Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the trial court granting summary judgment in favor of the City of Tyler and dismissing this personal injury action arising under the Texas Tort Claims Act on the grounds that the trial court lacked jurisdiction, holding that the trial court's jurisdiction was secure.Plaintiff was allegedly injured when he was driving a truck for his employer and an improperly secured piece of lumber flew off a truck owned by the City entered the driver side window and struck Plaintiff in the head. The trial court granted the motion for summary judgment filed by the City, concluding that the trial court lacked jurisdiction because Plaintiff failed timely to provide the City with notice of his claim. View "Leach v. City of Tyler" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued individuals and entities affiliated with the Russian Orthodox Church Outside Russia ("ROCOR" and, collectively, "Defendants") -- for defamation, contending that they defamed him when they publicly accused him of forging a series of letters relating to his appointment as the Bishop of Miami. Defendants moved to dismiss based on the "church autonomy doctrine," arguing that Plaintiff's suit would impermissibly involve the courts in matters of faith, doctrine, and internal church government. The district court denied the motion. Defendants then filed a motion for reconsideration and a motion to limit discovery to the issue of whether the church autonomy doctrine applied or otherwise to stay proceedings. The district court denied those motions as well   The Second Circuit held that it lacks jurisdiction to hear the appeal because the collateral order doctrine does not apply in the circumstances here. Accordingly, the court granted Plaintiff’s July 15, 2021, motion to dismiss. Dismissed the appeal, and vacated the temporary stay granted on September 2, 2021. The court explained that the district court's orders lack the conclusiveness required for appellate jurisdiction under the collateral order doctrine. Likewise, the court concluded that the district court's orders do not involve a claim of right separable from the merits of the action. View "Belya v. Kapral, et al." on Justia Law

Appellants Patricia Flores and Angelica Sanchez appealed after the trial court granted summary judgment in favor defendant City of San Diego (the City). Flores and Sanchez sued the City for wrongful death and negligence, respectively, in connection with the death of William Flores, who was operating a motorcycle that was the subject of a police vehicle pursuit when he crashed and was killed. The City moved for summary judgment on the ground that it was immune from liability under the grant of immunity provided for in Vehicle Code section 17004.7. The Court of Appeal concluded that the vehicle pursuit policy training required by section 17004.7 had to meet certain basic standards that were set forth in California Code of Regulations, title 11, section 1081, as adopted by the Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training (the POST Commission), including an annual one-hour minimum time standard set out in that regulation, before a governmental entity was entitled to immunity under the statute. "Not only did the City fail to present undisputed evidence that the training it provided in the year prior to the incident at issue met the annual one-hour standard, but the City failed to dispute the fact, put forth by appellants, that the training implemented by the City comprised a single video of less than half the required one-hour duration." In the absence of training that met the standards imposed by Regulation 1081, as required by section 17004.7, the City was not entitled to immunity under that statute, as a matter of law. Summary judgment in favor of the City was therefore erroneously granted, and the judgment had to be reversed. View "Flores v. City of San Diego" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court granting summary judgment for Landlord in this action brought by Tenant for damages arising from a bite from a dog owned by another tenant, holding that the circuit court did not err when it granted summary judgment to Landlord as to Tenant's general negligence and negligence per se claims.Tenant commenced this civicl action alleging that Landlord was negligent for failing to exercise ordinary care in the control, management, warning, and care of its property and was negligent per se for owning or keeping a "vicious dog" a public nuisance. See S.D. Codified Laws 40-34-13. The circuit court granted summary judgment for Landlord, noting that Landlord did not have actual knowledge of the animal's dangerous propensities. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court properly granted summary judgment to Landlord on Tenant's claims, nor did it abuse its discretion in denying Tenant's motion under S.D. R. Civ. P. 56(f). View "Davies v. GPHC, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed from the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of a mixed group of domestic and foreign corporations, (collectively, “the defendants”), in a product liability action stemming from a motorcycle accident and allegedly defective helmet. Plaintiff contended that the district court erroneously excluded the testimony of her expert witness, after finding his testimony based on novel and untested theories unreliable.   In the district court proceedings, defendant HJC Corporation (“HJC”), a foreign corporation organized under the laws of, and principally operating within, South Korea, moved separately for summary judgment based on a lack of personal jurisdiction. The district court denied this motion as moot, after granting summary judgment to all the defendants on the merits.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of Defendants’ motion to exclude Plaintiff’s expert’s testimony. Because the district court properly excluded Plaintiff’s expert’s testimony, the court affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendants. The court reversed its denial of HJC’s motion for summary judgment. The court concluded that the district court erred by failing to conduct a veil piercing or alter-ego analysis with respect to HJC and HJCA for personal jurisdiction purposes. The court agreed with HJC that the district court erred by failing to address HJC’s jurisdictional motion before reaching the merits of Defendants’ summary judgment motion. View "Sheila A. Knepfle v. J & P Cycles, LLC, et al" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the appellate court affirming the judgment of the trial court concluding that Defendant's allegedly defamatory statements about Plaintiff made during a hearing before the Greenwich Planning and Zoning Commission were entitled to statutory immunity, holding that the appellate court erred.Plaintiff brought this defamation action seeking to recover damages for injuries he claims to have sustained as a result of Defendant's alleged defamatory statements. The trial court granted Defendant's motion to dismiss, concluding that it did not have jurisdiction over Plaintiff's claims because the statements Defendant made about Plaintiff at the commission's hearing were entitled to absolute immunity because the hearing constituted a quasi-judicial proceeding. The appellate court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) a hearing on a special permit application before a town's planning and zoning commission is not quasi-judicial in nature; and (2) therefore, the appellate court erroneously determined that Defendant's statements were entitled to absolute immunity. View "Priore v. Haig" on Justia Law

Under California law, the Privette doctrine holds that there is a strong presumption that a hirer of an independent contractor delegates to the contractor all responsibility for workplace safety. SMC Contracting, Inc. (SMC) hired Tyco Simplex Grinnell, Inc. (Tyco) to install an automatic fire sprinkler system for a development in South Lake Tahoe. On one date during installation, a Tyco employee, Tommy Ray McCullar, arrived at work and found the floor covered in ice. While trying to use a ladder on the ice, he slipped and suffered injuries. McCullar later sued SMC based on these events. But the trial court, relying on the Privette doctrine, granted summary judgment in SMC’s favor. Challenging this decision on appeal, McCullar’s contended the Privette doctrine did not protect SMC because SMC retained control over Tyco’s work and negligently exercised this control in a way that affirmatively contributed to his injuries. That was so, he reasoned, because SMC caused the ice to form on the floor and then told him to go back to work after he notified it about the ice. Based on the Privette doctrine, and because McCullar failed to raise a triable issue of material fact, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "McCullar v. SMC Contracting, Inc." on Justia Law

Appellant was working as a bus ticketing agent in Washington, D.C. when a person attempted to sneak onto a bus headed to New York without a ticket. After Appellant ordered the person off the bus the two women got into a scuffle. District of Columbia Metropolitan Police officers arrived in response to the unticketed person’s call reporting Appellant for assault.   Officers grabbed Appellant, pressed her against the wall, and then forced her to the floor and handcuffed her. The police charged her with simple assault on the person attempting to get on the bus and with assaulting a police officer while resisting arrest. Appellant subsequently sued the District of Columbia and the police officers, alleging civil rights violations during this arrest and a second arrest that occurred in April 2016. She appealed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the District and its officers.   The DC Circuit agreed in part and reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment for the District and its officers on Appellant’s 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 wrongful arrest, common law false arrest, and respondeat superior claims. The court affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment as to Appellant’s other claims. The court explained that the district court erred in granting summary judgment to the District on Appellant’s wrongful arrest and common law false arrest claims because there is a genuine dispute of material fact over whether probable cause for the simple assault arrest had dissipated and required the police officers to release Appellant. View "Xingru Lin v. DC (PUBLIC)" on Justia Law

Plaintiff fell victim to a massive Ponzi scheme. Plaintiff sued JP Morgan and Richter Consulting. Plaintiff’s principal theory is that these firms aided and abetted fraud. And even if they did not, the complaint alleges that the transfers to JP Morgan were fraudulent.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Plaintiff's complaint. The court explained that early on, JP Morgan agreed to pay over $30 million to settle a group of claims filed by the trustees. To protect the settlement, two courts issued bar orders preventing creditors like Plaintiff from asserting any claims that belong or belonged to one or more of the bankruptcy trustees. Those orders, along with general bankruptcy-standing doctrine, prevent Plaintiff from pursuing JP Morgan separately. The same goes for the fraudulent-transfer claims against JP Morgan.   Further, Plaintiff’s aiding-and-abetting claim against Richter Consulting under New York law cannot move forward either, but for a different reason. The court explained that viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the allegations in the complaint describe no more than constructive knowledge of the fraud. View "Ritchie Spec. Cred. Investments v. JPMorgan Chase & Co." on Justia Law

Robert Owen died 11 days after being transferred from Huntsville Hospital to the University of Alabama at Birmingham Hospital ("UAB Hospital") for cardiac treatment. His widow Gloria Owen, as the personal representative of his estate, sued the ambulance company that had transported him, Huntsville Emergency Medical Services, Inc. ("HEMSI"), as well as HEMSI employees Jacob Steele, Calvin Hui, Christopher Nunley, and Dea Calce, alleging that events that occurred during Robert's transport had "caused him unnecessary stress, worry, concern, anxiety, and/or a delay in treatment," leading to further heart damage and his eventual death. During discovery, Gloria sought information from the HEMSI defendants about the previous conduct and employment record of Steele, a licensed emergency medical technician ("EMT") and the assigned driver of the HEMSI ambulance that transported Robert. The HEMSI defendants objected to Gloria's requests and sought a protective order, arguing that the Alabama Medical Liability Act ("the AMLA") governed her claims and prohibited discovery related to any acts and omissions of a defendant that were not specifically described in the complaint. The circuit court rejected the HEMSI defendants' request for a protective order and directed them to produce the requested discovery; they petitioned the Alabama Supreme Court for mandamus relief, specifically a writ directing the trial court to amend its order to give effect to what they claimed were the applicable privilege and discovery protections of the AMLA. The Supreme Court granted the petition in part, and denied in part. The Court held all claims asserted by Gloria in this action were governed by the AMLA and subject to the limitations on discovery imposed by § 6-5-551. To the extent that the trial court's October 2021 order did not give effect to the § 6-5-551 privilege, the HEMSI defendants' petition was granted and the trial court was directed to modify that order. But to the extent the HEMSI defendants sought to prevent Gloria from discovering information regarding acts or omissions that were specifically alleged and described in her complaint, their petition was denied. View "Ex parte Huntsville Emergency Medical Services, Inc., et al." on Justia Law