages and stubborn litigiousness was rejected by the Court of Appeals.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case and determined that the Court of Appeals erred in its analysis. The Court held that mere violations of traffic laws do not constitute bad faith under OCGA § 13-6-11. Bad faith requires intentional wrongdoing or reckless disregard of known harmful consequences, which is more than mere negligence. The Court found insufficient evidence of bad faith to support a claim for litigation expenses and reversed the Court of Appeals' judgment affirming the trial court's denial of Love's motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of bad faith litigation expenses. View "LOVE v. MCKNIGHT" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Barbara Politsch obtained a default judgment of approximately $175,000 against Metroplaza Partners, LLC in a premises liability case. However, Metroplaza had sold the property in 2005, over a year before Politsch's injury, and was not served with the summons and complaint. Metroplaza learned of the default judgment in January 2014 but did not act on it based on their counsel's advice. In February 2022, Politsch, with new counsel, renewed the judgment and sought to enforce it. Metroplaza then moved to set aside the default judgment, which the trial court granted under its equitable powers.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County granted Metroplaza's motion to set aside the default judgment, finding that Metroplaza had a meritorious defense, was never properly served, and had an excuse for not acting sooner due to reliance on their attorney's lack of advice. The court also noted the strong preference for cases to be decided on their merits and concerns about potential injustice.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case and affirmed the trial court's decision. The appellate court found no abuse of discretion in the trial court's ruling. It agreed that Metroplaza demonstrated a meritorious defense, a satisfactory excuse for not presenting a defense initially, and due diligence in seeking to set aside the default judgment once it was discovered. The appellate court emphasized the policy favoring decisions on the merits and the exceptional circumstances of the case, including the fact that Metroplaza was not the correct party to be sued. View "Politsch v. Metroplaza Partners, LLC" on Justia Law

Promise Healthcare Group, LLC and its affiliates operated various hospital and nursing facilities. During their Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings, Patrick Wassmann filed a $10 million medical malpractice claim based on treatment he received at one of the facilities between March 15 and June 9, 2017. Robert Michaelson, the liquidating trustee, objected to Wassmann’s claim, arguing it was time-barred because it became untimely by the time the Trustee objected to it and it was evaluated. The Trustee also argued that Wassmann’s claim should be barred because he failed to file a timely state court complaint in addition to his Chapter 11 proof of claim.The United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware set a bar date of May 31, 2019, for filing proof of claims. Wassmann filed his proof of claim on January 4, 2019. The court confirmed the Debtors’ reorganization plan on September 17, 2020, which went into effect on October 1, 2020. Wassmann had until November 1, 2020, to proceed against the Debtors in state court but chose to seek recovery in the Bankruptcy Court alone. The Bankruptcy Court denied the Trustee’s motion for summary judgment, reasoning that the claims allowance process under 11 U.S.C. § 502 evaluates claims as of the petition date and that a timely proof of claim does not require a separate timely non-bankruptcy complaint.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the Bankruptcy Court’s order. The Third Circuit held that the enforceability of a claim under 11 U.S.C. § 502(b) is determined as of the petition date, not the date of the court’s evaluation. The court also held that a creditor who has filed a timely proof of claim is not required to file a separate, timely non-bankruptcy action to preserve the claim. The court concluded that the Bankruptcy Court correctly allowed Wassmann’s claim as it was timely as of the petition date. View "In re: Promise Healthcare Group LLC" on Justia Law

Julene and William Dodd sued their attorney, Rory Jones, for legal malpractice after he missed the statute of limitations deadline for filing their medical malpractice lawsuit. The Dodds needed to prove that their original medical malpractice case had merit and that they would have won if Jones had filed on time. However, the district court struck the testimony of the Dodds’ experts, which was key to establishing the viability of their medical malpractice claim. The court found that the disclosures were untimely and that the experts failed to properly establish knowledge of the local standard of care, a foundational requirement of Idaho law. As a result, the Dodds’ legal malpractice claim was dismissed, and the court granted summary judgment in favor of Jones.The Dodds appealed to the Supreme Court of Idaho, arguing that the district court erred by ruling that Jones was not judicially estopped from arguing that no medical malpractice occurred and by excluding their expert testimony. They also raised claims of judicial bias. The Supreme Court of Idaho found that Jones could not be judicially estopped from claiming that no medical malpractice occurred because he was not a party in the original medical malpractice case but was representing the Dodds. The court also upheld the district court’s exclusion of the Dodds’ expert testimony, finding that the experts did not demonstrate familiarity with the local standard of care in Nampa, Idaho, at the time of the alleged malpractice.The Supreme Court of Idaho affirmed the district court’s judgment, concluding that the Dodds failed to establish an essential element of their legal malpractice case. The court also awarded attorney fees to Jones under Idaho Appellate Rule 11.2, finding that the appeal was pursued frivolously and without foundation, and sanctioned the Dodds’ attorney, Angelo Rosa, for his conduct during the appeal. View "Dodd v. Jones" on Justia Law