Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

Three public school teachers in Washington developed health problems after working in an older school building that contained polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) manufactured by Monsanto. The teachers sued Pharmacia, Monsanto’s successor-in-interest, alleging injuries from PCB exposure and brought claims under the Washington Product Liability Act (WPLA) for design defect, construction defect, and failures to warn, while also seeking punitive damages under Missouri law. After a seven-week trial, the jury found for the teachers on all claims, awarding substantial compensatory and punitive damages.The Snohomish County Superior Court, where the case was tried, ruled that Missouri law governed the issues of repose and punitive damages, while Washington law governed the substantive elements of liability. The court also admitted expert testimony estimating historic PCB exposure levels. Pharmacia challenged the verdict, but the trial court denied its post-trial motions. On appeal, the Washington Court of Appeals reversed in part, holding that Washington’s statute of repose applied, limiting the plaintiffs’ claims, and that the verdict form was insufficient for punitive damages because it did not specify which theory of liability supported the award. The Court of Appeals also found error in the admission of certain expert testimony.The Supreme Court of the State of Washington reviewed the case and partially reversed the Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court held that, under Washington’s established choice of law principles, Missouri law governs both the issues of repose and punitive damages because Missouri has the most significant relationship to those issues. The Court also held that the jury instructions and special verdict form were sufficient to sustain the punitive damages award under Missouri law, and that the challenged expert testimony was admissible under the Frye standard and ER 702. The Supreme Court reinstated the jury’s verdict and remanded for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Erickson v. Pharmacia LLC" on Justia Law

After a car accident in which the defendant, while driving a marked police vehicle, rear-ended the plaintiff’s car, the plaintiff sought medical treatment at a hospital and received an initial bill for $7,175.77 for emergency care and $92 for an eye exam. However, due to a preexisting contract between the plaintiff’s health insurer and the hospital, the insurer paid a reduced, negotiated amount—$4,395.75 for the emergency care—which fully satisfied the bill. The plaintiff then sued the defendant for negligence, seeking special damages for past medical expenses based on the gross charges listed on the hospital bill.In the Third District Court, Salt Lake County, both parties filed motions in limine regarding the admissibility of the gross charges versus the negotiated charges. The district court ruled that, under the collateral source rule, evidence of the negotiated charges paid by the plaintiff’s insurance was inadmissible, and only the gross charges could be considered. At a bench trial, the court awarded the plaintiff special damages based on the gross charges, less a deduction for amounts already reimbursed by the defendant to the plaintiff’s car insurance provider.On direct appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Utah addressed whether the collateral source rule requires exclusion of evidence of the negotiated charges for an insured plaintiff’s medical care. The court held that the collateral source rule does not require exclusion of the negotiated charges, because the gross charge does not reflect the plaintiff’s actual loss; neither the plaintiff nor the insurer was ever obligated to pay the gross amount. The court concluded that only the negotiated charge represents the compensable loss for special damages. Accordingly, the Supreme Court of Utah vacated the special damages award and remanded for a new trial on that issue. View "Gardner v. Norman" on Justia Law

A plaintiff brought suit against a defendant for defamation, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and related claims after the defendant published false and damaging material about her online. The defendant initially participated in the litigation with counsel, but later became self-represented and provided a P.O. box as his address. After failing to appear or defend the action, his answer was stricken, and the plaintiff mailed a statement of damages to the address he provided. The court entered a default judgment against the defendant for over $1 million, which was later renewed nearly a decade after its entry.Prior to the current appeal, the Superior Court of Los Angeles County denied the defendant’s anti-SLAPP motion and struck his cross-complaint after direction from the California Court of Appeal, which also awarded attorney fees to the plaintiff. After the defendant’s answer was stricken for nonappearance, the plaintiff served a statement of damages and obtained a default judgment. Years later, the plaintiff renewed the judgment, and the defendant moved to vacate the renewal, arguing the default judgment was void due to improper notice of damages and defective service.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the denial of the defendant’s motion to vacate the renewal of judgment. The court held that the plaintiff’s claims for defamation and related torts qualified as personal injury actions, making a statement of damages appropriate. The court further held that use of a custom statement of damages form, rather than the Judicial Council form, did not render the judgment void, and that service by mail to the defendant’s provided address was proper under the applicable statutes. The court affirmed the order denying the motion to vacate the renewal of judgment. View "Backlund v. Stone" on Justia Law

Edward T. Saadi, a licensed attorney proceeding pro se, obtained a $90,000 judgment against Pierre Maroun and Maroun’s International, LLC (MILLC) following a jury verdict in a federal defamation suit. Despite the judgment, Saadi was unable to collect payment for nine years. In 2018, Saadi discovered information suggesting Maroun had transferred $250,000 from his personal account to MILLC, allegedly to evade the judgment. Saadi claimed these funds were used to purchase a condominium titled to MILLC but used as Maroun’s residence, and to pay Maroun’s personal expenses. Saadi initiated proceedings supplementary under Florida law, seeking to void the transfer and recover assets.The United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida allowed Saadi to file an impleader complaint against Maroun and MILLC, asserting claims for fraudulent transfer and actual and constructive fraud under Florida statutes. Saadi also sought sanctions when MILLC failed to produce a representative for deposition, but the district court denied the motion, finding the individual was not a managing agent of MILLC. Ultimately, the district court granted summary judgment for Maroun and MILLC, ruling that Saadi’s claims were time-barred under Florida’s statutes of repose and limitations, and that tolling provisions did not apply. The court also found that the remedies Saadi sought were unavailable under the relevant statutes.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the district court’s rulings. Finding that several dispositive questions of Florida law lacked controlling precedent and were subject to conflicting interpretations by Florida’s intermediate appellate courts, the Eleventh Circuit certified five questions to the Florida Supreme Court. The court deferred its decision pending the Florida Supreme Court’s response to the certified questions. View "Saadi v. Maroun" on Justia Law

Carlos Pellecer died after falling from a Werner brand aluminum extension ladder while working as a handyman in New Orleans. His family sued Werner Co., a Delaware corporation, and New Werner Holding Co., Inc., alleging that the ladder was unreasonably dangerous under the Louisiana Products Liability Act (LPLA) and that the defendants failed to warn about a 2018 recall. The ladder in question was manufactured in 1991 by Werner Co., a Pennsylvania corporation (later renamed Old Ladder), which filed for bankruptcy in 2006. The defendants had purchased certain assets, including the Werner name and trademark, from Old Ladder in 2007, but did not manufacture or sell the specific ladder model involved in the accident.The Civil District Court for the Parish of Orleans denied the defendants’ motion for summary judgment and, after a jury trial, entered judgment on a verdict finding the defendants to be manufacturers of the ladder under the LPLA. The jury awarded over $5 million in damages, apportioning fault equally between the defendants and Old Ladder. The defendants’ post-trial motions were denied. The Louisiana Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, affirmed the trial court’s judgment, holding that the jury could reasonably find the defendants to be manufacturers under the LPLA’s apparent manufacturer doctrine.The Supreme Court of Louisiana granted certiorari and held that the defendants were not manufacturers of the ladder under the LPLA. The court found no evidence that the defendants labeled the ladder as their own, held themselves out as its manufacturer, or exercised control over its design, construction, or quality. The court concluded that merely acquiring the Werner name and trademark did not make the defendants manufacturers of the subject ladder. The Supreme Court reversed the appellate court, vacated the trial court’s judgment, and rendered judgment in favor of the defendants. View "PELLECER VS. WERNER CO." on Justia Law

A railway employee, while working as a carman responsible for inspecting and repairing railcars, suffered injuries after the ballast beneath the tracks gave way, causing him to fall. He alleged that his employer failed to properly maintain the ballast under Tracks 46 and 47, despite prior complaints and a previous injury in the same area. The employer denied negligence and argued that federal regulations governing ballast, specifically 49 C.F.R. § 213.103 under the Federal Railroads Safety Act (FRSA), precluded the employee’s claim under the Federal Employer’s Liability Act (FELA).The District Court for the Parish of Caddo granted summary judgment for the employer, finding that the FRSA precluded the FELA claim. The Louisiana Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, affirmed, agreeing that federal regulation subsumed the field and thus barred the employee’s suit. The employee then sought review from the Supreme Court of Louisiana.The Supreme Court of Louisiana reviewed the case de novo and held that the FRSA does not preclude a FELA action. Relying on the reasoning in Pom Wonderful LLC v. Coca-Cola Co., the court found that the two federal statutes are complementary, not in irreconcilable conflict, and that Congress had not intended for the FRSA to preclude FELA claims. The court also determined that the employee presented sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact regarding negligence, making summary judgment inappropriate. Accordingly, the Supreme Court of Louisiana reversed the lower courts’ decisions and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "VAN BUREN VS. KANSAS CITY SOUTHERN RAILWAY COMPANY" on Justia Law

Delta Airlines contracted with Lands’ End to supply new uniforms for its employees, which were manufactured overseas and distributed to approximately 64,000 workers. After the uniforms were issued, many employees reported that the garments transferred dye onto other surfaces and caused a range of health symptoms, including skin irritation and respiratory issues. Two groups of Delta employees filed lawsuits: one group sought damages for property damage and breach of express warranty as intended beneficiaries of the contract between Delta and Lands’ End, while the other group pursued personal injury claims, alleging the uniforms were defectively manufactured or designed and that Lands’ End failed to warn of these defects.The United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin consolidated the actions and, after discovery, granted summary judgment in favor of Lands’ End on all claims. For the personal injury claims, the court excluded the plaintiffs’ expert testimony on defect and causation, finding the opinions unreliable under Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. The court also found that the plaintiffs failed to present sufficient evidence that the uniforms were defective or that any defect caused their injuries. On the breach of warranty claim, the court determined that Lands’ End had not breached the contract’s satisfaction guarantee because plaintiffs had not returned their uniforms as required by the contract’s terms.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The Seventh Circuit held that the exclusion of the plaintiffs’ expert testimony was not an abuse of discretion, as the experts failed to reliably establish defect or causation. The court also held that summary judgment on the breach of warranty claim was proper because the contract’s return requirement was reasonable and not an unlawful limitation on the express warranty. The district court’s judgment was affirmed in full. View "Gilbert v Lands' End, Inc." on Justia Law

A mechanical maintenance technician employed at a steel manufacturing facility contracted COVID-19 in August 2021, which ultimately led to his death following a double lung transplant and subsequent infection. The employee worked closely with a single partner during long shifts, and both were unvaccinated, sometimes failing to comply with company mask policies. The employee’s family and estate filed a workers’ compensation claim, alleging that his work conditions placed him at a greater risk of contracting COVID-19 than the general public. Evidence included testimony about his work environment, social activities, and the timeline of symptom onset.An Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) reviewed the claim and found that the estate failed to prove the employee’s exposure to COVID-19 at work was greater than that of the general public, or that his work increased his risk of contracting or exacerbating the disease. The ALJ dismissed the claim, concluding that the statutory requirements for an occupational disease under Kentucky law were not met. The Workers’ Compensation Board affirmed the ALJ’s findings, as did the Kentucky Court of Appeals, both determining that substantial evidence supported the denial of benefits and that the ALJ had not misapplied the law.The Supreme Court of Kentucky reviewed the case and affirmed the Court of Appeals’ decision. The Court held that, for a communicable disease like COVID-19 to be compensable under workers’ compensation, the claimant must prove the disease was work-related, that the nature of the employment increased the risk of contracting the disease compared to the general public, and that the injury exceeded the normal effects of such a disease. The Court found the estate did not meet its burden of proof on the threshold issue of work-related causation and affirmed the dismissal of the claim. View "ESTATE OF PERKINS V. NORTH AMERICAN STAINLESS" on Justia Law

An employee worked for over sixteen years as a shuttle car operator for a coal company, primarily in Kentucky, where he was regularly exposed to hazardous noise. After the Kentucky mine closed, he continued working for the same employer in Alabama for nine months before retiring. The employee began experiencing hearing difficulties before leaving Kentucky, and was later diagnosed with work-related hearing loss. He filed a workers’ compensation claim in Kentucky, listing his last day of work in Kentucky as the date of last exposure.The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) dismissed the employee’s claim for coal workers’ pneumoconiosis but granted his hearing loss claim, finding that the injury occurred on his last day working in Kentucky. The ALJ relied on medical testimony indicating that the short period of exposure in Alabama was inconsequential to the hearing loss, and applied Kentucky Revised Statute (KRS) 342.7305(4), which presumes liability for the employer with whom the employee was last injuriously exposed to hazardous noise for at least one year. The Workers’ Compensation Board affirmed, concluding that Kentucky had jurisdiction and that the injury manifested while the employee was still working in Kentucky. The Kentucky Court of Appeals also affirmed, holding that extraterritorial coverage statutes did not apply because the injury occurred in Kentucky.The Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed the Court of Appeals’ decision. The Court held that, under the amended KRS 342.7305(4), the date of injury for liability purposes is when the employee was last injuriously exposed to hazardous noise for at least one year with the employer, here in Kentucky. The Court concluded that Kentucky had jurisdiction over the claim and that the insurer covering the employer on that date was liable. View "KENTUCKY EMPLOYERS' MUTUAL INSURANCE V. CLAS COAL CO., INC." on Justia Law

A retired teacher who continued to work as a substitute until 2014 filed a workers’ compensation claim in 2015, alleging he developed mesothelioma from asbestos exposure during his employment with a county school board. Initially, he identified his last exposure as occurring during his full-time employment, which ended in 2003, and named Kentucky Employers’ Mutual Insurance (KEMI) as the insurer. Later, the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) determined that the last injurious exposure actually occurred in 2014, when the teacher stopped substitute teaching, which would make Encova Mutual Insurance Group the responsible carrier for the claim.After the ALJ’s finding, KEMI sought to have Encova certified as the responsible insurer, but the ALJ denied the motion as untimely and questioned his authority to resolve the issue. The Workers’ Compensation Board (WCB) affirmed the denial, but on the ground that neither KEMI nor Encova had standing, as neither had been formally joined as parties. The Kentucky Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the ALJ and WCB had the authority and obligation under the Workers’ Compensation Act to determine and certify the proper insurance carrier, even after a change in the last date of exposure.The Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed the Court of Appeals. It held that the ALJ and WCB have statutory authority to determine which insurer is responsible for payment of benefits when the last date of injurious exposure changes, and that insurers have standing to participate in such proceedings. The Court further held that the Act binds the insurer on the risk at the time of last exposure, regardless of notice or formal joinder, and that equitable defenses such as laches or estoppel do not bar certification in these circumstances. The case was remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "ENCOVA MUTUAL INSURANCE GROUP V. HALL" on Justia Law