Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court quashed a preliminary writ of prohibition granted to the Kristine and Dennis Hill preventing the circuit court from compelling production of certain settlement documents relating to a motor vehicle accident involving Kristine in this negligence lawsuit brought against Mercy Rehabilitation Hospital, holding that the documents were not protected by the work product doctrine.Kristine was a patient at Mercy recovering from back surgery when her hospital bed allegedly malfunctioned in a manner causing her to sustain back and spine injuries. Six months later, Kristine was involved in an accident that allegedly aggravated those injuries. After Kristine settled her claim with the insurance carrier of the at-fault driver the Hills sued Mercy, alleging negligence. Mercy sought production of the settlement documents to prove reduction, but the Hills identified as protected work product several of those documents. The circuit court sustained Mercy's ensuing motion to compel production of the documents, and the Halls petitioned for a writ of prohibition. The court of appeals issued a preliminary writ. The Supreme Court quashed the writ, holding that the circuit court properly concluded the settlement documents and related communications Mercy sought were not protected by the work product doctrine. View "Hill v. Honorable Wallach" on Justia Law

SM, AA and RM are the co-owners of Cannaco Research Corporation (CRC), a licensed manufacturer and distributor of cannabis products. All three individuals served as officers of CRC until February 2021, when AA and RM voted to remove SM from her position. SM sued AA, RM and others, including JA, AA’s husband, in a multicount complaint alleging causes of action for breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, fraud and other torts.   AA moved to disqualify SM counsel, Spencer Hosie and Hosie Rice LLP, on the ground SM had impermissibly downloaded from AA’s CRC email account private communications between AA and JA, protected by the spousal communication privilege and provided them to her attorneys, who then used them in an attempt to obtain a receivership for CRC in a parallel proceeding. The trial court granted the motion, finding that SM had not carried her burden of establishing AA had no reasonable expectation her communications with her husband would be private, and ordered the disqualification of Hosie and Hosie Rice.   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court held that the evidence before the trial court supported its finding that AA reasonably expected her communications were, and would remain, confidential. And while the court acknowledged disqualification may not be an appropriate remedy when a client simply discusses with his or her lawyer improperly acquired privileged information, counsel’s knowing use of the opposing side’s privileged documents, however obtained, is a ground for disqualification. View "Militello v. VFARM 1509" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Sue Chimento brought claims for defamation, negligence, intentional interference with business relations, false representation, constructive fraud, and conspiracy against Defendants Gallagher Benefit Services, Inc., and Scott McCoy, based on allegations they made to the Tulsa Police Department, Tulsa County District Attorney's Office, and the Oklahoma Insurance Department that she had embezzled money while under their employment. The trial court granted partial summary judgment to Defendants, finding that their statements to the police and district attorney were subject to an absolute privilege and their statements to Oklahoma Insurance Department were subject to a qualified privilege under 36 O.S. § 363. The trial court certified its order granting partial summary judgment for interlocutory review. The Oklahoma Supreme Court held that Defendants' statements to the police, the district attorney, and the Oklahoma Insurance Department were afforded a qualified privilege. View "Chimento v. Gallagher Benefit Services" on Justia Law

In this personal injury action, the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal brought by defendant New Jersey Transit Corporation and driver Renaud Pierrelouis (collectively, NJT), holding that NJT failed to preserve its interstate sovereign immunity defense by raising it before the trial court, and no exception to the general reservation rule applied.Plaintiff was injured while riding on a bus that collided with another vehicle. Plaintiff brought this action seeking damages. A jury found in favor of Plaintiff. Thereafter, NJT moved to set aside the verdict and for a new trial on damages. Supreme Court denied the motion. NJT appealed, arguing for the first time that dismissal was required under the doctrine of interstate sovereign immunity. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals dismissed NJT's ensuing appeal, holding that because NJT's sovereign immunity argument was unpreserved and did not qualify for any exception to the preservation requirement, an appeal as of right did not lie under N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5601(b)(1). View "Henry v. New Jersey Transit Corp." on Justia Law

The United States District Court for the District of New Hampshire certified two questions of law for the New Hampshire Supreme Court's consideration. Plaintiffs, individuals who presently or formerly lived in the Merrimack area, brought tort claims, including negligence, nuisance, trespass, and negligent failure to warn, alleging that defendants’ manufacturing process at its facility in the Town of Merrimack used chemicals that included perfluorooctanoic acid (PFOA). They alleged PFOA was a toxic chemical that was released into the air from the Merrimack facility and has contaminated the air, ground, and water in Merrimack and nearby towns. As a result, plaintiffs alleged the wells and other drinking water sources in those places were contaminated, exposing them to PFOA, placing them at risk of developing health problems, including testicular cancer, kidney cancer, immunotoxicity, thyroid disease, high cholesterol, ulcerative colitis, and pregnancy induced hypertension. The first question from the federal circuit court asked whether New Hampshire recognized “a claim for the costs of medical monitoring as a remedy or as a cause of action” in plaintiffs' context. Depending on the answer to the first question, the second question asked, “what are the requirements and elements of a remedy or cause of action for medical monitoring” under New Hampshire law. Because the Supreme Court answered the first question in the negative, it did not address the second question. View "Brown, et al. v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corporation, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued Defendants for violating his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights by recommending and imposing certain special conditions of post-release supervision that he contends is unconstitutional. The district court declined to grant Defendants summary judgment.   At issue in this appeal is whether a corrections professional who recommended that the Parole Board issue certain special conditions of release is absolutely or qualifiedly immune from claims challenging the constitutionality of those conditions and seeking monetary or injunctive relief.  The Second Circuit reversed and remanded. The court concluded that the Commissioner’s is absolutely immune from Plaintiff’s claims for damages because her challenged acts were quasi-judicial. The court did not address the Offender Rehabilitation Coordinator’s claim of absolute immunity but concluded that she is qualifiedly immune from Plaintiff’s damage claims because the challenged conditions were not clearly unlawful at the time she recommended them.   The court reasoned that to the extent Plaintiff is challenging the delegation of broad authority to the parole officer, the court noted that parole officers are statutorily authorized to impose special conditions. Plaintiff has not cited any law narrowing this authority. In sum, Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that the parole officer’s recommendation of these case-specific conditions violated his clearly established rights. View "Peoples v. Leon, et al." on Justia Law

Cash died when a hammermill shredder exploded at his workplace. The Tennessee Occupational Safety and Health Administration (TOSHA) determined that the explosion was primarily caused by the accumulation of combustible aluminum dust produced by the shredding process. The personal representative of his estate sued REI, the company that assembled and sold the shredder to LR, Cash’s employer, asserting four product-liability claims. The district court granted REI summary judgment, because it “did not design the hammermill system at issue, and instead assisted LR with locating primarily used components that LR requested based on the design of LR’s existing system, REI is not legally responsible for any alleged defect in the system as a whole.”The Sixth Circuit reversed. A key requirement of the contract-specification defense is that the customer provided the manufacturer with detailed plans or specifications directing how the product should be built. The district court erred in holding that no genuine dispute of material fact exists as to whether REI followed LR’s design specifications. There was evidence to suggest that REI contemplated incorporating a dust-collection bin in the design, one that had not been requested. View "Cash-Darling v. Recycling Equipment, Inc." on Justia Law

In July 2019, Plaintiffs Suzanne Farrell and her husband, Joseph Farrell, were traveling to Galveston, Texas, when they stopped to refuel at a Circle K Store in Pineville, Louisiana. While Mr. Farrell pumped gas, Mrs. Farrell decided to take their dog for a walk. She ultimately chose a grassy area located at the edge of the Circle K parking lot. In order to reach this area of grass, Mrs. Farrell had to traverse a pool of water. The water extended approximately the length of a tractor-trailer and was draining to the low spot of the parking lot. Mrs. Farrell walked to the narrowest part of the water—approximately one foot across— and attempted to step over the water. She was unsuccessful, and she fell and sustained personal injury. Mr. and Mrs. Farrell subsequently filed this personal injury lawsuit against Circle K and the City of Pineville. Defendants jointly moved for summary judgment, arguing that they were not liable on the ground that the alleged hazardous condition was open and obvious. Plaintiffs opposed the motion, arguing that the hazard was not the pool of water, but the slippery substance hidden in the water, and that made the hazard not open and obvious. The trial court denied Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, finding “that there exist issues of material fact regarding whether a reasonable person should have seen the mold/mildew/algae/slime present in the water puddle at issue.” The Louisiana Supreme Court disagreed with the district court's decision, reversed and rendered judgment in favor of defendants. View "Farrell v. Circle K Stores, Inc. et al." on Justia Law

The district court awarded damages to plaintiff Lashondra Jones who was allegedly injured when she stepped on a wooden pallet with an attached pallet guard, holding a bulk watermelon bin, to reach a watermelon in the bottom of the bin, and the pallet guard collapsed. Defendant Market Basket Stores, Inc. appealed, and the appellate court reversed the award, finding manifest error in the factual findings of the district court requiring de novo review and concluding that the watermelon display did not present an unreasonable risk of harm to plaintiff. After review, the Louisiana Supreme Court concluded there was no manifest error in the district court’s finding of negligence on the part of the defendant; therefore, the appellate court erred in its ruling. View "Jones v. Market Basket Stores, Inc." on Justia Law

Matthew Morgan, an inmate assigned to the Concordia Parish Correctional Facility and under the supervision of the Sheriff of Concordia Parish, escaped from his trustee work assignment at the Concordia Parish courthouse. Morgan walked to a nearby Wal-Mart parking lot where he attempted to carjack and kidnap Sharon Tisdale. Tisdale was diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder as a result of the incident, and filed suit against Morgan and the Sheriff. Following a trial, the district court found both defendants liable, apportioning 90 percent of the fault to the Sheriff and 10 percent to Morgan. The district court awarded Tisdale $250,000 in general damages. The issue this case presented for the Louisiana Supreme Court's review was whether the district court erred in its apportionment of fault, and whether the court abused its discretion in awarding damages. The Supreme Court determined fault should have been reallocated, decreasing the Sheriff’s fault to 50 percent and increasing Morgan’s fault to 50 percent. However, the Court found no abuse of discretion in the award for general damages. View "Tisdale v. Hedrick, et al." on Justia Law