Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

The relevant consolidated appeals constitute the latest chapter of a long-running legal battle over attempts to satisfy a 2010 default judgment of $318 million under the Anti-Terrorism Act, 18 U.S.C. Section 2333, against the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia or FARC) for murder and kidnapping.   In the first appeal (Case No. 20-11736), Appellant appealed the district court’s orders directing certain garnishees to liquidate and/or distribute their assets to Plaintiffs who obtained the $318 million judgment. In the second appeal(Case No. 20-12467) Appellant appealed the denial of their motion for a preliminary injunction to stop the sale of real property located at 325 Leucadendra Drive in Coral Gables, Florida. In the third appeal(Case No. 20-12545) Appellant’s wife appealed the district court’s denial of her motion to intervene in the proceedings concerning the sale of real property located at 325 Leucadendra Drive (and owned by Leucadendra 325, one of the Appellants in Case Nos. 20-11736 and 20-12467).   In Case No. 20-11736, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that a jury must decide whether Appellant and his companies qualify as agencies or instrumentalities of the FARC such that their assets can be garnished by Plaintiffs to satisfy their $318 million judgment. The court, therefore, reversed and remanded that appeal. In Case No. 20-12467, the court dismissed the appeal as moot because 325 Leucadendra has been sold and the court lacks the ability to grant the requested relief. In Case No. 20- 12545, the court affirmed the district court’s order denying Appellant’s wife’s motion to intervene as untimely and therefore dismiss the appeal. View "Keith Stansell, et al v. UBS Financial Services, Inc., et al" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that because Defendant's conduct did not establish a prima facie case for punitive damages in this negligence case, the trial court erred in granting Plaintiffs' motion to obtain Defendant's financial records.Plaintiffs sued Defendant, alleging negligence under a theory of respondent superior. Plaintiffs filed a "Motion on Prima Facie Case for Punitive Damages" seeking to obtain Defendant's financial records, which the superior court granted. At issue before the Supreme Court was whether the superior court erred in granting Plaintiffs' motion without establishing that Defendant's conduct, if proven, was aggravated or outrageous. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) to establish a prima facie case for punitive damages necessary to justify the discovery of a defendant's financial information a plaintiff must establish that there is a reasonable likelihood that the punitive damages claim will be submitted to the jury; and (2) a punitive damages claim will be submitted to the jury only where there is proof that the defendant’s conduct was either intended to cause harm, motivated by spite or ill will, or outrageous, in which the defendant consciously pursued a course of conduct knowing that it created a substantial risk of significant injury to others. View "Swift Transportation v. Honorable Carman" on Justia Law

Art dealer Inigo Philbrick sold V&A Collection, LLC an ownership interest in artwork by Wade Guyton (the “Guyton”). In a second transaction, made without V&A’s knowledge or participation, Guzzini Properties Ltd. purchased the Guyton, an artwork by Rudolf Stingel (the “Stingel”), and a third painting. Guzzini removed the second action to federal court and then moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. V&A argued that by suing to quiet title to the Stingel in New York state court, Guzzini consented to submit to the jurisdiction of New York courts for all claims arising out of the same agreement.  The district court found that because the two lawsuits did not arise out of the same transaction, Guzzini did not implicitly consent to litigate the dispute over the Guyton in New York.   The Second Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the two key elements of conversion are (1) plaintiff’s possessory right or interest in the property and (2) defendant’s dominion over the property or interference with it, in derogation of plaintiff’s rights. Here, the court explained that V&A’s conversion claim is premised on its assertion that it has “a possessory right to and at least a 50% ownership interest in the Guyton”. These assertions, if satisfactorily established, could allow V&A to prevail on its conversion claim regardless of the outcome of the state court action. Even if the state court declares the June 2017 Agreement void, that would not settle the question of whether V&A had a “possessory right or interest in the property.” Thus, to bring its claim, V&A must find a court able to exercise jurisdiction over Guzzini. View "V&A Collection, LLC v. Guzzini Properties Ltd" on Justia Law

A conservator was appointed after the minor children’s grandmother had already brought a wrongful-death lawsuit on their behalf. The conservator tried in various ways to exercise his litigation powers, with the goal of dismissing the grandmother’s lawsuit and bringing a similar one in a different county. The conservator was eventually joined as an “involuntary plaintiff” in the grandmother’s lawsuit, and his further attempts to gain control of the litigation, in that court and others, were rejected. He appealed several rulings unfavorable to him, but the Court of Appeals concluded that he had forfeited his exclusive power under OCGA § 29-3-22 (a) (6) earlier in the case when he declined to join the grandmother’s case voluntarily and sought its dismissal. The Georgia Supreme Court granted certiorari and held that a conservator who declines to join preexisting litigation voluntarily and seeks to have that litigation dismissed does not thereby forfeit his exclusive power to participate in that litigation after he is joined as a party under OCGA § 9-11- 19 (a). So the Court reversed the Court of Appeals’ contrary holding, vacated the parts of the Court of Appeals’ opinion affected by it, and remanded the case to that court for further proceedings. View "Hall, et al. v. Davis Lawn Care Service, Inc., et al." on Justia Law

Defendant appeals the trial court’s judgment in favor of Plaintiff on her causes of action for wrongful eviction and financial elder abuse. Defendant contends that (1) it was unfairly surprised at trial because the pleadings were inadequate to put LOP on notice of Plaintiff's claims; (2) Plainitiff failed to prove financial elder abuse; (3) the trial court erred in the admission and exclusion of evidence; (4) Plaintiff is not entitled to damages, or alternatively, her damages should be limited; and (5) the award of attorney fees and costs should be reversed. address the adequacy of the pleadings.   The Second Appellate District affirmed the trial court’s judgment, order denying the motion for a new trial, and order awarding Plaintiff attorney fees. The court explained the record demonstrates that Defendant was not misled. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Defendant’s motion for a new trial on this basis. Having argued that refusal to re-rent was the only theory of recovery for wrongful eviction pleaded in the complaint in its summation brief, Defendant cannot contend that it was unfairly surprised or that the cause of action was inadequately pleaded. Further, the court held that the right to re-rent under LAMC Section 151.27 and the Ellis Act is a property right within the meaning of the Elder Abuse Act. Moreover, substantial evidence supports the finding that LOP had fraudulent intent and knew its refusal to re-rent was wrong or harmful to Plaintiff. View "Cameron v. Las Orchidias Properties, LLC" on Justia Law

A Wisconsin newspaper owned by Gannett published an article about Batterman and his business, Financial Fiduciaries, describing a judicial proceeding in which several trust beneficiaries successfully removed Batterman as de facto trustee of a $3 million fund. The court concluded that Batterman violated his fiduciary duties. Although the court did not rule on whether Batterman committed criminal acts, it ordered him to pay the beneficiaries’ litigation expenses because his conduct “amounted to something of bad faith, fraud or deliberate dishonesty.” Batterman sent a retraction letter to the newspaper. Weeks later, the newspaper revised the article but did not remove it. Batterman then sued Gannett for defamation. The district court entered judgment for Gannett, finding that the allegedly defamatory statements were substantially true and protected by Wisconsin’s judicial-proceedings privilege, which protects publishers that report court activity.The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The district court correctly ruled that the only plausible defamation claim in Batterman’s complaint pertained to the implication that he committed elder abuse. The other defamatory statements were substantially true and privileged. Mishandling a deceased person’s estate may not always constitute elder abuse, but a reasonable jury could not conclude that observing the relationship between Batterman’s conduct and elder abuse constituted a false statement. View "Financial Fiduciaries, LLC v. Gannett Co., Inc." on Justia Law

The issue in this appeal is whether respondent Santa Barbara Cottage Hospital (Hospital) can be held liable for the alleged negligence of its staff physician. The physician’s patient, Plaintiff, appealed the judgment entered after the trial court granted Hospital’s motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff claimed that the physician had negligently injured him during surgery performed at Hospital. Plaintiff settled his malpractice action against the physician for $1 million, the maximum coverage under the physician’s professional liability insurance policy.   Based on actual agency and ostensible agency theories, Plaintiff sought to hold Hospital vicariously liable for the physician’s negligence. The Second Appellate District affirmed the judgment in Hospital’s favor. The court explained that for actual agency to exist, the principal must in some manner indicate that the agent is to act for him, and the agent must act or agree to act on his behalf and subject to his control. By producing the “Physician Recruitment Agreement” between Hospital and the physician, Hospital satisfied its initial burden of production as well as its burden of persuasion for summary judgment purposes. In his reply brief Plaintiff alleged, “Because of the extent of [Hospital’s] control over the physician’s practice of medicine, except for how he actually treated patients, the physician was an actual agent of Hospital.” Accordingly, summary judgment was properly granted as to Plaintiff’s claim of actual agency. For summary judgment purposes, Hospital satisfied its initial burden of production as well as its burden of persuasion that the physician was not its ostensible agent. View "Franklin v. Santa Barbara Cottage Hospital" on Justia Law

Kelly Day appealed the district court’s dismissal of the diversity action she filed against SkyWest Airlines for personal injuries she allegedly sustained when a SkyWest flight attendant carelessly struck her with a beverage cart. The district court granted SkyWest’s motion to dismiss the action as preempted under the Airline Deregulation Act (“ADA”), which preempted state laws “related to a price, route, or service of an air carrier.” The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals concurred with sister circuits that personal-injury claims arising out of an airline employee’s failure to exercise due care were not “related to” a deregulated price, route, or service. Therefore, the Court reversed the district court’s dismissal of Day’s action and remanded for further proceedings. View "Day v. SkyWest Airlines" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a middle school student, was brought to school by his mother. He was wearing a hoodie over his head because he was embarrassed of his haircut. When Plaintiff’s mother told him to pull down the hoodie, Plaintiff got upset and a school employee called Defendant, the school resource officer. Defendant spoke with Plaintiff for two minutes before pushing him to the ground, pinning him down, and then pushing him in the back as he walked away. Defendant entered a guilty plea to a criminal battery charge.In this civil case, the district court entered summary judgment in Defendant’s favor on each of Plaintiff’s claims, finding he was entitled to qualified immunity. However, on appeal, the Eleventh Circuit reversed as to the excessive force and battery claims, finding that the force used by Defendant was excessive and that a reasonable jury could find that Defendant acted maliciously. View "Trellus Richmond v. Mario J. Badia" on Justia Law

This case stemmed from the serial fraud of Brandy Murrah, the former owner of a drug-screening laboratory who was in prison for falsifying test results. The plaintiffs, Angel Avendano and Sandy Knowles, claimed to be victims of Murrah's fraud and alleged that social worker Victoria Shaw conspired with Murrah to falsify the results of their drug tests. Shaw moved to dismiss the claims against her, and the circuit court granted that motion. Avendano and Knowles appealed. Because the Alabama Supreme Court concluded that Avendano and Knowles's complaint stated some viable claims against Shaw, it affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Avendano v. Shaw" on Justia Law