Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

A 14-year-old passenger, Kevin Greenidge, died from cardiac arrest aboard an American Airlines international flight from Honduras to Florida. Kevin, who suffered from multiple health conditions, began experiencing breathing difficulties soon after takeoff. Despite the crew’s efforts and the assistance of two medical professionals on board, Kevin did not survive. During the resuscitation attempt, there was a dispute about whether the aircraft’s automated external defibrillator (AED) functioned properly, as several witnesses reported it failed to deliver a shock, despite internal device data indicating otherwise.Following Kevin’s death, his aunt, Melissa Arzu, acting individually and as administrator of his estate, filed suit against American Airlines in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas. She alleged liability and loss of consortium under the Montreal Convention and breach of contract under Texas law. Both parties moved for summary judgment. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of American Airlines on all claims, finding that the alleged deviations from airline policy and medical response did not constitute an “accident” under Article 17 of the Montreal Convention.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed summary judgment on the claims based on the crew’s allegedly ineffective medical response, holding that such a response does not amount to an “accident” under Article 17 without unusual circumstances or willful inaction. However, the court reversed summary judgment on the claims premised on the AED malfunction, finding that a genuine dispute remained as to whether the AED’s failure, in violation of FAA regulations, could be considered an “unexpected or unusual event.” The court also held that the Montreal Convention expressly preempts Arzu’s breach of contract claim. View "Arzu v. American Airlines" on Justia Law

A man suffered severe injuries, including the loss of his leg, when his stopped tractor-trailer was struck by a truck driven by an employee of a motor carrier. The shipment had been coordinated by a broker, and the injured man alleged the broker was liable for negligently hiring the motor carrier and its driver, pointing to the carrier’s poor safety rating and regulatory violations. The claim asserted that the broker knew, or should have known, that hiring this carrier posed a reasonable risk of causing harm.In the United States District Court for the Southern District of Illinois, the broker moved to dismiss the negligent-hiring claim, arguing that it was preempted by the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act (FAAAA). That court, following precedent from the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, agreed and dismissed the claim, reasoning that it was expressly preempted by the FAAAA and did not fall within the safety exception. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision, maintaining that the safety exception did not apply to the broker in this context.The Supreme Court of the United States reviewed the case to resolve a division among the circuits. The Court held that the FAAAA’s safety exception does encompass negligent-hiring claims against brokers when those claims concern the use of motor vehicles in transportation. Specifically, the Court determined that state common-law negligent-hiring standards, as applied to brokers who select motor carriers, constitute the exercise of “safety regulatory authority of a State with respect to motor vehicles” and are thus not preempted by the FAAAA. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Seventh Circuit and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Montgomery v. Caribe Transport II, LLC" on Justia Law

A law enforcement officer conducted a traffic stop of an individual suspected of participating in a series of armed robberies. During the stop, the suspect, D’Juantez Mitchell, did not comply with police orders and drove his vehicle into the officer and toward another officer. In response, the officer shot and killed Mitchell. Mitchell’s estate and children challenged the officer’s use of deadly force, alleging violations of constitutional rights and Kentucky law.The United States District Court for the Western District of Kentucky granted the officer qualified immunity on federal claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, concluding there was no violation of clearly established federal law. However, the district court denied the officer’s motion for summary judgment on the state-law claims, finding a genuine dispute as to whether the officer acted in subjective good faith, and thus denied Kentucky qualified official immunity.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial of qualified official immunity under Kentucky law de novo. The appellate court held that the officer’s use of deadly force constituted a discretionary act under Kentucky law and that the plaintiffs failed to provide evidence sufficient to rebut the presumption that the officer acted in good faith. The court found that neither purported inconsistencies in the officer’s testimony nor affidavits concerning his general racial animus created a genuine issue of material fact regarding his subjective intent during the incident. The court emphasized that the video evidence showed the officer and another were in imminent danger when the vehicle moved, supporting the officer’s stated belief that deadly force was necessary.The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of qualified official immunity, holding that the officer was entitled to immunity from the state-law claims. View "Mitchell v. Conrad" on Justia Law

Two individuals were involved in a car accident, after which one party sued for damages, alleging a traumatic brain injury and seeking nearly $2 million. The parties agreed that the plaintiff would undergo a neuropsychological examination, but they disagreed on the terms governing the examination. The defendant argued that Nevada’s Rule of Civil Procedure 35 (NRCP 35) should control the process, while the plaintiff asserted that a new statute, NRS 629.620, provided additional rights and should apply.The Eighth Judicial District Court of Nevada ruled that NRCP 35 governed the examination but imposed several conditions, including disclosure of raw test data to the plaintiff’s counsel (with restrictions), permitting non-neuropsychologist experts to review the data, allowing the exam to be audio recorded, and permitting the presence of a court-certified interpreter. The defendant sought reconsideration, which was denied, and then petitioned for extraordinary relief from the Nevada Supreme Court.The Supreme Court of Nevada held that NRS 629.620 is unconstitutional to the extent it governs discovery in civil litigation and conflicts with NRCP 35. The court found that NRCP 35 is a procedural rule within the judiciary’s domain, and legislative attempts to alter its operation via NRS 629.620 violate the separation of powers. Regarding the specific exam conditions, the court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion by allowing disclosure of raw data to counsel with a protective order. However, it found the district court abused its discretion by permitting audio recording and the presence of an interpreter without a showing of good cause. The court granted the writ in part, directing the district court to modify those conditions, and denied relief as to the other challenged conditions. View "POWERS VS. DIST. CT." on Justia Law

A married couple who appeared on a reality television series operated a YouTube channel, while another individual and her husband operated a separate channel focused on reality TV gossip. The second channel discussed the couple and made several statements about them, some of which were highly negative and specific. The couple filed a lawsuit against the channel operators, alleging defamation and civil conspiracy based on these statements. Additional claims were made regarding comments about financial fraud, racist remarks, and accusations of criminal conduct and murder.The case was reviewed by the Eighth Judicial District Court in Clark County, Nevada. After the couple amended their complaint, the defendants filed a special motion to dismiss under Nevada’s anti-SLAPP statutes. The district court granted the anti-SLAPP motion in its entirety, dismissing all claims, and subsequently awarded attorney fees to the defendants. The plaintiffs appealed both the dismissal and the fee award.The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed the case. It clarified that under the anti-SLAPP analysis, courts must independently evaluate each alleged statement to determine whether it is protected communication. The Court held that the district court erred by dismissing the complaint entirely, as defendants had not met their burden under the first prong for four specific statements (involving allegations of financial fraud, racist conduct, and murder). For the remaining statements, the defendants met their burden, and the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate a probability of prevailing. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the dismissal, remanding for further proceedings on the four unprotected statements, and reversed the attorney fee award, instructing the district court to reconsider fees based on partial success. View "ROSENBROOK VS. LLOYD C/W 85175" on Justia Law

The appellant filed a lawsuit alleging medical malpractice and gross negligence against several healthcare providers and associated entities. The Superior Court of the District of Columbia dismissed the complaint, finding it barred by the statute of limitations and for failure to state a claim. After the dismissal, the appellant sought to file a notice of appeal but missed the standard thirty-day deadline, asserting that he did not receive timely notice of the dismissal order due to administrative errors, including misdirected court communications. He filed a motion for leave to late file his notice of appeal, claiming excusable neglect or good cause due to these circumstances.Upon review of the appellant’s motion, the Superior Court denied the request. The court relied on D.C. App. R. 4(a)(7), which allows reopening the time to appeal under limited circumstances, including a fourteen-day deadline after notice of the judgment. Because the motion was filed more than fourteen days after the appellant learned of the judgment, the trial court found it untimely under this provision. The court also cited potential prejudice to appellees from having to defend a “frivolous” appeal.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals vacated the Superior Court’s decision and remanded for further proceedings. The appellate court held that the trial court erred by applying the timing requirements of Rule 4(a)(7) when the motion was properly brought under Rule 4(a)(5), which provides a different standard for extensions based on excusable neglect or good cause and does not impose the same fourteen-day limit. The appellate court further clarified that the merits of the underlying case and the ordinary burden of defending an appeal are not relevant factors in assessing such motions. View "Newton v. Grajny" on Justia Law

Jonathan Lewis was injured when he slipped and fell on a painted line in the parking lot of a convenience store in South Carolina. The fall occurred after a store employee had cleaned the area using water and a powdered concrete cleaner, but no warning signs, cones, or safety vests were present, despite company policy. Lewis injured his right leg, undergoing surgery and incurring significant medical expenses. He had a prior history of injury to the same tendon, but the circumstances of the fall were undisputed: he slipped immediately after stepping on the wet surface as he exited the store.Lewis filed a premises liability suit against the store, alleging negligence in failing to warn about or remedy the hazardous condition. The case was removed to the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina. After discovery, the district court granted summary judgment to the store. It held: first, that the wet and cleaned surface was an “open and obvious” hazard, removing the store’s duty to warn; second, that there was no evidence the store could have foreseen the specific risk; and third, that Lewis failed to offer expert testimony establishing causation for his injury. The district court also denied Lewis’s Daubert and spoliation motions.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed the grant of summary judgment, holding that genuine disputes of material fact remained regarding whether the hazard was “open and obvious” and whether expert testimony was required to establish causation. The court vacated the district court’s Daubert and spoliation rulings, remanding for further proceedings. The main holding is that, under South Carolina law, questions of breach and causation in slip-and-fall cases with these facts are for the jury, and expert testimony is not always required for causation in such cases. View "Lewis v. Circle K Stores Inc." on Justia Law

Cinda Haddon was injured in a motor vehicle collision when Ladarius Vanlier, who was uninsured, struck her vehicle. Haddon filed a lawsuit against Vanlier for negligence and, as allowed by Tennessee’s Uninsured Motorist Act, served process on her uninsured motorist insurer, Auto-Owners Insurance Company. Vanlier could not be served, so Haddon proceeded directly against Auto-Owners. The case went to a jury trial, which found Vanlier at fault and awarded Haddon $320,000 in damages for her personal injuries, including pain and suffering, loss of enjoyment of life, permanent injury, and medical expenses.After the jury’s award, Haddon requested prejudgment interest. The Circuit Court for Davidson County denied her request, reasoning that prejudgment interest is not available for personal injury actions under Tennessee law, even though equitable considerations would otherwise support such an award. Haddon appealed. The Court of Appeals for Tennessee reversed, holding that claims against an uninsured motorist carrier sound in contract, not tort, meaning the prohibition on prejudgment interest for personal injury actions did not apply. The Court of Appeals sent the case back to the trial court to determine the amount of prejudgment interest.The Supreme Court of Tennessee reviewed the case and concluded that the action’s gravamen was in personal injury, not contract. The Court determined that Haddon’s claim was based on the tortious conduct of Vanlier and sought damages for personal injuries, rather than any breach of contract by Auto-Owners. As prejudgment interest is not allowed in personal injury actions under Tennessee law, the Supreme Court of Tennessee reversed the Court of Appeals and reinstated the trial court’s judgment denying prejudgment interest. The holding is that prejudgment interest is not available in an action brought against a tortfeasor and defended by an uninsured motorist carrier when the claim’s gravamen is personal injury. View "Haddon v. Vanlier" on Justia Law

A resident of a skilled nursing facility signed an arbitration agreement upon admission. Twelve days later, the resident died. The resident’s husband, acting both individually and as executor of her estate, brought suit in Iowa District Court for Henry County against the nursing facility and several related entities, as well as additional healthcare providers. He alleged negligence, gross negligence, wrongful death, and dependent adult abuse. Nearly a year into the litigation, the nursing facility defendants moved to compel arbitration based on the agreement signed by the decedent.The Iowa District Court for Henry County granted the motion to compel arbitration. The court reasoned that, under the existing Iowa precedent, waiver of the right to arbitrate requires both conduct inconsistent with that right and prejudice to the opposing party—a two-part test established in prior Iowa Supreme Court cases. Applying this standard, the district court found limited prejudice to the plaintiff because discovery had not been extensive and the trial date was still far off. The plaintiff was granted interlocutory appeal.The Supreme Court of Iowa reviewed the case for correction of errors at law. The court determined that the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) governed because the agreement involved interstate commerce, and that the FAA preempts Iowa's arbitration-specific waiver rule, which requires a showing of prejudice. Instead, the court held that the generally applicable contract law standard for waiver applies: the voluntary or intentional relinquishment of a known right. Applying this standard, the Supreme Court of Iowa concluded that the nursing facility had impliedly waived its contractual right to arbitration by participating in litigation and discovery for months after being aware of the arbitration agreement, and by delaying a motion to compel arbitration. The Supreme Court of Iowa reversed the district court’s order and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Cole v. Southeast Iowa Orthopaedics and Sports Medicine" on Justia Law

The case involves a nonprofit religious organization in Shelby County that hosted a wedding reception for two of its missionaries. The organization hired a catering company for the event, and the plaintiff, who operated a catering business, was brought in by another caterer associated with the company to help with the reception. She was paid for her work and arranged for additional staff to assist. At the end of the event, the plaintiff was directed by a member of the organization to exit the building through a specific door. It was dark outside, and there was no exterior lighting in the area. After stepping outside, the plaintiff took a few steps and fell off a loading dock, sustaining serious injuries.The plaintiff sued the organization in the Shelby Circuit Court, alleging negligence, wantonness, and negligent or wanton hiring, training, and supervision. The organization moved for summary judgment, arguing that the plaintiff was a licensee rather than a business invitee and that any danger was open and obvious due to the darkness. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the organization. The plaintiff appealed, contesting only the negligence claim.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case de novo. It determined that the plaintiff was a business invitee because she was present to provide a material benefit to the organization. The court further held that whether the darkness constituted an open and obvious danger was a question of fact for the jury, not an issue to be resolved on summary judgment, because there was evidence the lighting was not total darkness and could have misled a reasonably prudent person. The Supreme Court of Alabama reversed the summary judgment on the negligence claim and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Joseph v. Caritas of Birmingham" on Justia Law